USA(3) - Decisive force

PART ONE
Background
Commanders employ forces within the three states (peacetime, conflict, and
war) of the theater strategic environment. Army commanders, particularly at the
operational level, operate with other services, government agencies, United
Nations (UN) agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), private voluntary
organizations (PVOs), and multinational partners. These unified operations—joint,
multinational, and interagency efforts— require a thorough understanding of Army
capabilities as they contribute to the unified structure. Combatant commands and
theaters form the unified structure for this organizational environment. A combatant
command is one of the unified or specified commands established by the
President. A theater is the geographical area outside the continental United States
(CONUS) for which a commander of a unified command has been assigned
military responsibility. Combatant commanders conduct unified operations.
To discuss the US Army in theater operations at the operational level of war,
commanders must understand the theater strategic and operational environment.
To do that, they must understand the fundamentals that define that strategic
environment and how the application of those fundamentals affects Army
operations. Chapter 1 discusses planning and execution of major operations,
operational art, operations in war, and military operations other than war
(MOOTW). Chapter 2 describes the national and theater strategic environments
and provides a means to assess Army operations at the operational level.
Chapter 3 examines how the commander in chief (CINC) and the Army service
component commander (ASCC) apply operational art and design. Operational art
and design are the linkage between execution of tactical operations and campaign
plans to obtain strategic objectives in theater. These chapters provide the basis
necessary for understanding Army operations at the operational level.
Chapter 1
Decisive Victory
In peacetime, conflict, and war, the Army is the nation’s
predominant decisive land force. Whenever the Army is called upon,
it fights to win and operates to achieve decisive results at minimum
cost to life and treasure. Army forces (ARFOR) in combat seek to
impose their will on the enemy. In MOOTW, they seek to create, set,
or control conditions to achieve their purpose. The standard is to
achieve the military commander’s end state within the strategic end
state articulated by the National Command Authorities (NCA).
PLANNING AND EXECUTION
In today’s global-based, force-projection ever-increasing threats and instabilities. Still,
Army, planning and executing major the opportunities for peace, growth, and
operations to support a theater campaign is a stability are evident. Army capabilities to
formidable task. The theater strategic succeed in leveraging the environment
environment is uncertain and dynamic, with consistent with national policy and strategy is
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the key. Commanders at all levels must
organize, resource, train, and employ their
forces to be the decisive force when and where
required. The Army operational-level
commander’s challenge is to shape the military
environment and set the conditions for decisive
results or victory—unqualified success in all
major operations, whether in peacetime,
conflict, or war. This chapter is synchronized
with Joint Pubs 1, 0-2, 3-0, 4-0, and 5-0;
multiservice publications (FMFM 1, NDP 1,
AFM 1); and Army FMs 100-1 and 100-5.
THEATER CAMPAIGN
The theater campaign is the focus of army
operations in war, conflict, or peacetime. It is
linked to a theater strategy. The campaign is a
series of related and integrated major
operations with strategic, operational, and
tactical complementary actions simultaneously
and sequentially arranged to accomplish
national strategic, theater strategic, and
operational objectives within a given time and
space. The campaign plan describes the
conduct of air, land, sea, space, and special
operations. If appropriate, it also includes
interagency operations, NGOs and PVOs, and
multinational operations, often in relation to
UN actions. To win rapidly and decisively, both
combat and noncombat operations occur
simultaneously throughout the combatant
commander’s campaign space and the
operational-level commander’s battle space
and against the enemy’s theater depths.
In wartime, a broadly conceived theater
campaign plan normally involves the
employment of large unified and joint forces. A
single, unifying strategic concept of operations
synchronizes the actions taken at each level of
war against the enemy’s depth. The intent is to
concentrate strategically the decisive force,
simultaneously destroying and disrupting key
enemy capabilities and functions, and
exploiting the resultant strategic advantage
and initiative before the enemy can react.
Achieving the theater strategic objectives,
while striving to incur minimum casualties, is
the measure of success.
Other campaigns may also be broad in
scope but usually call for smaller forces and
may include UN forces as well as other
international agencies, NGOs, PVOs,
Government agencies. Also based on
and US
theater
strategies, these campaigns involve a series of
integrated operations with strategic aims at
international, national, and theater levels. The
intent is to establish and maintain the desired
military conditions while employing a wide
range of military and nonmilitary capabilities
to achieve theater strategic and operational
objectives.
Campaigns covering the full range of
military operations demand plans with sound
linkages between theater strategy, the
campaign plan, and major operations plans.
The theater campaign must include forwarddeployed
forces and force-projection forces
involved in peacetime engagement— for
example, the Partnership for Peace Program,
multilateral training, meetings—all part of the
CINC’s strategy.
THEATER STRATEGY, CAMPAIGN,
AND MAJOR
OPERATIONS LINKAGES
The vital linkage between national and
theater strategic direction and the tactical
employment of forces on the battlefield takes
place in major operational-level planning. The
theater strategy and campaign relate the ends,
ways, and means of national strategy to the
outcomes, methods, and resources for
operational activities. Translating national,
alliance, or coalition guidance, the theater
commander devises theater strategic
objectives, concepts, and resource implications
for a broad range of activities in the theater,
including provisions for both war and MOOTW.
The theater strategy is the foundation for the
campaign plan and forms the framework for
the employment of forces.
With the outbreak of crisis or, more
optimally, in anticipation of an outbreak, the
CINC modifies portions of his strategy and
campaign and, when necessary, develops a new
campaign plan. His critical tasks are to identify
the military operations that will achieve the
desired military end state, thereby
contributing to conditions for achieving the
strategic end state. The military end state
normally represents the conditions the CINC
wants the campaign to achieve and is reflected
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in his mission statement, concept, and intent.
The NCA normally directs the military to
support other elements of national power to
achieve a strategic end state that may be
broader in scope than the necessary military
end state. The intent of the CINC to meet the
necessary military end state must be nested
inside the broader intent of the NCA. Within
the theater of war and theaters of operations,
the CINC’s campaign plan supports the
strategic intent, concepts, and objectives.
Operational-level commanders set the
conditions for tactical plans and support the
campaign with operational intents, concepts,
and objectives. Commanders at the tactical
level ensure their intents, concepts, and
objectives are nested within those of the
operational-level commander. Regardless of
level, Army commanders consider the objective
factors of mission, enemy, terrain, troops-time
available (METT-T) in their battle space to
achieve dominance over the enemy and to
protect the force.
MAJOR OPERATIONS
Commanders of major operations require a
fundamental understanding of the principles of
planning. Operational and tactical planning
share the same basic, self-evident
requirements—a complete definition of the
mission, clarity of the commander’s intent,
thoroughness of estimates, and sound concepts
of operations. At the operational level, the
imperative is to remain capable of responding
to continually changing conditions. These
principles assist operational-level planners
significantly.
Mission
To the Army operational-level commander,
a mission is more than expressing what the
unit must accomplish and for what purpose. In
analyzing the mission, he considers his
superiors’ intent and the battle space and
anticipates the missions that could logically
follow from the mission in the campaign plan.
Anticipating and staying ahead of change
requires the operational-level commander to
continuously reassess the stated mission in
light of changing strategic and operational
conditions. Subordinates still require clear,
understandable statements of mission and
intent before and during battle. In assigning
missions, commanders consider that nested
concepts contribute to the unified effort and
dominance of the enemy.
Estimates
Just as at the tactical level, the
operational-level commander’s continuous
estimate assists commanders in choosing the
best course of action (COA) and in making
adjustments to changing situations during
execution. Commanders first consider the
enemy’s capabilities, his likely intent and COA,
and wargame friendly alternatives to get from
the current friendly state to the desired
military end state. Once a commander selects a
COA, he articulates the operational concept—a
description of his vision for the operation. He
also begins to formulate ways to support the
CINC’s plan to keep the public informed of the
campaign, thereby gaining its understanding
and support. The result of the estimate is an
accurate assessment of the current enemy and
friendly situation, a refined understanding of
the mission, and a clear expression of
alternatives, which is the basis for the rest of
the plan.
Estimates never stop. Operational-level
commanders continually review the situation
by—
•Visiting subordinates and getting their
estimates
•Observing operations.
•Meeting with higher and adjacent
commanders.
•Receiving updated intelligence and
information about support efforts.
Commanders revise their concepts
accordingly. During the execution of the plan,
they may adjust the operation. Estimates
include changes in military and strategic
conditions as a basis for future missions.
Further consideration of estimates is
important for resource allocation changes,
particularly in support operations.
Commander’s Intent
After mission analysis, the operationallevel
commander clearly describes the
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operation’s purpose, the desired end state, the
degree of acceptable risk, and the method of
unifying focus for all subordinate elements.
The operational-level commander’s intent
contains the intent statement of the next senior
commander in the chain of command. The
commander’s intent is meant to be a constant
reference point for subordinates to discipline
their efforts. It helps them focus on what they
have to do to achieve success, even under
changed conditions when plans and concepts
no longer apply. For major operations, a clear
statement of intent is essential to successful
integration and synchronization of effort,
including support operations throughout the
depth of the battle space.
Concept of Operations
The concept of operations describes how a
commander visualizes the major operation
unfolding. The concept is based on the selected
COA to accomplish the mission, expressing
what, where, and how the various subordinate
operations will affect the enemy. The concept
addresses the sequence and timing of events
most likely to produce the desired end state.
Support, in particular, can be a dominant
factor in the determination of the nature and
tempo of operations. Operational-level
commanders answer these questions—what,
where, and how—in sufficient detail for the
staff and subordinate commanders to
understand what they are to do, how they are
to fight, and how they are to provide support for
the fight. In the concept of operations,
subordinate commanders describe how they
see the actions of each unit fitting together to
accomplish the mission. They describe their
view of probable enemy actions and how they
plan to defeat the enemy. The operational-level
commander ensures that his concept is
consistent with his intent, the intent of the
CINC, and
campaign.
OPERATIONAL ART
The subordinate commanders’ application
of operational art begins with understanding
the theater strategic concept and guidance
about the military end state. As strategic
realities tend to constrain the strategic
possibilities, the guidance also limits
operational-level possibilities. Directly stated,
strategic guidance allows the operational-level
commander to proceed along clear lines in
planning an operational concept to support a
desired military end state.
the strategic purpose of the
Every subordinate campaign or operation
plan (O-PLAN) requires an overarching
operational concept. The subordinate joint
force commander (JFC) is normally responsible
for the concept—an idea that is initially a
product of the higher commander’s intent,
mission analysis, personal estimate of the
situation, and creative imagination and
intuitive judgment. Initially, it exists only in
his mind. Yet, the operational concept must be
clearly articulated relative to the conditions in
which it will apply. No finite set of principles
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exists to help in formulating an operational
concept, but history has validated the
application of several key military notions or
concepts.
Three commonly used concepts are center
of gravity, lines of operations, and decisive
points. Center of gravity usually relates to the
main enemy force or capability. The concept of
center of gravity is useful as a tool to analyze
enemy strengths and vulnerabilities. By
identifying and controlling decisive points,
commanders gain a marked advantage over the
enemy and can influence the outcome of an
action. A line of operation connecting a force
with its base of operations is useful for focusing
the effects of combat power toward a desired
outcome. A commander who uses more than
one line of operation produces flexibility and
creates opportunities for success. By applying
all three concepts, either separately or in
concert, the commander forms a concept to set
conditions for operations and battles with
conclusive, and sometimes, decisive results.
Other useful theoretical concepts include
culminating point, synergy, simultaneity and
depth, anticipation, leverage, tempo, direct
versus indirect approach, and termination.
In developing the concept, operationallevel
commanders should consider alternatives
that lead to decisive operations and battles.
These operations are key to determining the
outcome of engagements, battles, and major
operations. Many other operations support
decisive operations. For example, two
supporting ground battles, an interdiction
operation, and a deception operation all could
support a separate, decisive ground battle
during a single phase of a campaign.
Commanders at all levels provide focus by
designating the main effort and supporting
efforts, which help set priorities, determine
risks, and unify the effort. The operationallevel
commander focuses by applying structure
to the theater of war and his area of
responsibility (AOR). Structure is a product of
the strategic objectives, forces allocated for the
theater, a concept for their employment, the
factors of METT-T, and the presence of alliance
or coalition structures.
Thinking more broadly and outside the
structure, the commander synchronizes major
actions within his battle space. The
operational-level operating systems—
movement and maneuver, fires, protection,
battle command, intelligence, and combat
service support (CSS)— are logical ways for
commanders to describe systematically the
integration of functions that occurs in each
phase of the campaign plan within a given
battle space.
OPERATIONS IN WAR
The Army operational-level commander
dominates land combat to provide decisive
results for the CINC. He recommends force
projection into theaters; links strategy and
campaigns to major operations and tactics
through battle dynamics (described later in
this chapter); integrates assigned and
supporting joint capabilities effectively; and
transitions smoothly from crisis back to
peacetime. The Army operational-level
commander also understands all aspects of the
CINC’s intent. More than merely
comprehending the Army or land force role in
the joint operation, he understands the
planning considerations of the other service
operational-level commanders and ensures a
mutual understanding and contribution to the
accomplishment of all subordinate missions.
He also realizes that the joint team shares
limited resources. The CINC’s vision for the
campaign provides direction for the allocation
of these limited resources. Most significantly,
the Army operational-level commander
recognizes that theater success requires more
than the success of a single service component;
it requires unified success of the joint team, as
directed by the CINC.
FORCE PROJECTION AND
EARLY ENTRY
Power projection is the ability of the US to
apply any combination of economic, diplomatic,
informational, or military instruments of
national power. An effective power-projection
capability serves to deter potential adversaries,
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conduct joint, multinational, and interagency
operations anywhere in the world from
CONUS or forward-deployed locations.
Ensuring the projection of lethal force
worldwide represents the operational-level
commander’s most critical and difficult task.
This task is essential because power projection
forms a central element of the US National
Security Strategy. This task is challenging
because it requires the operational-level
commander to deploy limited forces thousands
of miles and conduct a high-stakes, come-asyou-
are operation. The importance of the
anticipation, balance, and timing of offensive
operations represents three critical forceprojection
considerations.
Anticipation
The operational-level commander improves
his ability to project decisive force through
anticipation. Predeployment and deployment
decisions are crucial. Made under conditions of
great uncertainty and friction, these decisions
influence the success of entry, combat, and
postconflict operations. Once made, the
decisions are most often irretrievable. The
operational-level commander improves these
early decisions by anticipating alert and
deployment. Anticipation also plays a key role
throughout the deployment. Time remains a
critical resource, while ambiguity and
uncertainty continue to cloud the environment.
Continuous force tracking, total asset
visibility, and continuous intelligencepreparation-
of-the-theater enable the
operational-level commander to anticipate
changes and maximize his freedom of action.
Balance
The most difficult predeployment decisions
in support of the campaign plan concern force
mix and balance. The operational-level
commander must resolve requirements for
quick, decisive victory with strategic
constraints and uncertainty. Initially, he must
seek a balance in joint capabilities instead of a
balanced ARFOR. He will want to deploy
credible, lethal forces early, but limited
strategic lift, undeveloped theater
infrastructure, and time constraints may
prevent him from doing so. Conversely, he may
require the maximum amount of combat power
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at the cost
CINC can
of logistical support. Either way, the
seldom afford duplicate capabilities
among elements of the joint team. Maritime air
and amphibious capabilities, naval gunfire,
and fleet ballistic missiles represent lethal
force often available to support early entry
operations. These or other forward-presence
forces may protect the lodgment, deter enemy
attack, or initiate limited offensive operations
if conditions limit the early entry of fully
balanced Army combat power. The operationallevel
commander must exploit forwardpresence
forces; split-based operations; and
host nation, coalition, and joint assets to
balance early entry capabilities.
Timing
The operational-level commander also
faces a critical decision as he plans the
transition to offensive operations. Early entry
units may initially secure the lodgment as
additional forces arrive. However, American
operations doctrine and the situation will
prevent long-term defensive operations. The
operational-level commander must decide
when he has sufficient combat capability to
transition to offensive operations. He must also
consider other joint capabilities that
complement Army force projection
characteristics. He must apply the CINC’s
intent and guidance to evaluate trade-offs
between the time required to assemble
overwhelming combat force and the benefits of
early offensive action against an enemy that is
consolidating gains or preparing for offensive
action. The preferred model remains Operation
Just Cause, which emphasized overwhelming
and paralyzing the enemy through decisive,
simultaneous strikes throughout the depth of
the battle space. This action resulted in
minimal losses and rapid strategic conclusion.
BATTLE DYNAMICS
WITHIN THE THEATER
Operational art links success in tactical
engagements and battles with strategic aims.
The aspects of battle dynamics establish this
relationship: battle command; battle space;
depth and simultaneous attack; early entry,
lethality, and survivability; and CSS. Although
FM 100-5 describes each of these dynamics,
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5 is the first document
that codifies the elements of battle dynamics.
Battle Command
Battle command describes one dimension
of the linkage among strategy, operations, and
tactics. Battle command is a commander’s
mental decision-making frame work. The
attributes of battle command—assigning
missions, prioritizing and allocating resources,
assessing and taking risks, guiding and
motivating the organization—contribute to
positive impact on commanders at critical
points in the battle or on the battlefield.
Commanders visualize current and future
states of friendly and enemy forces and then
formulate concepts of operation to accomplish
the mission. The Army operational-level
commander faces unique responsibilities in
this area. Time constraints and requirements
during force projection strain the process of
translating theater strategy and design into
operational design and tactical objectives. The
Army operational-level commander may
proceed through the first iteration of the
estimate process concurrently with the CINC
and subordinate Army commanders.
Consequently, the CINC may not fully develop
and communicate his strategy in military
terms early enough to support parallel
planning. The Army operational-level
commander must translate nonmilitary
theater end states into clear military objectives
to support the planning of his staff and
subordinate commands.
Battle Space
Battle space characterizes another facet of
the linkage among the levels of war. It
represents the domain in which commanders
conduct their operations at the tactical,
operational, and theater strategic levels. The
Army operational-level commander’s battle
space forms a subset of the CINC’s and
contains the battle space of all subordinate
commanders. Its physical volume expands or
contracts in relation to the Army operationallevel
commander’s ability to acquire and
engage the enemy. It includes the breadth,
depth, and height in which he positions and
moves assets over time. It also reflects the
capabilities of the intelligence systems that
support him and the deep operations
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capabilities of the units and systems that
support his command. The Army operationallevel
commander’s battle space may extend
beyond his operations area, and it may not be
contiguous. It also extends back to CONUS, to
include the deployment and logistical systems
that support Army operations in theater.
Depth and Simultaneous Attack
Depth and simultaneous attack reinforce
the linkage among strategy, operations, and
tactics. The operational-level commander
supports the CINC’s aims by dominating the
opponent in his battle space through depth and
simultaneous attack. The operational-level
commander cannot maximize depth through
unilateral action. To achieve it, he must link
the levels of war by augmenting his intelligence
and deep operations systems with joint
capabilities. The operational-level commander
also joins the levels of war through
simultaneous attack. His efforts to achieve
simultaneity concentrate the effects of
engagements, battles, and major operations in
the dimension of time. Resulting concurrent
operations at all levels of war increase the
requirement for tightly integrated activities.
Application of depth and simultaneous attack
blurs the boundaries among tactics, operations,
and strategy.
Early Entry, Lethality,
and Survivability
Early entry forces are those operational
deploying forces required to support the CINC
or other JFC concepts of operations in a
precrisis or crisis situation. Early entry forces
must be able to deploy rapidly, enter the
operational area, and secure the lodgment.
They must either immediately have a decisive
effect or create conditions for the arrival of
substantial follow-on forces that can then
conduct decisive operations. Early entry forces
must consist of lethal and survivable units
tailored to support or carry out the operational
intent of the JFC.
Combat Service Support
The functions of CSS have not changed in
many centuries. Logisticians have and will
continue to have similar requirements to arm,
fuel, fix, move, and sustain soldiers and their
systems. The primary differences are in the
execution of the support provided. These
differences are a result of diplomatic, economic,
social, and technological changes. Successful
armies recognize and adapt to this change,
harness it to their benefit, and are ultimately
victorious.
Rapid force projection from CONUS,
extended lines of communication (LOCs), and
potential forcible entry into logistically barebased
areas of operations (AOs) require Army
development of a CSS system that is versatile,
deployable, and expansible. The CSS system
must be as capable as the joint and
multinational forces, to include the SOF, it
supports. The CSS system must include both
the deployed force and the sustainment base.
Its purpose must be to maintain readiness and
sustain ARFOR in all operations across the
range of military operations and at all levels of
war—strategic, operational and tactical. The
focus of the CSS system must continue to be
soldiers and their weapons systems.
INTEGRATION OF JOINT
CAPABILITIES
The operational-level commander plays a
critical role in integrating joint capabilities. He
understands all aspects of the CINC’s intent
and recognizes the importance of unity of
effort. These two abilities underpin the concept
of integrated joint capabilities. The
operational-level commander integrates joint
capabilities during the land phase of joint
operations and as a service component
commander reinforcing other members of the
joint team.
The operational-level commander is the
primary coordinator and integrator of joint
capabilities during decisive land operations.
The CINC seeks combinations of forces and
actions to achieve concentration in various
dimensions throughout all phases of the
campaign. During the decisive phase of joint
operations, the operational-level commander
becomes the integrator of joint capabilities
within his battle space. During this phase, the
CINC coordinates the availability of resources
and integrates supporting joint force
operations elsewhere in the theater. The
operational-level commander synchronizes the
actions of theater intelligence assets, naval
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gunfire and fleet ballistic missiles, air
interdiction, close air support (CAS), joint
electronic warfare assets, SOF, and other joint
and national assets. He and his staff must
exploit the capabilities of these resources.
The operational-level commander also
integrates joint operations indirectly through
the support of other services. He contributes to
the integration of operations in which the
CINC assigns him support missions. The
attack of enemy air defenses to support air
operations and the attack of small enemy naval
vessels in support of maritime operations
during the Gulf War are two examples of this.
The operational-level commander also seeks
opportunities to integrate his capabilities into
the operations of the other members of the joint
force. He understands the planning
considerations of air, maritime, and SOF and
seeks opportunities to contribute to unity of
effort and the accomplishment of other service
missions.
TRANSITION TO PEACETIME OR WAR
The operational-level commander
considers postconflict operations early in the
planning process. They fall in two broad
categories:
•Actions to restore order and normal social
activities following armed conflict.
•Operations to
readiness levels.
Early decisions
reestablish precrisis
concerning mobilization
and deployment establish conditions for critical
postconflict operations. Long-term solutions to
regional crises usually require more than the
defeat of the enemy’s military. The operationallevel
commander develops plans for conflict
termination and postconflict operations early.
He reviews them as branches and sequels to
deployment and combat operations and plans
for simultaneous combat. ARFOR assist the
JFC in supporting the host nation with
operations to handle refugees, clear minefield
for immediate tactical purposes, control
prisoners of war, provide humanitarian
assistance, and provide other forms of support.
Nonmilitary considerations often require the
initiation of these MOOTW before the
completion of combat operations.
Once the conflict ends, forces may deploy to
their home stations or to another theater. The
operational-level commander must plan for
this possibility. He must expect the NCA to
alert his forces, as in precrisis operations. His
forces must be versatile enough to transition
rapidly from one regional conflict to another.
Once forces return to their home stations, they
rapidly reestablish premobilization levels of
readiness in anticipation of future operations.
MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR
The Army operational-level commander’s
role in MOOTW is critical to achieving
strategic success. Like the decisive phase of
combat, most of these operations are landbased.
Consequently, the Army operationallevel
commander functions as the central
integrator of a joint and multinational team.
He faces ambiguous threats, unpredictable
conflicts, ad hoc staffs, and force packages, as
well as a multitude of nonmilitary participants.
The operational-level commander prepares for
a mission of unknown duration and anticipates
changes in its nature and scope. To ensure
success, he applies operational art executed
within the framework of battle dynamics. He
achieves his desired end state by carefully
planning, integrating complementary
capabilities, and using versatile forces.
Transitions may have no clear division
between combat and peacetime activities, may
lack definable timetables for transferring
responsibilities, and may be conducted in a
fluid, increasingly diplomatic environment.
JTF Andrew coordinated with many
federal, state, and private organizations. These
included the Federal Emergency Management
Agency, the Civil Air Patrol, the American Red
Cross, the General Services Administration,
the Public Health Service, the Department of
Agriculture, the Salvation Army, the Boy
Scouts of America, and many religious relief
organizations. The commander of JTF Andrew
determined that victory would be achieved
when the local schools reopened. This had a
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significant focusing effect on the efforts of DOD
and non-DOD participants and answered the
question, “How do I know when I am done?”
This disaster-relief effort demonstrated
the versatility of the US armed forces. The
training for war that developed initiative,
ingenuity, and flexibility in the conduct of
operations served the nation well in a
noncombat situation. The alert of the 10th
Mountain Division for Somalia less than six
weeks after sending more than 6,000 soldiers
and their equipment to south Florida further
highlights their versatility.
PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
Military decision making and planning
processes also apply to MOOTW. The
operational-level commander faces unique
planning considerations because of the nature
of MOOTW. Areas that require special
planning considerations include interagency
cooperation, parallel and continuous planning,
intelligence, and constraints and restraints
placed on the operation.
Gaining cooperation among the multitude
of participants is a formidable task. The
operational-level commander unifies the
efforts of all participants operating within his
battle space by attempting to reach agreement
on common goals and objectives. Consensus on
goals and objectives requires an understanding
of the roles, missions, and capabilities of each
participating member. Additionally, both
national and international representatives of
the media will likely cover the operation.
Facilitating their mission keeps the service
member, the local populace, and the
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international community apprised of the
situation and may contribute to the
achievement of national aims and objectives.
Parallel planning is essential. Ideally, this
begins with the NCA decision to commit
military forces. The uncertainty surrounding
the mission requires commanders to
simultaneously begin planning at all levels.
Parallel planning provides planners with the
ability to influence task organizations, mission
statements, and force caps and obtain access to
critical strategic intelligence early in the
planning process. The operational-level
commander must participate in the
development of end states, conditions, and
measures of effectiveness (MOEs). He must
understand the diplomatic, economic, and
social objectives of the operation before
determining the military end state and
sequencing operations to achieve it. Clarity of
mission and desired end state is critical.
Intelligence is the key to force protection.
The Army operational-level commander
acquires and disseminates information on the
country, the people, and the diplomatic,
economic, and military situations. Key items of
information are shared with members of
participating civilian organizations, who in
turn can be vital sources of intelligence.
Continuous access to strategic intelligence and
reliable low-level sources is paramount to
situational awareness. The viability of the
rules of engagement (ROE) are assessed
continuously with the current mission, friendly
force capability, threat conditions, and
environment within which operations are
conducted. ROE protect the force and also
provide a framework within which hostile acts
are controlled.
The Army operational-level commander
must conduct a continuous estimate process.
He operates in a dynamic environment.
Changes in strategic objectives, operational
constraints, or the nature of the threat are
three examples that may invalidate the initial
mission analysis. Operations, intelligence,
deployment, engineer, and logistics estimates
are constantly updated as new information
becomes available. The commander’s
continuous estimate process serves to integrate
the parallel planning and estimate processes
ongoing in each functional area.
The operational-level commander obtains
clear, strategic guidance on constraints and
restraints early in the planning phase. He
determines his authority and capability to
enforce local laws and assesses restraints on
weaponry, tactics, and levels of violence.
Excessive force could impede the attainment of
operational goals and hamper the efforts to
maintain legitimacy and obtain international
acceptance. Disciplined forces, measured
responses, and patience are essential to
successful outcomes.
INTEGRATION OF COMPLEMENTARY
CAPABILITIES
The operational-level commander
integrates and synchronizes complementary
capabilities within his battle space.
Establishing cooperation among many
participants is demanding; integrating their
capabilities is even more so. The simultaneous
application of complementary strengths,
concurrently conducted at all levels, provides
the necessary leverage to achieve the desired
end state. The key to developing this leverage
is the ability to establish unity of military and
civilian efforts. Without a formal interagency
command structure, commanders ensure unity
of effort through leadership. They must
demonstrate the logic and soundness of their
solutions and the competence of their
execution. Robust liaison is critical in this role.
Providing assistance to other participants
promotes integration of their unique
capabilities. Operational-level commanders
enhance their integration efforts by—
•Collocating their headquarters with local
and regional governments.
•Establishing a civil-military operations
centers.
•Aligning military and diplomatic
boundaries.
By planning, implementing, and
continuously updating a complementary joint
and interagency concept, operational-level
commanders integrate diplomatic, military,
and economic power across all dimensions of
the environment.
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Chapter 1
TRANSITION TO WAR
OR OTHER OPERATIONS
The operational-level commander plans
MOOTW anticipating the requirement to
transition to another, similar operation or even
war. The experiences of the 10th Mountain
Division (Light Infantry) during 1992 and 1993
set the precedent. MOOTW require flexible
leaders with versatile forces. The operationallevel
commander must be able to address a
wide array of missions against a multitude of
diverse threats. His versatile force must be
capable of fighting and winning our nation’s
wars, yet it must be fully capable of
transitioning from warfighting to other
operations. Rapid changes in the strategic
situation may force sequential commitment
from one theater to another; while changes
within the same theater may require a
transition from one type of operation to
another. Activities such as nation assistance,
humanitarian support, and disaster-relief
operations may continue when higher levels of
violence arise. Commitments to MOOTW may
precede combat, follow combat, or flow readily
back and forth between the two.
MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS
Throughout history, military operations
have been conducted with armed forces of
several nations in pursuit of common
objectives. The changing world environment
dictates that future operations will most likely
require multinational involvement.
An operation conducted by forces of two or
more nations is termed a multinational
operation. An operation conducted by forces of
two or more nations in a formal arrangement is
called and alliance operation. An operation
where the military action is temporary or
informal is called a coalition operation.
Campaigns and major operations may be
conducted within the context of an alliance,
coalition, or other international arrangement.
Such operations, whether or not they involve
combat, are planned through both
international and US channels. In practice,
each coalition operation is unique. Planning
and conduct of the operations vary with the
international situation and the composition of
the forces. Alliance or coalition members may
not have identical strategic perspectives, but
there should be sufficient harmony of interests
to ensure a common purpose for the campaign.
The need to maintain consensus within the
unified effort.
Multinational operations require close
cooperation among all forces. Capabilities will
often differ substantially among national
forces, but higher considerations of national
prestige will often be as important to the final
success as the contributions to the overall
effort. Seemingly small decisions, such as
national composition of the main effort, may
have significant consequences for the outcome
of the operation. Members should be consulted
on their recommendations for COA
development, ROE, and assignment of
missions.
To assure unity of effort, all plans require
detailed coordination with essential supporting
plans for liaison and the provision of mutual
support. Host nation support and the
capabilities of coalition partners in particular
may dictate the tempo of the attack and its
form. The commander must focus on lateral
coordination across national and interagency
boundaries, in particular the effective sharing
of information. Though unity of command
promotes unified effort, American commanders
should be prepared to operate within the
alliance or coalition under command of other
than a senior US commander.
alliance or coalition is paramounted to preserve a
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Chapter 2
The Theater
The Unified Command Plan (UCP) establishes criteria for a
unified theater based on National Security Strategy, National
Military Strategy, geography, and history. The President approves
the UCP, which sets forth basic guidance to all unified combatant
commanders; establishes their missions, responsibilities, and force
structure; delineates the general geographical AOR for geographic
combatant commanders; and specifies functional responsibilities for
functional combatant commanders. A key consideration is strategic
objectives. National strategic direction and evolution of geopolitical
circumstances shape the theater’s geographic boundaries.
Theater commanders provide strategic direction and operational
focus to subordinate commanders. They develop a theater strategy
and campaign plan, organize their theaters, and establish command
relationships for effective unified (joint and multinational)
operations. Through this process, theater commanders plan and
conduct unified operations that ensure a united effort within the
command.
The military instrument of national security policy requires
synchronization with the diplomatic, informational, and economic
efforts. Circumstances determine the extent of the synchronization
required. The national synchronization effort is referred to as unified
action; the theater level is referred to as unified operations.
Interagency operations are another consideration for Army
commanders in the theater.
The US Constitution requires civilian control (the NCA) of US
military forces. Consequently, subsequent legislation has molded
today’s defense establishment and produced the concept of the
unified theater. Unity of command requires that one responsible
commander focus resources toward obtaining defined objectives and
strategic end states. Across the range of military operations, unity of
command gives a single, unified commander responsibility for all
military operations within a designated theater strategic
environment (see Figure 2-1). Command lines within the unified
theater are established to designate one responsible commander.
Section I
The Strategic Hierarchy
The first round of the first battle is a strategic-level decision.
GEN William W. Hartzog
Commander, US Army Training and Doctrine Command
To accomplish unity of effort within the unified theater, the CINC devises
a theater strategy for that geographic portion of the globe. This military
strategy is a combination of the art and science of employing armed forces or
2-1
Chapter 2
the potential threat posed by the presence and capabilities of that force to
secure national security objectives through the application of force. The CINC
derives his military strategy for a geographic region from a hierarchy of
guidance and manifests it in the unified theater campaign plan and theater
contingency plans.
The theater strategic environment is shaped by the special conditions,
circumstances, and influences in the theater that affect the employment of
military forces and the decisions of the chain of command. The theater
strategic direction is expressed through hierarchical levels of strategy.
National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy, and theater strategy
all provide the basis for each theater’s strategic direction. These strategies
integrate national security and military objectives (ends), national security
policies and military concepts (ways), and national resources and military
forces (means) to achieve national security objectives. The Army’s planning
and conduct of major operations or MOOTW is the operational-level link
between the tactical level force’s actions and the strategic hierarchy
discussed above. This operational-level link is discussed later in this chapter
and in the Chapter 3 discussion of operational art and design.
The National Security Act (NSA) of 1947, as amended, created the
Department of Defense and the positions of Secretary of Defense (SECDEF)
and Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The National Security Act of 1947, and
subsequent implementing memorandums, authorized the formation of
unified and specified combatant commands. Commanders of these combatant
commands are called CINCs.
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FM 100-7
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
The NCA establish the National Security
Strategy and appropriate strategic end states.
The National Security Strategy announces US
interests and objectives. This strategy is the art
and science of developing, applying, and
coordinating the instruments of national
power—diplomatic, economic, military, and
informational—to achieve objectives that
contribute to national security. National values
and principles form the foundation of US
interests and objectives. The Army’s keystone
doctrine (FM 100 5) reflects these values as the
American view of war. US interests and
objectives outlined in the 1994 version of
National Security Strategy include—
•Enhancing our security. The survival of the
US as a free and independent nation, with
its basic values intact and its institutions
and people secure.
•Promoting prosperity at home. A healthy
and growing US economy to ensure
opportunity for individual prosperity and
resources for national endeavors at home
and abroad.
• Promoting democracy. Healthy, cooperative,
and diplomatically vigorous relations with
allies and friendly nations. A stable and
secure world where political and economic
freedom, human rights, and democratic
institutions flourish.
The 1995 National Military Strategy
describes two fundamental strategic military
objectives derived from the National Security
Strategy.
•Promote stability through regional
cooperation and constructive interaction.
•Thwart aggression through credible
deterrence and robust warfighting
capabilities.
To achieve these strategic objectives, US
military forces must perform three tasks:
•One, remain constructively engaged in
peacetime.
•Two, attempt to prevent the eruption of
conflict.
•Three, should conflict prevention fail, fight
and win our nation’s wars.
The overlapping and interrelated strategic
concepts that allow the military to execute
these three tasks are overseas presence and
power projection. Figure 2-2 depicts the
relationships between the strategic concepts of
overseas presence and power projection and the
national military objectives.
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Chapter 2
NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY
The Goldwater Nichols DOD The National Military Strategy and
Reorganization Act of 1986 requires the defense policy provide strategic guidance for
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to the employment of military forces. The Joint
help the NCA in providing strategic direction Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) provides
for the armed services. The National Military planning guidance to the CINCs and chiefs of
Strategy and the Joint Strategic Planning the services to accomplish their missions based
System (JSPS) are the methods the CJCS uses on current military capabilities.
for providing that assistance.
THEATER STRATEGY
The CINC translates the national level
strategic directives into a theater strategy.
This strategy is the basis for developing a
campaign plan and leads to operations plans
for execution. Joint or multinational forces
implement these plans in theater to achieve
theater strategic objectives that, in turn,
achieve national objectives.
The CINC’s strategy has several
components. First, it expresses his vision and
intent (military objectives). –the theater ends
to which operations are conducted. Next, it
provides integrated strategic concepts, COAs,
and guidance—the theater ways designed to
secure national objectives, using the theater’s
wide-ranging military capabilities. Finally, it
gives the service and functional component
commanders guidance for planning and
employing nuclear, conventional, and SOF
theater means.
The plan’s process allocates the theater
means. Forces are allocated based on theater
missions as they compete with requirements in
other theaters. Means are expected to fall short
of what would ideally be available. The theater
campaign plan sequences unified activities
over time and space to compensate for these
shortcomings.
METT-T analysis is a traditional
assessment method for tactical-level leaders.
Under deliberate planning circumstances,
tactical-level commanders and staffs should
use the Army’s deliberate decision making
procedures in FM 101-5. As part of the Joint
Operations Planning and Execution System
(JOPES) procedures, strategic and operationallevel
leaders use more formal methods, such as
strategic estimates or commander’s estimates,
as they analyze military and diplomatic
situations (see Joint Pubs 5-03.1 and 5-00.2).
includes the mission analysis and the
assessment of the operational-level
environment discussed in Section VI of this
chapter. At the theater strategic level, the
CINC develops his theater strategy by first
identifying specified and implied missions and
tasks for his theater. He derives these from
many sources, including the national security
and military strategies, policies, directives, the
JSCP, the UCP, Joint Pub 0-2, and other
directives and agreements.
While identifying theater missions, the
CINC analyzes his theater strategic
environment. Using the strategic estimate,
which includes the factors of METT-T, he
considers the potential instabilities or threats,
the limitations, and the nature of anticipated
operations. Assessment factors include the
integration of capabilities by diplomatic,
informational, and economic instruments of
national power provided to the military. In
addition, the CINC must consider
international security agreements. This
analysis leads to formulation of a strategic
estimate that defines the strategic situation in
the theater. Thus, the estimate produces broad,
strategic concepts of what must be done in
theater. Then, the CINC integrates these
concepts into the theater strategy.
The CINC’s staff and subordinates, to
include his service and functional component
commanders, contribute to the development of
the theater strategy. The functional component
commander is the commander in charge of a
service or functional component command,
which consists of all individuals, units,
detachments, organizations, and installations
under the command assigned to the unified
CINC. The development of the multiple theater
strategic concepts leads to a specific strategic
COA for implementation in the theater
At the strategic level, METT-T analysis campaign. Once the CINC selects the desired
focuses on conditions, circumstances, and course, his staff and subordinate joint
influences of the theater strategic commands use the theater strategy to develop
environment. At the operational level, it and integrate OPLANs, including campaigns.
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FM 100-7
Section II
The Chain of Command
The Goldwater Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 prescribes the
chain of command. The NCA exercises authority and control of the armed
forces through the chain of command with two distinct branches. The first
branch runs from the President to the SECDEF to the combatant
commanders for missions and forces assigned to their commands. The second
branch runs from the NCA to the secretaries of the military departments to
the chiefs of the service forces for execution of service functions.
Commanders of combatant commands are responsible to the NCA for the
preparedness of their commands and execution and accomplishment of
assigned missions. The secretaries of the military departments are
responsible for organizing, training, equipping, and providing forces. The
authority exercised by the military departments is subject by law to the
authority provided to the combatant commanders.
The DOD Reorganization Act placed the CJCS within the chain of
command to communicate the directions of the NCA. Though he does not
exercise military command over any combatant forces, all communications
between the NCA and combatant commanders pass through the CJCS.
Figure 2-3 displays the chain of command.
NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITIES
This portion of the chain of command action is passed to combatant commanders.
begins with the President and SECDEF, who The President, with the advice of the SECDEF
make up the NCA. They alone have the and CJCS, establishes combatant commands
constitutional authority to direct US armed and appoints combatant commanders under
forces into military action. Once the NCA
the authority of the National Security Act of
1947. The JSCP apportions forces for each
makes the decision, authorization for military combatant command for planning.
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
While the CJCS does not exercise
command over military forces, the SECDEF
may assign oversight responsibilities to the
CJCS to assist in controlling and coordinating
the combatant commanders. The CJCS
functions within the chain of command by
conveying to the CINCs the orders of the
President and SECDEF.
The CJCS coordinates all communications
on matters of joint interest addressed to the
CINCs by other authority. The CJCS acts as
the spokesperson for the CINCs, especially on
the operational requirements of their
commands. The CJCS monitors the geographic
regions of the world not assigned to a
combatant command.
COMBATANT COMMANDER
A combatant commander is a commander statutory authority (combatant command) to
of a unified or specified command. A combatant organize and task all services under his control
commander is called the CINC. A combatant to accomplish military missions. Combatant
commander is the only military leader with commanders are key links in the chain of
command.
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Chapter 2
SERVICE BRANCH (MILITARY DEPARTMENTS)
The chain of command for the military
departments runs from the NCA to the
secretaries of the military departments. The
secretaries exercise authority, direction, and
control through the service chiefs of their forces
not assigned to combatant commands. This
chain of command includes all military forces
within the respective service. This branch of
the chain of command is separate and distinct
from the branch that exists within a combatant
command.
The secretaries of the military
departments are responsible for the
administration and support of their forces, to
include those assigned or attached to
combatant commands. The secretaries fulfill
their responsibilities for forces apportioned to
combatant commands by exercising
administrative control (ADCON) through the
service component commanders assigned to the
combatant commands. ADCON is subject to the
command authority of the combatant
commander.
The ASCC, using ADCON authority, is
responsible for preparing, maintaining,
training, equipping, administering, and
supporting ARFOR assigned to the unified and
specified commands. The emphasis of the
service branch of the chain of command is
administrative (legal, personnel, finance) and
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FM 100-7
logistical support to respective service forces.
Training during peacetime, in preparation for
war, and before commitment of forces is also a
key element and task for the ASCC.
The CINC provides the channel for
strategic and operational guidance in theater
and ensures the US unity of command. The
service administrative and support channel
provides administrative, training, and logistics
support, ensuring that the CINC receives
organized, equipped, and trained US military
forces. Figure 2-3 illustrates this branch of the
chain of command.
Within the parameters set by the CINC’s
organization of the theater and the command
relationships he establishes, the ASCC
organizes the ARFOR to best accomplish the
assigned missions. The CINC has the authority
to direct certain Army organizational options
but normally leaves internal Army
organization and command relationships to the
ASCC.
COMMAND AUTHORITIES
Command is central to all military actions.
Unity of command is central to unity of effort.
The authority vested in a commander must be
commensurate with the responsibility
assigned. Commanders in the chain of
command exercise authority as prescribed by
law or a superior commander. Commanders of
US military forces use various levels of
authority, which are described as command
relationships and other authorities. Within the
seven levels of authority, four are command
relationships—combatant command
(COCOM), operational control (OPCON),
tactical control (TACON), and support. The
other three are coordinating authority,
ADCON, and direct liaison authorized
(DIRLAUTH).
COMBATANT COMMAND
COCOM is the command authority
authorized by Title 10, US Code, Section 164,
or as directed by the President in the UCP to
combatant command commanders (unified or
specified). COCOM provides full authority to
organize and employ commands and forces as
the combatant commander considers necessary
to accomplish assigned missions. This
authority enables the CINC to organize and
employ his commands and forces, assign tasks,
designate objectives, and give authoritative
direction over all aspects of military
operations, joint training, and logistics
necessary to accomplish the assigned missions.
The CINC normally exercises COCOM through
his service component commanders. COCOM is
not transferable.
OPERATIONAL CONTROL
Commanders at or below the combatant
commander exercise OPCON as their
command authority. OPCON is inherent in
COCOM and is the authority to perform the
functions of command over subordinate forces.
The CINC may delegate OPCON to his
subordinates. OPCON is the most authority
with which subordinates can direct all aspects
of military operations and joint training needed
to accomplish any assigned mission. A
commander with OPCON may control forces
from one or more services. OPCON does not
normally include the authority to direct
logistics, administration, discipline, internal
organization, or unit training. The service
component commander retains his service
responsibility and authority for forces under
OPCON of another command. Commanders
must be aware of the US and North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) terms of OPCON
and not interchange the two. The NATO term
OPCON more closely resembles the US
definition of TACON.
TACTICAL CONTROL
The CINC uses TACON to limit the
authority to direct the tactical use of combat
forces. TACON is authority normally limited to
the detailed and specified local direction of
movement and maneuver of the tactical force to
accomplish an assigned task. TACON does not
provide organizational authority or
administrative and support responsibilities.
The service component continues to exercise
these authorities.
SUPPORT
The CINC identifies support relationships
for one force to aid, assist, protect, or
logistically support another force. The
supporting force gives the needed support to
the supported force. Establishing supported
and supporting relationships between
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Chapter 2
components is a useful option to accomplish supporting action, and other instructions
needed tasks. This concept applies equally to necessary for coordination and efficiency. The
all dimensions of the joint force organized by
the CINC.
Each subordinate element of the joint force
can support or be supported by other elements.
Normally an establishing directive is issued to
specify the purpose of the support relationship,
the effect desired, and the scope of the action to
be taken. Joint Pub 0-2 states, “Unless limited
by the establishing directive, the commander of
the supported force will have the authority to
exercise general direction of the supporting
effort.” The execution of general direction
includes the designation and prioritization of
targets or objectives, timing and duration of the
supporting commander is responsible for
ascertaining the needs of the supported
commander. The supporting commander must
fulfill those needs from within the existing
capabilities, priorities, and requirements of
other assigned tasks. The categories of support
are general, mutual, direct, and close.
General Support
General support provides designated
support to an entire supported force and not to
any particular subdivision. General support is
the most centralized support relationship. For
2-8
combat units, this relationship provides the
most flexibility for influencing the battle
during conduct of operations and is used when
the enemy situation is unclear. It is more
commonly used in the defense than the offense.
Mutual Support
Mutual support describes actions that
units provide one another against an enemy
because of their assigned tasks, their positions
relative to one another and to the enemy, and
their inherent capabilities.
Direct Support
Direct support provides designated
support to a specific force and authorizes the
supported force to seek this support directly.
The supporting force provides support on a
priority basis to the supported force. Also, the
supporting force may provide support to other
forces when it does not jeopardize the mission
or put the supported force at risk. The
authority to accomplish support of other than
directly supported forces rests with the higher
tactical or operational commander but also
may be delegated. An example of this support is
when the elements of a general support
artillery brigade assigned a direct support
mission are diverted temporarily to support a
force other than the designated force.
Close Support
The fourth alternative, close support, is
that action of the supporting force against
targets or objectives that are sufficiently near
the supported force as to require detailed
integration or coordination of the supporting
action with the fire, movement, or other actions
of the supported force.
FM 100-7
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Other authorities granted outside the
command relations delineeated above are
coordinating authority, ADCON, and
DIRLAUTH.
Coordinating Authority
Coordinating authority is a consultation
relationship between commanders, but not an
authority to exercise control. The CINC and
other subordinate commanders designate
coordinating authority to assist during
planning and preparation for actual
operations. The CINC specifies coordinating
authority to foster effective coordination;
however, coordinating authority does not
compel any agreements.
Administrative Control
ADCON is the direction or exercise of
authority necessary to fulfill military
department statutory responsibilities for
administration and support. ADCON may be
delegated to and exercised by service
commanders at any echelon at or below the
service component command. The secretaries
of military departments are responsible for the
administration and support of their forces
assigned or attached to unified commands. The
secretaries fulfill this responsibility by
exercising ADCON through the service
component commander of the unified
command. ADCON is subject to the command
authority of the combatant commander.
Direct Liaison Authorized
DIRLAUTH is the authority granted by a
commander at any level to a subordinate
commander to coordinate an action directly
with a command or agency within or outside
the command. DIRLAUTH is a coordination
relationship, not a command relationship.
Section III
Joint Force Commands
The NCA, with the advice and assistance of the CJCS, establishes
combatant commands (unified and specified) on a regional or functional basis.
Regionally oriented unified commands are called theater combatant
commands. The CINC, using the COCOM options, establishes the theater
command structure. He may establish subordinate JFCs (subunified
commands and JTFs). These subordinate JFCs may be established on a
regional or functional basis.
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Chapter 2
COMBATANT
With the advice and assistance of the
CJCS, the NCA establishes combatant
commands (unified and specified) to perform
military missions and prescribes the force
structure of such commands. Commanders of
combatant commands are responsible to the
NCA for the preparedness of their commands
to execute assigned missions and for the
accomplishment of the military missions
assigned to them.
SPECIFIED COMMANDS
A specified command is a command that
has broad, continuing missions. The NCA, with
advice and assistance of the CJCS, establishes
a specified command. A specified command is
composed normally of forces from a single
military department. Still, it may include units
and staffs from other services. Currently, no
specified commands exist.
UNIFIED COMMANDS
Unified commands are those combatant
commands with significant forces from two or
more services. Unified commands may be
functionally or regionally oriented.
Functionally Oriented (Global)
Unified Commands
Functionally oriented unified commands
are the US Space Command (SPACECOM), the
US Transportation Command (TRANSCOM),
the US Special Operations Command
(SOCOM), and the US Strategic Command
(STRATCOM). Functionally oriented unified
COMMANDS
commands operate globally across all
geographic regions. The UCP provides
missions, geographical areas, and forces
assigned to unified commands. The UCP is
normally reviewed biennially during an odd
year. Suggested changes are submitted for
consideration. Those that receive support are
subsequently implemented.
Regionally Oriented (Theater)
Unified Commands
Unified commands with regional
responsibilities are the US Atlantic Command
(ACOM), the US Southern Command
(SOUTHCOM), the US European Command
(EUCOM), the US Central Command
(CENTCOM), and the US Pacific Command
(PACOM). Each regional combatant command
has a specific geographic AOR or theater that
includes the land, sea, and airspace in the
strategic region. UCP-designated AORs
provide military focus and a basis for
coordination worldwide.
A theater combatant commander has the
flexibility to organize and employ forces
wherever required to accomplish his assigned
responsibilities in coordination with other
supporting combatant commanders. Effective
use of the nation’s military power requires
close integration of the separate services. Unity
of effort is required for effectiveness and
efficiency. Centralized direction provides for
unified action by forces. Decentralized
execution is essential because of the enormity
of the command and control (C2) span.
THEATER COMBATANT COMMANDS
The theater combatant commander,
referred to as the CINC, is a strategic-level
commander of a unified command, who
provides strategic direction and operational
focus to his subordinate commands. CINCs
serve as the vital link between national
military strategy and theater strategy. They
provide the strategic and operational direction
required for major unified and joint land, air,
and maritime operations. The CINC is not
simply a planner and allocator of resources; he
has a broad range of responsibilities
established by public law and described in joint
publications.
The CINC organizes his forces, assigns
tasks, designates objectives, provides
authoritative direction, and employs his forces.
He designs and executes theater campaigns
and unified operations, supports the operations
of other theater CINCs, and continually
assesses the environment, anticipating the
need for theater operations where his forces
may play a supporting or supported role.
A CINC is assigned a myriad of
responsibilities to fulfill his unique command
role. Joint Pub 0-2 discusses the CINC’s
responsibilities at length. It specifies that the
CINC is responsible for maintaining the
security of his command and protecting the
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FM 100-7
interests of the US, its possessions, and its
bases against direct and indirect hostile
threats. The CINC ensures that his command
is prepared to carry out missions assigned by
the NCA. The CINC assigns responsibilities
and missions to his component forces and
maintains unity of command.
The CINC executes his strategic planning
responsibilities for developing a theater
strategy and theater campaigns (war plans to
achieve national strategic objectives). He uses
operational art and theater design while
performing the following critical tasks:
•Prepares the estimates (strategic and
commander’s) of the situation.
•Establishes a theater strategic end state.
•Determines strategic center of gravity.
•States his strategic vision and intent in his
strategic concept of operations.
•Organizes the theater.
•Identifies subordinate commands and
determining specific forces required to
execute campaign plans.
•Establishes command relationships and
delegating authority.
•States readiness shortfalls and developing
programs to correct those shortfalls.
•Concentrates his forces and supplies
strategically.
•Conducts strategic maneuver to destroy,
dislocate, or neutralize the strategic center
of gravity.
•Seeks strategic advantage and the
initiative.
•Directs the development of theater
contingency plans and concept plans leading
to the conduct of operations in war or
MOOTW.
•Achieves a theater strategic end state.
The CINC’s campaign plan provides a
common frame of reference within which
operations of land, air, maritime, special
operations, and space forces, as well as
interagency, multinational, or UN forces, are
unified, integrated, and harmonized. Joint
campaign doctrine is found in Joint Pubs 3-0,
5-0, 5-00.1.
The services provide forces to operate
within a subordinate JFC in the operational
areas that the theater commander organizes.
They further subdivide these areas among
their forces. The SECDEF directs the Secretary
of the Army to assign ARFOR to the CINCs.
Operating within national budget constraints,
the NCA cannot satisfy all of the CINC’s
requirements. Therefore, during deliberate
planning, CINCs identify their force shortfalls.
The CJCS, through the military department
chiefs, identifies forces to fill these shortfalls.
The JSCP apportions forces to each CINC for
planning purposes. This apportionment may
not equal the current forces assigned. The NCA
assigns additional forces when a CINC is
required to implement a specific plan requiring
more forces than assigned or apportioned for
planning.
The CINC, by exercising COCOM
authority, performs the following legal
functions of command over assigned forces:
•Determines forces required to achieve the
military end state, organizes available
forces, allocates resources, and commands
forces.
•Employs commands and forces.
•Assigns tasks.
•Designates objectives.
•Exercises authoritative direction over all
aspects of military operations, signal
support, logistics, and joint training to
accomplish missions assigned to his
command.
Combatant commanders alone exercise
COCOM authority by establishing command
relationships with subordinates, delegating
appropriate authorities, and assigning
responsibilities to their subordinates (see
Figure 2-4). The CINC strives for centralized
direction and decentralized planning and
execution. The CINC has the following six
options, including combining options, through
which he may exercise COCOM authority
(Joint Pub 0-2):
•Service component command.
•Functional component command.
•Subordinate unified command.
•Joint task force.
•Single-service force.
•Direct command.
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SERVICE COMPONENT
COMMAND
A service component command consists of
those individuals, units, detachments,
organizations, and installations of a single
military service assigned to the unified
command. Except for the CINC and members
of his joint staff, the senior officer of the service
component assigned to a unified command and
qualified for command by the regulations of
that service is designated the service
component commander. His assignment is
subject to the concurrence of the CINC. The
service component commander is responsible
for all command aspects of his force, to include
logistics within the unified command.
The ASCC serves as the principal advisor
to the CINC for supporting and employing
ARFOR in theater and ARFOR outside the
theater tasked to support theater operations.
The ASCC may delegate part of this
responsibility
complex, and
as the theater becomes more
it may become necessary to
establish an intermediate headquarters, based
on the complexity of the operational
environment. This alternative is discussed
further in Section VI of this chapter.
FUNCTIONAL COMPONENT
COMMMAND
Based on his mission analysis, the CINC
may form a functional component composed of
like functional forces from more than one
service. Functional component commands may
be established for MOOTW or war to perform
particular operational missions that may be of
short duration or may extend over time and
involve forces from two or more services. The
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FM 100-7
functional component commanders are as
follows:
•Joint force land component commander
(JFLCC).
• Joint force air component commander
(JFACC).
•Joint force maritime component commander
(JFMCC).
•Joint force special operations component
commander (JFSOCC).
Each focuses on operational responsibilities,
leaving logistical support to the respective service
component commander. See Figure 2-5. Functional
component commanders may serve simultaneously
as service component commanders. For example,
an Army JFLCC could direct Marine forces and
serve as the ASCC commander.
SUBORDINATE UNIFIED
COMMAND
Unified commanders, with approval from
the NCA, may establish subordinate unified
commands (also called subunified commands).
CINCs establish subunified commands to
conduct operations on a continuing basis
according to the criteria that established the
unified command.
The CINC may exercise COCOM through a
subunified commander for operations on a
continuing basis. The subunified commander
exercises functions, authority, and
responsibilities similar to those of a unified
command CINC, except for COCOM. He
exercises OPCON of assigned commands and
forces within the assigned AOR or functional
area. The CINC PACOM, for example, has
three subordinate unified commands: Alaskan
Command (ALCOM), US Forces Japan (USFJ),
and US Forces Korea (USFK).
The ASCC of subunified commands
operates in the chain of command within the
subordinate unified command. The ASCC of
the subunified command normally
communicates directly with the unified
command ASCC on matters that relate
specifically to that service and informs the
subunified commander as that commander
directs.
JOINT TASK FORCE
The SECDEF, a combatant commander, a
subunified commander, a functional
component commander, or an existing
commander of a joint task force (CJTF) may
establish a JTF. A JTF is established normally
on a geographical area or functional basis to
execute missions with specific limited
objectives that do not require centralized
control of joint logistics. A JTF is composed of
elements of two or more services and exists
until mission completion.
The CJTF exercises OPCON over forces
assigned to the JTF. The unified command’s
ASCC places an ARFOR under OPCON of the
CJTF for the conduct of operations and retains
responsibility to provide service-specific
support to the ARFOR. The JTF established in
the Persian Gulf in 1988 to protect shipping
and the JTF established in Panama in 1989 to
conduct Operation Just Cause illustrate this
type of organization.
SINGLE-SERVICE FORCE
COMMAND
Normally, the Army will not be involved in
this COCOM option due to its operational
interdependence with the other services. Still,
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Chapter 2
on occasion, such as the support to Charleston,
SC, by FORSCOM units in the aftermath of
Hurricane Hugo, the Army may conduct a singleservice
operation.
DIRECT COMMAND
The CINC can retain direct command of
specific operational forces. The direct command
option is used when the circumstances of the
mission require urgency and the forces must
remain immediately responsive to the CINC.
Direct command of specific SOF is a prime
example of this COCOM option. Such forces
could be composed of forces from one or more
services. This option would likely be employed
for short, sensitive, and small-scale operations.
Special operations often fall under this
organizational option.
Section IV
Multinational Commands
Operations in a multinational environment have both similarities and
differences to normal joint operations. This section highlights some of the
differences found in a multinational environment. It details the differences
between alliance and coalition operations. It discusses the need for mutual
understanding and respect, for capitalizing on inherent operational strengths
of a particular nation, and for obtaining unity of effort.
COMMAND STRUCTURE
Multinational operations can be
categorized in one of two major groups:
coalitions and alliances. Coalitions and
alliances must create a structure that meets
the needs, diplomatic realities, constraints,
and objectives of the participating nations.
Since no single command structure fits the
needs of all alliances and coalitions, several
different models could evolve.
COALITIONS
Coalitions normally form as a rapid
response to unforeseen crises and are ad hoc
arrangements between two or more nations for
common action. During the early stages of such
a contingency, nations rely upon their military
command systems to control the activities of
their forces. Therefore, the initial coalition
arrangement will most likely involve a parallel
command structure.
Under a parallel command, no single
multinational army commander is designated.
Usually, member nations retain control of their
national forces. Coalition decisions are made
through a coordinated effort among the
participants. A coordination center can be
established to facilitate exchange of
intelligence and operational information,
ensure coordination of operations among
coalition forces, and provide a forum for
resolving routine issues among staff sections.
During Operation Desert Storm, the coalition
coordination, communications, and integration
center (C3IC) was established to effect
command relationships. Figure 2-6 depicts a
parallel command.
As a coalition matures, the members may
choose to centralize their efforts through
establishing a lead nation command structure.
A lead nation command is one of the less
common command structures in an ad hoc
coalition. A coalition of this makeup sees all
coalition members subordinating their forces to
a single partner, usually, the nation providing
the preponderance of forces and resources.
Still, subordinate national commands
maintain national integrity. The lead nation
command establishes integrated staff sections,
with the composition determined by the
coalition leadership. Figure 2-7 provides a
model for a lead nation command structure in a
coalition.
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FM 100-7
ALLIANCES
Typically, alliances are formed because of
formal agreements among two or more nations exercised among participants.
for broad, long-term objectives. Alliances are
characterized by years of cooperation among
nations. In alliances— some equipment interoperability exists, and
•Agreed-upon objectives exist. command relationships have been firmly
established.
•Appropriate plans have been developed and
•A developed theater of operations exists,
•Standard operating procedures have been
established.
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Chapter 2
Cooperation among members of an
alliance, such as NATO, is advantageous, since
mutually developed procedures for making and
executing decisions exist. Often, when
members of such an alliance cooperate in
operations outside of their alliance sphere,
such as in naval operations in the Persian Gulf,
procedures worked out within the alliance are
adapted quickly.
As in a coalition, a lead nation command
structure may exist in a developing alliance
when all member nations place their forces
under the control of one nation. This means
that the lead nation’s procedures and doctrine
form the basis for planning for and
coordinating the conduct of operations. Though
this type of arrangement is unusual in a formal
alliance, such a command structure may have
advantages under certain treaty circumstances
existing with Latin America, Southwest Asia,
or Japan that may evolve into alliance
arrangements.
A lead nation command in an
be characterized by a staff that is
alliance may
integrated to
the degree necessary to ensure cooperation
among multinational or national subordinate
Army formations. Usually, alliances are
organized under an integrated command
structure that provides unity of command in a
multinational setting. The key ingredients in
an integrated alliance command are that a
single commander will be designated, that his
staff will be composed of representatives from
all member nations, and that subordinate
commands and staffs will be integrated to the
lowest echelon necessary to accomplish the
missions. Figure 2-8 represents a typical
multinational army force organized under an
integrated command structure in an alliance.
If multinational formations exist below the
multinational army component headquarters,
the alliance membership will determine the
command of those subordinate organizations.
Multinational army force headquarters staffs
will be integrated. Accordingly, heavy reliance
will be placed on liaison between forces.
COMMAND AND CONTROL
International agreements should set forth commanders and procedures that ensure unity
the degree of authority for multinational of effort. Ideally, the coalition/alliance will
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FM 100-7
designate a single military commander to
direct the combined efforts of the participating
forces. The US contingent of a multinational
command may be a unified command, a
specified command, a subordinate unified
command, a functional component command, a
JTF, or a force of a single service.
A common understanding of C2
relationships facilitates the required unity of
effort. The US chain of command, from the
President to the lowest US commander in the
field, remains inviolate. US forces in a
multinational force will continue to recognize
their COCOM relationship to a US unified or
specified commander. Subject to NCA prior
approval, a multinational force commander
may exercise appropriate and negotiated
OPCON over US units in specific operations
authorized by a legitimizing authority such as
the UN Security Council.
The multinational force commander and
the US theater CINC providing the US forces to
the multinational force must coordinate and
agree to the command relationships. This
agreement must be in consonance with the
NCA criteria for C2 within multinational
operations, which may establish limits of
OPCON. For example, within these limits, a
foreign UN commander cannot—
•Change the mission or deploy US forces
outside the AOR agreed to by the NCA.
•Separate units.
•Redirect logistics and supplies.
•Administer discipline.
•Promote individuals.
•Change the internal organization of the US
units.
Other national forces will likely remain aligned
to their national command authority.
International agreements will specify
when and how the transfer of authority from
national command to multinational command
takes place. At lower echelons, command
relationships will be identical to US joint
relationships (OPCON, TACON, support,
coordinating authority) or at least similar
(OPCOM, tactical command [TACOM]).
Definitions of these terms differ slightly
between US and NATO. Commanders of
operating forces must clarify how each is
applied. FM 100-8 describes the doctrine for
multinational army operations.
Section V
Theater Organizations
A theater is an assigned geographic area outside CONUS and under the
command of a regional combatant commander (unified command) (Joint
Pub 0-2). Under the UCP, a theater or AOR is viewed from the strategic
context, the level of international military cooperation required, or the degree
of dedicated US military resources necessary in the theater. These
perspectives influence how the Army conducts operations in each theater.
TYPES OF THEATERS
Military strategists often describe
theaters as maritime, continental, or littoral,
based on their dominant geographic and
strategic characteristics. This description
influences the predominant type of military
forces used, the strategic missions assigned,
and the strategic and operational objectives
pursued in the theater.
Continental theaters primarily involve
control of land and associated airspace.
Maritime theaters focus on ensuring control of
the seas and associated airspace. While
continental and maritime theaters are
different, both demand the synchronized
efforts of all services, both within and between
theaters. Littoral theaters combine aspects of
both continental and maritime theaters.
CONTINENTAL THEATERS
Continental theaters are established to
control the land and associated airspace vital to
the sustenance of a nation or nations or to destroy
an opponent’s means to exercise such control.
EUCOM, CENTCOM, and SOUTHCOM are
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Chapter 2
continental theaters. Military action in
continental theaters may vary in purpose and
scope from participation in the internal defense of
another nation against subversion, lawlessness,
and insurgency to major operations and
campaigns to destroy enemy land forces. The
focus of continental campaigns is on the
combination and sequencing of air, space, land,
sea, and SOF operations.
MARITIME THEATERS
Maritime theaters are established both for
the forward defense of the nation and for
strategic access to US resource needs, friends,
and potential adversaries. ACOM and PACOM
are maritime theaters. The focus of maritime
campaigns is very similar to that of continental
campaigns. Campaigns in maritime theaters
may be composed of one or more of the
following types of operations:
•Fleet operations to seize or maintain
unobstructed access to ocean areas by
destroying or blocking enemy forces.
•Joint operations to control key land areas.
ALLOCATION
AMONG
•Limited operations with limited objectives
such as peacekeeping or nation assistance.
LITTORAL THEATERS
Operations in a littoral region require
integration and synchronization of naval, air,
and land forces. World political changes and
affordability have reduced US access to land
bases in forward areas near the most likely
crisis regions. This has increased the
importance of military operations that can
capitalize on sea bases and land lodgments
that, once synchronized, project land and air
combat power deep into the region. Littoral
theaters are not as predominant as the other
two theaters but have been seen in previous
campaigns along peninsulas or coastlines.
The deployment of US forces to Southwest
Asia during Operation Desert Shield in 1990 was
accomplished for the most part by sealift.
However, maritime support and the maritime
interdiction operations required synchronization
forces operating within the CENTCOM
continental theater, thus forming a littoral region.
OF RESOURCES
THEATERS
When considering the requirements of the
many active theaters, national planners
establish the priorities by providing planning
guidance, allocating forces, and apportioning
limited resources. Theaters are described as
theaters of focus, economy-of-force theaters, or
deferred theaters. This description corresponds
to the relative prioritization of resources for the
specific theaters.
THEATER OF FOCUS
A theater of focus is the theater of main
military effort because it has the highest risk
level and potential for conflict. NCA and CJCS
provide guidance, forces, and resources
accordingly. CENTCOM was the theater of
focus during Operations Desert Shield/Storm.
ECONOMY-OF-FORCE THEATER
An economy-of-force theater receives a lesser
level of forces and resources than the theater of
focus because the associated risk and potential
for conflict are lower. SOUTHCOM during the
early 1980s illustrates this type of theater. Forces
and resource requests are filled after those of the
theater of focus. Those that cannot be filled are
then identified and tagged for filling when the
economy-of-force theater is upgraded to a theater
of focus.
DEFERRED THEATER
A deferred theater receives the least priority
for assigned forces and resources, based on its
associated risk level and potential for conflict.
CENTCOM during the early 1980s was an
example of a deferred theater. Forces and
resources are identified and tagged for deployment
but not deployed other than during exercises.
INTERNAL THEATER ORGANIZATION
Theater combatant commanders develop commander considers his theater structure
a theater strategy and then organize the and command relationships. The Army,
theater. Considerations for multinational besides operating as part of a joint force, must
operations should always be prominent as the be prepared to conduct multinational
2-18
operations with land, air, and naval forces of
other nations, as well as interagency
operations. While unity of command may not
be possible in multinational operations, unity
of effort is essential.
Each CINC may assign associated areas
within his theater to subordinate
commanders. CINCs may designate joint
areas or zones during war and MOOTW, while
theaters of war and operations are designated
only in time of war. Combat zones (CZs) and
communications zones (COMMZs) may be
established as needed. The CZ is an area
required by forces to conduct combat
operations. The COMMZ contains LOCs and
those theater organizations and other
agencies required to support forces in the
field. The CINC organizes his theater to
enable him to synchronize his unified
operations or integrate single-service, joint,
special, and supporting operations with allied
and interagency activities and NGOs and
PVOs.
FM 100-7
OPTIONS FOR CONDUCT
OF WAR
In war, the CINC may use many of the
structures identified above or others as
required to subdivide the theater. When the
NCA authorizes combat operations, the theater
commander, with NCA and CJCS approval,
delineates a theater of war.
Theater of War
A theater of war is defined as the air, land,
sea, and space area which is or may become
directly involved in the operations of war.
Operations within a theater of war are
invariably joint and usually multinational. The
theater of war should be operationally selfsufficient,
with a sustaining base adequate to
support contemplated operations. The theater
of war should encompass only that part of the
areas or countries to be involved in the war.
While part of the theater is in a state of war, it
may be possible that all nations within the
theater are not at war. See Figure 2-9.
Theater of Operation
If the CINC determines that he should
subdivide his theater of war to contend with
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Chapter 2
Joint Operations Area
more than one major threat, he may designate
subordinate theaters or AOs for each major
threat. Still, the theater commander must
ensure that such divisions do not violate the
principle of unity of effort. The theaters of
operation refer to that portion of an area of war
necessary for military operations and for the
administration of such operations for extended
periods. The theater of operations commander
often has responsibilities similar to the theater
CINC, but not of the same scope. During World
War II, the Atlantic, European, Mediterranean,
and Russian theater of strategic direction was
divided into four similar subordinate theaters of
operation. These theaters of operation were
integrated geographically and focused upon
enemy Axis forces.
The range of military operations also may
require designating several geographic
subareas of responsibility such as a joint
operations area (JOA) or joint zone (JZ), a joint
special operations area (JSOA), or a joint rear
area (JRA). A subordinate theater also could be
used in a larger theater for decentralizing the
effort to a subunified commander. Subareas of
responsibility are portions of a theater CINC’s
AOR and are delegated usually for a long term
and often over large areas. See Figure 2-10.
JOAs are geographic areas the CINC
creates to conduct specific military missions
and their supporting activities. JOAs are
usually established for short-term operations.
JOAs are particularly useful when operations
are to be conducted on the boundaries between
theaters. The JOA commander’s authority is
limited to that required to accomplish specific
tasks. US operations in Panama during
Operation Just Cause in 1989 offer an example
of a JOA.
Joint Zone
A joint zone is a term for an area
established to permit friendly surface, air, and
subsurface forces to operate simultaneously.
ARFOR transit but do not normally operate in
a JZ.
Joint Special Operations Area
JSOAs are restricted areas of land, sea, and
airspace that the CINC assigns to a JFSOCC to
conduct special operations. JSOAs may be
established for short or long duration special
operations efforts, normally when they are
independent of conventional operations. If
conventional operations in the JSOA are
required, coordination with forces operating
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FM 100-7
within the JSOA must be effected prior to stockage areas, movement control points,
initiation of operations. The CINC may logistics headquarters and units, the rear
delineate a JSOA to facilitate simultaneous portion of the intratheater communications
conventional and special operations in the zone, airfields and air bases, transitioning land
same general operating area. The capture of forces, theater missile defense forces, the
the hijacking terrorists of the Achilles Lauro in theater rear headquarters, and strategic
the Mediterranean in 1987 was in a JSOA. reserves. See Figure 2-11.
Joint Rear Area
In war, as in peacetime and conflict, the
CINC may designate a JRA. The JRA is
designated to facilitate protection and
operation of installations and forces that
provide logistics and/or support to combat
operations. The joint rear area coordinator
(JRAC) is the officer given responsibility for the
overall security of the JRA and for furnishing a
secure environment to facilitate sustainment,
host nation support (HNS), infrastructure
development, and movements of the joint force.
The size of the JRA may vary considerably
and is highly dependent on the size of the
theater, logistics support requirements, the
threat, or the scope of the joint operation. The
JRA is usually to the rear of the theater or CZ,
but it is not necessarily contiguous to the CZ.
With split-based operations, much of the JRA
could be in CONUS. A JRA can also be adapted
to a modern, high-intensity, nonlinear
battlefield. A JRA may be segmented and
contain isolated pockets of relatively secure
support areas that collectively make up a JRA.
Combat Zone, Communications Zone,
and Theater Base
The CINC may additionally organize his
theater of war into a CZ, a COMMZ, and a
theater base. The CZ is that area required by
combat forces to conduct operations. CINCs
may further subdivide the CZ into forward and
rear combat zones. They are normally forward
of the Army rear boundary.
The COMMZ contains those theater
organizations, LOCs, and other agencies in the
JRA required to support forces in the field.
Usually, the COMMZ is in the rear portion of
the theater of operations, reaching back to the
CONUS base or perhaps to another combatant
commander’s AOR. The theater CINC may
establish these areas for long-term, continuing
requirements or for short durations to meet a
specific situation.
The theater base is a sizable portion of the
JRA. It has logistics facilities such as ports of
debarkation, marshaling areas, logistics
Subordinate Areas of Operations
Subordinate army commanders organize
their assigned AOs for tactical operations. This
organization is based on terrain orientation,
security orientation, or a threat orientation.
Subordinate army commanders establish
necessary control measures to delineate
responsibilities for zones of action or sectors of
defense to coordinate fires and direct
maneuver. These measures may include lateral
boundaries, axes, objectives, phase lines, and
special areas, for example, airspace control
area or air defense area. If the enemy situation
is known, a threat orientation is more
appropriate. Accordingly, the subordinate
army commanders would organize their AOs to
accommodate all of the air, land, and sea forces
necessary to impose their tactical battle space
to defeat the enemy. For example, the main
battle area (MBA) is the portion of the
battlefield in which the decisive battle is fought
to defeat the enemy. Only those control
measures necessary for operations against the
enemy should be imposed upon subordinate
commanders, minimizing the use of lateral
boundaries except where necessary to separate
friendly forces or provide flank and rear
security against an enemy situation.
OPTIONS FOR CONDUCT
OF MILITARY OPERATIONS
OTHER THAN WAR
The theater of war does not normally
encompass the CINC’s entire theater. In the
remainder of his theater, the CINC may be
conducting MOOTW. CINCs designate a
theater structure that achieves strategic and
theater focus in both MOOTW and war. This
structure allows synchronization and
integration of all instruments of power within
the theater. At times, this synchronization
requirement may extend to UN operations.
If hostilities are imminent, the CINC may
designate an area of conflict— an area of land,
sea, and air designated for the conduct of hostile
MOOTW. However, if an MOOTW is required
that does not include response to hostilities,
such as a natural disaster or humanitarian
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Chapter 2
Figure 2-11. Combat Zone and Communications Zone Organization
assistance, the CINC may establish an area of responsibility such as a JOA, JSOA, AO, or
assistance within his theater. The area of COMMZ or JRA. Establishment of these
conflict or area of assistance may be further subareas is to provide the same functions and
subdivided into several geographic subareas of control measures as required for conducting
wartime operations. See Figure 2-10.
Section VI
The Army in Theater
This section discusses the three tasks of the operational-level commander
and how they influence theater organization, the environment, and the
echelons of command within the Army. It discusses the ASCC and the Army
commander as a subordinate JFC. Senior army leaders, using an operationallevel
perspective, task-organize the Army to maximize its capabilities in the
theater. The Army’s theater organization provides the means to execute the
designs of operational art while facilitating joint operations.
ARMY OPERATIONAL-LEVEL COMMANDER
The ASCC supports the theater combatant trains, and equips these land forces to
CINC by conducting Army operations to accomplish all assigned missions.
support or attain the CINC’s established
objectives. The Army contributes forces to Unified Cz results in assigning forces for
perform combat, logistics, and support employment, apportioning forces for planning,
activities in theater. The Army organizes, and allocating them for execution to combatant
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FM 100-7
commanders. In support of the CINC, the
ASCC organizes the assigned forces to
accomplish the three operational-level tasks of
the senior army commander:
•Establishing the link among joint,
multinational, interagency, NGO, PVO, or
UN operations.
•Executing functions to support continuous
operations by subordinate army forces.
•Planning and executing operations to
support the joint campaign when designated
as an operational commander by the CINC.
Other subordinate army commanders may
perform the tasks; still, they remain the
responsibility of the ASCC.
ESTABLISH JOINT, MULTINATIONAL,
NGO, PVO, AND
INTERAGENCY LINKAGE
The first task of the senior army commander
in theater is to establish linkages to joint,
multinational, and interagency organizations.
These linkages include—
•Receiving joint, multinational, and
interagency or UN direction.
•Advising the CINC on Army capabilities.
•Establishing liaison with joint,
multinational, and interagency
organizations and NGOs and PVOs.
•Augmenting the joint, multinational, and
interagency staff as required.
•Linking with specific joint, multinational,
NGO, PVO, and interagency systems.
•Coordinating intelligence collection,
analysis, and dissemination.
The commander’s guidance includes the
subordinate commander’s missions and tasks
that are expected to contribute to the higher
echelon’s plan. The guidance should include
the assignment of forces and sequencing of
subordinates’ assigned mission and tasks. The
guidance will include any delegated authority,
other information pertinent to the situation,
and any changes that modify subordinate
missions and tasks.
The ASCC of the unified or subunified
command or the ARFOR commander of the
JTF advises the CINC or CJTF, respectively,
on employment of US Army organizations and
their capabilities. The ASCC must ensure that
his subordinate commanders and staffs are
trained, agile, and versatile to meet this
requirement. The CINC looks to his ASCC for
the nomination and selection of specifically
Army-apportioned or assigned units for
assignment to subordinate joint commands.
The Army conducts liaison with joint,
multinational, NGO, PVO, and interagency
organizations in theater. This liaison includes
lateral liaison with other services, as well as
higher and lower liaison with the appropriate
joint or multinational force staff and any
subordinate joint or multinational
organizations as required. The ASCC must
understand the capabilities that the other
services bring to the theater. Such
understanding enhances the opportunity for
synergy within the joint force.
Similar to the exchange of liaison teams is
the requirement of ARFOR to augment a joint
force staff or receive augmentation from joint
forces when the Army forms the core of a joint
staff headquarters. The ASCC must interface
with joint information and control systems
such as intelligence and communications.
These systems require specific hardware that
may be unique to the joint force headquarters
and may require special Army efforts for
effective joint coordination.
Army intelligence elements closely
coordinate with joint, multinational, and
interagency organizations to establish the
mutual supporting intelligence structure
required to support the joint commander’s
operations. The intelligence structure should
assign collection capabilities consistent with
available assets, conduct timely all-source
analysis, and provide rapid dissemination of
available intelligence information.
CONDUCT SUPPORT
OPERATIONS
The second task of the ASCC in theater is
to execute his Title 10 responsibility by
supporting operations. At theater level, the
preponderance of operational considerations
are logistical but may include significant
engineer efforts, depending upon existing
infrastructure. In the force-projection mode,
decisions made early will be highly significant
as the time for combat operations approaches.
Decisions such as the sequencing of arriving
forces and equipment will often not be
reversible.
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The answers to such questions as what is
needed first—construction engineers or
infantrymen, tanks or trucks—may sow the
seeds of success or failure. The commander and
his staff should analyze these kinds of
questions, being careful not to eliminate any
option before the need for such a decision is
clear.
These analyses require a full assessment
of the factors of METT-T and an understanding
of where and how risks are taken. Army
commanders retain responsibilities to support
Army units through the service chain of
command, regardless of the joint and
multinational arrangements. The ground
transportation system, common classes of
supply, and construction of the infrastructure
are examples of the Army’s contribution to the
overall theater effort.
Each joint or multinational organization
with Army forces has an ARFOR commander
who ensures Army support requirements are
met. These support requirements, which
include logistics, personnel services, and
health services, are service-specific and flow
through the service chain of command. Support
functions at the operational level are addressed
in FM 100-16, FM 100-10, and FM 63-4.
CONDUCT OPERATIONS
The third task of the ASCC in theater is to
conduct operations. When designated by the
CINC as an operational-level commander, the
senior army commander, in this role, serves in
the chain of command, planning and executing
major operations that support the joint
campaign. He designates, sustains, and shifts
the main effort of subordinate ground forces to
support the joint or multinational plan. His
understanding of operational art (see
Chapter 3) is essential to his performance of
this role.
ARMY SERVICE COMPONENT COMMANDER
Each unified and subordinate unified
command has an Army service component
command. The CINC’s Army service
component command consists of the ASCC and
all those elements under his command. The
ASCC is responsible for—
•Recommending to the CINC or subunified
commander the proper employment of Army
component forces.
•Accomplishing assigned operational
missions.
•Selecting and nominating specific units of
the Army for assignment to theater forces.
•Conducting joint training, including
training other service components as
directed.
•Informing the CINC of Army logistics
support effects on operational capabilities.
•Supporting operational and exercise plans
as requested.
•Developing Army program and budget
requests for the CINC.
•Informing the CINC of program and budget
decisions that may affect planning and
operations.
•Conducting Army-specific functions such as
internal administration and discipline,
training, normal logistics functions, and
Army intelligence matters.
•Informing the CINC of joint nonstrategic
nuclear support required by the Army.
•Ensuring signal interoperability.
•Providing
support to
JTF.
logistical and administrative
the ARFOR participating in a
SUPPORT
The Army service chain expects the ASCC
to monitor and support all ARFOR in its
geographic area. The ASCC, exercising
ADCON, may communicate through the Army
Chief of Staff to the Secretary of the Army for
service-specific matters. The ASCC is
responsible for command logistical support
unless a higher command directs otherwise.
Sometimes, the CINC may direct the
ASCC to provide common items to other
services within his AOR. Additionally, the
ASCC may support allied or coalition forces.
Army commanders in joint organizations use
the channel from the ASCC to the Department
of the Army for service-specific requirements.
This channel forms a hierarchy for Army
support in theater but does not imply a
superior-subordinate relationship. Army
elements within subordinate joint
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FM 100-7
organizations perform functions similar to the
ASCC. An illustration of this concept is the
organization of the service channel in PACOM
with a notional JTF (Figure 2-12).
In Figure 2-12, the ARFOR within the
notional JTF coordinate logistics through US
Army, Japan (USAR-J). USAR-J is the Army
service component command of USFJ, a
subunified command. USAR-J is responsible
for coordinating support services through US
Army, Pacific (USARPAC). Within PACOM, a
unified command, USARPAC is the Army
service component command and coordinates
directly with the Department of the Army. The
purpose of the service channel is the efficient
use of Army resources within a theater. The
JTF establishing authority’s Army service
component command is responsible for
providing logistical and administrative support
to ARFOR participating in a JTF.
COMMAND AND CONTROL
During conditions of peacetime, each
regional CINC has an Army service component
command through which he normally exercises
COCOM of ARFOR assigned by the NCA to the
CINC. In conflict and war, the CINC may
transfer OPCON to the designated
headquarters. The organizational design of a
headquarters to support C2 tasks of the Army
service component command, the JTF, the
operational-level headquarters (numbered
army), and corps must be versatile, agile,
flexible, and modular in structure. Such a
design provides the Army service component
command the flexibility to establish the
required C2 capability, using assigned assets or
preestablished functional and modular
augmentation packages from other component
forces or other Army assets.
The ASCC must determine the degree of
participation within the AOR required by
ARFOR. That participation can range from
Army contributions to a JTF, to total
involvement of the Army component in theater,
to reinforcements from CONUS or other
theaters. The assessment of the operational
environment will determine how the Army
organizes within the AOR.
The first option is for the ASCC to provide
an operational-level C2 capability. The Army
contribution to a subunified command is an
example of this option. This subunified
command’s ASCC has responsibilities within
the designated AO similar to those of the
unified commands ASCC. The deployment of
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Army units to operate within a JTF requires
the ASCC to establish an ARFOR operationallevel
headquarters to command and control
those units. This headquarters may require
augmentation from the ARFOR not assigned to
the CINC or from other services. Another
alternative is to augment the JTF
headquarters. The complexity of the
environment and the degree of Army
participation determines the option selected.
A second option is the formation and
deployment of an operational-level
headquarters (for example, a numbered army)
to control the conduct of operations. The ASCC
makes this decision in consultation with the
CINC. This presupposes a highly complex
operational environment with the involvement
of multiple ARFOR (usually more than one
Army corps). The ASCC remains the senior
army commander within the unified command
and may or may not be physically located
within the AO. If the ASCC is not located in the
AO and does not deploy, he may constitute and
deploy a requisite headquarters to perform C2
for the ASCC’s Title 10 support responsibilities
therein. This requisite headquarters would be
in addition to the operational-level
headquarters conducting operations.
The first two options require coordination
with the ClNC. The third option is internal to
the ASCC and concerns the organization of the
Army operational-level component. The ASCC
may determine a need to consolidate functions
under a deputy commanding general
responsible for operations and a deputy
commanding general responsible for support
and logistics. The DCG for Support would serve
as the senior logistician responsible for battle
command of all logistics and support forces and
coordination of all logistics support. If
designated as the executive agent, the DCG for
Support would also be responsible for
coordinating logistics support for joint and/or
multinational forces in the theater of
operations.
The DCG for Operations would serve as the
senior operator responsible for battle command
of all maneuver forces, conducting major
operations, battles, and engagements. In this
arrangement, the ASCC would continue his
service responsibilities and establish required
linkages among joint, multinational,
interagency, NGO, PVO, or UN. This option
reduces the span of control required of the
commander. As with the first option,
complexity of the environment determines the
selection of this organizational alternative.
These options provide an orderly means for
the Army to accomplish the operational-level
responsibilities in theater. The options also
provide a means to evolve the Army theater
structure as the complexity of the theater
evolves.
Another set of circumstances in which the
Army could be divided into separate elements
is when the CINC requires a sense of urgency
and direct responsiveness of an Army force to
him. Under such exceptional circumstances,
the theater organization may have two or more
independent ARFOR operating directly under
the theater CINC. These separate ARFOR
would focus on specific missions, as determined
by the CINC and ASCC. The ASCC continues
to focus on the task of supporting the
operations of all ARFOR within the theater.
However, commanders of the ARFOR under
COCOM (working directly for the CINC) focus
primarily on operations and the establishment
and maintenance of joint and multinational
linkages. Thus, the three tasks of the
operational-level commander would be
conducted by both Army commanders. The
structure of the ASCC is adaptable enough to
meet the three crucial tasks in any theater
situation. The ASCC’s responsibility is to
advise the CINC of a structure that meets the
dictates of operational design.
Both the ASCC and numbered army commanders would be responsible for
establishing linkages with joint, multinational, government, nongovernment,
private voluntary, and interagency organizations. However, the ASCC would focus
on support operations, and the numbered army commander would focus on the
conduct of operations and the requirements of a joint force land component, if
designated by the CINC.
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FM 100-7
ARMY COMMANDER AS A SUBORDINATE
JOINT FORCE COMMANDER
The CINC may designate an ARFOR
commander as a subordinate JFC. The
designation may be as a subunified
commander, a JFLCC, or a CJTF. Based on the
ASCC structure, the Army JFC must
reexamine his responsibilities and capabilities
to perform the three tasks of the operationallevel
commander. Establishing a joint
headquarters under these circumstances will
be a unique extension of the joint linkage task.
As a JFLCC, the ARFOR commander
retains the responsibility, through the service
branch of the chain of command, to support
subordinate Army forces. Because of the
complexity of the two tasks—operations and
support—the ASCC may delegate the authority
for performing the support task to a
subordinate Army headquarters. The ASCC,
when delegating this responsibility, must
ensure his subordinate commander is aware
and understands the CINC’s intent and
concept of operations. This delegation allows
the ASCC, as the JFLCC, to focus on
conducting operations.
As a subunified or CJTF, the ARFOR
commander would normally expect to focus on
the conduct of joint operations. Support of the
ARFOR under control of the subunified
command or JTF will flow through the CINC’s
ASCC. Depending on the method in which the
CINC employs the Army component, the ASCC
may appoint a single subordinate commander
responsible for executing typical logistics and
administrative functions. Chapter 6 has details
on Army component operations.
OPERATIONAL-LEVEL
ENVIRONMENT
The requirement to assess the
environment in which operations are to be
conducted exists at the strategic, operational,
and tactical levels. The factors of METT-T
provide a structure for the conduct of those
analyses. In preparing and conducting major
operations to support joint campaigns, the
ARFOR commander and the CJTF must
examine the operational environment, using
the factors of METT-T and a regional analysis.
The results of that examination serve as a
means for assessing relative strengths and
weaknesses of the theater and are used to
guide and temper actions.
The ARFOR commander and the CJTF
view the operational-level environment in
much the same manner as the CINC views the
larger theater strategic environment. Both
commanders consider the factors peculiar to
the area in which they will operate. The
environment is determined by the
circumstances, influences, and conditions that
affect the employment of military force and the
decisions of the operational levels of command.
The assessment of the strategic
environment is based upon the circumstances,
conditions, and influences of the theater. The
operational environment within that theater is
assessed in a similar manner. The
commander’s three operational-level tasks
provide the structure for the METT-T
assessment and correspond to the three
elements in the strategic assessment. Within
these three tasks, eight components further
define the operational METT-T assessment.
Figure 2-13 is a model for the conduct of the
operational-level assessment.
JOINT, MULTINATIONAL, AND
INTERAGENCY LINKAGE
(CIRCUMSTANCES)
Four components make up an assessment
of joint, multinational, and interagency
linkages.
Interoperability
Interoperability is the ability of forces to
provide a capability or service, to accept
services from other forces or agencies, and to
use those capabilities and services to operate
effectively together. The presence of
government agencies is an aspect of operations
in a joint environment. The degree of required
Army interoperability with these agencies will
be determined by the circumstances of the
operational environment.
Alliances and Agreements
Alliances and agreements are the formal
means that guide multinational operations.
The degree of formality is a dynamic state
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Chapter 2
determined by mutual needs. Where need
exists, the degree of formality increases with
time. This same principle applies to
interagency operations. These arrangements
are initiated when a requirement for more
formal arrangements exists.
Where arrangements are yet unformed or
in early development, operations may be based
on very informal agreements by
representatives of the Army and the agency.
Initially, participants may have only general
principles from public law, presidential
instructions, and agency policy or doctrine to
guide their actions. As time permits and
requirements demand, the arrangements are
formalized in memorandums of understanding
that outline specific responsibilities.
Forward Presence
US forces, in modest numbers, are forward
deployed to sustain alliance commitments and
to contribute to regional stability. Forward
presence is accomplished also through the
periodic deployment of CONUS-based forces
for participation in training exercises, nation
assistance activities, or counterdrug
operations. Pre-positioning of forces and
sustainment to include Army pre-positioned
afloat (APA) contribute to mobility and
flexibility of US forces. This supports the forceprojection
military strategy and provides for
rapid response to a crisis or reinforcement and
sustainment of forward-presence forces.
Objective
The operational-level commander derives
the objective from the theater campaign plan
developed from the theater military strategy.
That plan and strategy is subject to
modification by allies/coalition leaders, which
may have a subsequent impact on the
operational objective. The time available is also
a factor that must be addressed when
considering the objective.
OPERATIONS (CONDITIONS)
The components of the operations task are
the threat and the geography, topography, and
climatology.
Threat
The threat is based on the ability of an
enemy or potential enemy to limit, neutralize,
or destroy the effectiveness of a current or
projected mission, organization, or equipment
item. The threat may be indirect by having the
potential to adversely impact on US interests
or the attainment of US objectives. The world
remains extremely dangerous. Many nations
can acquire technologically advanced, highly
lethal weapons that could threaten US and
allied forces. For example, third-dimension
platforms, ballistic missiles, cruise missiles,
armed helicopters, and weapons-carrying
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), combined
with accurate guidance and mass casualty
warheads, present a significant threat to a
warfighting CINC’s assets.
Instabilities
A variety of factors challenges the stability
of various countries and regions. These
instabilities can lead to increased levels of
competition, regional conflicts, and civil war.
Additionally, regional factions, some
possessing forces and equipment equivalent to
the US, may seek to expand their influence by
coercion or direct force. These regional
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FM 100-7
challenges will often involve an adversary
whose system of beliefs interprets differently
such fundamental ideas as right or wrong, the
value of human life, and the concept of victory
and defeat.
Geography, Topography, and Climatology
The geography describes the land, sea, air,
and the distribution of plant and animal life,
including man and his industries. The
topography describes the configuration of a
surface, including its relief and the position of
its natural and man-made features.
Climatology describes the prevailing weather
conditions of a region.
SUPPORT OPERATIONS
(INFLUENCES)
Two components of the support task are
the infrastructure and foreign nation support.
Infrastructure
Infrastructure is a term that applies to all
fixed and permanent installations, fabrications
(road, rail, communications networks, water
networks, air networks, or utility systems), or
facilities for the support and control of military
forces.
Foreign Nation Support
Foreign nation support includes all civil or
military assistance provided by a nation to
foreign forces within its territory during
peacetime, conflict, or war. Foreign nation
support is based upon agreements mutually
concluded between nations. The coalition
participants establish similar support
arrangements at the theater strategic level. An
additional concern, especially in alliances, is to
determine the type of support that the US
forces, when directed, may have to provide to
the alliance partners or host nation.
RANGE OF OPTIONS
As the commander examines the
operational environment, he begins to make
judgments about the operational impact on his
three tasks. These judgments are the
subjective and objective measurements of the
components of each task as they affect the
employment of the Army force. They
correspond to a range of options that describes
the commander’s ability to accomplish the
three tasks in the operational environment.
Figure 2-13 lists the three tasks, the
operational environment components, and the
broad values that describe the range over
which these tasks and components may be
measured.
The commander assesses the operational
environment and assigns a cumulative
assessment describing it as austere, restrictive,
or developed. This perspective permits the
comprehensive analysis of the operational
environment through the examination of each
task and the environmental components that
align with each task of the operational
commander. This analysis helps identify the
areas that require more or less effort. The
analysis also influences the commander’s
skillful synchronization of the operational
functions.
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Chapter 3
Theater Strategic and
Operational-Level Perspective
A major concept essential to understanding Army theater
operations at the operational level is operational art and design. Key
elements of operational art and design apply across the range of
military operations. Commanders must understand these elements
when they plan and conduct Army operations in theater. This
chapter discusses the Army operational-level commander's
employment of ways and means to obtain ends established by theater
strategy and campaign plans.
No particular echelon of command functions solely at the
operational level. Command echelons may vary with the nature of the
campaign or major operation, strategic and military objectives,
organizational structure, or size of the joint force. The intended
purpose—not the level of command—is the primary determinant of
whether a force functions at the operational level.
OPERATIONAL ART
FM 100-5 describes operational art as
"... the skillful employment of military forces
to attain strategic and/or operational
objectives in a theater of operations through
the design, organization, integration, and
conduct of theater strategies, campaigns,
major operations, and battles. Operational
art translates theater strategy and design
into operational design which links and
integrates the tactical battles and
engagements that, when fought and won,
achieve the strategic aim."
Operational art links tactical events to
strategic objectives. Using operational art, the
CINC envisions the theater strategic and
operational design. To achieve theater
strategic design and objectives, the CINC
arranges unified operations, joint operations,
major operations, and tactical-level battles.
Operational art at the operational level uses
major operations in support of joint campaigns
to sequence these events over time and space.
Senior army commanders and their staffs
practicing operational art may operate in a
joint and possibly combined arena. They
sequence Army operations to achieve theater
strategic and operational objectives.
KEY CONCEPTS OF OPERATIONAL
ART AND DESIGN
The theater strategic and operational
concepts that explain operational art and
design include center of gravity, decisive points,
lines of operation, culminating point, indirect
approach, positional advantage and strategic
concentration of forces, and deception. The
CINC and his principal subordinates should
agree on what design features are most
important to accomplishing the mission. The
CINC establishes the first use and priority of
these concepts. Subordinates’ use and priority
is a subset of the CINC’s. For example, the
CINC selects the strategic center of gravity,
and subordinates select decisive points on the
path to attacking the center of gravity.
Center of Gravity
The essence of operational art is
concentrating friendly military forces and
resources against the enemy’s main sources of
strength (strategic center of gravity) in a
manner that provides the JFC with the
strategic and operational advantage and the
initiative. The destruction, dislocation, or
neutralization of the enemy center of gravity
should prove decisive in achieving strategic
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FM 100-7
objectives. Similarly, the JFC must identify the
theater friendly center of gravity and protect it.
The enemy center of gravity exists at all
levels of war. A center of gravity is the
foundation of capability—what von Clausewitz
called "the hub of all power and movement, on
which everything depends....the point at which
all our energies should be directed." (On
War, 1976) The center of gravity maybe seen in
more complex components or abstract terms,
such as the enemy’s alliance, solidarity, or
national will and in actual examples such as
strategic reserves, C2, logistics, industrial base,
and so forth. The center of gravity is most
useful at the operational level of war as an
analytical tool to focus the effort against the
enemy’s strength.
In MOOTW such as disaster relief and
humanitarian assistance the enemy’s center of
gravity is the threat of hunger or the elements
of the environment. The uniqueness of these
operations requires the commander and his
staff to understand the military’s role in
relation to the total efforts of national power
being used to resolve the situation. The
military’s role supports the other elements of
national power.
Decisive Points
Decisive points provide commanders with a
significant advantage. They are the keys to
defeating or protecting the center of gravity.
Normally, there are more decisive points in a
theater than there are resources to attack
them. The commander designates the most
critical points and objectives as a means of
gaining freedom of maneuver to gain and
maintain momentum. By correctly identifying
and then attacking (or protecting) decisive
points, the commander is able to defeat the
enemy’s center of gravity. Decisive points serve
as trigger points for friendly force actions that
sustain the initiative. The AO will have more
decisive points than available resources to
commit against them. The commander and his
staff must conduct a risk analysis to prioritize
the friendly force efforts.
A stand-alone, individual information war
action can be decisive. Winning the
information battle before the war can be even
more decisive than winning it during
hostilities. Winning the information war before
the war may preclude combat operations. The
ability to get inside an adversary’s decisionmaking
cycle (his operational ability to react) is
critical to attacking his centers of gravity,
exploiting his weaknesses, and effectively
concentrating our own combat power. An area
that must not be overlooked is using, and even
driving, emerging technologies to access the
tactical situation on the ground.
Lines of Operation
Lines of operation define the directional
orientation of a force in relation to the enemy.
They connect the force with its base of
operations—from which it receives
reinforcements and resupply-–and its forward
units—where it operates against the enemy.
This concept is linked to the interior or exterior
(or combination) directional orientation of a
force in relation to the enemy. Lines of
operation are used to focus combat power
effects toward a desired end.
Culminating Point
The culminating point is the point in time
and space at which the offensive becomes
overextended, and offensive combat power no
longer sufficiently exceeds that of the defender
to allow continuation of the offense. While this
point may not be precisely determined, the
commander and his staff should consider it in
the design concept.
A defensive culminating point is that point
at which the defender’s capability is reduced to
such a degree that continued pursuit could
result in the defender’s defeat in detail. If the
defender’s aim is to transition to the attack,
then the culminating point is where the
defender must revert to a holding action and
await reinforcement. If the defender’s aim is to
retain terrain, then the culminating point is
where the defender must withdraw, delay, and
so forth.
Indirect Approach
An indirect approach is a scheme that
attacks the enemy center of gravity from
unexpected directions or at unexpected times.
The indirect approach seeks enemy
vulnerabilities and avoids enemy strengths. The
application of techniques to win the information
war is one area that leads itself to the indirect
approach. When possible, JFCs attack enemy
centers of gravity directly. Where direct attack
means attacking into an opponent’s strength,
JFCs should seek an indirect approach.
Examples include attacks of flanks, rear areas, or
C2 capabilities. Vulnerabilities are boundaries or
seams between forces, the relative weaknesses of
unprotected flanks or rear areas, or unhardened
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Chapter 3
command, control, communications, and
intelligence (C3I) facilities.
Positional Advantage and
Strategic Concentration of Forces
Strategic realities indicate that force ratios
may not favor friendly forces across the
theater. Therefore, the JFC determines where
to strategically concentrate force and in what
areas to accept risk. Clearly, this aspect ties in
with the center of gravity, indirect approach,
positional advantage, and deception. Joint
forces seek to obtain positional advantage
relative to enemy forces. Such advantage
includes control of territory—air, land, sea,
subsea, and space—from which to better
operate and attack. Having positional
advantage includes denying this territory and
freedom of movement to the enemy. Attaining
this advantage involves combat operations.
Deception
Deception manipulates enemy perceptions
about friendly force intentions, positions, and
timing. Deception has strategic, operational,
and tactical aspects, and its planning is as
complex and detailed as the overall plan.
Deception relies heavily on intelligence
information, which helps commanders identify
appropriate targets, develop a credible story,
and determine the effectiveness of the effort.
KEY ELEMENTS OF THEATER
AND OPERATIONAL DESIGN
The key elements of theater and
operational design reinforce the concepts of
operational art and design. The elements
consist of the—
•Objective.
•Sequence of operations and use of resources.
•Phases.
•Branches and sequels.
•Sequential and simultaneous warfare.
•Logistics.
The senior army commander’s effective use
of operational art and design elements
translates theater strategy and the campaign
into operational and, ultimately, tactical
action. No specific level of command is
concerned solely with operational art and
design. The level of command that has the
responsibility to link strategic aims with
tactical execution varies in military operations.
The theater commander and subordinate
operational-level commanders may control
large military formations over great geographic
distances while sequencing tactical military
operations in pursuit of strategic or operational
objectives. Conversely, operational-level
commanders may control relatively small
military formations conducting specific, shortterm
operations for the same purpose. Senior
army commanders practice operational art
across the range of military operations.
Whatever the environment (peacetime,
conflict, or war), the operational-level
commander links theater strategy and
campaigns to tactical execution by effectively
sequencing operations over time.
Objective
The objective is the central element of
operational design because it establishes the
condition necessary to achieve the strategic
aim. While the CINC initially keys on national
or alliance strategic objectives, he also
supplements them with theater strategic and
operational objectives. To ensure clarity of
strategic and operational intent when
conducting subordinate campaigns, JFCs may
identify and carefully describe operational
objectives from the CINC’s specified and
implied tasks.
Sequence of Operations and
Use of Resources
The sequence of operations and use of
resources are closely related elements of
theater and operational design. The
operational-level commander links theater
strategy and campaigns to tactical execution by
effectively sequencing major operations and
battles over time. As described in FM 100-5,
tempo and battle command contribute
significantly to the effective sequencing of
events.
The JFC visualizes the sequence of
operations necessary to achieve the desired
conditions of the strategic end state. Without
this linkage, operations are apt to become a
series of disjointed events less likely to achieve
the desired theater objectives. The
visualization includes identifying the enemy
center of gravity and culminating points and
protecting the friendly center of gravity. This
process is useful when determining phases of a
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FM 100-7
Branches and Sequels
campaign, applying resources against these
phases, and enabling the JFC to envision
requirements for branches or sequels.
Phases
Generally, the campaign is divided into
phases that focus on major changes in the
nature of the total effort, such as defensive to
offensive, decisive maritime action, and
decisive continental action. Some campaigns
are naturally progressive in their phasing
(establish sea control, gain a lodgment, initiate
a major continental campaign), while others
are more complex. The latter may be the case
when the opponent has initiated hostilities and
the theater commander must transition from
an initial defense, to seizure of the initiative,
and eventually to offensive operations to
achieve the strategic goal. The main effort is to
attack the centers of gravity simultaneously
throughout the depth of the battle space. Often
that effort is phased.
Each phase in the campaign should lay the
groundwork for its successor until a final
decisive effort can be joined. A phase may
orient on a physical objective or on establishing
a certain advantageous condition. The
description of each phase should identify the
strategic tasks to be accomplished, together
with the ultimate purpose—the why—of the
strategic tasks. The description should include
a narrative of the theater commander’s
strategic concept of how and when these
strategic tasks are to be accomplished. It
should also include an estimate of force
requirements, as well as major supporting
operations necessary for the effort.
These concepts and force estimates should
be continually refined up to the time the
operation order implementing that phase is
required. Prior to terminating the phase or
meeting the necessary conditions for moving to
the next phase, planning will have begun and
the refinement process to facilitate the
transition will continue.
Besides phases, the JFC visualizes
requirements over the full range of operations
for branches to preserve freedom of action.
Branches are contingency plans for changing
disposition, orientation, or direction of
movement and for accepting or declining
battle. Sequels are actions taken after an event
or battle and are based on possible outcomes—
victory, defeat, or stalemate.
Sequels, for example, might reflect a
potential transition from the strategic defense
to a counteroffensive, to a withdrawal, or to an
occupation. The visualization of branches and
sequels is not simply a thought process of
events. This visualization is a parallel planning
process that provides the command a valuable
resource-time.
Sequential and Simultaneous
Warfare
In considering phasing, the JFC addresses
the problem of deployment to ensure that
forces arrive at times and places that support
the campaign. Because of limited resources,
geographic considerations, and our system for
organizing the force, the US may go to war in
sequential phases.
At the strategic level, sequential actions
include mobilization, deployment, and
sustainment of the sequential employment of
forces. Because the US is strategically insular,
plans are driven to exterior LOCs, and, with
limited resources, the campaign is phased to
achieve strategic ends.
At the operational-level, sequencing may
be seen more in terms of employment.
Additionally, sustainment is a critical
consideration in sequencing campaigns. The
campaign establishes requirements for the
procurement and apportionment of national
resources from CONUS-sustaining bases.
Forward bases must be established, LOCs
must be opened and maintained, intermediate
bases of operations must be established to
support new phases, and priorities for services
and support must be established by phase.
Logistics considerations, then, become key to
sequencing the campaign plan.
The phasing and sequencing of operations Notwithstanding the generally sequential
should not be slow or methodical. However, as nature of campaign phases, some phases are
soon as conditions permit, the JFC strives to conducted simultaneously—particularly in
overwhelm the enemy throughout the depth of depth. Deployment may continue well after
the battle space. He conducts simultaneous employment begins. Sustainment is conducted
attacks throughout the depth to paralyze the throughout. Redeployment may begin during
enemy and force an early capitulation. posthostility operations. Defense and offense
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Chapter 3
operations are always interrelated. Also,
sequential operations may be conducted in a
single operation, for example, the raid into
Libya.
Logistics
Logistics is one of the combat functions
that helps commanders build, sustain, and
project combat power. It is also a major
operating system at each level of war. Combat
operations and logistics increasingly merge at
higher levels of war. Neither can be conceived
without consideration of the other.
Strategic and operational logistics support
wars, campaigns, and major operations;
tactical logistics supports battles and
engagements. Strategic and operational
The resources provided
commander are the means.
direction that governs
operations are the ways.
logistics interface in the theater. The
combatant commander provides strategic
guidance and priorities for operations, while
the service component commanders identify
operational requirements to the national
industrial logistics base.
Deployment and integration of forces and
logistics in the theater are based on the
combatant commander’s theater strategic
design in his campaign plan. Centralized
management and distribution of supplies and
materiel at the strategic level facilitate
decentralized execution of logistics at the
operational and tactical levels. Further
discussion of operational art and its
corresponding components can be found in
FM100-5.
RESOURCES
to the operational
The authoritative
the conduct of
MEANS
The means allocated to the operational
commander influence the selection of the
operational objectives. Tangible resources
include military forces and supplies made
available to the commander. These may
include other nonmilitary assets such as US
civilian agencies or HNS and direct
augmentation, for example, civilian reserve air,
land, or maritime fleet transportation assets.
Intangible resources include the
commander’s authority over forces not under
his direct command; authority over certain
nonmilitary aspects of theater operations, for
example, refugees; and public and diplomatic
support of military operations.
WAYS
The allocation of resources provides
capabilities and constraints on the conduct of
operations. The concept for operations emerges
from these capabilities and constraints. The
concept is tempered by contingency plans
(branches) that include deception. The
authoritative guidance for the operational
concept is the ways of the operation.
The nature of the strategic direction may
require that the use of military force be limited
such as by ROE. Limiting factors dictate how
the Army operational-level commander uses
resources to attain a particular operational
objective. The Army commander articulates
these limiting factors in the form of restrictions
and constraints.
Restrictions
Restrictions prohibit the operational-level
commander from performing specific actions or
categories of actions. The laws and treaties of
the US embody some restrictions such as those
on the treatment of noncombatants imposed by
the Geneva Conventions. Others will be unique
to the circumstances and locale of the
particular conflict. Some restrictions may
prohibit the use of certain weapons, preclude
operations in certain geographical areas, or
limit certain tactical methods such as the
mining of harbors. Such restrictions may
influence the achievement of operational-level
objectives.
Constraints
Constraints shape operational
alternatives. In contrast to restrictions,
constraints denote actions that the commander
must take or methods he must employ. Limits
of advance and control measures in general are
examples of constraints. The imperative to
minimize casualties also may shape
alternatives.
Methods may include objectives unrelated
to operational military aims but which have
inherent strategic significance. For example,
the JFC may require the Army commander to
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FM 100-7
employ combined forces even though their use tactically insignifican. The retention of
would make operations more complex from the Verdun in 1916 constituted such a constraint
Army perspective. Frequently, constraints on French operations, though it resulted in no
require retaining or protecting areas deemed military gain and cost nearly a million lives.
diplomatically or psychologically important but
OPERATIONAL-LEVEL COMMAND
The Army may act as a service component,
functional component, subunified command, or
JTF subordinate to the JFC during the conduct
of operational-level activities. The ASCC, or
ARFOR commander, acting in one or more of
these roles at the operational level, plans and
conducts subordinate campaigns, major
operations, and operations to attain theater
strategic and/or operational objectives to
support the joint force mission.
The JFC translates strategic guidance to
operational terms in the form of an OPLAN or
operations order (OPORD). This OPLAN/
OPORD includes a clear mission and specific
tasks to which the traditional military
decision-making cycle is applied. The JFC
provides a clear definition of the conditions
that constitute the strategic and military end
states. The conditions for the end states must
exist before planning and execution of military
operations can be effective. The Army
operational-level commander may translate
these conditions into a single military objective
or phased military objectives expressed in
major operations that support joint campaigns.
The Army commander participates in the
joint concurrent (parallel) planning process to
help the JFC translate strategic direction and
aims into a clearly defined and achievable end
state and objective. Usually, the more intense
the conflict and the more predominant the
military factors, the easier it is to translate
strategic direction into operational-level
objectives. When the nonmilitary elements of
national power dominate, the full use of military
capability may be limited. Joint Pub 3-O states
that adaptive planning provides a range of
options encompassing all the elements of
national power (diplomatic, economic,
informational, and military). The selection of
military operational-level objectives tends to be
more complex in MOOTW.
3-5
PART TWO
Planning and Execution
The two chapters in this part discuss the planning considerations for Army
operations and the operating systems at the operational level in theaters.
Chapter 4 presents planning considerations for Army participants at the
operational level in theaters in the joint operations of subordinate joint campaigns.
Chapter 5 discusses operational art requiring the synchronization of the six
operational-level operating systems.
Chapter 4
Planning Framework
While the planning process is essentially the same at most levels
of command, subordinate planning at the operational level demands
a broader perspective over the whole range of military operations.
Joint Pubs 3-0 and 5-00.1 describe the conditions under which
subunified and JTF commanders write campaign plans to support
the theater campaign plan. Functional and service components of
the joint force conduct subordinate and supporting operations—not
independent campaigns.
Operational-level Army planners use major operations as tools to
synchronize ends, ways, and means to support the joint operations of
a subordinate joint campaign. These major operations sequence
tactical battles or activities to attain theater strategic and
supporting operational-level objectives and guidance from the
unified theater campaign. Theater strategic planners use unified
operations to synchronize the ends, ways, and means of the theater
combatant commander’s theater strategic purposes.
CAMPAIGNS
Though commanders traditionally apply
campaigns to conflict and war, they can also
design them to accomplish theater strategic
objectives in peacetime. A subordinate joint
campaign plan serves as the key employment
plan to be implemented in subordinate
operating areas such as a theater of operation
or other JOA. This plan is the basis for
planning among the staff and various
subordinate service component commands.
This campaign plan provides the
subordinate commander’s vision and intent. It
does this through broad, operational concepts
for operations and sustainment throughout the
time frame necessary to achieve the theater
commander’s assigned strategic concept and
objectives.
The subordinate JFC, in his campaign
plan, considers an orderly schedule of theater
strategic decisions and directions and the
supporting operational focus of the theater
campaign plan. He then provides a series of
related joint operations within the joint
campaign. The plan comprises subordinate
forces and designates command relationships,
subordinate tasks, and objectives.
The subordinate plan ensures
synchronization and integration of joint and
single-service forces but can integrate, when
delegated, specific (special operations) and
other supporting forces. The subordinate JFC
might consider relationships, also delegated,
with multinational, interagency, international,
and UN forces. However, normally the theater
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FM 100-7
commander first integrates these types of
forces into his unified operations to achieve
unity of effort in the theater. Integrating these
forces to achieve designated objectives, either
directly or indirectly, contributes to obtaining
the CINC’s strategic objectives.
Theater-level or subordinate campaign
planning is a dynamic and continuous process
that occurs in peacetime, conflict, or war. It
guides the development of supporting
operations or campaign plans and facilitates
the implementation of national strategic
direction, priorities, and resources allocations.
Deliberate planning is designed as a cyclic
process during peacetime conditions.
Deliberate planning allows the opportunity to
develop and refine plans (OPLANs, concept
plans [CONPLANs], and concept summaries)
to be used in wartime. Crisis action planning
(CAP) procedures provide for the transition
from peacetime to hostilities or war. Deliberate
planning supports CAP by anticipating
potential crises and developing the contingency
plans that facilitate the rapid development and
selection of a COA and execution planning
during a crisis. The deliberate theater and
supporting plans are based on evolving
assumptions and/or an intelligence buildup.
The intelligence buildup is continuous
throughout the range of military operations.
Intelligence readiness begins in peacetime,
before any crisis. The commander establishes
intelligence requirements that direct
peacetime intelligence operations supporting
contingency planning. Two specific elements—
staying out front in intelligence planning and
understanding how to get intelligence
support— are key components to contingency
planning. As contingency plans are activated,
the commander focuses intelligence and
targeting to support specific mission decision
and planning requirements. In addition, the
commander begins planning for the crossover
point in intelligence when initial reliance on
higher echelon intelligence is augmented by
tactical intelligence and electronic warfare
(IEW) assets within the AO.
Intelligence readiness means that
intelligence organizations must develop broad
knowledge of priority contingency areas,
update those data bases daily, and be prepared
to surge in support of emerging missions.
Commanders and J2s must direct the
intelligence effort daily to ensure data bases
are available if alerted to support contingency
planning and execution. The intelligence staff
must provide commanders routine, direct, and
habitual links into the intelligence system.
These links provide an early focus on the
commander’s tactical and operational
intelligence needs. When a regional crisis
occurs, the intelligence system focuses on
pushing intelligence and tailored products to
the users and prepares for the unit to pull
needed intelligence.
When a crisis develops, the CJCS issues a
warning order. The supported CINC,
subordinate force commanders, and supporting
commanders adjust their plans as time permits
and the probability of conducting operations
increases. The supported commander develops
COAs and recommends a specific COA to the
NCA. The NCA selects a COA and the CJCS
issues an alert order. During the execution
planning phase, the supported CINC and his
staff prepare the campaign plan and an
OPORD, normally by modifying an existing
OPLAN, to initiate the first phase of the
theater campaign. Execution begins with the
NCA decision, via the CJCS execute order, to
execute the campaign plan and continues until
the campaign reaches an end state favorable to
the US and its allies.
ORIGINATING AUTHORITIES
Campaign planning can be directed by the
NCA, assigned in the JSCP, undertaken by the
theater commander, or undertaken to support
the sequential requirements of subordinate
JFCs. Existing OPLANs or CONPLANs may
provide the basis for development of campaign
plans.
The campaign plan is the basis for action
within a hierarchy of decision making and
guidance. That guidance links national
security strategy and policy directives to
tactical-level battles and engagements. Both
levels of campaign plans ensure the linkage of
those battles and engagements toward the
accomplishment of the desired strategic end
state. See Figure 4-1.
Upon approval by the NCA of a proposed
military option with alternatives, the CJCS
designates the supported and supporting
combatant commanders and issues further
planning guidance. The supported CINC has
primary responsibility for all aspects of theater
campaign plan development. The supported
CINC develops his strategic estimate and
intent, then prepares the recommended
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Chapter 4
strategic concept as the preferred COA, which,
upon approval, becomes the basis of his
campaign plan.
When the CJCS approves the campaign
plan, the supported CINC provides a copy of
the plan to supporting CINCs and subordinates
for their use as a basis for developing their
supporting plans. In practice, the process is
sequential only in meeting formal approval
dates. All parties conduct concurrent planning
throughout the process, via working papers,
informal and formal drafts, liaison efforts, and
action officer and commanders’ conferences.
The supported CINC ensures that his
theater organizational staffs can coordinate
effectively with supporting CINCs. The CJCS
outlines to all involved CINCs the degree of
coordination and cooperation required.
Unless limited by the establishing
directive, the supported commander exercises
general direction over the supporting effort.
General direction includes—
•The designation of targets or objectives.
•Timing.
• Duration of the supporting action.
•Other instructions as necessary for
coordination and efficiency with the unity of
effort between supported and supporting
efforts and plans.
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FM 100-7
The supported commander should consider
the accepted operational and tactical practices
of the services of the supporting forces.
The supporting commander is responsible
for ascertaining the needs of the supported
force. He fulfills those, needs with existing
capabilities and in keeping with the priorities
and requirements of other assigned tasks.
Normally, the supporting commander is
permitted to prescribe the operations, tactics,
methods, communications, and procedures the
supporting force employs.
Occasionally, the NCA or CINC requires
more rapid translation of strategic aims into
direct, tactical execution, with an abbreviated
operational-level link. This typically occurs
during specific incidents or sensitive situations
requiring NCA control. These direct actions of
special operations are usually of short
duration, requiring nearly simultaneous
operations. The 1986 US raid on Libya is an
example. As conventional operations become
longer in duration or more complex in
execution, they are likely to require an
expanded operational-level link between the
strategic aim and tactical execution.
CAMPAIGN DESIGN
The theater strategic environment
significantly affects campaign design at the
theater strategic or operational levels. Alliance
and coalition requirements are obviously key
factors to consider. The availability and
capabilities of forward-presence forces—to
include allied and international forces,
interagency organizations, and NGOs and
PVOs—influence force apportionment
decisions. Mobilization, deployment,
sustainment, and force-generation capabilities
influence the type and timing of operations.
ROE may impose limitations, constraints, or
restraints.
Campaign plans are designed to conduct a
series of related military operations to achieve
strategic objectives in a given time and space.
Theater campaigns achieve national strategic
objectives, whereas subordinate campaigns
achieve the CINC’s theater strategic objectives.
Campaign plans are the theater strategic and
operational extensions of the CINC’s theater
strategy. They translate theater strategic or
operational concepts into theater or
subordinate campaign plans for military action
by specifying how intelligence, operations,
logistics, and C2 is used over time to attain
national or theater strategic objectives.
The key to designing the theater campaign
plan is understanding the desired strategic end
state, determining the military end state,
identifying the enemy’s strategic center of
gravity, and—having achieved the strategic
advantage by strategic concentrations and
subsequent strategic maneuver—attacking the
center of gravity to achieve the end state.
Though theater and subordinate campaigns
have different levels of scope, purpose, and
perspective, they share common fundamentals.
•They describe the situation affecting the
conduct of military operations.
•They describe the strategic end state and
conditions that constitute that end state.
•They orient on the enemy’s strategic center
of gravity and/or successive decisive points
at all levels of war and levels of depth.
•They provide an orderly schedule of theater
strategic or operational decisions—the
commander’s vision and intent.
•They provide concepts of operations and
sustainment to achieve national or theater
strategic objectives within a theater
organization—the basis for all other
planning.
•They describe the series of related unified or
joint operations and major operations that
lead to the campaign end state, to include
objectives and conditions necessary to begin
each subsequent sequence of operations.
•They phase the levels of campaigns to
clearly define or focus sequential activities.
Phases often correspond to changes in the
purposes of unified or joint major
operations.
•They identify the strategic center of gravity
and/or key decisive points during the
campaign. Key decisions are often based on
attainment of conditions identified as
necessary to begin phases or shift
operations. Other key decisions involve
shifting priorities and resources.
•They provide the CINC’s or subordinate’s
design for synchronizing efforts.
•They describe the terms of priority of effort
and resources by phase or subsequent
operation. This aspect includes a description
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Chapter 4
of the supporting capabilities and their
intended affect on operations.
•They provide the organization of the unified
or joint force and designate command
relationships between the theater CINC
and his subordinates.
•They identify specific objectives and assign
tasks and concepts for each subordinate
that are sufficient to serve as the basis for
subordinate planning.
•They synchronize and integrate joint,
single-service, supporting, and special
operations forces in conjunction with
multinational and UN forces; international
and interagency organizations; and NGOs
and PVOs into a cohesive and synergistic
whole that is unified in nature.
Campaign planning is the primary means
by which the CINC provides for strategic unity
of effort and through which he guides the
planning of unified and joint operations within
his theater and its subordinate operating
areas.
Theater Campaign Plan
Through the theater campaign plan, the
CINC—
•Defines theater strategic objectives.
•Describes a strategic concept of operations
and sustainment.
•Sequences unified operations.
•Allocates subordinate forces.
•Establishes command relationships and
delegates authority.
•Assigns objectives and tasks.
•Synchronizes joint, single-service,
supporting, and special operations forces
with allied, UN, NGO, PVO, and
interagency or international efforts.
A theater campaign plan includes the
ClNC’s strategic vision of the unified
operations sequence necessary to attain the
national strategic objectives assigned by higher
authority. It orients on the enemy’s strategic
center of gravity; achieves unity of effort with
the armed forces allocated by the nation;
clearly describes the strategic end state; and
serves as the basis for subordinate planning.
Two of the most important aspects of this plan
are the synchronization of forces in operations
and the concept for their sustainment.
Integration and Synchronization
of Forces and Operations
The campaign plan integrates and
synchronizes unified, joint, and multinational/
coalition operations by serving as the unifying
focus for the conduct of operations. The CINC
coordinates from among the total US, allied, or
interagency and international capabilities and
applies or focuses those necessary to prosecute
the campaign. He orchestrates this application
of force so that a variety of supporting
capabilities is complementary and
reinforcing—all oriented on achieving
campaign objectives.
Concept for Sustainment
The campaign plan integrates and
synchronizes unified, joint, and multinational
logistics and support operations. It ensures
that logistics and support planning are
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FM 100-7
centralized, comprehensive, and continuous.
Although implementation and execution of
logistics functions and support are normally a
national and, specifically, a service
responsibility, the CINC coordinates from
among the total US, allied, or interagency or
international capabilities and applies or
focuses those necessary to prosecute the
campaign. Logistics and support
considerations are vital to the successful
execution of the campaign plan.
Supporting Campaign Plans
Theater combatant commanders and their
staffs prepare campaign plans. In addition,
principal subordinate JFCs prepare
subordinate or supporting campaign plans as
required against multiple strategic threats.
These include subunified and JTF commanders
and their staffs.
The theater commander may decentralize
the joint force by establishing theaters of
operation or JOAs for subordinate JFCs who
directly command the warfighting service
forces. Subunified or JTF commanders, when
assigned a strategic mission, prepare
subordinate campaign plans that support the
higher CINC’s concept and contribute to the
unified effort in the theater.
A JTF is established usually for different
levels of command to achieve specific objectives
of limited scope. The JTF mission may be of
sufficient scope to achieve a strategic objective.
In such a case, under direction of the theater
CINC or, in certain circumstances, under
direction of the NCA (through the CJCS), the
commander of the JTF may be responsible for
establishing a subordinate campaign plan.
DECISION MAKING
Strategic decision making that affects
campaign planning occurs at three levels:
national security level, national military level,
and theater level.
National Security-Level Planning
At the national security level, the NCA
uses the national security system to design
national security objectives and guidance
reflecting a strategic end state.
National Military-Level Planning
At the national military level, the CJCS
uses sequential planning systems, such as
JSPS and JOPES, to provide further national
strategic direction affecting the theater
campaign plan process.
Joint Strategic Planning System
The JSPS is the primary formal means by
which the CJCS, in consultation with other
members of the JCS and CINCs, assists the
NCA in providing national strategic direction.
The JSPS is used to assess the strategic
security and specific theater environments,
evaluate the threat, and propose the national
military objectives , strategic concepts and
guidance, and force capabilities to support the
achievement of national security objectives. It
provides strategic rationale for the initiation of
joint operations planning.
Joint Operation Planning and
Execution System
Campaign planning occurs within the
established deliberate or execution processes of
JOPES. Campaign logic, sequence, and
fundamentals go into the OPLAN format
within JOPES. JOPES provides procedures to
translate strategic direction into a plan of
operations. A CINC can use JOPES to develop
and select appropriate COAs. This COA
development process can be also applied to
campaign plan development.
Theater-Level Planning
At the theater level, within JOPES
guidelines, the CINC employs a theater design
process to develop the theater campaign plan.
This design process —
•Begins with receipt of current national
strategic direction.
•Follows with evaluation of the theater
strategy and strategic estimate.
•Continues with specified planning
considerations of operational art and a
series of related sequential planning
actions.
•Leads back to the national strategic
guidance and end state to ensure that it can
be successfully employed.
Subordinate JFCs receive guidance
through the JOPES-related, theater-level
campaign planning process. They formulate
supporting plans based on the theater CINC's
strategic guidance and intent. While campaign
planning is a responsibility of the theater
CINC and subordinate JFCs, it has a specific
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Chapter 4
relationship to JSPS and JOPES. These
systems provide a process for the theater
commander to receive strategic guidance from
and provide input to the NCA and CJCS, as
well as a methodology for developing the
campaign plan.
Theater campaign planning (Figure 4-2)
portrays an orderly series of related actions
and operations that occur in the campaign
design considerations within JOPES. The
broad process begins when the CINC receives
current strategic guidance and then
systematically considers—
•Derived mission.
•Revised theater strategy and estimate.
•Commander’s estimate.
•Commander’s concept.
•Objectives, tasks, and concepts for
subordinates.
•Command relationships.
•Theater organization.
•Requirements for supporting plans.
The final link in the process is a
determination of plan feasibility and requests
for change or augmentation. Planning may be
self-regenerating, depending on changing
conditions of the above actions or events.
Derived Mission
Specified and implied strategic tasks are
determined from specific NCA guidance; from
national or alliance documents, such as the
JSCP, the UCP, or Joint Pub 0-2; or from CINC
initiatives. The national military objectives
form the basis of the campaign’s mission
statement. Using these guides, the CINC
derives his theater campaign mission—a
strategic mission that accomplishes the
purpose of national strategic direction.
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FM 100-7
Initially, the mission may be a general
statement of the theater strategic objectives
and their purposes, but it may later be refined
after specific tasks and phases have been
developed and delineated as a result of the
commander’s estimate. The mission evolves.
From the derived mission, the CINC
determines what is to be done, what resources
are available, and what obstacles or actions
may prevent mission accomplishment. The
CINC states this derived mission in succinct
terms that are understandable to superiors and
subordinates alike. The CINC provides
guidance to subordinate commanders through
his application of operational art and the
description of his strategic intent.
The commander’s intent is a concise
expression of the purpose of the unit’s
activities, the desired results, and how
operations progress toward that end. In his
intent, the commander clarifies the why
element of the mission statement for his
subordinates. This helps them pursue the
desired strategic end state without further
orders, even when operations do not unfold as
planned.
Revised Theater Strategy
and Estimate
The national and multinational strategic
guidance the CINC receives from higher
authority, whether explicit or implicit, drives
the campaign planning process. Guidance is
expressed through national security strategy
and national military strategy relative to the
deliberate or crisis-action attainment of
strategic objectives and guidance. During CAP,
assumptions change and plans are adjusted.
The theater campaign plan must be
flexible. It must be able to accomplish its
designed purpose and adapt to changing
assumptions, guidance, or situations affecting
the desired outcome. The plan should be
subjected to continued, detailed review and
revised as required so that it does not become
outdated, is not overcome by critical events, or
does not become unworkable. Major
components of the CINC’s strategic estimate
are strategic direction, the theater strategic
situation, strategic concepts, specific COAs,
and decisions. Joint Pub 5-00.1 describes these
in detail.
Commander’s Estimate
The CINC’s study of the situation, coupled
with his review of existing theater strategy and
strategic estimate, is a continuous process from
which strategic concepts are formulated and
COAs are derived to become the basis of the
theater campaign plan. In practice, the
commander’s views, as expressed in the
commander’s estimate during deliberate or
CAP, contribute to NCA deliberations in
forming strategic guidance. As a minimum, the
commander’s estimate will include—
•The mission, situation, and COAs.
•Considerations that affect the COAs.
•Enemy capabilities.
•Analysis of enemy capabilities.
•Comparison of own COAs.
•Recommended COA.
For each COA, the estimate should
address-
•Combat forces required; for example,
airborne brigade, tank battalion. Identify
types of units.
•The force provider.
•The destination.
•Required delivery dates.
•A coordinated deployment estimate.
•An employment estimate.
•Strategic lift requirements, if appropriate.
Concepts of Operation
The CINC’s strategic concepts of operation
and sustainment in the theater campaign plan
are linked closely and derived from his
strategic intent. They accomplish the following:
•Describe the strategic end state and
requirements and conditions that constitute
that end state.
•Design the theater strategic concept,
objectives, and tasks and supporting
operational direction, objectives, tasks, and
concepts for subordinates to carry out their
campaigns or operations.
•Organize joint, single-service, supporting,
and special operation forces, in conjunction
with multinational or UN forces,
interagency organizations and NGOs and
PVOs into a cohesive, unified force designed
to plan and execute subordinate campaigns
and operations.
•Retain strategic reserves.
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Chapter 4
Command Relationships and
Organization
•Establish command relationships.
•Integrate the nations’s mobilization,
deployment, and sustainment efforts into
the CINC’s employment and logistics
concepts.
•Concentrate forces and materiel resources
strategically so that the right force is
available at the designated times and places
to conduct decisive, winning operations.
•Seek to gain the strategic advantage over
the enemy that affords an opportunity to
take the strategic initiative through
offensive operations.
•Defeat or destroy the enemy’s strategic
center of gravity to achieve the strategic end
state.
In his strategic concept, the commander
describes how he visualizes subordinates
conducting campaigns, major operations, and
the decisive battle, focusing on the employment
of his force as a whole. This description
includes conditions to be achieved, sequence of
events, and expected enemy reactions to
friendly forces as the battle progresses. Above
all, the commander should specify the desired
military end state– the results he expects the
battle to achieve, including effects on the
enemy and the desired posture of friendly
forces after the fight. The commander should
describe how this posture will facilitate
transition to future operations or postconflict
operations.
Objectives and Subordinate Tasks
The theater strategic and supporting
operational objectives assigned to subordinates
are critical elements of the theater strategic
design of the theater campaign. These
objectives establish the conditions necessary to
reach the desired end state and achieve the
national strategic objectives. The CINC focuses
on national military or alliance strategic
objectives to select his theater strategic and
supporting operational objectives. Subordinate
JFCs, in turn, are assigned specific theater
strategic and supporting operational objectives
for subordinate campaigns. The CINC carefully
defines the objectives to ensure clarity of
theater strategic and operational intent and to
identify specific tasks required to achieve those
objectives.
The CINC organizes the subordinate
operating areas within the theater and
establishes the command relationships for
these areas to support the campaign.
Organizations and relationships are based on
the campaign design, complexity of the
campaign, and degree of control required.
Within the campaign planning process, the
CINC determines the organization and
command relationships before assigning tasks
to subordinates.
To establish command relationships the
CINC must determine the types of subordinate
commands and the degree of authority to be
delegated to each. This further clarifies the
intent of the CINC and contributes to
decentralized execution and unity of effort. The
CINC selects the types of subordinate
commands from the six doctrinal options, for
example, service components, subordinate joint
commands, and so forth. The options for
delegating authority emanate from COCOM
and range from OPCON to support.
Requirements for Supporting Plans
The CINC considers a total resource
support concept that is integrated both
vertically and horizontally into supporting
plans for theater and subordinate campaigns or
operations. The CINC and subordinate JFCs
and their staffs develop these plans based on
unified support that can be provided from
national-level assets, supporting CINCs,
services, alliance or coalition partners, other
government agencies, NGOs and PVOs,
international agencies, UN agencies, and host
nations. Supporting plans may—
•Address tasks and support requirements
during mobilization, predeployment,
deployment, entry, operations, postconflict
operations, redeployment, and
demobilization.
•Address requirements for diplomatic,
informational, and economic coordination
and support.
•Detail support during the various phases of
the theater campaign.
Supporting commanders synchronize their
plans with the theater campaign plan. They
time-sequence mobilization to support
deployment, deployment with execution,
execution with sustainment, and vice versa.
They identify resources and necessary liaison
early—as the plan is being developed.
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FM 100-7
Supporting plans provide for liaison from the
supporting CINC to the supported CINC, who
has control over all support in the theater.
Coordination is required with allies,
coalition forces, and host nations on
intratheater movements. Plans to effect
intratheater movement should provide the
CINC maximum control of the movement and
concentration of forces and materiel, which will
permit rapid response to changing situations
as the campaign develops.
The CINC identifies intelligence support
requirements for the campaign through the
development or revalidation of a supporting
intelligence plan. This plan identifies
requirements for national-level support from
DOD intelligence agencies and military
services.
Supporting and subordinate commanders
and supporting US departments and agencies
use the CINC’s strategic concepts of operation
and tasks for subordinates as the basis for
determining the necessary support for each
phase of the campaign plan. Supporting and
subordinate commanders respond to the
identified tasks by preparing supporting plans
and by submitting them for approval to the
supported CINC.
National Agencies and
Industrial Resources
National-1evel intelligence organizations
are essential to campaign planning and
execution because of the need for access to
different data bases, reconnaissance and
surveillance capabilities, and finished
intelligence. During the development of the
theater campaign plan, the CINC should
identify intelligence and mapping support
requirements and request support from the
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Defense
Mapping Agency (DMA), and other nationallevel
intelligence agencies. Such other federal
agencies include the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA), the National Security Agency
(NSA), and the intelligence staffs of the
Department of State (DOS) and military
services.
The list of agencies with which the Army
may find it necessary to establish linkage
varies based on the mission. FM 100-19
discusses MOOTW conducted to support US
civil authorities and identifies the US agencies
that must be considered. These agencies can
determine foreign counterpart organizations
with which the Army may need to establish
linkages.
The capacity of the nation to expand its
industrial base may ultimately have a
constraining effect on the campaign plan. The
CINC must compare the expected consumption
rates with the projected availability of critical
supplies to ensure that the campaign plan is
logistically feasible. To manage projected
shortages, the CINC may plan to restrict or
control the use of critical assets. The CINC may
recommend that DOD implement industrial
production and repair surge for specific
shortfall systems.
Defense Intelligence Agency. The DIA is
responsible for coordinating national-level
support to the unified efforts of the CINC. DIA is
also responsible for deploying national
intelligence support teams to the theater to
facilitate the flow of quality intelligence to the
CINC. When actual operations commence,
increased strategic intelligence support may be
provided by a DOD joint intelligence center (JIC)
to furnish an integrated defense intelligence
position to the CINC.
Defense Information System Agency. The
Defense Information System Agency (DISA) is
responsible to the CINC for the employment of
communication resources at designated defense
communication system (DCS) entry stations
and gateways to terminate long-haul trunks
and circuits from the JOA. DISA ensures that
the required entry station, gateways, and
switching centers have appropriate equipment
and cryptographic devices to assure worldwide
interoperability of the CINC’s command,
control, communications, and computers (C4)
assets.
Department of State. DOS involvement
extends from policy formulation at the highest
level to mission execution at the host nation
and country team levels. At the country team
level, the US ambassador is responsible for
directing, coordinating, and supervising all US
Government elements, except those under the
command of an established US theater
commander.
At the theater level, the CINC may use his
diplomatic advisor to coordinate with US
ambassadors and their country teams to plan
and conduct campaigns. Throughout the range
of military operations, the ambassador
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Chapter 4
remains an important player in the conduct of
unified operations. The role of establishing and
maintaining interagency linkage to this
representative of the President is vital for
accomplishing the strategic objectives.
United States Information Agency. The
United States Information Agency (USIA) is
responsible for supporting US foreign policy
objectives by informing the public in other
nations about US programs and policies. The
USIA can advise the CINC on the implications
of foreign opinion on the execution of present
and future campaigns.
Defense Logistics Agency. The Defense
Logistics Agency (DLA) is the CINC’s link to
the national industrial base. DLA provides
supplies to the military services and supports
their acquisition of weapons and other
materiel. Support begins with joint planning
among the services for weapons systems’ parts,
extends through production, and concludes
with the disposal of materiel that is obsolete,
worn out, or no longer needed. DLA provides
supply support, contract administration
services, and technical and logistics services to
all military services.
US Army Materiel Command. The US Army
Materiel Command (USAMC) operates the
Army’s national logistics system through its
major subordinate commands and separated
reporting activities (SRAs) to fulfill the Army’s
need for logistics support. USAMC—
•Performs assigned materiel functions and
related functions for research, development,
test, and evaluation (RDTE).
•Provides acquisition, logistics support, and
technical assistance for materiel systems.
•Performs other materiel acquisition
management functions.
•Provides the Army’s national logistics
system-level maintenance support for items
of materiel used by the Army.
•Serves as the DOD single manager for
conventional ammunition.
•Provides management of operational
policies, programs, objectives, and resources
associated with its worldwide Logistics
Assistance Program.
Additionally, USAMC accounts for and
manages Army Reserve and operational
projects (OP) worldwide. These functions and
capabilities may be provided to the Army
component command through the logistics
support element (LSE).
Logistics Support Element. LSE is a flexible,
deployable multifunctional unit. It commands
and controls forward elements of the strategic
base. These forward elements are composed
primarily of DOD civilians and contractors.
The LSE is structured to link the industrial
base with the operational-level units and,
through the logistics assistance
representatives, with tactical logistics. The
CINC and ASCC require a tailorable logistics
C2 element for forward elements of the national
base. The LSE supports these needs by using a
flexible combination of military, DOD civilian,
and contractor personnel that allows it to alter
its mission and size based on METT-T. The
objective of the LSE is to sustain readiness by
operating as far forward as feasible,
minimizing the evacuation of critical
reparable from the theater of operations and
thus reducing the flow of replacement materiel.
Military Resources
CJCS considers theater strategies and
plans when prioritizing and apportioning
forces and resources among the combatant
commanders. National strategic planning for
mobilization, predeployment, deployment,
entry operations, postconflict operations,
redeployment, and demobilization is based on
the planned employment and sustainment of
forces by the various combatant CINCs.
The strategic concept of operations of the
theater campaign plan imposes requirements
on mobilization timing and generation of
necessary force capabilities. Campaign
planners and mobilization planners must
coordinate and integrate closely. Strategic
deployment planning focuses on intertheater
movement of forces and sustainment of the
theater for intratheater deployment,
concentration, and employment to support the
theater campaign plan. The CINC’s priorities
are the basis for either movement.
The NCA may direct the use of strategic
forces or reserves to support the CINC’s
employment concept. The CINC considers that
these forces may be apportioned to generate
decisive combat power and provide protection
and security for deploying theater forces or be
used against external threats that could affect
the outcome of the campaign.
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FM 100-7
Additionally, national-level assets may
support the CINC's employment concept for
conducting operations security (OPSEC),
deception, psychological operations (PSYOP),
SOF, civil affairs (CA) operations, and other
operations as unique operations within unified
operations.
Each service is responsible for providing
personnel, administrative, and logistical
support to its forces. The ASCC, in conjunction
with his subordinate senior army commanders
assigned to the unified or subunified command,
develops supporting plans to provide and
maintain adequate logistical support to Army
service forces and other forces as directed
throughout all phases of the campaign.
As a rule, the JTF does not have an ASCC.
However, the CINC may designate the ASCC as
the subunified commander or CJTF. The JTF has
an ARFOR headquarters that provides requisite
support to ARFOR within the JTF and requests
additional support from the controlling unified or
subunified command ASCC. Based on the
supporting plans developed by the controlling
unified, subunified, or JTF command, the
ARFOR headquarters develop its logistical plan.
In the event that national mobilization of
forces accompanies campaign plan execution,
special plans and management may be
required to ensure available supplies to meet
campaign priorities. In addition, as these
mobilized forces deploy, planners develop
theater distribution plans to eliminate
bottlenecks at arrival and intratheater
movement points. The CINC coordinates and
effects support agreements with the host
nation and allies for logistics, facilities
acquisition, transportation, and other
operations support.
MAJOR OPERATIONS
A major operation is the ARFOR’s
coordinated execution of land operations of a
joint operation that is part of a particular phase
of a subordinate’s or CINC's campaign. A major
operation sequences Army activities, battles,
and engagements to attain operational-level
objectives. Senior army commanders, as
subordinates to a subordinate JFC, and their
senior staff officers execute operational art
through the design and conduct of major
operations, including contingency operations.
Often the ASCC/ARFOR is the supported
commander planning and executing a major
operation. Then, the execution of the operation’s
general direction is exercised by the ASCC/
ARFOR. This impacts in particular on the
planning of deep operations; deep fires;
interdiction; Army airspace command and
control (A2C2); and reconnaissance, intelligence
surveillance, and target acquisition (RISTA)
within the senior army commander’s AO.
Sometimes, the ARFOR commander is a
supporting commander who plans and executes
major operations of the campaign. For
example, the ARFOR may be the supporting
commander to the JFACC and the supported
commander for the JFC's overall air
interdiction effort.
Operational-level planners develop major
operations to support the series of related joint
operations of the joint campaign plan. These
major operations also support the unified
operations of the theater campaign when
subordinate missions require a phased, related
series of joint operations to achieve theater
strategic objectives. Major operations that
support joint campaigns occur under certain
circumstances.
•First, a CINC assigns theater strategic
objectives and provides strategic guidance
and operational focus to an immediate
subordinate.
•Second, the CINC may establish multiple
operating areas within a theater. Under
both sets of circumstances, the strategic
importance of the objectives, the guidance,
and the complexity of the joint operations
require the development of joint, singleservice,
supporting, and special operations
forces that complement both the
subordinates’ joint campaign and the
CINC's theater campaign.
OPERATIONAL-LEVEL PLANNING
Operational-level plans can include
subordinate campaign plans and plans for
major operations. These plans support the
theater strategic objectives by linking those
objectives to tactical-level operations.
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Subordinate Campaign Plans
The combatant commander may opt to
divide the theater of war into theaters of
operations. When directed, principal
subordinate JFCs develop subordinate
campaign plans or OPLANs that accomplish or
contribute to the accomplishment of theater
strategic objectives. These plans support and
extend the theater CINC’s concept of
operations in a sequence or set of joint
operations composed of integrated major
operations and battles. These plans support
the theater campaign plan by achieving specific
strategic objectives or by establishing
conditions for further operations that lead to
the specified end state.
The principal CINC reviews subordinate
campaign plans, along with the necessary
supporting plans, to ensure they are valid,
synchronized, and support the concept and
objective of the theater campaign plan.
Appendix B provides an example of a
subordinate campaign plan.
Major Operations Plans
ARFOR with employment roles that
support JFCs develop major operations plans
to support the theater or subordinate campaign
plans. Plans are objective-driven and, when
applied collectively to the joint force, provide
the integrated and mutually supported effort to
generate and concentrate combat power at the
operational level of war. Appendixes C, D, and
E provide examples of major operations plans
for peacetime, conflict, and war, respectively.
SERVICE-COMPONENT-LEVEL
PLANNING
The ASCC’s planning responsibilities are
contingent on the Army’s role in supporting
theater-level unified operations. These
responsibilities can range from planning, to
participating in joint operations with other
components, to participating in major
operations, to planning only for the service
support of Army forces of the subordinate joint
commands.
Major Operations Plans
The ASCC’s responsibilities for planning
and conducting major operations depend on
how the combatant commander exercises his
COCOM options. If the combatant commander
elects to exercise COCOM through the ASCC
by delegating OPCON to him, then the ASCC
conducts major operations in conjunction with
the other service components and also provides
logistical support for all ARFOR assigned to
the theater and to other services as required.
The ASCC plans and conducts major
operations as directed by the CINC. In those
instances where the CINC elects not to use the
ASCC to plan and execute major operations,
the ASCC, while providing logistical support
for the Army forces, also recommends to the
CINC the proper Army force composition and
employment as part of the operational-level
commander’s delineated requirements.
Sustainment or
Reinforcement Plans
The capability to sustain the campaign
from beginning to end sets the tempo of
operations. Sustainment or reinforcement
planning—part of logistics-preparation-of-thetheater
(LPT) process—identifies and provides
the available supplies, equipment, materiel,
replacement personnel, and HNS
infrastructure to sustain the involved forces
according to the CINC’s concept of operations.
LPT plans, developed by logisticians at all
echelons, must include provisions for
infrastructure development and defense and be
consistent with the strategic aims and CINC’s
intent. FM 100-16 describes the LPT process in
detail.
MULTINATIONAL
OPERATIONAL-LEVEL PLANNING
Achieving unity of effort in multinational
operations is critical for success. Multinational
operations planners ensure success by
determining how US campaigns integrate with
alliance or coalition forces and how intelligence
and logistics resources are shared.
Understanding the personalities and
sensitivities of the senior commanders and the
national character of each of the allied armies
is the key to successful leadership in
multinational army operations. In addition,
understanding their capabilities, personal and
professional habits, and training background is
important.
Commanders must establish effective
working relationships among themselves. They
must establish rapport, mutual respect, and
unity of effort; use liaison officers; develop
standardization agreements; and overcome
language barriers. History has shown that it is
possible for military leaders having a wide
divergence of cultural backgrounds to cooperate
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FM 100-7
effectively while conducting multinational
military operations.
Military capabilities of nations differ based
on doctrine, training, and equipment. Even in
the US Army, differences exist among
commands concerning interpretation and
execution of doctrine. Some doctrines may
emphasize offensive operations; others
defensive. Some nations prepare for highly
mobile, mechanized operations, while others
concern themselves with insurgent or other
forms of warfare.
The multinational commander must
recognize the relative strengths and differences
of the multinational force cultures. Decisions
on employment must include the capabilities of
the multinational force. They must be made in
consultation with the military leadership of
those forces.
The multinational commander must
carefully balance the allocation of capabilities.
Subordinate commanders may have a tendency
to request control of forces that provide
capabilities not organic to that nation’s forces.
The guiding principle is not to hold assets that
are needed by others, while at the same time
not diluting the concentration of critical
capabilities.
Relationship to Campaigns
Campaigns may be conducted within the
context of an alliance, coalition, or other
international arrangement. Planning is
accomplished through US, multinational, or
international channels. Coordinated planning
on such matters as operations, logistics
(including infrastructure), intelligence,
deception, electronic warfare [EW],
communications (including infrastructure),
ROE, and diplomatic ends is essential for unity
of effort. The preparation of supporting plans
addressing coordination and liaison, HNS, and
the provision of mutual support are examples
of essential tasks that the theater CINC must
accomplish.
Employment
During multinational operations, the
multinational chain of command performs
detailed employment planning, to include
employment of national and international
agencies. These multinational plans may serve
as the basis for the US campaign plan and
supporting plans, or the US campaign plan
might provide the basis for employment
planning of multinational or coalition forces.
Subordinate commands, such as service and
functional component commands, subunified
commands, and JTFs, prepare the necessary
supporting plans for the conduct of joint
operations that support multinational
objectives.
Logistics Support
Traditionally, the responsibility for
logistics support to national component forces
remained with the responsible authorities of
the nations concerned. In a multinational
environment, logistics support must be the
collective responsibility of the nations involved.
The logistical objective in a multinational
environment is to achieve the greatest degree
of logistical standardization that is realistically
achievable, given operational constraints,
diplomatic and legal demands, and the existing
capabilities of the multinational participants.
Logistical standardization is affected by such
factors as compatibility and interoperability of
equipment, interchangeability of combat
supplies, and commonality of procedures. Also,
planners must develop methods to prevent
competition for resources, particularly
infrastructure and LOCs, that could adversely
affect operations.
Planners should consider options for
contracting, acquiring HNS, obtaining support
from other national forces, and integrating
such support within the multinational force.
These options can furnish critical support and
resources that are not available through
normal organizational means. Planners should
understand and consider rationalization,
standardization, and interoperability (RSI)
during planning.
Intelligence
Multinational commands include national
and alliance intelligence systems. In keeping
with the NCA guidance the CINC receives,
intelligence information should be integrated
and shared with the multinational command. If
possible, the multinational command and other
involved national forces must agree on these
procedures well in advance of commencement
of the campaign. Supporting plans should
address such matters as information-sharing,
complementary intelligence operations, and
liaison. These plans also should address
interaction with the multinational intelligence
center (when established).
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Information Operations
The Army applies information war/
operations technology to support the CINC to
enhance his battle command, improve
battlefield agility, and make split-based
operations possible. Effective use of
information operations can prevent the
initiation of hostilities by imposing the
perception that taking hostile actions against
the US or its allies would not be in the best
interest of the potential adversary. Spacebased
systems offer an unrestricted
environment to affect these operations.
Commanders must be able to access the
global grid of worldwide information resources
at any time and at any location in the world.
The Army often takes the lead among service
components for the entire joint and
multinational theater signal support
infrastructure. Essential planning
considerations must include-
•Wide area network planning/management.
•Frequency management.
•Communications security (COMSEC) key
management/distribution.
•Interfaces from theater systems to
sustaining base.
•Integration of signal support assets in theater
among joint and multinational forces.
The joint signal support architecture
provides vertical and horizontal integration for
army battlefield operating systems, as well as
the interfaces that provide interoperability
with joint and multinational forces’ systems
and the sustaining base. The key to future
success is a seamless communications
architecture that ties the many distributed
communications and automation elements into
an integrated, interoperable, and cohesive C4
network.
INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS
Interagency operations facilitate the
implementation of all elements of national
power. Interagency operations are critical to
achieving the strategic end state, especially in
MOOTW. The Army often operates in an
interagency environment alongside other
institutions of the US Government. This occurs
when the military is the prime strategic option,
as it is in war, but also when other instruments
of national power are the preferred option and
the military assists with forces.
Army forces must be prepared to conduct a
variety of operations that integrate
warfighting and MOOTW with a variety of
government agencies, other services, and forces
of other nations. These operations could
include stability operations, NEO,
counterterrorism, security, or arms control and
verification.
Interagency operations facilitate unity and
consistency of effort, maximize use of national
resources, and reinforce primacy of the
diplomatic element. DOD and CJCS coordinate
interagency operations at the strategic level.
This coordination establishes the framework
for coordination by commanders at the
operational and tactical levels. In some cases—
such as peacekeeping—DOS is the lead agency
and DOD provides support. In others—such as
peace enforcement—DOD is the lead agency.
The CINC is the central point for planning
and implementing theater and regional
strategies that require interagency
coordination. The CINC may establish an
advisory committee to link his theater strategy
to national policy goals and the objectives of
DOS and concerned ambassadors. The CINC
establishes a joint headquarters to conduct
interagency coordination and planning.
Military personnel may coordinate with other
US Government agencies while operating
directly under an ambassador’s authority,
while working for a security assistance
organization or while assigned to a regional
CINC.
Coordination among DOD and other US
Government agencies may occur in a country
team or within a unified command. Military
personnel working in interagency
organizations must ensure that the
ambassador and CINC know and approve all
programs. Legitimizing authorities determine
specific command relationships for each
operation. The command arrangement must
clearly establish responsibility for the planning
and execution of each phase of the operation.
Besides extensive US Government agency
coordination, commanders also must fully
integrate operations into local efforts when
appropriate. Such integration requires close
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FM 100-7
coordination with local government agencies
and bureaus; local military, paramilitary, or
police forces, and multinational partners. A
structure such as a mixed military working
group comprised of senior officials of the
military and other agencies may assist such an
effort and include belligerent parties as
appropriate.
As relationships among interagency
participants mature, increased effectiveness
can result. Interagency operations do not
necessarily lend themselves to the joint
geographic subarea of responsibility previously
discussed. Overlapping operational and
interagency boundaries can be a source of
confusion.
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Chapter 5
Execution
The Army commander executes major operations to support joint
campaigns. He practices operational art requiring the synchronization of
the six operational-level operating systems. (Minor differences exist
between TRADOC Pam 11-9 and the Universal Joint Task List.)
•Operational movement and maneuver.
•Operational fires.
•Operational protection.
•Operational battle command. (FM 100-5 defines battle command
and its impacts.
•Operational intelligence.
•Operational logistics. (TRADOC Pam 11-9 calls this “support.”
Joint Pub 4-0 expands the definition of logistics to incorporate
health services, engineer services, and current supply,
maintenance, and distribution services.)
This functional approach is by no means the only way to look at
the roles and responsibilities of the Army operational-level
commander. The operational-level commander must successfully
accomplish several complex operations that may not be easy to
analyze. He should consider the operational-level operating systems
as aids to identifying tasks that must be accomplished at the
operational level. These systems provide a structure for the
discussion in Part Three. They are a catalog of battlefield and
support activities that place functions into logical—not procedural—
relationships.
OPERATIONAL MOVEMENT
AND MANEUVER
Operational movement and maneuver is
the disposition of forces to create a decisive
impact on the conduct of a campaign or major
operation. The commander achieves this
decisive impact either by securing the
operational advantages of position before
battle or by exploiting tactical success to
achieve operational results. Simply put,
operational movement and maneuver involves
positioning the needed Army forces and
resources at the critical time and place.
The theater CINC designs, organizes, and
conducts campaigns. He sets the tempo and
direction for the conduct of operations. He
centralizes mobility planning, to include
supporting CINCs' plans. His senior
commanders consider mobility requirements
from initial planning, or prehostilities, through
mission accomplishment, or accomplishment of
posthostility activities.
The CINC's theater strategic concept is the
framework the senior army commander uses to
develop his supporting plan. The essence of the
Army commander’s plan is the distribution of
his available force to support the CINC's
strategic concept. Operational movement and
maneuver produces decisive impact on the
campaign or major operation. All other
operational-level operating systems seek to
maximize the effect of movement and
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FM 100-7
Ground Combat Operations
maneuver. They are synchronized to produce a
series of operational maneuvers that provide
subordinate commanders with the necessary
leverage to gain, retain, or sustain the
initiative.
At the operational-level, the scope and
complexity of movement and maneuver usually
involve joint and multinational operations.
Still, scale alone does not make movement or
maneuver operational. Rather, operational
movement and maneuver creates operational
advantage; this can be achieved at various
echelons.
OPERATIONAL MOVEMENT
Operational movement is the regrouping,
deploying, shifting, or moving of service, joint,
or multinational operational formations to and
within the theater from less threatened or less
promising areas to more decisive positions.
From the Army commander’s perspective,
movement involves forces deployed into his
area by the CINC and forces under his control
that he moves within his AOR.
Strategic Deployment
Strategic deployment, specifically the timephased
arrival of forces in the theater, may be
among the most challenging problems at the
operational-level. An error in determining the
proper sequencing of forces may be difficult, if
not possible, to correct. The Army operationallevel
commander must ensure the correct mix
of combat and support forces are sequenced to
arrive in the theater to support the CINC's
concept. He does this by influencing the
development of the time-phased force
deployment list (TPFDL) to ensure Army units
and sustainment are sequenced into his
operational area to support the planned
sequence of operations. Forces required for port
opening, reception, and onward movement
must be sequenced early in the TPFDL to flow
into the AO once the lodgment area is
established.
The senior army commander is responsible
for moving forces allocated by the CINC from
ports of debarkation to specific locations within
the Army’s objective area. This responsibility
includes the actual relocation or movement of
operational forces by any means or mode of
transportation. Prior to deploying the forces
into combat formation, the senior army
commander directs movement from positions
within the operational area to a forward
staging area or position.
Ground combat operations require
coordinated movement and effective
concentration of combat power against the
enemy in spite of enemy interdiction efforts.
Air defense, air and ground transportation,
reconnaissance and security, service support,
and traffic control are among the chief concerns
as these large movements occur. Ground
combat operations have the best chance of
success when they are synchronized with air
superiority and air interdiction operations.
Senior army commanders direct the movement
of subordinate forces, ensuring that by the end
of a distinct phase of the major operation,
forces are positioned in a way that enables
rapid transition to subsequent phases.
OPERATIONAL MANEUVER
Maneuver is the means by which combat
power is concentrated at the critical point to
achieve the surprise, shock, momentum, and
dominance that enable smaller forces to defeat
larger ones. Operational maneuver is the
means by which the commander sets the terms
of battle, declines battle, or acts to take
advantage of tactical actions. Throughout a
combat operations area, attack, defense, and
retrograde operations often take place
simultaneously as each combatant attempts to
mass, economize locally, and maneuver against
his opponent.
Maneuver Operations
Prior to the conduct of offensive, defensive,
or retrograde operations, senior army
commanders, in conjunction with the JFC,
posture their operational forces to influence the
enemy. As the army commander postures his
forces, he visualizes the depth of the campaign.
Although initial deployment is important,
army commanders posture for initial and
subsequent operations, based upon their
visualization of the operational end state.
Offensive Operations
The offensive is the decisive form of war
and must be exercised in a coherent and
cohesive manner. The key to success in an
offensive operation is to defeat, destroy, or
neutralize the enemy force. Offensive
operations seek—
•To secure decisive terrain.
•To deprive the enemy of resources.
•To gain information.
•To deceive, divert, and hold the enemy in
position.
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Chapter 5
•To disrupt the enemy’s attack.
•To set up the conditions for future
operations.
The goal is to mass effects, and not necessarily
our forces, as we pursue offensive operations.
At the operational level, offensive operations
may be directed against an element of the field
force-the mass of enemy forces, the boundary
between two of its major combat formations, a
vital C2 center, a logistical base, or LOCs. It also
could be more abstract—the cohesion among
allied forces, for example, or the mental and
psychological balance of a key enemy
commander. Operational-level commanders
execute offensive maneuver simultaneously
through operational envelopments, turning
movements, infiltrations, penetrations, and
frontal attacks—all of which must be integrated
with air operations throughout the depth of their
battle space to ensure the best chance for success.
Defensive Operations
Army leaders conduct defensive operations
to defeat an enemy attack, gain time,
concentrate forces elsewhere, control key
terrain, wear down enemy forces as a prelude
to offensive operations, or retain operational
objectives. The defender must counter the
attacker’s initiative. At the operational-level,
the defender may disrupt the enemy attack
with spoiling, special deception, psychological,
and interdiction operations. A successful
defense has reactive and offensive air and
ground elements working closely together to
deprive the enemy of the initiative.
Army forces may either conduct a mobile
defense that focuses on the destruction of the
attacking force or an area defense that focuses
on the retention of terrain. The mobile defense
orients on the destruction of the enemy force by
employing a combination of fire, maneuver,
offense, defense, and delay to defeat its attack.
The area defense absorbs the enemy into an
interlocked series of positions from which the
army commander destroys the enemy largely
by fires.
Senior army commanders normally hold
operational reserves in depth to seize the
operational initiative during a defensive
operation. These reserves may include
dedicated forces, designated operating forces,
generated forces from reconstitution, or
incoming newly arrived forces.
Retrograde Operations
Retrograde operations
the rear or away from the
are movements to
enemy. They gain
time, preserve forces, avoid combat under
undesirable conditions, or draw the enemy into
an unfavorable position. Control of the airspace
is the key to their success. The underlying
reasons for retrograde operations are to
improve an operational situation or prevent a
worse one from occurring.
Peacetime Stationing
Requirements
The CINC addresses peacetime stationing
requirements in light of his potential
warfighting needs and availability of forwarddeployed
forces. The ASCC controls trained
and ready Army forces based overseas for
CINC employment. Those forces are backed by
rapid reinforcement by Army forces from the
US or from other theaters. An evident
mobilization capability and a demonstrated
determination to respond effectively to crises
can have significant deterrent value.
MOBILITY AND
COUNTERMOBILITY
Operational mobility is linked closely to the
concept of movement and maneuver.
Operational movement and maneuver include
the functions of providing mobility for
operational forces and countering the mobility
of enemy operational forces.
Facilitating maneuver of major formations
without delays includes counteracting the
effects of operationally significant obstacles. It
also includes enhancing operational movement
by preparing and improving facilities and
routes critical to major operations.
Operational counter-mobility delays or
otherwise hinders the movement of enemy
operational formations, to include selecting
and emplacing systems of obstacles for
operational effect.
Terrain, both natural and man-made,
significantly influences operational mobility.
Terrain consists of coastal plains, mountain
ranges, forests, jungles, deserts, rivers, river
deltas, built-up areas, railroad embankments,
pipelines, and so forth. Terrain affects the
ability to sustain forces, often dictating the
capacity of LOCs. This effect, in turn, can limit
the size and composition of supported forces. In
war, the operational-level commander
considers the effect of terrain features upon
ground movement and the ability of air power
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FM 100-7
to influence that movement by detecting
ground forces and subsequently delaying,
disrupting, and destroying the forces. In
peacetime, the army commander may consider
how these features affect accomplishment of
missions supporting peacekeeping or
humanitarian operations.
The commander must consider the effects
of weather and be cognizant of its effects in the
theater. Key terrain considerations for the
operational-level commander are linked to an
understanding of battle space. The commander
seeks to preserve freedom of operational
movement by countering the effects of natural
or man-made, operationally significant
obstacles. He must be prepared to counter
enemy movements by delaying, channeling, or
blocking operational formations. The
commander achieves this through the use of
countermobility.
OPERATIONAL FIRES
The term operational fires refers to a
commander’s application of nonlethal and
lethal firepower to achieve a decisive impact on
the conduct of a campaign or major operation.
Operational fires are a separate element of the
commander’s concept of operations (addressed
separately from maneuver) but must be closely
integrated and synchronized with the
commander’s concept of maneuver.
Operational fires are joint, and potentially
multinational, activities and are a vital
component of any operational plan.
Operational maneuver and operational
fires may occur simultaneously within a
commander’s battle space but may have very
different objectives. In general terms,
operational fires are not fire support, and
operational maneuver is not necessarily
dependent on operational fires. However,
operational maneuver can be affected by such
fires and can exploit opportunities created or
developed by the JFC's operational firepower
(Joint Pub 3-09). Operational fires are
normally furnished by assets other than those
required for the routine support of tactical
maneuver. However, as the range of assets
used to support tactical maneuver increases,
those same assets will play a more significant
role in the delivery of operational fires. The
Army has significant capabilities for
contributing to the joint, deep fight or planning
and conducting its own deep operations, when
necessary, using operational maneuver and/or
organic operational fires.
Operational fires include targeting and
attacking land and sea targets whose
destruction or neutralization would have a
significant impact on a campaign or major
operation. Operational fires include the
allocation of joint and multinational air, land,
sea, and space means. In a war involving
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), fires
could become the predominant operational
instrument.
A synchronized, systematic, and persistent
plan of attack among air and land and, when
applicable, sea and space commanders is
essential. Air superiority enables the ARFOR
to execute operations without interference
from enemy air forces and maintains tactical
flexibility. Air component missions that
contribute most directly to land operations are
counterair, close air support (CAS), air
interdiction, special operations, airlift, and
surveillance and reconnaissance. An example
is air interdiction operations flown against an
enemy heavy division maneuvering to
counterattack friendly forces during friendly
offensive operations. The land forces contribute
to air operations by fire—suppression of enemy
air defenses (SEAD), land-based air defense,
ground defense of air bases—and by maneuver
through attack helicopter operations or seizure
of air bases and air defense sites by ground
forces.
THEATER AIR CONTROL
SYSTEM
The supported CINC must effectively
employ the air capabilities provided by the
assigned or supporting service or functional
component forces within his AOR. Each
component within the unified command
structure may conduct a variety of air
operations in the CINC's AOR. Additionally,
supporting CINCs may also fly missions to
support the supported CINC's objectives. The
supported CINC must integrate assigned and
supporting forces into his theaterwide air
operations and ensure component direct
support air operations are coordinated with his
theaterwide operations. The A2C2 process
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Chapter 5
integrates the maneuver of Army aviation into
the overall scheme of maneuver. Users of Army
airspace achieve operational influence through
the synchronization of air maneuver, using all
battlefield operating systems focused
throughout the depth of the AO. All Army
airspace users fire and maneuver within the
third dimension of the ground commander’s
AO. The A2C2 process is used to synchronize
these Army assets in the area above the ground
commander’s AO.
To ensure this integration, the CINC may
choose to establish a functional component—
the JFACC. This responsibility is normally
assigned to the service that has the
preponderance of air assets and the best
capability to command and control joint air
operations. Responsibilities of the JFACC are
described in Joint Pubs 3-01.2 and 3-56.1. If
the JFACC is not established, the air
component commander (ACC) is responsible for
providing fixed-wing tactical air support to
United States Army (USA) forces.
Circumstances may require that the US Navy
(USN) or US Marine Corps (USMC) provide all
or part of the tactical air support for the
ARFOR. Under such circumstances, the Naval
component commander is responsible for
providing the tactical air support.
FM 100-103-1 describes multiservice tactics,
techniques and procedures for integrating
airspace C in a CZ. Figure 5-1 describes a
notional C2 structure for integration and
coordination of joint fires.
The theater air control system (TACS) is
not a formal system in itself but the actual sum
of various component air-ground systems. The
TACS includes the organizations, personnel,
equipment, procedures, and techniques
comprising the Army Air-Ground System
5-4
FM 100-7
(AAGS) and the Air Force component
commander’s (AFCC's) TACS-related
responsibilities and missions. The AAGS is the
system necessary for providing the land
component commander or ARFOR with the
means for receiving, processing, and
forwarding the requests of subordinate
commands for air support missions and for the
rapid dissemination of information and
intelligence produced by air means.
TACS provides the same type of system for
the AFCC. A similar system exists within the
USN and provides the USN-USMC naval
aviation C2 system for naval aviation.
FM 31-12 contains a detailed discussion of the
USN-USMC C2 system and the additional
agencies included therein. Although
components and agencies of the TACS belong to
different services and sometimes to different
nations, they function as a single entity in
planning, coordinating, and integrating- air
support operations with ground operations.
The AAGS begins at the highest echelon in
the theater and extends through all echelons
down to maneuver battalions. This system is
used for coordinating and integrating tactical
air support with ARFOR ground operations.
The AAGS is composed of operations, fire
support, air defense, Army airspace C2, and
liaison elements. Each Army component of the
system is designed to operate with an element
of the US Air Force (USAF) TACS but is also
compatible with both USN and USMC air
control systems. Figure 5-2 illustrates the
components of a typical TACS and the locations
of the liaison elements within the AFCC.
OTHER SYSTEMS
Technology is improving extended-range
acquisition and attack systems such as the
multiple launch rocket system (MLRS), the
Army tactical missile system (ATACMS), and
the Apache attack helicopter. These systems
allow the Army to extend battle space and play
a larger role in decisive deep operations.
Senior army commanders must orchestrate
available Army, joint, and multinational lethal
delivery systems to disrupt, delay, destroy, or
degrade enemy operational forces or critical
functions and facilities. They must ensure that
systems designed to impair, disrupt, or delay the
performance of enemy operational forces,
functions, and facilities are coordinated with
fires. The extended range and flexibility of attack
helicopters and fire support systems make it
possible to shift the focus and concentration of
fires rapidly over the width and depth of the
operational commander’s battle space. EW,
PSYOP, special reconnaissance, and SOF must
be synchronized with operational fires in war, or
they may be used by themselves in MOOTW.
PLANNING
In the past, theater air forces have
provided operational fires; however, the
increasing range and accuracy of projectile,
rocket, and missile systems, combined with
maneuver and attack capabilities from attack
helicopters and light forces, now provide the
Army commander with his own organic
operational-fires capability. The ability of each
service to engage targets at operational depths
demonstrates the inherent joint and
potentially combined nature of operational
fires.
The senior army commander, in supporting
the CINC's campaign plan, plans operational
fires within his AO. His major role is to
synchronize ground and air operational fires in
his AO to achieve operational and tactical
objectives. The army commander applies
operational fires in depth to achieve
operational objectives quickly with minimum
casualties.
The army commander plans operational
fires from the top down (the operational
commander establishes objectives and
designates and integrates targets, then passes
them to the subordinate joint or allied units for
execution). The Army commander executes
those fires with organic and allocated assets
and by nominating targets that he cannot
strike with these assets to the JTCB. He uses
the targeting process to shape the battle space
and synchronize fire support, interdiction, and
maneuver. He does this using the decide,
detect, deliver, and assess (D3A) methodology
and participating in the JFC's joint targeting
process.
The D3A methodology enables commanders
to respond rapidly with synchronized
operations to events vital to establishing
favorable conditions for mission
accomplishment. The D3A methodology is a
process that helps a commander’s structured
attack of critical targets and creates a
favorable battle tempo for friendly forces,
particularly at decisive points and times during
the operation.
5-5
Figure 5-2. Theater Air Control System
FM 100-7
This methodology requires extensive
lateral and horizontal coordination, which the
staff does, based on the commander’s intent. In
planning operational fires, both ground and air
component commanders consider the effects
that all fires, especially scatterable mines and
cluster-type munitions, may have on future
ground operations. FMs 101-5 and 6-20-10
discuss the targeting process in detail.
Commanders concentrate the effects of
their fires rather than massing the weapons
themselves. Extended-range acquisition and
attack systems allow the commander to reduce
the vulnerability of his forces by dispersing the
friendly forces and massing effects on the
enemy. However, fires alone are unlikely to
achieve completely operational objectives.
Integrated properly with operational
maneuver, fires can help achieve a decisive
impact on the operation.
GENERAL TASKS
Operational fires help the Army
commander accomplish his mission and protect
the force. Operational fires achieve both
operational and tactical objectives while
holding enemy critical functions at risk
throughout the depth of the battle space.
Operational fires are more than deep fires.
They achieve operational objectives by
extending the battlefield in both space and
time. Targets critical to the success of friendly
operations exist throughout the depth of the
battlefield. Current and emerging capabilities
permit their acquisition and attack at
increasing ranges and with faster response
times. Operational fires expose or attack
enemy centers of gravity. Attack of key
operational targets helps to set the conditions
for operational maneuver. Disrupting,
delaying, or limiting critical enemy functions
helps the commander dictate the terms for the
close fight. Operational fires may hold or deny
terrain in support of both operational and
tactical objectives.
Tactical objectives are supported by the
ability of operational fires to disrupt, delay, or
limit enemy capabilities that would impact
immediately on the current battle. Tactical
objectives support the attack of committed
enemy formations throughout their depth. This
support helps the commander seize and retain
the initiative, alter the tempo of operations,
and set the conditions for decisive close combat.
Support of both operational and tactical
objectives through operational fires is based on
the ability of operational fires to hold all critical
enemy functions at risk throughout the depth
of the battle space. Operational fires neither
leave the enemy a place to hide nor time to rest,
critically limiting his freedom of action. As
such, operational fires hasten the physical
destruction of the enemy force and the
disintegration of cohesive operations and
demoralize the enemy’s will to fight. In
MOOTW, the availability of operational fires to
the commander acts as a deterrent to
escalation of conflict and, when necessary,
provides him additional means to accomplish
the mission and protect the force.
Also, the enemy may possess a sophisticated
operational fires capability. The Army
commander must consider enemy capabilities
and establish measures to protect the force.
Operational fires may be used to disrupt enemy
capabilities before they can be used against
friendly forces. Examples include theater missile
defense, counterreconnaissance, surveillance and
target acquisition, counterfire, and joint
suppression of enemy air defenses (J-SEAD).
Operational fires focus largely on one or more of
three general tasks: facilitating maneuver,
isolating the battlefield, or destroying critical
enemy functions and facilities.
Facilitating Maneuver
Operational fires can facilitate maneuver in
depth by suppressing the enemy’s deep-strike
systems, disrupting the enemy’s operational
maneuver and tempo, and creating exploitable
gaps in tactical defenses. Interdiction and
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Chapter 5
maneuver are inseparable operations against a
common enemy. Interdiction directs, disrupts,
delays, or destroys the enemy’s surface military
potential before it can be used effectively against
friendly forces (Joint Pub 1-02). Effective
interdiction and maneuver are complementary
operations designed to achieve the JFC's
campaign objectives. Together they present the
greatest dilemma to the enemy. The synergy
achieved by integrating and synchronizing
interdiction and maneuver assists commanders
in optimizing leverage at the operational level.
When the campaign calls for ground
operations to be decisive operations or defeat
mechanisms, planning for the interdiction
operations and target prioritization must be
based on the ground commander’s concept of
operations. Just as air commanders (Naval and
Air Force) know and understand the
capabilities, strengths, and weaknesses of
opposing air forces, ground force commanders
must know and understand the capabilities,
strengths, and weaknesses of opposing ground
forces.
Proper interdiction planning requires both
air and ground expertise. The interdiction and
maneuver planning responsibilities of the
operational-level commander fall into two
areas: influencing joint air interdiction
operations and ensuring that ARFOR and
JFLCC target nominations are struck
according to available assets. To ensure
integration of interdiction and maneuver, the
Army operational-level commander must—
•Define Army interdiction objectives and
priorities and provide them to the JFACC.
•Establish allocation of CAS effort between
subordinate Army forces and the operational
headquarters.
•Ensure the deep operations coordination cell
(DOCC) determines high-payoff and highvalue
targets.
•Ensure that consolidated target, nominations
reflect ARFOR priorities.
•Recognize that Army targets do not
automatically get higher priority.
•Facilitate notification to subordinate unit
commanders when the JFC determines that
the circumstances have changed and therefore
alter asset allocation priorities.
•If designated as an appropriate ground forces
commander, establish a fire support
coordination line (FSCL) within boundaries
and in consultation with superior, subordinate,
supporting, and affected commanders.
Isolating the Battlefield
Isolating the battlefield is another major
task of operational fires. Operational-level
commanders isolate the battlefield by
interdicting enemy military potential before it
can be used effectively against friendly forces.
Commanders usually combine this isolation
with other operations in a simultaneous attack
designed to use superior combat power to
achieve quick, decisive outcomes.
While interdiction destroys enemy forces,
its primary contribution to the operation is
curtailing the enemy’s freedom of movement
and information flow and influencing the
enemy’s battle tempo by diverting, delaying,
and disrupting enemy forces. Interdiction can
slow the action of enemy reserves and obstruct
the redeployment or movement of forces.
Interdiction of the logistical support
system disrupts enemy operations by choking
off the enemy’s combat power. Friendly ground
and air forces must exploit the enemy’s reduced
freedom to maneuver and synchronize this
reduction with other operations to achieve the
desired tempo of operations.
Destroying Critical Enemy
Functions and Facilities
Operational-level commanders may use
operational fires to destroy critical enemy
functions and facilities. Critical targets may
include high-value C2 systems, mobility assets
such as fixed and mobile bridging, air defense
sites, and enemy long-range delivery systems
such as surface-to-surface missiles, theater
ballistic and cruise missiles, airfields, and
aircraft.
The objective in such cases is the deliberate
elimination or substantial degradation of
critical enemy operational capabilities, for
example, attaining air superiority by
destroying enemy air operations and air
defense capabilities. Operational fires do not
necessarily depend on other concurrent
operations for success; however, they may be
employed with other systems and maneuver in
a simultaneous attack of enemy operational
capabilities. Operational fires are particularly
attractive in a theater where lack of resources
may preclude major ground offensive
operations.
5-8
FM 100-7
ORGANIZATION
The senior army commander ensures unity
of effort and purpose by organizing fires in his
operational battle space. He is a major planner
of operational fires and a major allocator of fire
support resources. He closely coordinates joint
and multinational assets. He allocates or
controls resources and designates missions to
subordinates. They attach forces, establish
support relationships, or control usage; specify
the degree of risk; and retain systems control.
A primary consideration for the Army
commander is the allocation of scarce
operational fires resources, especially air
assets.
COORDINATION
The senior army commander and his staff
play a major part in coordinating joint and
multinational assets. Under the guidance of
the JFC, land, air, and maritime components
execute major operations designed to attain
strategic objectives. The JFC synchronizes
operational-level fires as part of the joint
planning process. This process entails
component coordination and cooperation in the
employment of all fires.
Deep Operations Coordination Cell
The DOCC1 is a proposed fire support element
at the operational-level headquarters that
plans, coordinates, and executes employment
of operational fires. Chapter 7 discusses the
DOCC in detail. J-SEAD is an example of this
type of coordination and cooperation.
Battlefield Coordination Element
The Army DOCC effects coordination
with other services through the battlefield
coordination element (BCE). The ASCC
OPERATIONAL
Operational protection conserves the
fighting potential of a force so that it can be
applied at the decisive time and place,
Operational protection includes actions taken
to counter the enemy’s firepower and
1. To accomplish this mission, the 3d US Army formed
a deep operations targeting cell during Operations
Desert Shield and Desert Storm.
provides the BCE and collocates it either
ashore or afloat with the ACC's air operations
center (AOC) or theater equivalent. The BCE
expedites the exchange of information through
face-to-face coordination with elements of the
AOC established by the ACC. The AOC is the
operational facility in which the ACC
centralizes the planning, direction, and
controlling functions over all tactical air
(TACAIR) resources.
The BCE's basic mission is to facilitate the
synchronization of air support for Army
operations. The BCE is responsible to the
ASCC/ARFOR commander and coordinates
with and receives objectives, guidance, and
priorities from his operations officer (G3).
Specific missions include processing land
forces’ requests for TACAIR support,
monitoring and interpreting the land battle
situation for the AOC, providing the necessary
interface for the exchange of current
intelligence and operational data, and
coordinating air defense and airspace control
matters.
Historically, the BCE has worked with
the Air Force in this coordination role, but with
the changes in world environment and joint
doctrine, the Army BCE can expect to work in
contingency operations with USMC and
maritime air component commanders.
Planners must identify and resolve problems
that result from these less-practiced and lessrefined
linkages. If the BCE collocates with an
AOC, it is organized into sections
corresponding to the AOC's. Figure 5-3
illustrates the organization of the BCE and its
interface with tactical air control. For more
information on the BCE, consult FM 100-103,
FM 100-15, and 71-100 series FMs.
PROTECTION
maneuver by making soldiers, systems, and
operational formations difficult to detect,
strike, and destroy. Operational protection
pertains to forces everywhere in the theater of
war or operations. Operational protection
includes, but is not limited to-
•Providing operational air defense.
•Conducting deception.
•Protecting operational forces and means.
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Chapter 5
• Employing OPSEC.
•Providing security for forces and means.
•Conducting rear operations, which includes
combatting terrorism.
•Conducting risk assessments.
•Planning for possible response or use of WMD.
PROVIDING OPERATIONAL
AIR DEFENSE
All members of the combined arms team
perform air defense operations; however,
ground-based air defense artillery (ADA) units
execute the bulk of the force protection mission.
Army ADA provides protection to forces and
selected geopolitical assets from aerial attack,
missle attack, and surveillance. Significant
assets. Enemy air operations may include
tactical ballistic missile (TBM), air-to-surface
missile (ASM), and cruise missile (CM) attacks,
The full spectrum of enemy air threat includes
UAVs, rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft, and
airborne and air assault operations. The
current approach to theater missile and air
defense places emphasis on leveraging the
synergy of joint capabilities to the maximum
extent possible to counter the threat. Each joint
force component addresses the target sets that
they are best equipped to engage and destroy.
The first target set is ballistic missiles.
Ballistic missiles can be strategic, operational,
or tactical. They may also have guided
munitions. Because of detection difficulties and
inadequate kill potential, manned aircraft are
inappropriate platforms to counter TBMs in
the terminal phase. The TBM target set is best
engaged by ground-based systems as
demonstrated by Patriot ADA during
Operation Desert Storm. Manned aircraft are
best suited by design for air-to-air
engagements of other manned fixed-wing
aircraft.
A second target set committed against
theater assets is cruise missiles, UAVs, and
fighter/bomber aircraft that evade the defense
considerations for employment of ADA in
theater operations include its role in joint and
multinational counterair operations, theater
missle defense, the threat, available assets,
and organizations.
The entire spectrum of threat air
operations can be flown with theater-level
Air Threats
5-10
FM 100-7
counterair operations of the joint air forces.
Ground-based air defense systems are best
equipped to engage these targets. UAVs and
helicopter platforms typically operate at
altitudes where fixed wing air-to-air combat is
not employed. These targets are destroyed
through ground-based systems, thereby
contributing to protection of forces and
geopolitical assets and denying the enemy
surveillance of friendly force activities.
The contribution of all services to theater
missile and air defense offensive and defensive
tactics engages all applicable target sets. These
offensive and defensive tactics cover all aspects
of active and passive defense measures
throughout the theater.
Joint and Multinational
Counterair Operations
Joint and multinational counterair
operations are conducted to attain and
maintain a desired degree of air superiority by
destroying or neutralizing enemy forces. Joint
and multinational counterair operations
include both offensive and defensive measures
taken against enemy air threats. Offensive
counterair (OCA) operations destroy, disrupt,
or limit enemy air threats as close to their
source as possible, whereas defensive
counterair (DCA) operations are conducted
primarily to counteract enemy air offensive
actions to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of
hostile air attacks.
Air defense forces conduct DCA operations
using both active and passive measures. Active
DCA operations use ADA; EW; Army aviation;
and chemical (smoke), combined arms, and air
elements to disrupt or destroy airborne enemy
aircraft, missiles, and other aerial vehicles that
pose attack and surveillance threats. Passive
DCA measures such as cover, concealment,
signature reduction, smoke operations, and
deception frustrate enemy targeting efforts and
minimize the effects of enemy attacks.
Theater Missile Defense
FM 44-100 states that the objectives of
theater missile defense (TMD) are—
•To reduce the probability of and to minimize
the effects of damage caused by a theater
ballistic missile attack.
•To detect and target theater missile
platforms.
•To detect, warn of, and report theater
missile launch.
•To coordinate a multifaceted response to a
theater missile attack.
•To integrate TMD with other combat
operations.
TMD has four operational elements—
passive defense, active defense, attack
operations, and command, control,
communications, computers, and intelligence
(C41). The Army contributes to all four. Passive
measures reduce the vulnerability of critical
forces and assets to theater missile attack.
Active defenses engage missiles and enemy
aircraft armed with air-to-surface missiles in
flight. Attack operations are conducted to
prevent the launch of theater missiles. C4I is
required to coordinate and integrate the
defense against the theater missile capability.
The senior Army air defense command in
theater executes a key portion of the TMD
concept. Air defense forces are task-organized
to defend in a TMD task force. The TMD task
force protects a mix of force organizations and
geopolitical assets that represent a high
priority for protection by the TMD. It is
composed of two overlapping tiers. The upper
tier is defended by theater high-altitude air
defense (THAAD). The lower tier is defended
by the Patriot. Through TMD, both OCA and
DCA actions are taken against theater
missiles. Simultaneous with the active defense
operations to destroy inbound theater missiles
are the attack operations to facilitate
counterfires using the flight data of the threat
TBM to locate the launch point. This is an
operational action that can extend air defense
activities far beyond the corps deep battle area.
For additional details on TMD, refer to
FM 44-100.
CONDUCTING DECEPTION
The conduct of deception contributes
greatly to the protection and survivability of
operational forces. Operational deception
consists of those operations that purposely
mislead enemy decision makers by distorting,
concealing, and falsifying friendly intentions,
capabilities, and dispositions. Deception
includes protecting the commander’s own
intentions, disseminating misinformation to
deceive the enemy about those intentions,
obscuring areas of the theater, and
determining the effect of the deception.
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The ultimate goal of deception is to mislead
the opposing military commander, prompting
him to plan and conduct his activities in a
manner that unwittingly serves the friendly
force’s objectives. Deception operations are
planned and executed at the operational level
of war and synchronized with strategic
objectives. They can support theater objectives
by deterring the escalation of conflict,
destroying the enemy’s warfighting means,
gaining and maintaining the initiative, and
shaping the enemy’s scheme of maneuver.
The operational-level commander
participates in the deception process at two
levels. He may plan and execute deception
operations within his mission purview, or he
may be asked to provide planning and
operational-level support for deception
activities planned and executed by
subordinate, adjacent, or higher command
echelons. Deception operations at the
operational level must complement or reinforce
the theater deception plan effort. The
operational-level commander reconciles
operational and tactical deception plans to
ensure they complement but do not contradict
the strategic (theater) plan.
PROTECTING OPERATIONAL
FORCES AND MEANS
The operational-level commander
safeguards his operational force by reducing
the effects of enemy operational-level actions
(movement, radio electronic combat, and so
forth). He does this by preparing operationally
significant fortifications, removing
operationally significant hazards, and
protecting the use of the electromagnetic
spectrum.
The operational commander provides
protective construction hardening for
operational forces and key facilities, for
example, C2, logistics, and rear area positions.
However, even hardened facilities are
vulnerable to a determined attack. The
operational commander eliminates hazards
that may adversely affect the execution of his
plan. Additionally, he ensures that actions are
taken to ensure friendly, effective use of the
electromagnetic spectrum, despite the enemy’s
use of EW.
EMPLOYING OPERATIONS
SECURITY
The operational-level commander attempts
to hide friendly force indicators associated with
planning and conducting major operations. He
does so by employing signal security (SIGSEC)
and concealment techniques and avoiding
operational patterns.
The operational-level commander protects
emitters and information transmitted through
friendly C2 communications-electronic systems
from enemy exploitation. He also hides
operational forces and facilities from enemy
observation and surveillance sensors. He
ensures units vary activities and ways of
conducting operations to avoid predictable
patterns that are vulnerable to enemy
interception.
PROVIDING SECURITY OF
FORCES AND MEANS
By identifying and reducing friendly
vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or
surprise, the operational-level commander
enhances the force's freedom of action.
Enhancement consists of measures to protect
the force from surprise, observation, detection,
interference, espionage, and sabotage. It
includes protecting and securing the flanks of
operational formations, critical installations,
facilities, and systems.
CONDUCTING REAR
OPERATIONS
The operational-level commander is
responsible for rear operations subject to
applicable host nation laws and agreements.
Rear operations include those activities that
allow freedom of maneuver in the COMMZ,
continuity of sustainment, and uninterrupted
battle command. The combatant CINC is
ultimately responsible for all rear operations in
the theater of operations. He normally assigns
subordinate commanders the responsibility for
operations in a JRA according to mission
requirements, force capabilities, the strategic
environment, and the threat. The CINC may
assign the overall mission of rear operations to
one commander—the JRAC. The JRAC must
ensure integration of all rear operations
missions and forces and synchronization with
the CINC campaign plan.
The potential magnitude of the threat to
the theater base and COMMZ dictates that US
forces be trained to cope with threat forces
when and where they attempt to interrupt
COMMZ operations. The operational-level
commander uses every appropriate active and
passive measure for defense against detection
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FM 100-7
from the air, attack from the ground, and
compromise of friendly defense systems.
Successful rear security operations are
critical in the rear area since it contains the
LOCs, establishments for supply and
evacuation, and agencies required for
immediate support and maintenance of field
forces. The key tasks of successful rear security
operations are—
•Coordinating base/base cluster defense
plans.
•Collecting, integrating, analyzing, and
disseminating timely and accurate
intelligence.
•Patrolling aggressively in coordination with
the host nation, to intercept and defeat
small threat forces before they close on their
objective.
•Deploying forces sufficient to counter the
enemy intrusion.
CONDUCTING RISK
ASSESSMENTS
Also integral to force protection is the
conduct of risk assessments. Risk assessments
identify hazards and examine the resulting
risks associated with the mission. Special risk
considerations must be made where the threat
of WMD exists. Risk assessment is dynamic. As
circumstances change and the command’s
experience level increases, risk assessments
confirm and reconfirm critical information that
affects decisions.
PLANNING FOR POSSIBLE
RESPONSE OR USE OF
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
US policy concerning nuclear warfare is to
deter it, and, if deterrence fails, to terminate
the conflict at the lowest possible level of
violence consistent with national and allied
policy objectives. This policy does not preclude
US first use of nuclear munitions. Nuclear
weapons may only be used following the
specific directives of the President.
Since the Army no longer has an organic
nuclear capability, it must rely on other
services for delivery of nonstrategic nuclear
weapons to support its operational warfare
requirements. Nuclear weapons should be
integrated with other fire support systems to
achieve the greatest operational advantage.
The potential employment of WMD can have
an enormous impact on the conduct of all
operations. These strategic, operational,
psychological, and political impacts affect
campaign designs. The sheer killing and
destructive power of these weapons create an
illusionary battlefield effect. Further, the
proliferation of WMD dramatically alters the
nature of regional conflict.
As these weapons proliferate, the
likelihood of their use against friendly forces or
in response to an enemy’s first use increases.
The effects of these weapons on a campaign or
major operation—either through use or the
threat of use—can cause large-scale shifts in
tactical objectives, phases, and/or COAs. Thus,
planning for the possibility of their use against
friendly forces is critical to campaign design.
Commanders must be aware of the political as
well as public sensitivities to the use of WMD
and be prepared to respond to the possibilities
of postuse public relations problems.
From the combatant commander’s
perspective, a swift end to a conflict will
partially negate the escalator potential of
these weapons. A combination of conventional
offensive and defensive measures can help
deter or reduce the likelihood of an enemy’s use
of these weapons. Offensive preventive
measures may include raids, surgical air
strikes, and operations designed to locate and
neutralize the threat of such weapons.
Commanders implement the defensive nuclear,
biological, chemical (NBC) principles of
avoidance, protection, and decontamination.
They also plan for effective air and ballistic
missile defense with different systems. US
military policy attempts to deter enemy use of
WMD through a defense posture that allows
US forces to survive, fight, and win under
conditions produced by these weapons.
Commanders must assess an enemy’s
willingness to employ these weapons and the
conditions that would prompt him to do so.
However, commanders should never assume
rationality in the mind of the enemy. A
virtually defeated enemy may resort to
unrestricted warfare by any means at hand.
Army forces may support use of WMD with
SEAD or with the reconnaissance and selection
of targets. More importantly, however, Army
officers must participate-in drafting and
executing campaign plans that envision
friendly use of WMD. The campaign plan must
identify the requirement for strikes with WMD
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that support campaigns and major operations.
Additionally, Army planners should identify
appropriate WMD targets and ensure
integration of WMD into the campaign plan
and/or major operation plan.
The Mass Destruction
Environment
When WMD are used, extensive
destruction and mass casualties can result.
Only cohesive, disciplined, physically fit, and
well-trained units can function in this
environment. But long-term operations in this
environment degrade even the best individual
and unit performance as a result of wearing
protective equipment. Commanders must train
and equip soldiers and civilians alike to endure
these conditions. By being better prepared
than the enemy for continuous operations
under conditions produced by WMD, US forces
can maintain an advantage over the enemy
that deters him from using these weapons.
Force protection is an imperative in this
environment. Units can survive the use of
WMD by anticipating their employment.
Commanders can protect their forces in a
variety of ways. These include training,
OPSEC, dispersion of forces, and proper use of
terrain for shielding against effects.
In an NBC environment, battle command
becomes more difficult. Command posts and
headquarters at all levels are likely targets.
Control is difficult even within the smallest
unit. Personnel in protective clothing are slow
to respond to rapid changes in mission. The
employment of these weapons greatly alters
the tempo of combat. So, commanders must
never assume that they are immune to attack
but consider ways of decreasing their risk.
Contamination avoidance is essential for
successful operation when faced with an NBC
threat. Avoiding contamination allows units to
maintain tactical momentum and preserves
combat power by keeping soldiers out of
increased NBC protective postures. It also
removes or lessens the need for
decontamination. Detailed information on
NBC contamination avoidance is found in
FM 3-3.
Multinational operations become more
risky with the threat of NBC use. Countries
that cannot protect themselves against these
weapons may become the primary target of an
enemy whose aim is to disintegrate the
coalition. The likelihood that an enemy will use
WMD against other coalition members will
increase as US forces demonstrate the ability
to defend effectively against their effects.
Commanders should consider that possibility
in all strategic, operational, and tactical
planning.
Nuclear Weapons
As a force that now lacks organic nuclear
capability, the Army must rely on Air Force
and Navy nuclear capabilities to deter regional
threats from using WMD and, should it be
necessary, to respond to regional use of these
weapons. The integration of nuclear weapons
and long-range ballistic missile systems
expands the scope of regional conflict. Ballistic
missiles significantly reduce reaction times
and create complex planning and decision
criteria. The ability of some nations to employ
nuclear weapons at extended ranges, using
ballistic or cruise missiles and high-speed
aircraft, will significantly enhance their
effectiveness as instruments of terror. With the
ability comes the possibility of conflict
escalation beyond the boundaries of the region.
Using intelligence estimates, planners
advise the commander of the enemy’s
capability to employ nuclear weapons and
under what conditions he is most likely to do so.
A significant intelligence task is locating these
weapons and assessing the probability of their
employment. Accordingly, the integration of
national, joint, and multinational intelligence
means is vital to this effort.
The immediate effects of a nuclear
detonation are blast, thermal radiation, initial
nuclear radiation, and electromagnetic pulse
(EMP). These effects can cause significant
personnel and materiel losses. Secondary
effects include urban devastation, fires, and
radiological contamination. The EMP from a
nuclear detonation can affect unshielded
electronic equipment and degrade C3I systems.
Residual radiation can also have long-term
effects on personnel, equipment, facilities,
terrain, and water sources. Therefore, ensuring
that friendly force dispositions do not provide
lucrative targets for nuclear weapons is
important.
Biological Weapons
While the US has renounced the use of
biological weapons, many nations have not.
The availability of biological weapons to
possible enemies requires that commanders
prepare for operations in a biological
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FM 100-7
environment. Defensive measures are
necessary to mitigate the effects of a biological
attack. Both military and civilian populations
require information and psychological and
medical preparation.
Chemical Weapons
All current and future operations have the
potential to occur in a chemical environment.
US policy does not condone or authorize first
use of chemical weapons. However,
preparedness to operate in this environment
negates many possible advantages for an
enemy to employ these weapons. This
preparedness is itself a deterrent.
Chemical weapons produce immediate and
delayed effects that can hamper operations
through the contamination of equipment,
supplies, and critical terrain features.
Commanders can reduce the effects of chemical
employment by applying the fundamentals of
contamination avoidance, protection, and
decontamination. Chemical reconnaissance
and decontamination are two planning
imperatives for all future missions; training is
the key. Detailed information on providing
NBC protection to the force, as well as risk
analysis and assessment, is found in FM 3-4.
OPERATIONAL BATTLE COMMAND
Initially described in FM 100-5,
operational battle command is the exercise of
authority and direction by a commander to
accomplish operational objectives. The control
mechanisms support the exercise of battle
command. The commander’s vision and his
stated intent guide the organization toward the
accomplishment of their mission or assigned
tasks. Battle command focuses efforts,
establishes limits, and provides structure to
operational functions. Battle command
supports the organization in the conduct of
current operations while planning and
preparing for future operations.
THE COMMANDERS
RESPONSIBILITIES
Visualizing the battlefield is a continuing
requirement for commanders. Battle command
at the operational level includes the collection
and protection of information, the assessment
of that information, the selection of appropriate
actions, and the establishment of direction for
the leaders of subordinate operational forces.
In exercising battle command, the operationallevel
commander considers those assets
available from higher headquarters as well as
from other service components and allies. He
then organizes his command and delegates
responsibilities.
Operational-level battle command requires
longer lead times, involves a greater span of
control, and is inherently joint and often
multinational. It includes tactical-level
principles such as issuing mission orders,
anticipating requirements, and using
initiative. The senior army commander
translates these principles, the CINC's
strategic direction, and the operational-level
objectives into a clear statement of intent.
The concept of battle space was developed
to help the commander visualize and organize
the projection of combat power to gain physical
dominance over the enemy. Battle space is the
three-dimensional physical environment—that
is not constrained by boundaries—in which
commanders visualize conducting combat
operations over time. Commanders use the
concept of battle space to help determine how
the terrain and all available combat power can
be used to dominate the enemy and protect the
force. Eventually, this vision becomes the
battlefield framework from which the
commander’s intent and concept of operation
are derived. Understanding of this concept
contributes to the synchronization of fulldimensional
operations.
Understanding also allows commanders to
synchronize combat power against the enemy
and keep the enemy from extending his battle
space to its greatest range. This helps
commanders determine how they might taskorganize
and position their units. By
understanding how to visualize operations to
disrupt the enemy in depth, commanders can
synchronize operations to disrupt the enemy in
depth to throw him off balance, to attack his
functions, and to set the conditions for decisive
victory. Synchronization, sequencing, and
phasing of the battle within the battle space is
critical to success. New technology in
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Structuring to Focus Effort
digitization has provided opportunities for
improved battlefield situational awareness and
increased weapons systems lethality.
Digitization efforts include ground maneuver
battle space as well as the airspace above the
theater. Digitization increases operational
tempo and protects friendly forces. Battle space
is discussed in detail in FM 100-5 and
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5.
The senior army commander maintains
clear unity of command during changes of
operational phases. This unity includes
relationships with joint and multinational
organizations. Significant changes in command
relationships require phasing plans to avoid
confusion. Any major organizational changes
require a review of the existing battle
command process.
THE COMMANDER'S VISION
A senior army commander performs four
functions to implement his vision and achieve
proper operational battle command. First, he
decides upon and communicates his intent and
provides direction so that others can
understand and respond. Next, he establishes
the structure to focus effort. Then, he plans and
organizes the activities necessary to get
results. Finally, he motivates, influences, and
supervises the force to develop and sustain the
organizational purpose required to accomplish
the mission.
Communicating the
Commander’s Intent
The commander’s intent is a concise
expression of the commander’s expected
outcome of an operation. The commander’s
intent funnels an organization’s collective
activities to achieve the commander’s desired
outcome. The commander’s intent is the central
goal and stand-alone reference that enables
subordinates to gain the required flexibility in
planning and executing. It is the standard
reference point from which all present and
future subordinates’ actions evolve.
Commanders and leaders—guided by their
commander’s intent—who can make decisions
can better ensure the success of the force as a
whole when conditions are vague and confusing
and communication is limited or impossible.
The design of commander’s intent is not to
restrain but to empower subordinates by giving
them freedom of action to accomplish a
mission.
Structure is critical for implementing the
commander’s vision. At the operational level,
the complexity and scope of the mission
contribute to uncertainty. Leaders cannot
always draw upon experience or previous
solutions to problems that may be entirely
different. An important component is
establishing the rules and defining the limits.
ROE, control measures, degree of risk, success
criteria, report formats, and other tools
contribute to the function of establishing
structure. Many of these matters are standard
procedures in smaller units. However, at
echelons above corps (EAC), the inherent joint
and multinational nature of operations, along
with the peculiarities of each theater, compel
the senior army commander to specify certain
elements.
Structuring focuses effort. Structure is a
characteristic of the control function of
leadership. The senior army commander
applies structure when he assigns missions
and communicates his vision. Structure is
accomplished formally through orders and
directives and informally in communicating
with subordinate commanders.
Planning and Organizing
Operational planning begins with the
assignment of a mission or with the
commander’s recognition of a requirement; it
continues until the mission is accomplished,
The staff uses the commander’s intent to
develop and coordinate the supporting
operation plan. Once the commander develops
the plan, he organizes his command and
designates command relationships to
accomplish the mission.
An operational-level commander keeps his
eye on long-range objectives throughout any
operation. He views tactical outcomes and task
accomplishments from the perspective of how
they contribute to the major operation. While
tactical setbacks might cause adjustments to
the operation, they should not unduly divert
attention away from the operational objective.
In the plan development process, the
commander and his staff interact continuously
during the commander’s analysis, the restated
mission, guidance to the staff, estimates, and
development of COAs. This interaction
continues through the commander’s decision to
publish an order. Continuous feedback and
coordination ensures that the staff and
commander focus on the objective.
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FM100-7
Motivating and Influencing the Force
At the operational level, leadership and
command is no longer simply a direct influence
process. It also includes a well-formed ability to
exercise indirect, organizational leadership.
Success depends on creating and maintaining
cohesive teams, units, and organizations, using
both direct and indirect modes of leadership.
FM 22-103 discusses these modes of
leadership.
The senior army commander must be able
to sustain the appropriate command climate—
a climate that fosters free communication—in
order to generate the motivation to maintain
cohesive teams. Free communication permits
the senior commander to assess how well his
vision is understood. It also assists him in
influencing every level of his command.
OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
Operational intelligence is that intelligence
required for the planning and conduct of major
operations within a theater of operations. At
the operational level of war, the joint and
multinational intelligence system does not
concentrate just on the collection,
identification, location, and analysis of the
center of gravity and operational objectives. It
also must focus its production effort downward
and concentrate efforts on warfighting priority
intelligence requirements (PIR).
•Basic (or finished) intelligence.
•Strategic indications and warnings.
•Tactical warnings.
•Current intelligence reporting.
•Intelligence-preparation-of-the-battlefield
(IPB) on an operational or theater basis.
•Targeting intelligence.
•Battle damage assessment (BDA) and
poststrike assessment.
•Collection requirements management
(synchronization of intelligence product
reports).
The operational-level intelligence
organizations also provide unique
counterintelligence (CI), signals intelligence
SIGINT, imagery intelligence (IMINT),
measurement and signatures intelligence
(MASINT), technical intelligence (TECHINT),
human intelligence (HUMINT), security
countermeasures services, and force protection.
These capabilities are found within the units of the
operational-level military intelligence (MI)
organization. An example of a typical theater MI
structure is discussed in detail in Appendix A.
COLLECTION
Military leaders normally rely on DOD or
other government agencies to monitor and
assess operational-level information applicable
to nonhostile situations that could require
military support. MI efforts focus normally on
potentially hostile threats. This intelligence
leads to the identification and location of highpayoff
targets that, if successfully attacked,
help achieve the assigned operational-level
objective.
During hostilities, the focus of the
operational-level intelligence effort is to
analyze the enemy’s operational capabilities
and estimate his intent. Many elements of
analysis that underwrite war or conflict
tactical intelligence apply at the operational
level, for example, enemy order-of-battle,
enemy capabilities, WMD, doctrinal norms,
and characteristics of the AOR.
Commanders and their intelligence and
chemical officers should evaluate these
elements and other products and reports in a
broad context. They should also establish Army
force collection requirements and allocate
organic and supporting collection assets.
A key role for the Army service component
is to expedite access to and facilitate
dissemination of theater and national-level
intelligence through the JIC. Intelligence at
the operational-level requires information
broader than that normally associated with the
tactical echelons. Political, economic, and social
factors affect the enemy decision-making
process and the corresponding friendly
collection plan.
PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE
REQUIREMENTS
Intelligence at the operational level must
project well into the future. The senior army
commander drives the intelligence effort by
articulating PIR and information requirements
needed in his decision-making process. For
intelligence to be timely, this commander must
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plan and control the intelligence effort with the
same level of interest and personal
involvement he devotes to other functions. In
particular, he must assure that his intelligence
system distributes products and intelligence
information that meet the needs of his staff and
the requirements of his subordinate
commanders.
INTEGRATION
Intelligence is vital to the design of a
successful operation. The senior army
commander must integrate intelligence with
all the other operational-level functions.
Tactical commanders must react quickly to
unanticipated shifts in the flow of battle with
forces reserved for that purpose. Operationallevel
commanders, however, must determine
their lines of operations and lines of support
much further in advance. Deployment of
intelligence collection personnel as part of the
force establishing a forward presence in a
contingency area contributes to this capability.
Commanders should consider both permanent
stationing and periodic deployment of CONUSbased
resources.
SYNCHRONIZATION
Synchronization is the arrangement of
operations and battlefield activities in time,
space, resources, and purpose to produce
maximum relative combat power at a decisive
point. It focuses the vast arsenal of intelligence
resources available from national to division
levels to accomplish the desired result—
synchronized intelligence operations at each
level that satisfy and deliver PIR to theater and
combat commanders.
Synchronization ensures IEW operations
are linked to the commander’s requirements
and respond in time to influence decisions and
operations. In the synchronization process, the
intelligence officer takes the commander's PIR
and backward plans to orchestrate the
collection and production efforts with the
operation and deliver intelligence when
required. Intelligence synchronization is a
continuous process that ensures the
intelligence system answers the commander’s
intelligence requirements in time to influence
his decisions.
VULNERABILITIES
Operational-level commanders must
clearly understand both enemy and friendly
capabilities and vulnerabilities. This
understanding focuses on hostile situations but
includes information applicable in nation
assistance, disaster relief, and other nonhostile
situations.
POTENTIAL THREAT
CAPABILITIES
Potential threat operational doctrine and
force capabilities across the range of military
operations remain the largest part of military
collection requirements. As collectors probe,
the critical focus must be on the nature of the
enemy’s battle command structure.
Collectors must seek the identity and
personal characteristics of opposing
operational commanders, their relationships
with their superiors and subordinates, and the
effects of these relationships on the
mechanisms through which the enemy makes
operational decisions. Questions that may be
asked include—
•What freedom of action does the opposing
commander have?
•How aggressively is he likely to exercise it?
•What degree of compliance can he expect
from his subordinates?
•How effective is his battle command system?
Such questions are more critical at the
operational-level than at the tactical level,
particularly for those military forces in which
initiative is reserved at relatively high levels of
command. A vital operational-level intelligence
task is to discover who commands and how he
exercises command in a given situation.
COMMANDER’S REQUIREMENTS
The senior army commander requires a
risk assessment concerning friendly
susceptibilities and vulnerabilities an enemy
may exploit. This assessment is part of
predictive products that support the
commander’s battle planning. Intelligence
agencies also must obtain information
concerning the nature and characteristics of
the AOR, to include significant hazards. The
commander needs to know the enemy’s total
capability, the area’s basic physical features,
climatological characteristics, and topography.
Information should include significant
military, technical, scientific, diplomatic,
economic, industrial, geographic, demographic,
topographic, hydrographic, climatic, cultural,
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FM 100-7
Security
and psychological features of the area. This
information contributes to hostile and nonhostile
military preparations.
PROBLEMS
The operational-level intelligence
collection process has some unique
characteristics. No analytical method or
mechanism completely eliminates the
problems of uncertainly, volume, and security.
Uncertainty
Operational-level commanders must
always consider security when working with
sensitive intelligence information, especially in
the multinational operational environment.
Operational-level commanders normally have
access to natiional strategic intelligence means.
Often, these systems can provide valuable
insights into probable enemy intentions. By
their very nature, these national collection
means are among the most sensitive of
intelligence assets, especially those sources
most likely to reveal probable enemy
intentions. Commanders must therefore
carefully balance their desire to act on
information derived from these sources, with
the realization that such action could risk
exposing the source and compromising the
national defense capability. The operationallevel
commander must make the decision on
the information to be shared. In nonhostile
situations, revealing information gained from
national assets could compromise US defense
capabilities. In multinational operations, the
problem is compounded by questions
concerning allied internal security.
The products of intelligence at this level are
sometimes imperfect guides to action; therefore,
senior army commanders may be required to take
risks. Commanders can mitigate these risks by
clearly articulating the PIR and information
requirements they need for their decision making.
The senior intelligence officer mitigates risk by
ensuring that facts are distinguished clearly from
assumptions and not by constraining intelligence
estimates by preconceived expectations of
preferences.
Volume
Another concern is the sheer volume of
intelligence that can overwhelm the commander
and his staff. The senior intelligence officer must
manage this volume and clearly separate the key
intelligence reports the commander and his staff
need from the background intelligence- supporting
analysis. A coordinated push mechanism that
alerts senior army commanders of significant
changes in the situation must be complemented by
a pull mechanism that keeps theater,
departmental, and national activities focused on
support to military operations.
DISSEMINATION
Senior commanders require free and timely
exchange of intelligence to make decisions with
confidence. Intelligence is timely if it allows the
commander to act at the appropriate time. The
dissemination means and the form employed
affect the timeliness of the dissemination of
intelligence. The timely dissemination of
usable and pertinent intelligence is the most
important intelligence problem that must be
solved on the battlefield.
OPERATIONAL LOGISTICS
Operational logistics consists of logistical
and other support activities required to
support the force during campaigns and major
operations within a theater of operations.
Using the LPT process, logisticians at all
echelons determine the logistics requirements
to support the CINC's campaign plan. Logistics
plays a dominant role in maintaining force
readiness for operations, mobilizing critical
human and materiel resources, moving the
force to its intended AO, sustaining the force
throughout the duration of operations,
redeploying the force to its peacetime base or
next contingency area, restoring the Army's
total capability, and demobilizing resources.
A force-projection army requires a logistics
system that anticipates requirments and
makes use of all available resources,
improvising when required. The Army logistics
system relies on local resources, when possible,
whether they are those of host nations or those
contracted or purchased. The system
recognizes constraints of time and limits of
strategic transportation systems and
compensates by pre-positioning materiel,
either afloat or ashore, in or near likely future
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Chapter 5
AOs. It makes use of all resources available, to
include DA and those of other government
agencies, as well as contractor personnel.
OPERATIONAL SUPPORT
0F THE FORCE
Operational support of the force extends
from the theater of operations logistics bases to
the forward CSS units and facilities. Early in
an operation, logistics planning and
management cells within the ASCC structure
are used to ensure rapid establishment of
battle command of logistics and to determine
future support requirements.
As the theater matures, a requirement for
separate, more formal logistical battle
command organizations may exist. Based on
the CINC's campaign plan and the operations
to be conducted, the ASCC determines the
nature and scope of the logistical force
structure. See FM 100-16 for a detailed
description of the logistics function at the
operational level of war.
Logisticians concentrate on providing
capabilities, not organizations, to fulfill
whatever support requirements exist.
Logisticians use logistics support bases to
fulfill support requirements as far forward as
possible. They tailor logistics forces so that the
required capability, and nothing more, is
deployed and employed. Although local
resources are used, logisticians rely on a
CONUS-based support source through
communications and reliable transportation
and distribution systems.
The theater of operations logistics base, in
performing its theater of operations logistics
functions, links strategic sustainment to
tactical CSS. At the operational level of
activity, the familiar distinction between
operations and logistics begins to blur.
Logistics is synonymous with operations and
becomes a significant undertaking of the ASCC
and his staff. Commanders conducting
operations across the range of military
operations must concern themselves with
operational support.
Operational logistics is the link between
the strategic and tactical levels. It
encompasses support required to sustain joint
and multinational campaigns, other military
activities, US forces, and forces of friendly
countries or groups within an AO. Military
units, augmented by DOD civilians, contractor
personnel, and available host nation resources,
make up the organizational structure found at
this level.
Operational-level logistics support may be
complemented by the deployment of USAMC's
LSE. The LSE, largely a table of distribution
and allowances (TDA) activity, performs any
logistics function not normally performed by
table of organization and equipment (TOE)
units. It is a self-contained organization that
may be staffed with any combination of civilian
and military personnel required to perform
specialized tasks. Civilians may be DA or DOD,
or they may be contractors who agree to deploy
to support highly sophisticated equipment.
Military personnel are battle-rostered from
other duty assignments or brought in to fulfill
special requirements of the LSE. The LSE's
unique skills include depot maintenance, oil
analysis, calibration of test equipment,
ammunition surveillance, release of prepositioned
strategic stocks, materiel fielding,
technology insertion, and BDA.
The primary focus of the operational
logistician is on—
•Reception.
•Position of facilities.
•Materiel management.
•Movement control.
•Distribution management.
•Reconstitution and regeneration.
•Redeployment.
As the CINC develops his strategic concept
of operation, he concurrently develops a
concept of support in coordination with his
service component commanders. They and
their staffs consider a myriad of logistics
factors that affect the ability of the operational
forces to conduct operations. Among the most
conspicuous, tangible resources are equipment
and other materials of war. When resources are
limited, the CINC/ARFOR must prioritize the
allocation of materiel among his commands,
giving the preponderance of support to forces
making the main effort and sometimes shifting
priorities as the campaign unfolds.
At the campaign- and major-operationplanning
levels, logistics is a dominant factor
in determining the nature and tempo of
operations. Sound logistics planning and
analysis are factors that allow for rapid
changes to operations plans. Logistics cannot
win a war, but its absence or inadequacy can
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FM 100-7
cause defeat. Operational-level activities are
characterized by—
•High consumption of military materiel.
•A great diversity of equipment types.
•Expansion of the battle area, resulting from
the employment of sophisticated weapons,
communications, and sensors by both sides.
•Extended lines of operation.
•Constrained resources.
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
CHARACTERISTICS
Senior army commanders must effectively
apply the five CSS characteristics:
anticipation, integration, continuity,
responsiveness, and improvisation in planning
and conducting the tactical CSS functions of
manning, arming, fueling, fixing, moving the
force, and sustaining soldiers and their
systems.
Anticipation
Anticipation ensures CSS operations are
agile and characterized by the demonstration
of initiative. Requirements must be accurately
projected to provide resources at the necessary
time and place. The synchronization of logistics
with operations is also a part of anticipation.
This synchronization requires a versatile and
mobile organization structure that maintains
an operational perspective.
Integration
Integration recognizes that CSS is integral
to the conduct of operations and the two are
mutually supportive. It ensures the agility and
versatility of an operation by providing the
maximum operational freedom.
Standardization and interoperability
agreements contribute to integration in the
joint and multinational environment.
Continuity
Continuity provides for the continued flow
of CSS that is essential to successful
operations. It exploits operational lulls to
restore logistics capabilities depleted during
past operations. Alternative approaches are
sought to avoid total reliance on any single
source.
Responsiveness
Responsiveness provides for rapid reaction
during a crisis. The CSS challenge is to make
required adjustments as the crisis response is
refined and the situation evolves. Forces must
be tailorable to meet force-projection
requirements that restrict the deployment of
entire CSS organizations. A split-based
logistics concept complements this capability.
Units must compensate for partial
organizations deployed in tailored packages
and for operating losses through the formation
of provisional units. These units must be able
to surge support at critical times and locations.
The concept of modularity must be built into
unit design to facilitate this process.
Improvisation
Improvisation helps units meet CSS needs
with available resources and may call for
nonstandard solutions. Improvisation permits
solutions to anticipated and real problems
where no solution has been identified
previously.
TACTICAL COMBAT SERVICE
SUPPORT FUNCTIONS
An operational perspective on logistics
requires the translation of the five CSS
characteristics into tactical-level applications
as described by the CSS functions of manning,
arming, fueling, fixing, moving the force, and
sustaining soldiers and their systems.
Manning
The manning function provides for unit
and individual replacements. In addition, it
provides for personnel readiness management
and casualty management.
Arming
The arming function replenishes arms,
munitions, and equipment in an environment
characterized by high consumption rates, the
demands of which are controlled by throughput
distribution and the establishment of
controlled supply rates.
Fueling
The fueling function ensures the
availability of fuels and packaged POL
products for a highly mobile force with the
potential for high consumption rates
demanding a dependable fueling system.
Fixing
The fixing function provides for preserving
availability of equipment. This function is
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performed as far forward as possible and in
minimum time. Expedited means of recovery,
repair, and return are characteristic of the
function.
Moving the Force
This function involves transportation
operations of units and materiel. often, this
function may be done on short notice for large
forces involved in major shifts of direction.
Total asset visibility, in-transit visibility, and
contracting support are critical to the
performance of this function.
Sustaining Soldiers and Their Systems
This function has five elements: personnel
service support, health service support, field
services, quality of life, and general supply
support. Public affairs (PA), religious support,
and legal support operations are elements of
personnel service support. These areas are
described in Appendix A of this manual, in
FM 100-10, in FM 100-16, and in branchspecific
manuals.
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PART THREE
Army Component Operations
This part includes three chapters that discuss Army service component
operations during force projection, operations in war, and MOOTW.
Chapter 6
Force Projection
Codified in the National Security Strategy (NSS) of 1994 and
further developed by the SECDEF, the US military strategy is built
upon the central components of engagement and enlargement.. .“to
enhance our security by maintaining a strong defense capability and
promoting cooperative security measures; work to open foreign
markets and spur global economic growth; and promote democracy
abroad.”
The Army represents a portion of the potential military power of
the nation. That power translates directly to influence the
international system. The US uses military power to compel an
adversary to accede to US will. That potential power deters
opponents from taking actions hostile to US interests. Peaceful
employment of military forces reassures our allies, demonstrates our
capabilities, promotes stability, and contributes to our ability to
influence international outcomes.
CRISIS
A crisis is an incident or situation involving
either an internal or external threat to the US,
its territories, citizens, military forces, and
possessions or vital interests. A crisis develops
rapidly and creates a condition of such
diplomatic, economic, or military importance
that commitment of US forces and resources is
contemplated to achieve national objectives.
During deliberate planning or CAP,
commanders prescribe, in TPFDD format, who,
what, when, and where forces will be deployed.
Based on these initiatives and a unit’s ability to
accurately identify its movement
requirements, USTRANSCOM then identifies
how the unit will move to meet National
Military Strategy objectives.
With the knowledge that extended force
closure times may directly increase the domestic
and coalition support risks for a particular
crisis, commanders rigorously discipline their
strategic lift requirements to that needed for the
operation. During the deployment process, US
forces are most vulnerable to significant
casualties. Conversely, as closure times extend,
the duration of a crisis extends, increasing the
risk of casualties.
A crisis can occur in peacetime, conflict,
and war. In peacetime, a crisis can be
precipitated by a natural disaster or civil
disturbance, resulting in a threat to civil
authority. In war, the threat focus can be
directed at the sovereignty of a nation. The
extent to which the Army is prepared to
respond to a crisis can significantly influence
the eventual outcome.
Adaptive planning is required to ensure
favorable outcomes. At the theater level, the
CINC is responsible for developing a range of
response options. These response options are
not limited to the military instrument of
national power but include economic,
diplomatic, and informational alternatives. The
requirement for interagency cooperation and
multinational considerations is evident.
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Chapter 6
Deterrence is preferable to war. Effective Sometimes, deterrent actions do not prevent
deterrence can prevent escalation of a crisis. the continued escalation of a crisis. The CINC
Deterrent action can resolve a crisis on favorable requires an Army capability to rapidly project
terms. When the opportunity exists, the use of a
deterrent action, such as a show of force, can send
combat-ready forces. The goal of these forces is to
deter conflict or, should deterrence fail, to win
a clear signal of US resolve to intervene should the
threat of unfavorable crisis resolution continue.
quickly, decisively, and with minimum casualties.
This Army requirement demands a deployable,
lethal, versatile, expansible, and sustainable force.
CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS
A contingency is the employment of contingency operations can occur in the
military forces in response to a crisis caused by environments of peacetime, conflict, and war.
natural disaster, terrorists, subversives, or A contingency may be a unique, standrequired
military operations. Due to the alone event in response to a natural disaster or
uncertainty of the situation, contingencies a man-made event or change in the direction
require rapid planning, response, and (branch) of an evolving campaign or major
development of special procedures to ensure operation. Within a campaign or major
the safety and readiness of personnel, operation, a branch is a contingency plan for
installations, and equipment. Like crises, the deviation of operations from the planned
6-2
line. It is a result of chance or uncertain events
that are identified as crisis triggers.
Senior army commanders assess their
operations. During this assessment, they
anticipate the probability of an occurrence of a
particular contingency, and they develop plans
(OPLAN or CONPLAN) to respond to that
contingency. If a crisis occurs, the commander
updates the OPLAN or CONPLAN and
converts it into an OPORD for execution. The
characteristics of a contingency operation
include crisis situations, NCA involvement
with US national interests at stake, and
operations that require a rapid military
response.
UNIQUE REQUIREMENTS
Army commanders must understand and
address additional requirements that are
unique to contingencies. Rapid deployment,
crisis action, and time-sensitivity make
contingency operations unique. Contingency
operations are usually joint undertakings
conducted within the framework of the UCP.
Once forces are deployed, the execution of
specific missions remains similar to normal
military operations in the peacetime, conflict,
or war environments. Successful contingency
operations, as in all military operations,
require detailed planning and aggressive,
synchronized execution.
IMPORTANT
CHARACTERISTICS
Some particularly important characteristics
of this type of operation include—
•Early response.
•Rapid projection of military power.
•Forcible-entry capability.
•Forces tailored to the situation.
•Unambiguous command relationships.
•Thorough coordination among all forces
(joint and multinational) and interagency
organizations.
•Timely, detailed intelligence.
•Lethality for early entry forces—hold enemy
forces at risk, protect the force, deter.
•Strict OPSEC.
•Sensitivity to the diplomatic implications of
the military operation.
•Quick resolution (win early with minimal
casualties).
•Major impact of national and international
news coverage.
•Effective instant communications with
attendant interest by the NCA and senior
service leadership in any operation.
•Effective theater air and missile defenses to
provide force protection and ensure the
security of lodgment areas and protection of
US and multinational forces and interests.
•Under the national strategy, the
requirement for possible redeployment with
subsequent employment in another theater.
RESPONSIBILITIES
The Army has a major responsibility to
execute a variety of contingency operations.
This responsibility requires the commander
and his staff to exercise operational art in
applying joint and Army doctrine in a highly
charged, time-sensitive environment. This
ability is of particular importance to the ASCC
in theater.
While the tactical combat operation may be
somewhat limited in duration, scope, and
intensity, the ASCC, in conjunction with the
CINC and the other component commanders,
sequences military operations that are not
necessarily combat operations to achieve the
desired end state. This sequencing includes
close coordination with DOS to ensure that
military operations support diplomatic
objectives after completion of tactical combat
operations.
The ASCC in theater has the following
responsibilities relating to contingency operations:
•Training and sustaining the force to conduct
operations required by the CINC.
•Installing, operating, and maintaining
signal capabilities that are interoperable
with joint, multinational, and/or
interagency systems. To ensure
interoperability, the ASCC may have to
provide signal capabilities to the allies
within the multinational force.
•Exercising OPCON of assigned and
attached forces and exercising operational
direction of supporting forces.
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Chapter 6
•Coordinating with other component
commanders to ensure effective and
efficient conduct of operations.
•Monitoring the operational situation and
passing information to the CJTF (JFC).
•Planning and conducting operations
according to JFC guidance and detailed
plans.
•Ensuring administrative and logistics
support as required and as directed by the
JFC.
•Establishing liaison with the JFC and other
joint organizations, multinational
organizations, NGOs and PVOs, or
government agencies.
•Coordinating with supporting commanders
to redeploy the force effectively to home
stations or to another theater.
•Planning and coordinating with supporting
organizations to reconstitute effectively the
force. This may require the use of
operational project stocks.
•Coordinating effective support of the media
and use of PA assets.
•Ensuring the units comply with federal,
state, and local (to include host nation)
environmental and pollution abatement
requirements.
ORGANIZATIONAL OPTIONS
The NCA tasks a combatant commander
with the responsibilities in a particular crisis
as outlined in Chapter 2. Based upon the
required tasks, the NCA, CJCS, and CINC
choose an appropriate command structure.
They may select any of the six COCOM options
(discussed previously in Chapter 2) for the
organization of forces. Having selected the
command structure, they select a commander.
In this chapter, the JTF option is used for
illustrative purposes. The CINC and ASCC
determine the composition of the ARFOR of the
JTF. Several options exist for the Army
structure in a JTF. The commander of the
ARFOR OPCON to the JTF determines the
best option based upon an assessment of the
operational environment.
Single Army Headquarters
to a Joint Task Force
The commander of ARFOR, in conjunction
with the JFC, may organize them under a
single Army headquarters responsible for the
three Army tasks: joint, multinational, NGO
and PVO, and interagency linkage; operations;
and internal support. He selects this option
when the mission is simple, limited ARFOR are
involved, and/or the threat is relatively small.
(See Figure 6- 1). The three tasks include joint
and multinational coordination. In this
example, we have omitted the multinational
coordination requirement because we assume
that the JTF is composed of US forces.
This single Army headquarters may be a
corps headquarters or smaller echelon of
command. While the corps and division, as
organizations, may be able to accomplish these
missions, they are not currently staffed or
trained to assume these and other operationallevel
missions. Therefore, both would require
substantial additional training, personnel, and
6-4
FM 100-7
C2 resources to be effective. Once the corps is
designated as the ARFOR to a JTF, the corps
commander is subordinated to the CJTF or the
establishing headquarters and must look to
him for guidance, strategic direction, and
missions for the force. In turn, the CJTF
exercises OPCON or TACON of assigned or
attached forces. This includes the
responsibility to train the joint force if the JTF
was developed during a deliberate planning
process to support existing OPLANs. Although
the ARFOR of the JTF is responsible for
operations and the direct support of his forces,
the ASCC retains responsibility to provide
overall support to all ARFOR, to include the
forces in the JTF. As the ARFOR to the JTF,
the corps and division staffs require training
on—
•JOPES.
•Management of TPFDD.
•Operational-level functions.
•Theater movement control.
As the ARFOR, the corps or division maybe
tasked to assume specific operational-level
Army responsibilities within its AO. Under
such circumstances, the corps or division would
not only be responsible for all Army units but
could also be responsible for providing support
to all services for—
•Mortuary affairs.
•Casualty operations.
•Postal operations.
•Finance.
•Signal support.
•Environmental protection and cleanup.
•Transportation and distribution of Class I,
III, V, and VIII supplies.
•Real estate and contract support.
•Theater topography support.
•General engineering and real property
maintenance activities (RPMA).
The corps/division would assume this
support responsibility as the Army executive
agency under agreements and memorandums
of understanding previously established
between services.
External augmentation of staff sections, to
include equipment, is required to properly
perform the ARFOR C2 tasks. Augmentation is
required for—
•Operational planning and control.
•Establishment of a JOPES cell.
•Diplomatic military planning activities.
•Signal support.
•Intelligence support.
•Liaison teams.
•PA support.
•Historical data collection of lessons learned.
The ARFOR’s intelligence connection to
theater and national assets must be deployed
early into a theater. The deployable
intelligence support element (DISE)
accomplishes this. The DISE is a small,
scalable, deployable element. It is the initial
forward intelligence team of split-based
operations. The DISE is tailored tactically from
MI units according to the factors of METT-T,
•NBC decontamination. lift, and pre-positioned assets.
•Rear
•Base
area protection.
security.
The mission of the DISE is to provide the
deployed commander accurate, detailed,
continuous, and timely intelligence to support
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Chapter 6
the rapid entry of US forces across the range of
military operations. Its communications
processing and downlink assets are linked to a
national and theater intelligence support base
located in CONUS or outside the AO. The two
types of tailorable DISE configurations are
mini-DISE (manpack) and DISE (vehicular).
Together these DISE configurations provide
the commander a robust intelligence capability
to support deploying forces. The DISE provides
split-based communications, broadcast
intelligence, and intelligence processing.
Additionally, the ARFOR must plan and
operate effectively with the media. The impact
of the media on the conduct of operations is
substantially greater today than in any
previous time. The capability of the news
media to transmit ongoing operations activities
to news networks globally cannot be
discounted. This new technology requires the
JFC/ARFOR to establish points of contact and
procedures for releasing information regarding
ongoing operations. The ARFOR’s public
affairs officer (PAO) should manage all media
and public requests for information. The JFC/
ARFOR must develop procedures and
guidelines that provide releasable information
to the media within security, accuracy,
propriety, privacy, and safety considerations of
the ongoing operation.
Two or More Army Forces
to a Joint Task Force
The JFC may desire direct control of
several separate Army ground operations. He
establishes, with the advice of the ASCC in
theater, two or more separate ARFOR
headquarters that are directly subordinate to
the JTF (see Figure 6-2). Each of these
separate Army headquarters would maintain
the three Army tasks of joint, multinational,
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FM 100-7
and, perhaps, interagency coordination;
operations; and internal support. The JFC
might use this particular option when—
•The operation is relatively simple.
•Several large Army organizations are
involved.
•Two or more lines of operation exist.
•The threat is located in two or more different
geographic areas.
•The situation allows the JFC to focus on
several dispersed ground operations
without diffusing his joint responsibilities.
Separate Support and
Army Forces Headquarters
As the situation grows more complex, the
JFC and the ASCC may organize ARFOR to
resemble a miniature theater organization. In
this organization, one headquarters would
focus on operations, while a separate
headquarters would focus on support
responsibilities (see Figure 6-3). These
circumstances align with the chain of command
discussed in Chapter 2.
The performance of the three tasks is a
constant requirement within the operationallevel
environment. Under these circumstances,
multiple commanders could share the tasks.
The ASCC would retain traditional
responsibilities as discussed previously. The
responsibility for the conduct of operations at
the operational-level could then be taken on by
the ARFOR commander within the task force,
assuming that the operation is of sufficient size
and scope to require an operational and not
solely tactical perspective. The requirement for
joint, multinational, and, perhaps, interagency
linkage would become a task that must be
performed by both commanders.
This alignment of the responsibilities,
though not expected to be a normal structuring,
shows the flexibility of the design to meet a
wide range of potential operational conditions.
The Army might organize under this option
when—
•The operation is extremely complex.
•More than one Army combat force
headquarters exists.
•The Army has a significant support
responsibility to other services/
multinational forces.
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Chapter 6
•Two or more lines of support exist.
•Additional theater support organizations
make a forward support element too large to
control effectively without dedicated
command effort.
•The JTF requires a significant support effort
that exceeds normal corps support
capabilities.
Army Commander as a Joint Force
Functional Component Commander
The JFC may organize forces functionally
under a single headquarters. As a norm, the
service commander with the predominant
number of forces is tasked to provide the
controlling headquarters. The JFLCC may
build his organization from an existing
structure and augment it with joint staff billets
for needed expertise. The Army force
commander, as the functional component
commander, would retain his responsibilities
for joint, multinational, and interagency
linkage operations and internal support of
ARFOR. See Figure 6-4. In those cases where
the Army force commander is not designated as
the functional component commander, he still
retains responsibility for internal support.
Army Commander as the Commander
of a Joint Task Force
When the contingency is predominately a
land operation, the CINC may designate an
Army commander as the JFC. This JFC has
considerable requirements placed upon him in
addition to his three Army tasks of joint,
multinational, and interagency coordination;
operations; and support. Under these
circumstances, the multinational and
interagency coordination task could require a
significant resource increase. He may consider
delegating some of the authority for his Army
tasks to subordinate commanders.
This JFC may build his joint organization
from an existing Army organization—a corps
headquarters or a numbered army. Today’s
corps will most likely find itself conducting
force-projection operations as part of a tailored
joint force and may be assigned the role of
serving as a JTF headquarters. The unit can be
designated as the JTF headquarters at any
time during either the deliberate planning
process or during CAP if the nature of the
mission so warrants. The Army JFC may
organize his subordinate Army units based
upon the three options presented in
Figures 6-1, 6-2, and 6-3.
Once the corps is designated as a JTF, the
corps commander, as the CJTF, is
subordinated to the combatant commander (or
the establishing headquarters) and must look
to him for guidance, strategic direction, and
missions for the force. In turn, the CJTF
exercises OPCON or TACON of assigned or
attached forces. This includes the
responsibility to train the joint force if the JTF
was developed during a deliberate planning
process to support existing OPLANs.
The CJTF must determine what
augmentation requirements are needed for the
task at hand and coordinate support through
the establishing headquarters. Augmentation
FM 100-7
of the corps staff is essential in transitioning
the corps to a JTF structure. Augmentation can
be organized using a modular concept to
address the various staff entities such as—
•Command and staff (joint staff and special
staff).
•Headquarters support and sustainment (life
support functions).
•Signal support.
•Security support for the JTF headquarters.
•Augmentation in technical areas such as
CA, PSYOP, and so on (Joint Pub 5-00.2).
Although augmentation must be tailored
for the specific situation and is different for
every mission, some augmentation is almost
always required in—
•Intelligence collection.
•Joint planning procedures.
•Logistics planning.
•Signal support, especially Army Global
Command and Control System (AGCCS)
access.
•Medical planning.
Augmentation in these areas assists in
ensuring linkage between the JTF staff and the
combatant command joint staff, especially
concerning access to information and
capabilities available at the combatant
command level.
The corps cannot function simultaneously
at both the tactical and operational levels. The
corps, as a JTF, can conduct either tactical- or
operational-level planning and missions. The
mission, not the size of the force, determines
the level at which the JTF functions. Once fully
engaged at one level, the corps cannot be
expected to assume the additional functions
and command responsibilities that correspond
to the other. Still, the corps commander must
fully understand both tactical- and
operational-level environments to ensure a
supportive relationship exists between his
plans and operations and those of subordinate
and higher headquarters.
The commander thinks not only in terms of
military resources but also considers those
interagency, diplomatic, economic, and other
resources that may be available and
appropriate for the task at hand. The CJTF
must understand the strategic and regional
environments, to include US policies, treaty
commitments, status of forces agreements
(SOFA), coalition parties’ interests, and so on.
These influences affect campaign and
operational planning and the establishment of
ROE for the force.
The Army JFC must have the additional
flexibility to assume the joint coordination role
and may choose to augment organic support
units with additional divisional, corps, or
operational-level support organizations. As
such, subordinate Army combat force
commanders would concentrate on operations
while the JFC conducts a large portion of the
joint, multinational, and interagency
coordination and operations support tasks
(internal and external). See Figure 6-5.
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Chapter 6
The Army JFC could retain these coordination
and support tasks when the operation is largely an
Army ground operation, the other services play a
support role to the Army, or the Army JFC has
sufficient resources in his organization to
accomplish these additional missions.
support personnel at a ground location (see
Figure 6-6). The CJTF and staff—
Establishing Authority
The authority who establishes the JTF
designates the JFC, assigns the missions,
prescribes the broad concept of operations,
allocates the forces, and defines the command
relationships. Generally, the establishing
authority designates the JFC from within his own
headquarters or from the preponderant service
within the joint force. The establishing authority
may direct formation of a joint staff from his own
staff, or he may direct the JFC to form the JTF
staff from his own resources and augment it as
necessary from other service or component
headquarters within the designated JTF.
Headquarters Functions
The Army JFC organizes the JTF
headquarters to accomplish assigned
missions. This headquarters may vary from a
small group aboard a ship to a large staff and
Plan operations of the JTF in accordance
with operational direction from the
establishing authority.
Direct, control, and coordinate operations of
assigned forces.
Coordinate planning activities of
subordinate forces.
Under supervision of the joint staff,
establish, when required, joint boards and
agencies to plan, control, and coordinate the
use of joint assets in specific functional
areas, for example, the JTCB.
Coordinate with other joint and
multinational forces, the UN, other
government agencies not assigned, and
NGOs and PVOs.
•Coordinate with other national forces anchor
foreign governments when required by the
establishing authority.
•Coordinate signal support.
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FM 100-7
Planning. During the deliberate planning
process, the CINC may designate the ASCC as
a JTF or ARFOR planning agent. The ASCC
director of plans coordinates the planning
effort. The Army staff planners develop JTF
and ARFOR plans in each functional area,
using Joint Pubs 5-00.1 and 5-00.2 as guides.
Each Army staff planner coordinates as
required with functional area counterparts in
the joint community. Planners should
understand and consider RSI during planning.
When agencies outside the Army must
contribute to the planning effort, the Army
force’s director of operations, or G3, requests
support from the appropriate agency. This
planning process develops the base OPLANs
and CONPLANs modified for execution during
contingencies.
During CAP, the director of plans directs
the planning effort until he receives an
execution order. After he receives the execution
order, the G3 completes execution planning
and conducts operations. The G3 (plans) begins
future planning, normally focusing on the next
major operation or phase. The JOPES
publications (Joint Pub 5-03 series) provide
planning policies, procedures, formats, and
guidance for joint operations.
Operations and Training. When designated as
the joint force headquarters, the ASCC deputy
chief of staff for operations (DCSOPS)
organizes the J3 section, receives
augmentation from other services, establishes
the JOC, and initiates CAP. The J3 assists in
planning, coordinating, and executing JTF
operations. The J3 normally organizes a battle
staff with representatives of all the
directorates within a JOC in order to provide
consolidated oversight. When the joint staff
does not have a J5 (plans), the J3 performs
long-range or future planning. However, the J3
has a plans cell to conduct near-term planning
of branches to the current operation. Besides
the JOC, the J3 also may supervise—
•A JTCB to coordinate targeting guidance
and objectives and to develop the joint
target list.
•A joint rescue coordination center (JRCC),
although the CJTF may task a subordinate
service force commander to perform this
function.
•A joint information warfare staff composed
of component representatives and
representatives of the J2 and J6.
•A joint meteorological forecasting unit
(JMFU) to provide weather support.
As a matter of principle, training remains a
national responsibility. To ensure the units are
able to execute their assigned missions and be
operationally ready, the leaders must know
and understand the capabilities and
limitations of the other nations’ units. The
enhanced mutual understanding of the
capabilities and limitations is to minimize the
differences and optimize effectiveness. To that
end, all command levels must conduct training,
which should include the JFC’s ideas and
desired outcomes. These concepts, specified by
content (basic tasks), scope (condition), and
objectives (standard), are an essential basis for
effective training. Training should be
coordinated and integrated where feasible.
Coordination is required among respective
participants to ensure mutual understanding
and compliance. Although the J3 must monitor
and evaluate the training status of all units,
the actual evaluation of the training status and
operational readiness of the respective units
remains a national responsibility. The
standards and criteria used for evaluation
should be published and understood by all
parties.
Special Operations. At the theater level a
special operations theater support element
(SOTSE) performs special operations staff
functions at the Army service component
command headquarters. At corps level, a
special operations coordination element
(SOCOORD) serves as a functional staff
element of the G3. The SOCOORD is the
mechanism by which a corps plans for and
obtains SOF support. As such, it has staff
responsibility for SF and ranger integration in
each of the battle operating systems’ functional
areas and serves as a focal point for SF and
ranger support to the corps staff.
The SOCOORD develops SOF target
nominations and mission requirements for the
corps to forward to the JFC. These
developments result in mission taskings from
the JTCB to the JFSOCC, who assigns
missions to appropriate SOF units. Service
distinctions of SOF are transparent. The
nature of the requirement and the total force
capability determines whether Army special
operations forces (ARSOF) or another element
of SOF is tasked to meet a given requirement.
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Communications. When designated as the joint
force headquarters, the ASCC’s theater signal
officer organizes a J6 staff, receives
augmentation from other services, and
establishes a joint communications control
center (JCCC) as required. Joint Pub 6-0
discusses the responsibilities and functions of
the J6. A key function among these
responsibilities is network management. The
JCCC exercises staff supervision over C4
control centers belonging to deployed
components and subordinate commands, Joint
Pub 6-05.1 describes the JCCC and its
functions.
Alternate communications means are
essential. During planning, the primary means
is the Worldwide Military Command and
Control System (WWMCCS). (Once fielded, the
Global Command and Control System (GCCS)
replaces WWMCCS.) Communications
networks include the four major networks of
the DCS:
•Defense Switched Network (DSN).
•Secure Voice System (SVS).
•Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN—
the future defense message system).
•Defense Data Network (DDN).
Initially, tactical satellites (TACSAT) may be
the only means of secure communication with
operational forces,
The Army JFC establishes alternate
communication means as soon as possible. The
JTF, ASCC, and ARFOR headquarters
establish communications during Phase I of
contingency operations. Organic signal
organizations provide signal support and
identify and forward shortfalls to the JCCC for
resolution. The JCCC requests JCS-controlled
contingency communications assets as
required.
Intelligence. When tasked as a joint force
headquarters, the ARFOR G2 organizes a JTF
J2 section, incorporating other service
augmentation and establishing a JIC from
organic assets. The other services may
augment the JIC as required. The JTF J2 is
responsible for determining the requirements
and direction of the intelligence effort to
support the CJTF’s objectives. He assists the
CJTF in ensuring that intelligence objectives
are correct, understood, prioritized,
synchronized, and acted upon. The J2 is also
responsible for employing joint intelligence
resources, identifying and integrating
additional intelligence resources such as the
JIC, and applying national intelligence
capabilities. He works with subordinate service
G2s (S2s) to develop complementary
intelligence operations that support the CJTF’s
requirements.
The JTF JIC is the primary J2 organization
supporting the JFC and the ARFOR. The JIC
facilitates efficient access to the entire DOD
intelligence system. The composition and focus
of each JIC varies according to the
commander’s needs, but each is capable of
performing indications and warnings (I&W)
and collecting, managing, and disseminating
current intelligence. Through the JIC,
ARFORs coordinate support from the Air
Force, Navy, and Marine Corps and national,
interagency, and multinational sources.
In addition to its other functions (I&W,
situation development, target development,
BDA, IPB, and force protection intelligence
development), the JIC coordinates the
acquisition of national intelligence between the
JTF and the CINC’s staff. The CINC posts
special intelligence teams to the AOR. These
teams are OPCON to the JFC and under staff
supervision of the JTF J2. They may include
DIA, the US Army Intelligence and Security
Command, or the National Security Agency.
Staff weather augmentation, as required, is
under staff supervision of the JTF J2. The JTF
J2, through the JIC, establishes and supervises
required functional intelligence organizations
that may include a—
•Joint interrogation facility (JIF).
•Joint captured materiel exploitation center
(JCMEC).
•Joint documents exploitation center
(JDEC).
•Joint imagery processing center (JIPC).
The JTF J2 requests a cryptologic support
group (CSG) and an associated mobile
cryptological support facility (MCSF) or
equivalent SIGINT communications package
from the CINC. The CSG works from within
the JIC.
Successful IEW support during forceprojection
operations relies on continuous
peacetime information collection and
intelligence production. Peacetime IEW
operations support contingency planning and
develop baseline knowledge of threats and
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FM 100-7
environments. These operations engage and
challenge the intelligence battlefield operating
system to respond effectively to commanders’
contingency planning intelligence
requirements. During peacetime operations,
commanders closely examine MI force
structures, operations, and training, which
ultimately leads to a combat-ready IEW force
capable of successfully supporting forceprojection
operations.
IEW operations planners must anticipate,
identify, consider, and evaluate potential
threats to the force as a whole throughout
force-projection operations. For smooth
transition to hostilities, intelligence staffs
must coordinate collection and
communications plans before the crisis occurs.
MI units continually update their contingency
plans to reflect the evolving situation,
especially during crisis situations.
Immediately before deployment, intelligence
activities update or top off deploying forces
with the most recent intelligence on the AO. MI
units continuously update technical data bases
and situation graphics.
Logistics. The J4 (logistics) plans, coordinates,
and supervises supply, maintenance,
transportation, general engineering, health
services, and other related logistics activities.
Each service component of the combatant
command is responsible for the logistics
support of its respective forces, except when the
CJTF designates a single-service responsibility
for a particular logistics function. The CJTF
establishes logistics priorities for the force,
assigns terrain and facilities for use as support
bases, and designates and maintains LOCs.
The J4 supervises the activities of any
logistics-related coordinating centers and
boards that may be required. These may
include—
•A joint movement center (JMC) that
coordinates strategic movement with
USTRANSCOM and ensures effective use of
transportation assets.
•A subarea petroleum office (SAPO) formed
around elements from the combatant
command’s joint petroleum office (JPO) to
augment the JTF in managing petroleumrelated
logistics.
•A joint facilities utilization board (JFUB) to
manage real estate requirements (unless
the JTF engineer is designated a special
staff officer and assigned these duties).
•A joint civil-military engineering board
(JCMEB) to provide overall direction for
civil-military construction efforts and
development of a civil engineering support
plan (again, the JTF engineer may manage
this activity).
•A joint medical regulating office (JMRO) to
coordinate the movement of patients in and
out of the assigned AOR.
•A joint military blood program office
(JMBPO) to coordinate the distribution of
whole blood within the AOR.
•A joint central graves registration office
(JCGRO) to handle mortuary affairs
(normally tasked to the ARFOR).
Logistical considerations permeate the
planning effort. These considerations are
essential conditions and objectives in each
phase of a plan or operation. The proper type of
service support units must deploy early for port
opening, reception, staging, and onward
movement of incoming units; to support
initially arriving forces; and to prepare
lodgment for rapid force buildup. The CINC
must decide whether to establish an in-theater
COMMZ. In most force-projection contingency
operations such a capability is not present. A
COMMZ is required if the operational
environment assessment identifies a
requirement to stockpile support and logistics
in theater.
Logistics planners should anticipate
circumstances that could threaten logistics
support capabilities. The plan should provide
for alternative COAs as external and internal
circumstances threaten the support capability.
As circumstances warrant, the Army and JFC
plan for operational replenishment to protect
or regenerate combat power that has been
dissipated in the conduct of operations. See
Joint Pub 4-0 and FM 100-16 for a detailed
discussion of theater logistics doctrine.
Influencing Factors
Whatever the organizational option
chosen, the Army commander must have the
capability to fulfill the tasks assigned him by
the Army and the JFC. If assigned both the
joint coordination and external support tasks,
in addition to his operations tasks, the ARFOR
commander must coordinate directly with the
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required joint agencies and those Army
logistics organizations that are part of the
force-projection contingency operation.
The resources and capabilities of Army
units correspond to their design and the
missions they perform. Units designed for
tactical operations do not have an operational
capability as an inherent part of that tactical
design. The three operational tasks are
predicated upon a unit design that provides the
capability to perform the operational functions
described herein. Echelons at, division level and
below have a tactical design and no inherent
capability to perform the operational-level
functions discussed in Chapter 5.
At corps level, more flexibility exists and
augmentation can be used to correct specific
design shortcomings for conducting operations
at the operational level. The ASCC and
numbered army are designed specifically for
operational-level operations. The corps,
however, when engaged in tactical operations,
cannot perform simultaneously at both the
tactical and operational levels. Though the corps
commander must maintain an operational
perspective, full-scale tactical operations
preclude the performance of operational
functions. As AR FOR are designated to
participate in force-projection contingency
operations, the commander must consider that
resource availability, media impact, US public
will, the geopolitical structure/support, and the
dynamics of the contingency environment may
restrict his selection of optimal organizational
structures. The commander selects lesser design
options because of restraints, constraints, and
the evolving nature of the operational
environment.
Logistics units are particularly suitable for
modular design so that entire units are not
required to perform specified functions.
Logistics units are also suitable for performing
split-based operations, where only essential
cells are deployed while the base organization
performs its function in CONUS or from a
forward-presence location elsewhere. Splitbased
operations are feasible only when
communications and automation are assured.
As circumstances evolve, final design of the
Army force must reflect the tactical and
operational requirements. Where an
operational requirement exists, the CJTF must
allocate ARFOR from the appropriate echelon
to perform those functions.
FORCE-PROJECTION STAGES
Contingency operations are undertaken in
response to a crisis. That crisis can occur in
isolation, as would be the expected case in
MOOTW. But a crisis also can occur during the
conduct of a major operation during hostilities.
Viewing the contingency operation as a series
of stages serves to sequence operations. When
the contingency occurs during the conduct of a
major operation, the stages assist in both
resolving the crisis and in returning the
contingency forces back into the ongoing
operation as rapidly as possible.
The eight stages of a force projection—
mobilization, predeployment activities,
deployment, entry, decisive operations,
postconflict/postcrisis operations,
redeployment, and demobilization— provide the
general structure for a contingency operation
and can be adjusted to fit the needs of a
particular contingency (FM 100-5). Execution
of these stages may not be distinct.
Predeployment activities and deployment, for
example, might be so closely followed by forced
entry and initial operations as to be indistinct.
Operations might begin well before the entire
force has closed. At minimum, commanders
and staffs must consider the—
•Coordination of sequencing and phasing of
forces (combat, CS, and CSS).
•Requirement and time frame to establish
and build up the theater base.
•Protection of forces, to include rear area
operations (rear area rapid reaction force).
•Preparation time for deployment,
operational readiness—types of units and
their readiness, and so forth.
•CINC’s critical items list in the TPFDD flow.
•Requirement and level of in-theater stocks.
•Host nation capability and availability.
Any particular contingency may not
include all of the general stages. For example,
a contingency operation may be the first phase
of an evolving major operation. Redeployment
of all forces may not begin until the end of the
subsequent phases of the major operation, of
which the contingency was a single phase.
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FM 100-7
STAGE I
MOBILIZATION
Mobilization is the process that permits
augmentation of the active force. The Army
Mobilization and Operations Planning and
Execution System (AMOPES) is the guide for
planning and participating in the JOPES. The
five levels of mobilization are selective
mobilization, Presidential selected reserve callup,
partial mobilization, full mobilization, and
total mobilization. These options need not be
executed sequentially and are part of the
graduated mobilization response. Units
mobilize through five phases: planning, alert,
home station, mobilization station, and port of
embarkation. FM 100-17 discusses
mobilization in detail.
STAGE II
PREDEPLOYMENT ACTIVITIES
This is a critical stage of a contingency
force-projection operation for which units
throughout the total force train. The ASCC
recommends to the CINC the size and
composition of the ARFOR required to support
the mission, including forces that support
assembly and deployment of the force.
Additionally, the ASCC identifies the lift
requirements to move the ARFOR and
requirements for reception and onward
movement upon arrival in the theater of
operations. The ASCC’s recommendation is
based on the assessment of the operational
environment. That assessment is revised to
reflect the dynamics of the operational
environment.
The JTF ARFOR commander maintains
the Army’s operational-level perspective
within the JTF for the contingency. The
attainment of strategic or operational
objectives requires sequencing of Army
military operations. In force-projection
contingency operations, ARFOR commanders
must keep this operational perspective, even if
they conduct separate tactical operations
directly for the JFC. The overall attainment of
the strategic objective may require military
operations not limited to combat missions.
These sequenced military operations require
an operational-level perspective over time.
The JFC’s primary Army advisor for this
perspective is the ARFOR commander assigned
to the JTF. This commander provides
operational-level perspective to the JFC during
planning, deployment, employment, and
redeployment. During planning, the ARFOR
commander must receive a clear definition of
the desired end state from the JFC. Because of
the inherent dynamics of the contingency
environment, considerable effort may be
involved in gaining clarity on the military end
state. The military end state may include those
diplomatic considerations that inevitably
accompany contingencies over which the Army
commander may have little direct control.
The CINC assigns the ways and means for
mission accomplishment. His ASCC advises
him on Army requirements to employ effective
and efficient Army means. The NCA and the
CINC assign the ways, in the form of
constraints and restrictions, to the ARFOR
commander. For example, the CINC may direct
the seizure of objectives with psychological,
rather than military, significance and may
establish specific ROE. Once the ARFOR
commander clearly understands the ends,
ways, and means for the contingency, he begins
the planning process in earnest or adjusts
exiting plans.
Based on the CINC’s concept of operations,
the ASCC reviews all existing OPLANs and
CONPLANs for suitability. He updates and
adjusts these plans to develop an OPORD.
Existing CONPLANs and lessons learned from
the joint and Army repositories (Joint
Universal Lessons Learned System [JULLS]
and the Center for Army Lessons Learned
[CALL]) should be the starting point when
conducting crisis planning. If no suitable plan
exists, the Army commander OPCON to the
JTF develops OPORDs, using the timesensitive
or CAP procedures outlined in Joint
Pub 5-03.1.
The ARFOR commander develops his
contingency OPORDs based on the maximum
capability the enemy can generate. In a crisis
caused by a natural disaster, the enemy
becomes the threat to human life and safety
and the potential for damage to the
environment. The AR FOR commander
conducts parallel, but more detailed, execution
planning with the JFC and normally issues a
supporting Army OPORD with detailed
instructions to subordinates. The concurrent
planning occurs at all Army echelons involved
in the contingency.
The ARFOR commander issues immediate
warning orders to all subordinate units.
Because of the time-sensitive nature of
contingency operations and the crisis-action
system, information must get to the
appropriate unit as rapidly as it becomes
available. Subordinate units must recognize
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that they may not receive complete OPORDs
from their higher headquarters until late.
Subordinate OPLANs based upon earlier
warning orders must be flexible enough to
adapt to the evolving contingency operations.
Therefore, horizontal and vertical coordination
must occur between staffs so that plans can be
made concurrently. Liberal use of warning
orders should be used so subordinate
commanders can begin work.
Certain planning considerations are
critical during this stage. Anticipatory logistics
requires appropriate commanders to project
support requirements and synchronize support
actions with tactical organizations. This action
is necessary to ensure combat power can be
sustained or reconstituted as required. The
ARFOR commander identifies potential
consequences to ensure that the JFC makes
knowledgeable decisions on lift prioritization.
Finally, as with all operations, OPSEC must
not be sacrificed, despite the urgency of the
crisis situation.
An important task facing the ARFOR
commander is the organization of his staff and
the Army augmentation of the JFC’s staff to
support the planning and execution of the
contingency operation. The makeup of the JTF
staff should reflect the composition of the
operational forces. If the JFC’s mission is
largely an Army mission, Army personnel
should predominate the staff. The Army
contribution to the JTF may include light,
armored, or special operations forces.
The Army augmentation package given to
the JTF staff should reflect the proportional
balance of the JTF force package. If the joint
staff is not sufficiently and appropriately
augmented, the ARFOR commander must
spend more effort advising the JFC on the
capabilities and limitations of the Army force.
Therefore, ARFOR likely to conduct
contingency operations should have designated
augmentation cells (discussed earlier in this
chapter) that automatically push forward to
support JTFs. See Figure 6-7.
STAGE III
DEPLOYMENT
The initial response force is the product of
a combination of many factors. It reflects the
mission of the JTF and the Army’s
corresponding tasks, along with the lift that
has been made available to conduct the
necessary strategic and operational movement.
6-16
FM 100-7
Other factors include the capabilities of the
host nation to support ARFOR on either a longor
short-term basis. Finally, the contributions
of alliance or coalition forces shape the initial
response by ARFOR. The supported CINC’s
decision on the composition of this force
requires the ASCC to project future events. The
Army force commander seeks to maintain
versatility, a flexible force mix, and the ability
to generate superior combat power,
sustainability, and the necessary internal lift
capability.
STAGE IV
ENTRY OPERATIONS
The execution stage—entry operations—
encompasses the occupation of the initial
lodgments in the operations area. In this stage
the capability for force is generated. Initially,
that capability does not go far beyond selfsustainment.
The ARFOR commander
sequences his resources into the operations
area to create the conditions for decisive
operations. This sequencing includes joint
mobility of operational forces that seek to gain
a positional advantage early.
Two alternative approaches exist to
establishing positional advantage. The first is a
long-term approach that focuses on building
the force capability over time. Once sufficient
capability is available, the ARFOR commander
tries to resolve the cause of the crisis. In the
second approach, rapid crisis resolution is
sought through the positioning of initially
deploying forces into the critical location. By
rapidly positioning forces with the requisite
capability, the crisis may be resolved earlier.
However, the Army might have to conduct
forcible entry operations. This approach has a
high payoff. Risk is the price for such potential.
The ARFOR commander coordinates the
movement of intertheater or intratheater
forces into the operations area. Opposed-entry
combat activities may take place during this
stage. The ARFOR commander deploys
operations and support forces into the
contingency area and establishes C2 to provide
initial lodgments. While the focus during this
phase is the deployment of forces, operations
may be required to secure simultaneous entry
zones that ensure force protection into the
contingency area.
An effective air defense should be
established in the lodgment area as rapidly as
possible. Air defense is critical for the
protection of the lodgment area. TBM, CM,
ASM, and UAV threats could seriously disrupt
or compromise the security of lodgment
operations. Based on the threat and
availability of joint and/or multinational ADA
systems, early entry forces tailor the ADA force
packages that are deployed initially. An ADA
task force is deployed to protect selected
enclaves. This stage ends with the
establishment of a secure airhead and/or
beachhead. See Figure 6-8.
STAGE V
DECISIVE OPERATIONS
A rapid buildup of force capability is the
focus of this stage. This buildup includes
establishing a forward-operating base, closing
the remainder of the force, expanding the
lodegment, linking up with other joint forces,
and establishing multinational and
interagency linkages. Decisive combat power is
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Chapter 6
positioned to resolve the crisis rapidly by
synchronizing and simultaneously engaging
enemy forces throughout the depth and space
of the operational area.
Force protection becomes increasingly
important during the operations stage.
Reconnaissance assets are focused to provide
the ARFOR commander with an accurate
picture of the enemy force actions and
intentions. OPSEC ensures the protection of
the force in part by preventing the enemy
reconnaissance from gaining similar
information on friendly forces. Deception
operations complement OPSEC by painting a
false picture of the friendly force’s intentions.
Effective air defense and TMD remain a
priority during this phase of the operation.
In MOOTW, decisive operations contain
similarities and differences from the principles
that guide operations in war. The principles of
objective, unity of effort, legitimacy,
perseverance, restraint, and security guide
actions in MOOTW. Figure 6-9 describes areas
for consideration during conduct of operations.
STAGE VI
POSTCONFLICT OPERATIONS
During the previous stage, the ARFOR
commander completes the Army contribution
toward attaining those operational objectives
to resolve the crisis that instigated the
contingency operation. Postconflict operations
secure the strategic objectives. Planning for
postconflict operations must be an integral part
of the overall Army plan, which is revised
continually as the conclusion of hostilities
approaches. The objective of this planning is to
transition operations with minimum confusion
to either the host nation, an international body,
or DOS. The Army contribution to postconflict
operations may include—
•Controlling prisoners.
•Handling refugees.
•Arranging for civilian contractors to clear
minefield and conduct demining
operations.
•Destroying explosive ordnance.
•Conducting civil affairs.
Simultaneously, units prepare for future
operations by consolidating, reconstituting,
and training. These future operations can
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range from the resumption of
redeployment. See Figure 6-10.
STAGE VII
FM 100-7
hostilities to
REDEPLOYMENT AND
RECONSTITUTION
During this stage, the force prepares for
future operations. The force may be redeployed to
its home station, to a staging base, or to another
theater for subsequent operations. In addition, the
ARFOR commander reconstitutes his force,
within his capabilities, to ensure flexibility for
future operations. (See Figure 6-11).
Reconstitution of the force requires an
extensive reallocation of resources and skills. The
LSE may play a major role during reconstitution
operations. The LSE must be able to receive,
identify, and determine disposition; maintain
accountability; store, prepare for shipment, and
arrange for movement of Class I, II, III (package),
IV, V, VI, VII, and IX items to the port or a theater
stockage location. Some of these functions can be
performed by augmenting LSE personnel with
TOE units or contractor personnel. Items
requiring repair may be repaired by the LSE or a
contractor within the theater or sent out of the
theater to a repair facility. The theater materiel
management center identifies the items requiring
redistribution instructions.
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Chapter 6
STAGE VIII DEMOBILIZATION
Demobilization is the process by which demobilization station/center actions, and
units, individuals, and materiel transfer from home station/horne-of-record actions. As with
active to reserve status. Demobization is mobilization, demobilization is discussed in
accomplished in five phases: planning actions, area of o perations action s, transit actions , detail in FM 100-17.
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Chapter 7
Army Operations in War
The NCA may exhaust its options to achieve vital national
interests with the diplomatic, economic, and informational elements
of national power. Such would require the NCA to use the military
element of national power as a primary instrument for protecting
national interests.
When the military element becomes the predominant element for the
execution of policy in a particular theater, the Army may enter the third state
of the range of military operations—war. This chapter discusses modern
warfare and the transition to war from peacetime or conflict. The chapter
closes with a short look at the termination of war.
MODERN WARFARE
War is a state of hostile, armed combat. War
is characterized by the sustained use of armed
force between nations or organized groups
within a nation. War involves regular and
irregular forces in operations to achieve vital
national security objectives. War may be
limited or general in the resources employed
and the risks of survival at stake.
Modern warfare may be nonlinear, thereby
making air operations increasingly vital to the
effectiveness of ground operations. The
commander may, by choice or by lack of
maneuver forces, place his force in dispersed,
noncontiguous areas from which he can operate
to destroy enemy forces. Nonlinear operations
require commanders to seize the initiative
through offensive action, to force the pace of
battle, and to retain the flexibility to bring
overwhelming force to destroy the enemy at a
time and place where he is most vulnerable.
The long-term aim is to regain the initiative
and flexibility needed to quickly destroy the
enemy force. At the operational-level, this
involves an appreciable amount of risk but
offers an opportunity for high-payoff success.
The Army organizes in war to fight effectively
both linear and nonlinear operations.
TRANSITION TO WAR
During peacetime, the Army trains to deter
war and, if necessary, to fight the nation’s wars.
The ASCC must ensure that during realistic
training for war his subordinate units consider
the effect of training on the environment and
the effect of the environment on training.
Federal laws require that Army activities
conducting training and operations during war
and MOOTW comply with all federal, state,
and local (to include host nation)
environmental and pollution abatement
requirements and standards. Environmental
pollution standards cover solid waste
management and control of pollutants in the
air and water and on terrain. Other legal
requirements cover resources such as
endangered species and wetlands. Other
environmental areas that must be addressed
concern noise, terrain damage, ecological
areas, and historical/archeological sites. Still,
the environment should be treated as a
resource, not a constraint.
The CINC structures the army in theater to
transition to war, to receive reinforcements, to
conduct major operations, and to terminate
war on favorable terms. The CINC fixes area
and organizational responsibilities for the
Army in consonance with the theater strategy,
the threat, available forces, and existing or
prospective alliances. These responsibilities
evolve significantly during the transition from
peacetime to wartime.
Unity of Effort
At the operational level, Army operations
in war are always part of unified and joint
operations and often part of multinational
operations. Therefore, the Army commander
must have a unified, joint, and multinational
view of operations. Army cooperation with the
other components is necessary to produce unity
of effort. Military operations are more than just
combat operations and do not necessarily end
with the cessation of hostilities. Some of the
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military operations that occur during and after
combat operations include—
•Processing and return of enemy prisoners of
war (EPW).
•Return of displaced civilians.
•Transfer of responsibilities to peacekeeping
forces.
•Restoration of basic life support services.
•Battlefield policing.
Units conduct these operations until
acceptable peacetime conditions are achieved
and the force is redeployed.
The Range of Military
Operations
All states of the range of military
operations may exist within the theater of war.
Peacetime activities may characterize a portion
of the theater, while other areas may
experience conflict. Thus, the principles and
operations that apply to peacetime and conflict
discussed in previous chapters may apply to
the theater of war. The primary focus of the
war environment, however, remains on combat
operations and those activities that ensure
success.
Organizational Changes
When the Army in theater transitions to
war, significant changes occur in Army
organizations. Such changes require a rapid
expansion of the Army in order to introduce
large numbers of maneuver and support forces
to reinforce the theater. The ASCC evolves and
expands to cope with the increased tempo of
operational and support missions. The Army
may introduce additional operational-level
headquarters to assist the CINC in controlling
the increased number of tactical organizations.
Depending on the analysis of METT-T and
the extent of global conflict, the CINC may
organize several theaters of operation within
the theater of war. This has not been done since
World War II. The CINC may form JTFs for
specific missions in theater, as was done during
Operation Desert Storm. Each of these will
most likely include ARFOR. In theater, more
than one Army commander may have
operational-level responsibilities. These
operational-level Army commanders sequence
operations over space and time to attain
operational or strategic objectives. The
principles outlined in Chapter 3 for the design
and execution of operational art apply to these
commanders.
RETURN TO PEACETIME
The desired end state of war is the rapid
return to peacetime on terms favorable to the
US and its allies. This end state includes
setting the conditions to prevent future war or
conflict. Postwar or military consolidation
operations may be necessary to ensure that the
theater transitions to peacetime and remains
there for the foreseeable future. Diplomatic
and economic considerations may predominate
during this process, with military operations
supporting these elements of national power.
ARMY SERVICE COMPONENT
FUNCTIONS IN WAR
The ASCC’s primary mission is to
contribute to the success of the joint or
multinational commander’s major operation.
The ASCC must envision the long-range
strategic objective in formulating his initial
plans for positioning forces. Army service
component functions during war include
movement and maneuver, fires, protection,
deception, C2, joint information systems
interface, IEW, and support.
MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER
The CINC requests forces stationed in
CONUS or from other theaters.
USTRANSCOM has overall responsibility to
move forces into the theater of war via strategic
lift. Based upon operational requirements, the
ASCC influences this process through JOPES,
AMOPES, and TPFDD. He ensures that the
proper types of Army personnel and materiel
flow into the theater to conduct and support
major operations. The CINC sequences this
flow to ensure that it supports the concept of
operations for current and future missions.
Within the AO, movement and maneuver must
be well-coordinated, integrated, and
synchronized to maximize the combat power
available to the theater commander. This
coordination and synchronization is conducted
on an area basis through maneuver control,
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FM 100-7
movement control, and battlefield circulation
control.
Theater Commander
The CINC may designate the ASCC as a
senior support headquarters without
responsibilities for conducting combat
operations. This becomes highly probable as
the requirements for support increase and the
CINC becomes more involved in directing
Army combat operations.
Army Service
Component Commander
The reception, preparation, and flow of
ARFOR in the theater is a primary function of
the ASCC. The ASCC sets clear movement
priorities within the context of the current
major operation and in preparation for future
major operations. The ASCC uses the senior
movement control agency (MCA) to provide the
movements program, which allocates
transportation support based on these
priorities to support reception and onward
movement activities. Execution of the program
provides for the movement of units, supplies,
and equipment from support areas forward to
the deployed forces and ultimately retrograde
of materiel from these forces.
The ASCC concentrates forces and creates
economy of force through the use of
intratheater movement. Through intratheater
movement, the ASCC develops positional
advantage in relation to the enemy to support
the campaign. The ASCC carefully weighs the
risks of concentration against the protection of
forces, installations, and the infrastructure on
which future operations depend.
The ASCC visualizes maneuver in the
operational sense. His visualization is from the
perspective of the entire theater army, not just
one or several of its elements. Divisions,
separate brigades, or regiments are the level of
resolution of’ his perspective. An early decision
is imperative. Once initial corps and division
positions are selected, the ASCC will find it
difficult to change the initial set.
Army Operational-Level
Commander
Planning offensive and defensive
operations and maneuvers to achieve the
CINC’s campaign plan is a primary function of
the ARFOR operational-level commander. In
addition, he plans large-scale operations
and directs maneuver of subordinate forces.
Plans Offensive and
Defensive Operations
The ARFOR commander at the operational
level plans offensive operations in war to
secure or retain the initiative, to exploit or
pursue the enemy, and to prevent the enemy
from regrouping and regaining the combat
initiative. He also plans defensive operations to
gain time or space to conduct decisive offensive
actions. Even in the defense, the ARFOR
commander seizes opportunities and plans for
offensive maneuver, counterattack, and deep
operations whenever possible.
Plans Large-Scale Operations
The ARFOR commander at the operational
level plans large-scale maneuver of assigned
forces to support the theater campaign, with a
view to the theater CINC’s ultimate objectives.
The CINC sequences and/or integrates major
operations by assigning zones or sectors,
boundaries, objectives, priorities, resources,
and phases. He integrates within his battle
space resources such as space-based systems
and information warfare assets. Planning
responsibilities center on analyzing the
assigned mission, visualizing major combat
operations and logistical requirements, and
disseminating plans and directives. The plans
generally project future operations and provide
details on mission accomplishment as directed
by the CINC.
Directs Maneuver
of Subordinate Forces
The Army operational-level commander
directs the maneuver of subordinate forces to
support the theater campaign plan. This
direction is tied to the overall concept of
operations and the estimate of the situation at
key decision points during the operation. The
primary emphasis of operational maneuver is
on the concentration of combat power through
the exercise of large land formations on broad
fronts.
Synchronization of operational movement,
fires, and support produces a series of
operational maneuvers that provide the Army
operational-level commander and subordinate
commanders with the necessary leverage to
shape the battle space to gain, retain, and
sustain the initiative. The ARFOR commander
synchronizes attacks on the enemy throughout
the battlefield to counter known or anticipated
enemy efforts, to exploit success, and to hasten
the total collapse of enemy forces.
Tactical execution focuses on destruction of
the enemy throughout his battle space through
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Tactical Firepower
use of depth and simultaneity. The Army
operational-level commander, while sensitive
to these immediate engagements, cannot allow
himself to be preoccupied with the close
operations and be distracted from the larger
perspective. He reallocates forces, reprioritizes
efforts, and conducts a continuous estimate
throughout the battle space to react to current
and future decisive points.
The Army operational-level commander
initiates changes designed to facilitate the
execution of current operations, with due
consideration to the impact on future
operations. He directs the movement of
subordinate forces to ensure that after a
distinct phase of the operation they are
positioned in a manner that will enable rapid
transition to subsequent phases.
Normally, deciding the specific form of
maneuver to be used against tactical or
operational objectives is left to the judgment
and discretion of subordinate tactical
commanders. Directing a tactical form of
maneuver at the operational level reduces the
flexibility of subordinates, narrows options,
and may unnecessarily restrict subordinate
commanders in developing optimum COAs.
To defeat the enemy’s center of gravity, the
commander can synchronize maneuver, fires,
and operations simultaneously in depth
against enemy forces at all levels. This
synchronization is one of the most dynamic
concepts available to a commander. Maneuver
and fires should not be considered separate
operations against a common enemy, but
rather complementary operations designed to
achieve the commander’s objectives. The
commander phases the operation against the
enemy’s decisive points at successive depths.
This phasing helps him determine the most
advantageous simultaneous employment of
forces and firepower for decisive engagement to
achieve the end state.
FIRES
JFCs use a variety of firepower means to
divert, disrupt, delay, damage, or destroy the
enemy’s air, surface, and subsurface military
potential. This paragraph discusses how the
JFC thinks about applying joint fires to
support his concept of operations.
The Firepower Model
Joint firepower can be classified as tactical,
operational, or strategic, based on its intended
effect.
The primary purpose of tactical firepower
is to directly and immediately support tactical
operations of the joint force against
appropriate tactical decisive points. Therefore,
maneuver commanders exercise control over
tactical firepower that supports their
maneuver operations. Tactical firepower
includes the coordinated and collective use of
target acquisition data, indirect-fire weapons,
armed aircraft (both fixed- and rotary-wing),
and other means against enemy elements in
contact or imminent contact. Included are
artillery, mortars, other nonline-of-sight fires,
naval gunfire, CAS, attack aviation assets, and
electronic attack. Tactical firepower also could
include the means for surface-to-air and air-toair
engagements.
Interdiction operations conducted by all
elements of the joint force can also be designed
to achieve or support tactical objectives. Some
interdiction missions may therefore be
considered as tactical. All interdiction missions
affecting the land battle require coordination
between several levels of command, both
within and across service lines (see Figure 5-2).
Operational Firepower
Operational firepower achieves a decisive
impact on a subordinate campaign or major
operation. Operational firepower is joint and
multinational. It is a separate element of the
subordinate JFC’s concept of operations
(addressed separately from operational
maneuver) but must be closely integrated and
synchronized with his concept for maneuver. In
that regard, operational firepower is integrated
normally with operational land maneuver for
synergistic effect, staying power, and more
rapid achievement of strategic aims.
Operational firepower is not fire support, and
operational maneuver is not necessarily
dependent upon operational firepower. Still,
operational maneuver can be affected by such
fires and can exploit opportunities created or
developed by the JFC’s operational firepower.
Today, all services contribute capabilities
that can be used for operational firepower. To
synchronize operations, the JFC may task one
component to provide fires to support another
component’s operations. Still, as service means
for operational firepower may be used for
tactical firepower, the JFC should preserve
that tactical capability as he develops his
concept of fires.
Operational firepower includes targeting
and attacking land and sea targets whose
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FM 100-7
destruction or neutralization will have a major
impact on a subordinate campaign or major
operation. Operational firepower includes the
allocation of joint and multinational air, land,
sea (surface and subsurface), and space means.
In a war involving WMD, fires could be an
operational instrument at decisive points that
leads to the enemy’s strategic center of gravity.
Operational firepower can be designed to
achieve a single, operationally significant
objective that could have a decisive impact on
the campaign and major operation.
Operational firepower may include the
interdiction of a major enemy force or forces to
set the conditions for subsequent, decisive
operations.
Operational firepower is planned top down.
The operational commander establishes
objectives, identifies targets, and then passes
them to subordinate joint or multinational
units for execution. Subordinate nominations
contribute to this top-down approach.
Operational firepower focuses largely on one or
more of the following:
•Destruction of critical functions, facilities,
and forces having operational significance.
•Isolation of a specific battle within the battle
space.
•Facilitation of maneuver to operational
depths.
Systems capable of providing operational
firepower generally include land- and seabased
airpower and surface-to-surface, longrange
missiles.
The ASCC has various means with which
to execute operational firepower. He may mass
fires, concentrate long-range missile fires,
employ attack helicopters, or coordinate the
use of air forces with Army resources.
Application of operational firepower is a
primary means for concentrating combat
power.
Strategic Firepower
Strategic firepower is intended to achieve a
major impact at the strategic level and thus an
impact on the course of the theater campaign or
war as a whole. Strategic firepower includes
selection and assignment of strategic targets to
attack capable forces. Strategic firepower also
makes the forces and resources available for
attacking those targets according to the theater
strategy and campaign plan.
Systems capable of providing strategic
firepower are generally those also capable of
providing operational firepower. The intended
effect or outcome qualifies a system, weapon, or
operation as either strategic or operational.
Nuclear munitions, because of the escalation
they signal, are normally categorized as
strategic firepower—whether they are
delivered by aircraft, missile, or other means—
and are closely controlled through a system the
theater commander establishes.
Army Interface
The Army operational-level commander is
the critical link for coordination of joint support
for Army operations and Army support for joint
operations. The Army operational-level
commander has a key role in ensuring that
ground and air operations, as devised by the
JFC, complement and reinforce each other. The
Army operational-level commander begins
coordination with the JFC and ACC early in
the operational planning process. During the
operational planning process, the Army
operational-level commander, in coordination
with his subordinate commanders and staff,
identifies Army requirements for air support
(reconnaissance, CAS, air interdiction, and
airlift). He also participates in the targeting
process by nominating targets for Army and
Air Force engagement.
Interdiction
Interdiction contributes substantially to
operational firepower, although it also can
have tactical and strategic effects. Interdiction
diverts, disrupts, delays, or destroys the
enemy’s surface or subsurface military
potential before it can be used effectively
against friendly forces. Although interdiction
can have tactical effects, it generally applies
forward of or beyond units in contact or
imminent contact. Its effects must be
synchronized in time, space, and purpose with
other supporting or supported operations of the
joint force. Interdiction-capable forces include,
but are not limited to—
•Fighter or attack aircraft and bombers.
•Ships and submarines.
•Conventional airborne, air assault, or other
ground maneuver forces.
•SOF.
•Surface-to-surface, subsurface-to-surface, and
air-to-surface missiles, rockets, munitions,
and mines.
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•Artillery and naval gunfire.
•Attack helicopters.
•EW systems.
•Antisatellite weapons.
•Space-based satellite systems or sensors.
Synchronizing interdiction and maneuver
is critical to the successful execution of the
campaign or major operation. Interdiction and
maneuver should not be considered separate
operations against a common enemy, but
rather complementary operations designed to
achieve the JFC’s campaign objectives.
Moreover, interdiction could be a maneuver
itself to gain positional advantage over an
enemy.
Potential responses to synchronized
maneuver and interdiction can create an
agonizing dilemma for the enemy. If the enemy
attempts to counter the friendly maneuver,
enemy forces can be exposed to unacceptable
losses from interdiction; if the enemy employs
measures to reduce such interdiction losses,
enemy forces may not be able to counter the
maneuver. The synergy achieved by
integrating and synchronizing interdiction and
maneuver assists commanders in gaining the
greatest leverage against the enemy at the
operational level.
The ARFOR operates within the theater
operational battle space that the JFC
establishes for the conduct of all operations.
Strategic, political, and internal boundaries
are examples of the further subdivision of the
battle space that must be considered by the
operational commander. The JFC establishes
operational boundaries to facilitate the
synchronization of maneuver and interdiction.
Synchronization of efforts within these
boundaries is of particular importance.
According to Joint Pub 3-0, the operational
land commander is the supported commander
for air interdiction in his AO, and he therefore
specifies the target priority, effects, and timing
of interdiction operations therein. While this
may mean specifying individual targets or
target sets and the desired effects to be
achieved in attacking them, the often preferred
method is for the land commander to specify
the operational-level effects he intends the
interdiction to achieve, the target priorities to
achieve those effects, and the date/time by
which the effects are required (for example,
eliminate the counterattack capability of X
Guard’s corps by destroying artil1ery, armor,
and soft-skinned vehicles not later than D+7).
Interdiction operations, whether by land,
air, or naval forces, complement overall
maneuver to destroy the enemy’s center of
gravity. The ARFOR commander may choose to
use interdiction as a principal means to achieve
the intended objective (with his subordinate
forces supporting the component leading the
interdiction effort). For example, actual or
threatened maneuver can force an enemy to
abandon or reveal covered positions or attempt
rapid resupply. These reactions provide
excellent and vulnerable targets for
interdiction.
Targeting
Targeting by the ARFOR staff follows the
same targeting process used at subordinate
echelons. This process is detailed in
FM 6-20-10. The targeting process is an
important part of the military decision-making
process described by FM 101-5.
At the operational level, the focus of the
targeting effort is more on planning and
coordination, rather than on execution of
operational firepower. Typically, when the
ARFOR staff identifies high-payoff operational
targets, it will coordinate with subordinate
units for acquisition and attack by systems
allocated or organic to the corps. There will be
some critical targets that subordinate units are
not capable of acquiring or engaging. The
critical nature of these targets—and the
requirement to coordinate and synchronize the
employment of several joint acquisitions/
attacks as quickly as possible—requires the
ARFOR commander to establish a staff section
to support the associated targeting effort. This
section is the DOCC.
The DOCC is organized with appropriate
joint service, multinational arms, and coalition
force representatives. The primary functions of
the DOCC are situational awareness, planning
and coordination, targeting, and control of
designated operational firepower. A
description of the DOCC functions is shown in
Figure 7-1. The primary mission of the DOCC
is to provide centralized coordination and
management of ARFOR deep operations. The
DOCC ensures effective and efficient
employment of critical assets and facilitates
synchronization of joint operations. The
primary functions of the DOCC apply across
the range of military operations.
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FM 100-7
Fire Control Measures fluidity and flexibility of successful joint
JFCs employ various fire support operations.
coordination measures to facilitate effective
joint operations. Many maneuver control Fire Support
measures have fire coordination implications. Coordination Line
Specific joint fire support coordination The ARFOR may establish an FSCL within
measures and the procedures associated with the AO to support his concept of operation. The
those measures also assist in preserving the ARFOR must coordinate the FSCL’s location
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with the appropriate ACC and other
supporting elements. If an FSCL is
established, its purpose is to allow the ARFOR,
its subordinates, and supporting units, such as
Air Force, to swiftly attack targets of
opportunity beyond the FSCL. Such attacks by
Army assets must be coordinated with all other
affected commanders in sufficient time to allow
necessary action to avoid friendly casualties.
This coordination includes informing and/or
consulting with affected commanders (that is,
supporting air components). The inability to
effect this coordination will not preclude the
attack of targets beyond the FSCL; however,
failure to coordinate this type of attack
increases the risk of friendly casualties and
could waste limited resources through
duplicate attacks. If the land force commander
desires to shoot or maneuver beyond his lateral
boundaries, he must first coordinate with the
appropriate commander. The interface within
the DOCC among the various fire support
representatives provides an excellent means of
initially coordinating the attack of targets in
the area.
The FSCL must complement the ARFOR
commander’s concept for deep operations and
optimize the synergy between operational
maneuver and operational firepower. To
achieve this synergy, supported and supporting
commanders must have clearly defined
responsibilities, selective targeting, and
coordinated operations. As the supported
commander, the ARFOR provides necessary
guidance (restrictions, constraints) for all
operations in the area beyond the FSCL and
within the designated ARFOR AO. The ARFOR
commander does not necessarily have to
control the supporting operations or joint
service activities in this area. Still, supporting
commanders must follow the AR FOR
commander’s intent and guidance for activities
in this area. Control of interdiction provides a
functional example.
Interdiction occurs both short of and
beyond the FSCL. Attack of planned
interdiction targets on either side requires no
further coordination, assuming the attack is
proceeding as planned. Deviation from the plan
requires coordination with affected
commanders. Attack of interdiction targets of
opportunity short of the FSCL requires
coordination with the affected commanders.
Before attacking targets of opportunity beyond
the FSCL, supporting commanders should
coordinate with the ARFOR commander.
However, if he cannot effect coordination, the
supporting commander controlling the attack
must follow the ARFOR commander’s guidance
for attacking targets in this area. Thus, the
ARFOR commander need not directly control
the overall interdiction effort (air, ground) but,
as the supported commander, he exercises
general direction over interdiction and other
activities of supporting commanders in his AO.
Besides the FSCL, other fire support
coordination measures may be used to
facilitate or restrict operational firepower.
These include restrictive fire areas (RFAs) and
no-fire areas (NFAs) to protect friendly
elements on either side of the FSCL. If ROE
permit, commanders should consider the use of
free-fire areas (FFAs) to expedite fires or the
jettisoning of ordinance in specific areas.
Whether attacking or defending, the
ARFOR commander usually designates an
initial FSCL and plans for a subsequent series
of on-order FSCLs. Execution of on-order
FSCLs must be transmitted in sufficient time
to allow higher, lower, adjacent, and
supporting headquarters time to effect
necessary changes.
Warfighting Airspace
Warfighting airspace is the airspace
directly above the ground commander’s AO
that provides for freedom of maneuver for those
forces operating in the third dimension.
Commanders in the field use various means to
gain freedom of maneuver in this area,
especially in the conduct of deep operations.
Warfighting airspace uses the coordinating
altitude to define this area. The coordinating
altitude is an airspace permissive control
measure designed to coordinate airspace
between high performance fixed-wing and
rotary-wing aircraft. The JFC has already
designated the AO. The warfighting airspace
presents a three-dimensional view of the
battlefield. In the warfighting airspace, the
ground commander retains freedom of
maneuver without overly restricting any of the
other users of airspace.
Coordination
To coordinate operational-level fires, the
DOCC interacts with multiple Army, Air Force,
and sometimes Naval aviation organizations.
The DOCC works very closely with the
command’s MI organization and the echelons
above corps (EAC) analysis and control
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FM 100-7
element (ACE). They are the DOCC’s main
source of targeting data.
To ensure that targeting data is developed
into target lists, the manning of the section
must include MI officers. The DOCC works
with the command’s subordinate unit’s fire
support element (FSE) to deconflict targets and
targeting information, to task corps for
operational fires support, and to forward air
support requests to the AOC. The DOCC also
provides the corps with target feedback,
especially BDA received through the BCE.
Assignment of artillery, WMD target analysts,
and maneuver arms (especially aviation)
officers to the coordination section is crucial to
its effective coordination with the tactical-level
headquarters.
The Army DOCC effects coordination with
the US Air Force through the BCE located at
the Air Force AOC, the ground liaison officers
at the wings, and the Army liaison officer
aboard the airborne battlefield command and
control center (ABCCC). Similar functions are
performed within the Navy Tactical Air
Control System (NTACS) by its tactical air
control center. These assets receive
information from and provide feedback directly
to the DOCC. An automated targeting support
system to transmit targeting priorities,
targeting lists with supporting intelligence
data, and targeting damage assessments are
essential to this coordination.
Joint Interface
The DOCC provides the Army members to
the JTCB and the joint command, control, and
communications countermeasures (C3CM) cell.
Joint Targeting
Coordination Board
The CINC or JFC may establish a joint
targeting coordination board to direct the
theater targeting process, to include special
operations targeting. The board consists of
members of the joint staff and representatives
of each subordinate command. The JTCB
ensures the effective employment of all
theater-level deep surveillance and attack
resources, including SOF. It coordinates
targeting information, provides targeting
guidance and priorities, prepares or refines
joint target lists (JTLs), and deconflicts lethal
and nonlethal assets. The JTCB is usually
chaired by the J3 or his representative.
Its organization reflects theater force
composition, strategic objectives, geography,
and the threat. The JTCB includes
representatives of the land component
commander, air component commander, naval
component commander, special operations
component commander, AOC, and marine, air,
and electronic planning cells. Input from the
joint staff element is used also to prepare the
JTL.
The JTCB normally meets daily to ensure
that JFC targeting and EW guidance is
disseminated, to monitor the effectiveness of
lethal and nonlethal targeting efforts, to
coordinate and deconflict joint force operations,
to validate fire support coordination measures,
and to approve new target nominations for
inclusion in the JTL. JTCB results are
provided to the supporting forces. Joint
Pubs 3-0 and 3-09 discuss the purpose and
functions of JTCBs. Joint Pub 3-05.5 contains
discussion of SOF mission tasking as part of
the JTCB process.
Joint C3CM Cell
The JFC usually organizes a joint C3CM
cell to coordinate EW targeting information,
provide EW targeting guidance and priorities,
prepare or refine JTLs, and compile a list of
crucial friendly assets that must be protected
from joint EW operations. The C3CM cell is
normally chaired by the J3 or his
representative and has representatives of the
J2, J6, operational fires coordination section,
and other staff elements and service
components as appropriate.
The ASCC establishes a C3CM plan, in
coordination with the CINC’s plan, to attack
high-value targets. The EAC C3CM plan,
developed from the ASCC’s intent, focuses on
subordinate unit operations and complements
joint operations with other component
commands within the theater.
PROTECTION
Operational fires organic to the joint force
are key in protecting the rear area from ground
threats. A vital mission of Army ADA is to
protect the force and critical theater assets
from aerial attack, missile attack, and
surveillance during warfighting operations.
The priorities may shift to protecting major
concentrations of combat forces and
supplementing protection of maneuver forces.
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Protection of LOCs remains critical as they
extend to support maneuvering forces.
Army commanders are often responsible
for the security and protection of facilities and
units that support joint or multinational
commanders conducting close and deep
operations. Additionally, Army commanders
may be tasked to provide security for air bases
located within their AO. ARFOR commanders
must continuously employ risk-management
approaches to effectively preclude
unacceptable risks to personnel and property,
including protecting forces preparing for or en
route to combat.
Risk management is the recognition that
decision making occurs under conditions of
uncertainty. Decisions must remain consistent
with the commander’s stated intent and offer a
good expectation of success. The risk-taking
skill requires competency as a prerequisite.
Risks from WMD must be continually assessed
to ensure force protection and deterrence and
should be addressed in plan synchronization
and force resourcing. Trained and disciplined
organizations lessen risk.
Rear Operations
Rear operations include those activities
that allow freedom of maneuver, continuity of
support, and uninterrupted C2. In linear battle
terms, these actions occur behind forces
engaged in active combat. The rear operations
procedures discussed herein focus on
operations during war. Similar actions could be
required in MOOTW. Joint Pubs 3-10 and
3-10.1 and FMs 90-23 and 90-12 provide
additional coverage of rear operations. Rear
operations has four functions: sustainment,
movement, terrain management, and security.
An Army commander may execute these rear
operations functions in a COMMZ/JRA or CZ.
Communications Zone/
Joint Rear Area
A JFC normally establishes a theater base
communications zone (JRA) and the CZ within
the territory of a sovereign host nation. Unlike
the CZ, most host nations whose sovereignty
remains viable maintain some level of control
in a COMMZ.
The host nation may retain overall
responsibility for security, movement, and
terrain management. In such cases,
commanders of US forces in the COMMZ own
only the bases they physically occupy. They are
responsible for the security of bases and
coordination with the host nation for additional
security assistance or other rear operations
support. HNS agreements, SOFA, or other
legal instruments guide the US and host nation
relationship. The US commander in the
COMMZ directs and coordinates rear
operations, using a single command
headquarters. At this echelon, support is the
principal operation. Several US organizations
work with the host nation to execute each rear
operation function.
Separate US functional commands and
agencies control the movement of US assets in
the COMMZ and coordinate these movements
with host nation and US area commanders.
The army organization with responsibility for
rear operations is usually responsible for
coordinating terrain management and security
with host nation agencies in its AO.
•Rear Area Operations Center. A rear area
operations center (RAOC) is a subordinate
CP within the ARFOR’s CP. The RAOC is
responsible for collecting rear area
information, managing terrain, controlling
area damage, determining the impact of
weather, and synchronizing the rear area
battle plan to facilitate responses to enemy
threats in the rear area. FMs 100-15, 90-12,
and 90-23 detail these rear operations
activities.
•ARFOR Support. The ARFOR designates a
support organization (corps support
command [COSCOM]) to execute the
support function and assist in movement
and terrain management. In contingency
operations, ARFOR may hand off these rear
operations responsibilities as the lodgment
or AO expands. EAC organizations assume
these responsibilities, thereby allowing the
corps to focus on tactical operations.
Combat Zone
In a CZ, the ARFOR commander usually
owns all the terrain on which his forces conduct
operations and is responsible for synchronizing
all rear operations. This discussion
characterizes rear operations at corps and
below in contingency situations with no
developed COMMZ and environments with no
viable HNS.
Chain of Command
Command and control of rear operations is
the key to success across the width and depth
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FM 100-7
of the battle space. To ensure overall security of
the rear area, commanders at all levels must
clearly understand C2, C2 responsibilities, and
C2 elements. Each unit in the rear area,
regardless of its support function, shouId be
able to defend itself. Ideally, threats to the rear
should be engaged and defeated before they can
affect rear operations. When they must be
fought in the rear, a system of incremental
responses must be able to eliminate the threat
as quickly as possible.
The chain of command for rear operations
is embodied in area commands for security,
area damage control (ADC), and terrain
management functions. Any unit in the
COMMZ uses this channel to report
information of intelligence value and to request
engineer, chemical, explosive ordnance
disposal (EOD), military police (MP), and host
nation assistance.
The COMMZ tactical chain of command for
rear operations flows from the theater CINC to
the ASCC, to rear operations centers (ROCs), to
base clusters, and to bases. This chain of
command is used to coordinate protection of
units and facilities within geographical areas of
the COMMZ.
Commander in Chief
The CINC is responsible for rear
operations. He normally designates a JRAC,
often the ASCC. The ASCC as the JRAC would
then assume US responsibility for coordinating
rear operations in the COMMZ, which includes
coordination with the host nation. The JRAC is
responsible to his US superiors for the
development and maintenance of US
installations, control of US movements,
administration of the US support effort, and
overall security of all US forces and resources
present in or transiting the COMMZ.
Army Service
Component Commander
The ASCC would likely delegate the
responsibility for rear operations planning to
his deputy chief of staff for operations. At
theater, operational-level planning is
conducted to sequence future rear operations,
coordinate HNS, and synchronize the four rear
operations functions (support, movement,
terrain management, and security). The ASCC
uses a decentralized control system of area
commanders for rear operations covering large
areas of the theater COMMZ. The area
commander usually designates his deputy
commander as the rear operations officer who,
in turn, often executes this responsibility
through the security, plans, and operations
(SPO) officer.
Rear Operations Centers.
The ROC (as depicted in Figure 7-2)
collects information and plans and coordinates
security, ADC, and terrain management. The
ROC is composed of functional sections that
work closely with their area command
structure. The ROC sections coordinate with
host nation liaison elements in addition to
NBC, EOD, MP, engineer, and other technical
organizations.
The ROC maintains multiple
communications channels using switched
telephone services and combat net radios
(CNRs) with higher and adjacent headquarters
and units. The ROC conducts vulnerability and
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threat assessments within its AO. It then plans
and coordinates protection of designated
critical facilities and resources. It also advises
MCAs of security issues, area surveillance
responsibilities, response (combat) operations,
positioning of units, and ADC. The ROC reacts
to incidents most of the time but also looks to
short-term planning. It has an FSE and mobile
base defense coordination teams (BDCTs) to
assist in detailed rear area defense planning.
The ROC’s most important contribution to
COMMZ/JRA security is the establishment and
coordination of base defense plans. The ROC
coordinates base siting with the technical chain
of command and then organizes these bases
into base clusters to provide mutual support.
The rear operations commander, with ROC
recommendation, designates base and base
cluster commanders to coordinate defensive
plans. Sometimes the ROC identifies single
bases that are isolated, such as a specialized
fixed facility, or clearly independent, such as
an air base, and treats them as separate base
clusters.
Base Cluster Commander
The base cluster commander
communicates with all bases in his cluster
through a base defense operations center
(BDOC). Each base and base cluster is
responsible for preparing its own defense
plans. The ROC sends a BDCT to the base
cluster commander’s base cluster operations
center (BCOC) to assist in consolidating
individual base defense plans into a
coordinated base cluster defense plan. Assets
for forming the BDOC and BCOC are gathered
from available base or cluster assets. See Joint
Pub 3-10.1 for a detailed discussion of base
defense. The BDCT reviews and assists in
coordinating all needed US and host nation
security and damage control support, to
include fire support and ADA support. It then
ensures the completed defense plans are
brought to the ROC for record and integration
with the total protection concept.
Host Nation
The host nation, when capable, retains
responsibility for security and ADC of all areas
outside US bases. Despite the status of HNS,
US commanders are always responsible for the
defense of their base. They take measures to
avoid detection by reducing the base signature,
most notably through OPSEC, and the use of
camouflage and concealment. US commanders
take protective measures to withstand enemy
attacks and employ measures to speed recovery
and return to full mission capability should an
attack occur. Measures include the
emplacement of protective obstacles,
fortification of critical facilities, and
installation of NBC defense systems.
US commanders also plan graduated levels
of response to enemy attack to defeat Level I
threats and to delay and disrupt Level II and
III threat forces until outside assistance
arrives. See Table 7-1. If the host nation has
limited capabilities to fulfill its rear operations
responsibilities, or the AOR is hostile, the JFC
or ASCC may designate US assets to execute
these functions. The commander could require
additional US engineer forces for ADC and
other sustainment engineering tasks. He might
provide more CSS and CS organizations for
supply, movement, and terrain management.
Without HNS, the ASCC may assume
responsibility for overall security of the
COMMZ/JRA, addressing all three levels of
threat. All US commanders would concern
themselves with greater security roles beyond
their normal self-defense responsibility.
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FM 100-7
Units in the COMMZ are especially
vulnerable to enemy attack because of their
focus on support and limited combat
capabilities. Combat units located in the
COMMZ are usually newly arrived or
regenerated and thus have limited combat
potential. The ASCC must coordinate
responses to all three levels of threat to prevent
disruption of support activities, interdiction of
LOCs, demoralization of forces, and diversion
of combat forces.
In the COMMZ, US response forces handle
Level II and III threats. Response forces are
generally tactical combat forces (TCFs) and/or
host nation forces, depending upon the viability
of the host nation and established host nation
agreements. In the COMMZ/JRA, security
operations are economy-of-force operations. US
MPs provide security support to all Army
operations through execution of their
battlefield mission of area security. MPs are
normally designated as the rear operations
response force to defeat Level II threats. The
ASCC normally designates a TCF to defeat
level III threats. The ASCC may designate a
TCF from any of the following:
•Tactical units passing through the rear area
to the forward-deployed force.
•Units assigned or reconstituted in the rear
area. The ASCC may already have units
assigned rear security operations (an MP
brigade task force augmented according to
the factors of METT-T).
•Tactical units of other service components or
allies within the theater army under
OPCON of the senior army commander.
•Tactical units from forward-deployed
elements.
•A task-organized force from assets
disembarking in the theater.
The theater commander’s campaign would
require significant change should the threat in
the rear area grow to a level that required
diverting combat units. The German Army
experienced this situation during World War II
on the eastern front. German rear area
commanders— confronted with large numbers
of partisan forces—bypassed enemy units and
inserted conventional and special operations
forces, disrupting their operations. This threat
ultimately required over 25 German divisions
dedicated to rear area security. Table 7-1 lists
the three levels of response and typical threats
that can trigger the response.
DECEPTION
In war, the Army commander integrates
Army deception plans with joint force
deception plans to ensure unity of effort. The
better the enemy is deceived, the more
protection is provided to the friendly force.
Deception operations must be closely
coordinated with the JFC’s deception staff
element (DSE) and support the JFC’s deception
plan. The Army commander attaches
representatives to the DSE to participate in
deception planning. At the operational level of
war, the Army commander uses deception as
one of his major force multipliers. This is
particularly important when the relative
strength differential between opposing forces
favors the enemy. In war, the Army
commander finds deception particularly
attractive as a means to influence the decisions
of an opposing commander.
Deception requires planners to view the
friendly force from the perspective of its
opponent. That perspective and a notion of how
that opposing commander believes the friendly
force will act are key to the deception strategy.
The purpose of the deception operation is to
cause the enemy to act in a way prejudicial to
his best interests. A deception plan seeks to
exploit the expectations of the opposing
commander by offering confirming evidence of
those expectations. The resultant enemy action
must be to his disadvantage as the actual
friendly force plan unfolds. While deception can
have a high payoff, it is difficult to execute
successfully.
The Army operational-level commander
blends his deception plans into the concept of
operation. The deception plan is a viable COA
that was considered but not selected. At the
operational level of war, the commander forms
a deception cell that includes functional
representation from the entire staff. This cell
requires considerable resources to be an
effective element of the major operation.
The commander may execute the deception
COA as a branch of the major operation. This
execution requires the positioning of forces and
the allocation of materiel. If required, the Army
operational-level commander may execute the
deception branch of the concept of operation if
his selected COA is compromised. The
deception operation must be a viable COA. To
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be successful, it must cause the enemy to
confirm its preconceived ideas of friendly force
actions.
COMMAND AND CONTROL
Command relationships in war may evolve
during the transition to war to be substantially
different from those exercised during
peacetime or conflict. This evolution is the
result of several factors, to include additional
ways and means available to the CINC to
prosecute the war effort.
Developing the
Chain of Command
During the transition from peacetime to
wartime, a theater undergoes a process of
development. As the theater expands, the
purpose of combat operations grows in
complexity and the size and scope of combat
and support force structures increases. This
may result in organization of the theater into
theaters of war or theaters of operation as
discussed in Chapter 2.
Intermediate Army
Headquarters
The requirement to establish an
intermediate Army headquarters between the
ASCC and the corps depends on
characteristics of the theater environment
based on METT-T and the reasons identified in
Section III of Chapter 2. The number of
subordinate headquarters that a higher
headquarters can control depends on a number
of factors; mission, experience, training,
communications abilities, and logistics are a
few. The span of control will be as broad or
narrow as the situation dictates.
Numbered Army
The ASCC, with the concurrence of the
CINC, establishes a numbered army,
designates a numbered army commander, and
provides him with the directive or order that
forms his command. This directive specifies the
rationale for establishing the numbered army,
the objectives it should meet, and the forces
involved. Numbered armies plan and direct
major operations. Operations at this level
involve the deployment, movement and
maneuver, and fires of land combat power over
extended terrain and the integration of all
Army and other service support into the
operation. Subordinate tactical commanders
determine the specific tactics in maneuver,
fires, intelligence, force protection, C2, and
allocated support. Primary emphasis at the
numbered army level is on planning for future
operations.
Exercising Control
Through Planning
The Army operational-level commander
actively participates in developing the
subordinate JFC’s theater of operations
campaign plans. He interfaces with the
commanders of the other services and directs
the preparation of the Army’s major operations
to support the plan. He issues planning
guidance, weighs various COAs, and develops
and coordinates a concept of operations. The
Army operational-level commander ensures
that his concept is aligned with that of his
superior commander. He coordinates vertically
with senior and subordinate commands and
horizontally with adjacent and supporting
commands and activities. With representatives
from the other services, the Army commander
incorporates sea and airpower in the concept
early in the planning process. This power
includes fire support, reconnaissance, sealift,
air defense, and airlift.
Planning in wartime at the operational
level is continuous and more complex than in
other environments for the following reasons:
•The synchronization of functions in large
areas over greater periods of time
introduces additional variables.
•The presence of an enemy with possibly
equal or greater capabilities, pursuing
actions independently, causes continuous
updating of planning efforts.
•The planning process remains relatively the
same, while the requirement for joint
planning increases dramatically at nearly
all echelons.
•The Army operational-level commander
must plan for a large number of branches
and sequels to help simplify decisions in a
time-sensitive war environment.
Establishing Command
Relationships
In the directive that creates the Army operational-
level echelon, the theater commander
establishes command relationships. These
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FM 100-7
Tenets
relationships are responsive to the needs of the
theater of operation commander and are
unique to the environment in which the echelon
is created. This operational-level echelon
may be a numbered army, a designated corps,
or any other Army organization that meets the
needs of the JFC. The Army component designs
the operational-level echelon to maximize
unity of effort, to allow flexibility in employing
subordinate echelons, and to effect a rapid
response to changes in friendly and enemy situations.
As the theater expands, the CINC
may—
•Separate the Army’s operations and support
functions.
•Designate the ASCC as a support
headquarters with OPCON of Army support
organizations.
•Maintain control of major maneuver forces,
or put maneuver forces under OPCON of
subordinate joint commanders.
JOINT INFORMATION
SYSTEMS INTERFACE
The JFC’s staff maintains joint
communications interfaces through the JCCC.
The ASCC’s communications staff participates
in theater joint and multinational
communications network planning and
management through its interface with the
JCCC. In cases where the ASCC provides the
bulk of the joint force headquarters staffing,
the ASCC may be required to operate an
integrated JCCC/ASCC communications
management center. Key duties center on
network management of voice, data, and video
systems signal interoperability. Frequency and
COMSEC management are also key duties.
Joint Pub 6-05.1 provides a detailed
description of JCCC organization and
functions.
INTELLIGENCE AND ELECTRONIC
WARFARE
IEW is the commander’s key to victory on a
battlefield and to success in MOOTW.
Intelligence enables commanders to focus,
leverage, and protect the combat power and
resources at their disposal to win decisively on
the modern battlefield and succeed in
endeavors short of war.
Army MI is commander-driven,
synchronized, disseminated, split-based, and
tactically tailored.
Commander-Driven
The commander drives the intelligence
effort. He focuses the intelligence system by
clearly designating his PIR, targeting
requirements, and priorities. He ensures that
the intelligence efforts are employed fully and
synchronized with maneuver and fire support.
He demands that the intelligence battlefield
operating systems provide needed
intelligence in the correct form.
Synchronized
The G2/S2 synchronizes intelligence
collection, analysis, and dissemination with
operations to ensure the commander receives
the intelligence he needs, in the form he can
use it, in time to influence the decision-making
process. Intelligence synchronization is a
continuous process that keeps IEW operations
tied to the commander’s critical decisions and
concept of operations.
Disseminated
Broadcast dissemination of intelligence is
the simultaneous broadcast of near real-time
intelligence from collectors and processors at
all echelons. It permits commanders at all
echelons to simultaneously receive the same
intelligence, thereby, providing a common
picture of the battlefield. It allows commanders
to skip echelons and pull intelligence directly
from the echelon broadcasting it.
Split-Based
Split-based intelligence operations provide
deploying tactical commanders with highresolution
intelligence until their organic
intelligence collection assets are employed.
These operations augment organic intelligence
production and employ collection and analysis
elements from all echelons—national to
tactical—to support bases from which they can
operate against the target area.
Tactically Tailored
In force-projection operations, the
commander tailors IEW support for each
contingency, based on the mission and
availability of resources. He must decide which
key intelligence personnel and equipment to
deploy early and when to phase in his
remaining MI assets. The ASCC serves as the
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intelligence integration headquarters for the
Army operational-level commander. The ASCC
must have timely intelligence on the enemy,
weather, and terrain; the conditions of the
AOR; the civil population; and related
environmental factors. The collection of
information and the production and
dissemination of intelligence are continuing
processes during peacetime as well as during
war.
Sources
The ASCC processes and refines
intelligence information from many sources to
the degree of resolution necessary to support
theater army operations. Sources include the
Army, the US command’s JIC, DIA, CIA, NSA,
other services, allied forces intelligence
agencies, and other federal intelligence
investigative and law enforcement agencies.
These sources produce intelligence information
on the capabilities, vulnerabilities, and
probable COAs of the armed forces of foreign
nations and other forces they may sponsor. The
ASCC accomplishes his intelligence mission
through the ACE.
The intelligence support elements (ISE) of
the MI organization provide 24-hour liaison
with the US Army; with joint, multinational,
and allied military organizations; with
intelligence services; and with US corps. These
liaison elements assist supported
organizations in identifying IEW
requirements, establishing priorities, and
interfacing directly with the operational-level
MI organization. The ISEs serve as extensions
of the ACE and are collocated with the
supported organization. These elements
provide a mechanism for US and allied
commands to request information on the
enemy.
The ISEs facilitate the production and
exchange of intelligence, as well as the
coordination for EW support, to include civil
broadcast jamming. ISEs also work with unit
intelligence officers and assist with intelligence
input to operational planning, situation arid
target development, and IPB. These support
elements are located at such distances from the
ACE that they operate independently. They
respond to the needs of their counterpart
agencies and commands at least as often as
they respond to the needs of the ACE.
Operational-level MI organizations
support operational planning at ASCC level.
This planning provides predictive intelligence
as the ASCC link to coordinate, synchronize,
and deconflict intelligence support, intelligence
asset management, deep targeting priorities,
and SOF operations conducted by subordinate
units.
Direction and Coordination
The CINC provides overall direction and
coordination of the intelligence effort of
assigned forces. Through the ACE, the ASCC
maintains the means of executing his
intelligence function. However, the theater
commander may establish an intelligence
organization to perform theater intelligence
functions. When established, this organization
also provides the ASCC with the intelligence
information required to supplement the
component’s organic intelligence capability. In
war, Army operational-level commanders
concentrate on several specific areas of
intelligence to facilitate military combat
operations. These include—
•Identifying enemy capabilities and likely
COAs that could affect future major
operations.
•Targeting specific enemy commanders and
echelons for deception.
•Determining the best way to protect friendly
vulnerabilities and exploit enemy
weaknesses.
•Updating the PIR.
•Using all sources of intelligence efficiently
by integrating collection assets to produce
operationally useful products.
Operational Protection
The commander uses the entire
intelligence system to support force protection.
The intelligence system is active and proactive,
identifying, locating, and targeting an enemy’s
ability to target and affect friendly forces. Force
protection intelligence products—
•Identify and counter enemy intelligence
collection capabilities.
•Assess friendly vulnerabilities from the
enemy’s perspective.
•Identify the enemy’s perception of friendly
centers of gravity and how he will attack
them or influence them.
•Identify risks to the force.
•Identify potential countermeasures to deny
enemy access to friendly critical areas.
7-16
•Contribute to threat avoidance once the risk
is identified.
•Enable the commander to plan for both
passive and active OPSEC, deception, and
other security measures.
With this intelligence, the commander
decides which countermeasures he must use to
shield his intentions, present false images to
the enemy commander, and protect his force.
Counterintelligence
CI operations counteract foreign
intelligence and terrorist threats to the
friendly force. Their specialty is support to
force protection.
Rear Area Operations
IEW contributes to the rear battle by
helping to identify, analyze, wargame, and
provide early warning of potential threats to
the friendly rear area. IEW also contributes by
identifying terrain that supports friendly rear
area operations.
SUPPORT
In war, the CINC may designate the ASCC
to have a predominately support focus. In this
role, the ASCC has a number of logistics and
support responsibilities. The ASCC may also
have support responsibilities for other US and
allied forces as a result of established
agreements or as assigned by the ClNC. The
ASCC provides primary support within the
theater through subordinate groups, brigades,
and commands specifically organized and
allocated to accomplish the theater support
mission. The ASCC maintains organizational
flexibility by tailoring the type and number of
support units to the mission requirements and
by planning for the expansion of the support
capability. Some specific support requirements
the ASCC commander executes are base
development; engineer support; replacement
training; support; reception, staging, and
onward movement; and reconstitution.
Base Development
The ASCC role in base development is key
in the operational support capability because it
focuses on long-term support. The ASCC is
responsible for a portion of the joint
sustainment base (LOCs, ports, bases,
airfields, and units responsible for operating
each). The CINC assigns
the sustainment base.
Engineer Support
The ASCC supplies
FM 100-7
the Army’s portion of
engineer support to
provide the facilities needed in the COMMZ to
receive, stage, move, and support combat
forces. The ASCC must ensure that his LOCs
remain open. He must either establish or
maintain his supporting base and provide
engineer support to other services. Engineers
in the theater give priority to general
engineering and survivability functions.
Replacement Training
The ASCC provides the means to train
replacements. Normally, he establishes a
training center that is the focal point for
regeneration. The center trains replacements
and assigns them individually or as crews,
squads, and platoons. Resource constraints
may require the commander to delay the
training of replacements.
Responsiveness and Suitability
The ASCC ensures that support is suitable
and responsive to the priorities of the CINC
and to subordinate commands. At this level,
ASCC resource management (prioritizing,
stockpiling, and so forth) has a long-range
perspective. The ASCC forms a logistics
operations cell to orchestrate elements of the
support process. This element ensures that
current priorities, intentions, and operations
support the requirements of the ARFOR in
theater. This organization balances the needs
for current operations against the needs for
future operations and advises the ASCC
accordingly.
Reception, Staging, and
Onward Movement
The ASCC is normally responsible for
reception and onward movement of Army
forces. As the ASCC conducts reception
operations, he receives forces at aerial ports
and seaports and equips, fuels, fixes, arms,
moves, decontaminates, if required, and
protects these forces as they pass through the
support base to their tactical assembly area.
Operational-level army logistics commanders,
support elements, and advance parties for
incoming units must ensure that augmentation
forces are equipped rapidly and deployed to
designated marshaling areas. Incoming forces
are required to perform many of their support
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functions, receiving only minimum-essential
services and support from the ASCC. Reception
operations may begin before hostilities start
and continue until hostilities cease. Reception
operations and support operations are similar
and occur concurrently.
Reconstitution
The ASCC plans and conducts operationaland
tactical-level reconstitution operations.
FM 100-9 defines reconstitution as
"extraordinary actions taken by commanders
to restore combat-attrited units to a desired
level of combat effectiveness commensurate
with mission requirements and availability of
resources." The ASCC is concerned primarily
with the regeneration option of
reconstitution—the rebuilding of a unit
through the large-scale replacement of
personnel, equipment, and supplies; the
establishment of C2; and the conduct of
mission-essential training for the newly rebuilt
unit. The ASCC must ensure time and
resources are allotted to conduct reconstitution
operations. The ASCC draws from the CONUS
base, using intertheater and intratheater
assets based upon the mission of the JFC.
Reconstitution is normally done in preparation
for future operations in the operational
sequence. If regeneration of a unit is
undertaken, the ASCC must understand the
effects those operations may have on
established support operations. Reconstitution
may adversely affect both support and
reception operations.
A reconstitution planning cell is located in
the ASCC operations section. Assignment of this
task to the G3 (operations) section reveals that
reconstitution is first and foremost an
operational decision. This cell plans for the
reconstitution operations in preparation for
future operations. The ASCC employs the cell as
part of the reconstitution assessment and
evaluation team (AET) that performs liaison
functions and assists the ASCC in implementing
detailed reconstitution efforts. The reconstitution
planning cell may be employed as part of the C2
of the reconstitution task force.
The ASCC synchronizes reconstitution
with all other functions within the theater.
Properly planned and executed reconstitution
actions do not detract from combat efforts but
enhance them. In the offense, well-executed
reconstitution efforts maintain the momentum
of the attack by prolonging the unit’s arrival at
its culminating point. In the defense,
reconstitution preserves combat power
potential and allows the operational-level
commander greater freedom of action.
TERMINATION OF WAR/POSTCONFLICT
OPERATIONS
Upon successful termination of combat
operations, the deployed forces transition to a
period of postconflict operations prior to
redeployment. This transition may occur even
if residual combat operations are occurring in
other parts of the theater of operations.
Anticipation and early planning for postconflict
operations eases the transition process. The
JFC must determine the conditions to which
the operations area is to be returned.
According to the CINC’s directives, the
ASCC must oversee the orderly transition of
authority to appropriate US, international,
interagency, or host nation agencies. The
ASCC and subordinate commanders
emphasize those activities that reduce
postconflict or postcrisis turmoil and help
stabilize the situation. Commanders must also
address the decontamination, disposal, and
destruction of war materiel; the removal and
destruction of unexploded ordnance; and the
responsibility for demining operations. The
consolidation of friendly and available enemy
mine field reports is critical to this mission.
Additionally, the ASCC must be prepared to
provide health service support (HSS),
emergency restoration of utilities, support to
social needs of the indigenous population, and
other humanitarian activities as required.
The US historical perspective upon the
successful termination of past conflicts has
been rapid redeployment and demobilization.
Redeployment and demobilization should occur
at a pace that does not disrupt the ability of the
ASCC to execute continuing missions. The
successful termination of war activities leads to
transition to the state of peacetime. Still, the
possibility always exists that resumption of
hostilities may occur. Thus, units must rapidly
convert to a wartime posture and be prepared
to conduct wartime operations. During this
period, force protection is vital in order to
prevent undue harm to US forces.
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Military Operations Other Than War
This chapter discusses Army MOOTW—operations in two states
of the range of military operations: peacetime and conflict. Peacetime
is a state in which diplomatic, economic, informational, and military
powers of the nation are employed to achieve national objectives.
Since peacetime is the preferred state of affairs (as opposed to conflict
or war), how well the Army and other services accomplish their
missions in peacetime is vital to US national interests.
Conflict is a unique environment in which the ARFOR
commander works closely with diplomatic leaders to control
hostilities, with the goal of returning to peacetime conditions. In
conflict, the military, as an element of national power, takes on a
more prominent role than in peacetime. The Army participates in
conflict as a component of a joint organization that is usually an
element of a multinational structure. Other US Government
agencies, NGOs, PVOs, and international organizations (IOs) often
participate.
FUNDAMENTALS OF MOOTW
Army warfighting doctrine is based on wellestablished
principles of war. MOOTW are
based on similar principles that guide the
force’s actions. The principles of war apply for
those actions that involve our forces in combat.
For MOOTW that do not require direct combat,
the principles are objective, unity of effort,
legitimacy, perseverance, restraint, and security.
FMs 100-5 and 100-23 describe these principles
and their application. These principles are not
immutable, but serve as guides for action.
Commanders must balance these principles
against the specific missions and nature of the
operation.
In planning for military operations in
peacetime and conflict, commanders must tailor
a force that is suitable for the mission.
Suitability is the measure of a force’s capability
against possible threats and the diplomatic
acceptability of the chosen force. Acceptability is
based on the force’s appropriateness, given
diplomatic considerations, and qualities that
are consistent with accomplishment of national
interests and objectives. The commander’s
acceptability of the force includes the
perceptions of the indigenous population,
the international community, and the
American public. Force capability is the
measure of a unit’s ability to counter an
expected threat and execute a mission. A force
must have the capability to accomplish a
military mission by virtue of its training,
equipment, and structure.
The force composition for MOOTW must be
proportionate to the stated goals of the
sponsoring authority and provide sufficient
capability to complete the mission and protect
the force. The perception that the force
employed exceeds the limits of its mandate
lessens legitimacy with the international
community, the US public, and the indigenous
population. Capability and acceptability are
not constants but vary based upon the threat,
the intensity of operations, the missions to be
performed, and changing international
perceptions.
The composition of the force should reflect
the commander’s consideration of the military
end state, METT-T, mission-specific training
requirements, strategic lift, pre-positioned
assets, joint and multinational military
forces, reserve component forces, nonmilitary
US agencies, NGOs, PVOs, and host nations
forces. The nature of MOOTW is such that CS
and CSS units may have an equal if not greater
role than combat units.
RESPONSIBILITIES IN PEACETIME
The Army’s responsibilities in peacetime During peacetime, senior army commanders
are as important as its traditional combat roles. are always postured to present a deterrent to
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internal or external threats to US national
interests. They do this by conducting routine
peacetime operations and nonhostile activities.
UNIFIED COMMANDERS
At the direction of national leaders, CINCs
may use ARFOR to perform noncombat
missions that support diplomatic initiatives.
Army leaders then carry out these activities as
part of the overall unified command plan.
These activities may include job training
exercises, peace support operations, nation
assistance activities, disaster relief and
humanitarian assistance, security assistance,
shows of force, and support for counterdrug
operations.
The commander of a unified command,
such as PACOM and ACOM, may control and
coordinate military support to domestic
emergencies in the states of Alaska and Hawaii
and territories and possessions of the US.
CINCs must continuously assess their regions
to identify the strategic situation and
situations requiring military forces for
noncombat missions. Armed forces may be
tasked with direct responsibility, or they may
conduct operations that support other US
Government agencies.
SENIOR ARMY COMMANDERS
The Army’s role in peacetime is to support
the regional CINC’s efforts to prevent unstable
situations from developing into the loss of local
control or open conflict. Senior army
commanders may do this by conducting routine
activities that maintain the potential of
ARFOR to conduct major operations. This
potential may serve as a deterrent, or it can
enhance the capability to react in emergencies.
Army component forces may turn this potential
into actual mission execution to actively control
a situation. As ASCCs or other senior army
commanders respond to the regional CINC,
they may be required to conduct peacetime
operations in one region while simultaneously
conducting conflict and/or war operations in
others.
SPECIAL OPERATIONS
FORCES COMMANDERS
In peacetime, SOF help attain peacetime
military objectives and may promote regional
stability by advising, training, and assisting
allies. SOF peacetime activities could be the
conduct of US humanitarian assistance
programs, security assistance programs, and
multinational training exercises. Like
conventional forces, SOF are a deterrent. In
multinational operations, SOF involvement
with allies worldwide contributes to deterrence
and provides a low-visibility means of
extending US influence.
Due to extensive unconventional warfare
(UW) training, SOF are well-suited to conduct
various peacetime operations and provide
various types of support. SOF should be
considered the force of choice for peacetime
missions. General-purpose forces may also be
called for their particular specialties or when
the scope of operations is so vast that
conventional forces are required.
ARMY SERVICE COMPONENT
COMMANDER
The operational-level functions discussed
here are used as a starting point to discuss the
ASCC in peacetime. Some systems, such as
operational fires, may not have extensive
peacetime applications. Still, the operationallevel
commander and his staff need to analyze
each function and its corresponding
subfunctions, augmenting or deleting as
necessary to ensure the proper integration and
synchronization of all peacetime operations
and activities.
Movement and Maneuver
The CINC may use armored, light, or
special operations Army forces and their
corresponding CS or CSS structures available
within the region. Some situations require
deployment of additional units via strategic
lift. The MCA provides for the orderly flow of
these forces and resources. The ASCC receives
and prepares incoming units for operations.
Since peacetime operations are normally
conducted in a permissive environment, CS or
CSS units may be the predominant elements
and deploy early to prepare to support the
arrival of other units.
The CINC may assign operating forces a
JOA, but he generally uses few boundaries or
other special control measures. Normally, the
ASCC, a subordinate Army commander, or a
JFC employs these forces to execute a specific
MOOTW mission. Each operation is discrete in
response to a specific situation, though it may
be sequenced with past and future operations.
Execution focuses on near-term operations.
Peacetime operations often require special
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engineer, legal, CA, PSYOP, and PA
considerations. Once the operating force
completes its mission, it redeploys to its home
station or continues peacetime activities in
theater with little requirement for
consolidation operations or other transition
efforts.
Protection
Protecting forces and resources from a wide
range of threats is an important responsibility
for all senior commanders. In force-projection
contingency operations, the threat of the use of
WMD must be continually tracked to preclude
unacceptable risk to the force. Options for
protection from these weapons encompass the
politico-military range and include diplomatic
defusing and deterrence through NBC
readiness, active and passive defense, air
defense, and WMD reduction. The ASCC
directs measures in peacetime to conserve
military potential so that it can be applied at a
decisive place and time.
Protecting the force depends on current,
accurate intelligence for I&W of possible
obstacles or threats. Protection includes
conducting antiterrorism measures,
maintaining discipline and order, and
providing limited deception measures. As part
of protecting the force, the ASCC issues the
peacetime ROE established by the regional
commander in coordination with JCS, the host
nation, and the ambassador. Through an
operational risk assessment, the ASCC ensures
the conservation and safety of the force.
Providing air defense of the force and selected
geopolitical assets has a deterrent value. It also
has an advantage that it is seen as a
nonescalatory measure.
Conducting Antiterrorism
Measures
Terrorist acts overseas are a constant
threat to US armed forces, civilians, and
facilities. The ASCC presumes civil authorities
and host governments will implement
counterterrorism procedures to protect people
within their territory. The CINC ensures
coordination of all local antiterrorist policies
and measures for protecting DOD facilities,
equipment, personnel, and family members
abroad. The ASCC may assist in implementing
specific antiterrorist actions called for by
terrorist threat conditions (THREATCONs)
discussed later in this chapter. The theater
commander’s peacetime ROE provide a flexible
self-defense and deterrent posture. These rules
deal with terrorist and other threats.
Maintaining
Discipline and Order
Good order and discipline are instrumental
for conserving military potential. The ASCC
establishes a command climate conducive to
this end. He ensures the maintenance of proper
liaison with DOD police organizations as well
as with local or host nation, allied, and
interagency police agencies. Within Army
organizations, the ASCC facilitates Army MP
and Criminal Investigation Command
elements investigating offenses. In addition,
the ASCC enforces the policies of the senior
army commanders. The ASCC may provide
prisoner confinement facilities for those who
violate good order and discipline.
Providing Limited
Deception Measures
Peacetime operations usually require little
deception beyond normal OPSEC. OPSEC, or
the information measures the ASCC uses,
must be consistent with established guidelines
and may require interagency coordination.
Fires
A major challenge for any force taking part
in peacetime operations is to be organized to
accomplish the goals of the sponsoring
authority and provide sufficient capability to
protect the force. The committed ARFOR must
be sufficiently lethal and survivable to protect
itself, deter possible aggression, and
accomplish its mission. This specialized force
must be capable of performing both hostile and
nonhostile actions simultaneously throughout
its AO. The ASCC must always have available
and continuously plan for the employment of a
joint or multinational force suite of fire support
systems. A credible operational fires capability
deters aggression and increases the options
available to the commander to accomplish his
mission and protect the force.
Fire support units provide more than lethal
and nonlethal fires during MOOTW. Fire
support coordinators and operational-level
planners must establish liaison early to start
planning and coordinating targeting functions
(operational IPB, high-payoff target selection,
target acquisition and attack system selection/
tasking, and BDA planning) should fires be
needed. The organization and equipment of fire
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support units can augment the C3I collection
and other capabilities of the joint or
multinational force.
Doctrine for fires and the basic tasks of fire
support do not change during MOOTW. Still,
the MOOTW environment presents unique
challenges that affect tactics, techniques, and
procedures for fires and require the meticulous
attention of planners. Planners must consider
the characteristics of the MOOTW threat and
their impact on both operational fires and fire
support.
The MOOTW AO typically presents threats
that do not conform to linear operations.
Threats are diverse and may manifest
themselves anywhere at any time, making
them difficult to predict. Threat personnel and
activities may be indistinguishable from
friendly until hostilities are initiated. The
prevalent threat in MOOTW is from hostile
terrorist, guerilla, or partisan activities.
Additionally, environmental factors (weather,
disease) pose a serious threat. In some
scenarios, they will be the prevalent threat.
Normally, MOOTW threats do not involve a
sophisticated military force unless hostilities
have escalated to the realm of conflict or the
threat is capable of rapidly massing and
dispersing military or paramilitary force to
achieve its objectives. MOOTW threat
activities include hit and run harassing tactics
such as attacks and raids, mining and booby
traps, sabotage, deception, and psychological
warfare designed to embarrass and demoralize
friendly governments and forces.
External support from other nations for the
indigenous MOOTW threat and adaptation of
friendly operations to the local geography
compound the problem. External support of the
threat extends the problem to the international
diplomatic arena, usually increasing the
restrictions and constraints on military
options. The extremes in geography require
organizations to prepare for and adapt to
variations in terrain and vegetation and the
impact of seasonal weather changes.
All of these aspects of the MOOTW threat
impact planning and execution of operational
fires. The range of threats in an MOOTW
environment impact both operational fires and
fire support. First, all friendly forces are
vulnerable. No rear area enjoys relative
security. This vulnerability requires
establishment of integrated base defenses with
a mutually supporting fires capability. Fires
must first support the increased security
requirements for both position defense and
movement. Second, planners must recognize
the restrictions and constraints of ROE on the
application of force. Planners must then
consider indirect and nonlethal fires, in
addition to direct fire systems, when they
write ROE. ROE should address appropriate
responses to various expected threat actions
and force protection. The diversity of available
fire support systems, including those of
coalition forces, requires that ROE include
weapon system and munition selection as well.
At all echelons of command, ROE significantly
impact all aspects of fire planning, target
acquisition, and attack. Finally, the nonspecific
nature of MOOTW threats requires continuous
planning. Consideration must be given to
mutual support between adjacent units or
bases and even AOs.
The fleeting nature of the threat requires
near real-time target acquisition and sensor-toshooter
links. Target acquisition systems must
be capable of distinguishing between friendly
and threat activity. This capability increases
the importance of HUMINT and IMINT
sources, which provide real time eyes on targets
such as patrols, police, SOF, UAV/RPV
(remotely piloted vehicle), and J-STARS (joint
surveillance target and attack radar system).
Ground surveillance, countermortar, and
counterbattery radars are equally important
and have special employment considerations in
the MOOTW environment. Electronic
intelligence (ELINT) systems may provide
valuable situation development information,
but the need to verify target descriptions limits
ELINT responsiveness and utility as a target
acquisition system for triggering target attack.
These considerations highlight the need for
close coordination among joint, multinational,
and coalition force operations; intelligence; and
fires representatives at the ASCC
headquarters. Although these considerations
are not all-inclusive, they may appear to focus
fire support at lower echelons rather than
operational fires. Still, the MOOTW
environment forces the ASCC/ARFOR to plan
meticulously, coordinate, and execute
application of force.
To expedite fire support coordination, fire
planning, and clearance of fires, special
arrangements are required with the host
nation military, allied nations, joint services,
and national and local civilian authorities.
These arrangements include determining
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FM 100-7
communication requirements, identifying
liaison personnel, and establishing
procedures—all focused on the interoperability
of the multinational force effort to support
peacekeeping objectives.
Within NATO and the ABCA (American,
British, Canadian, Australian) quadripartite
working group, special agreements exist which
facilitate fire support operations. These are
NATO standardization agreements
(STANAGs) and quadripartite standardization
agreements (QSTAGs). Many countries that
the US may support have no bilateral fire
support agreements. Action may be required,
based on the situation, to establish
agreements. Support in these efforts may be
arranged through the appropriate DOS
agencies and country teams. This increase in
centralized C2 of fires is needed for civilmilitary
cooperation, developing and adhering
to ROE, establishing appropriate procedures
for clearance of fires, and establishing an
appropriate joint/multinational force staff
structure to plan, coordinate, and, when
necessary, control operational fires.
Command and Control
Peacetime operations contribute to
stability and conflict prevention in order to
complement diplomatic initiatives. The ASCC
may conduct a wide range of peacetime
operations that directly or indirectly stabilize a
situation or contribute to the general welfare.
Contingency force-projection operations
develop through CAP (see Chapter 6). These
actions may evolve into longer-term
commitments such as regional peacekeeping
operations. Other peacetime operations may
begin as long-term commitments that may
require deliberate planning. Examples include
overt PSYOP programs, nation assistance, and
security assistance.
Command relationships in peacetime are
normally based on the in-place theater
structure that conducts routine peacetime
activities. These peacetime relationships
require special sensitivity to and coordination
with nonmilitary organizations. As a result,
operational-level command relationships and
unity of command may be clouded.
The Ambassador
The ambassador is responsible for the
direction, coordination, and supervision of all
US Government interagency activities within a
particular country. The ASCC’s staff, under the
direction of the unified commander’s
diplomatic-military staff element, may
integrate ARFOR to support the ambassador.
Military commanders must work closely with
the ambassador and his country team to assure
effective exchange of information and
coordination. Sometimes, the military
commander may be a part of the country team
and directly advise the ambassador.
The Commander in Chief
The CINC may use forward-deployed Army
units in theater when the NCA directs. In such
a case, command relationships change little
from routine peacetime activities. The ASCC
controls ARFOR operations and recommends
and coordinates the use of contingency forces
and mobilization of reserve forces from outside
the theater. In such a case, the CINC may use
existing command relationships, or, if the
mission requires forces of multiple services, he
may establish a JTF. The ASCC may advise the
CINC to integrate reserve component forces
either in a training status or brought to active
duty for an extended period to assist in
executing operations.
Intelligence
The ASCC needs high-quality, timely
intelligence to conduct peacetime operations.
The ACE serves as the clearinghouse for allsource
intelligence. The ACE maintains lists of
I&W that the ASCC uses to anticipate
peacetime operations. The ACE produces
intelligence information and disseminates it to
commanders and staff agencies for use. This
intelligence effort must address diplomatic and
economic information as well as information
related to potential natural disasters. Based on
these indicators and CINC guidance, the ASCC
focuses the collection and processing of
information on specific peacetime operations.
Intelligence provides a basis for all US
plans and operations in MOOTW. The nature
of MOOTW is one of heavy involvement with
the host nation populace, government, and
military. Due to this heavy involvement with
the host nation, most activities in MOOTW are
HUMINT-intensive. HUMINT operations
provide valuable intelligence, as well as I&W
on threat activities and operations. HUMINT
provides timely information on threat
capabilities and intentions. HUMINT collects
information by interrogation, observation,
elicitation of personnel, and exploitation of
documents and material. HUMINT is also the
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most effective intelligence discipline available
to the threat. Consequently, counter-HUMINT
operations are the key to the success of any
activity in MOOTW. Counter-HUMINT
operations are used to degrade or neutralize
threat espionage, sabotage, and subversion
capabilities.
Close liaison with a variety of US and host
nation military and civil organizations is
critical to the success of any MOOTW activity.
This liaison is imperative for coordination,
intelligence collecting, and information
sharing. CI personnel are uniquely suited to
this task. As a minimum, CI personnel must
coordinate with members of the US country
team, US MI units, US MP units, CA units,
PSYOP units, HN regional and urban area
coordination centers, HN intelligence and
security forces, and HN military, paramilitary,
and police.
Battle Space
In MOOTW, commanders seek to counter
the threat’s effects in a given battle space. The
threats in MOOTW will vary between each
MOOTW activity. Battle space is a physical
volume that expands or contracts in relation to
the ability to influence and counter the threat.
A higher commander does not assign battle
space, which extends beyond the limits of the
commander’s AO. Battle space is based on the
premise that the commander’s thinking
expands to develop a vision for countering the
threat before any mental constraints are
emplaced, such as boundaries, legal mandates,
or terms of reference (TOR).
Battle space includes all friendly assets
available to counter the threat. In MOOTW,
pure combat power is only a small portion of
the true battle space. Other assets may include
the diplomatic efforts of embassy officials,
liaisons with host nation governments and
military agencies, as well as the efforts of
NGOs, PVOs, and IOs.
Unity of effort is essential to operations
within a given battle space. Ownership of
assets is less important than application of
their effects toward countering the threat. An
understanding of battle space allows
commanders to keep their options open,
synchronize all friendly assets, and counter the
threat. As the commander considers the
mission, as well as any perceived mission creep,
he can visualize his battle space throughout
the operation and how the battle space may
change as he moves to counter the threat.
Area studies provide host nation weather
and geographical information, as well as basic
intelligence (seaports, airports, transportation
systems, water storage, POL storage, building
materials availability) helpful in preparing for
natural disasters and other contingency-type
operations. Forward presence, both through
permanent stationing and periodic deployment
of CONUS-based HUMINT resources, is
essential to this effort.
The theater-level MI organization
continuously develops and refines indicator
lists. These lists allow the ASCC to monitor
diplomatic, military, and economic conditions
in the area. Army intelligence sources provide
the necessary information and intelligence to
identify and predict potential threats. Allsource
intelligence analysis provides the ASCC
with the necessary information to protect his
forces, noncombatants, and resources. It also
allows him to prepare for future operations
while minimizing the probability of surprise
from a potential threat.
Logistics
The ASCC is responsible for developing
and providing the elements of sustainment for
ARFOR within a region and for other services,
based on executive agent responsibilities for
common servicing. Unless directed by national
authority, NGOs and PVOs will provide their
respective support. Strategic logistics support
is projected from CONUS and other OCONUS
sites, using all national resources, including
USAMC, DLA, other services, and commercial
sources. The ASCC provides logistics,
direction, and prioritization. The ASCC staff
monitors all support activities to ensure
smooth, daily sustainment of the force. The
ASCC seeks to conserve Army resources
whenever possible by using contractors, the
host nation, or other viable sources of support.
In peacetime, the CONUS support base
continues to project logistics support from
national resources. The ASCC monitors the
support of the soldier as well.
The Army personnel system and training
base provide a supply of qualified soldiers into
forward-deployed/forward-presence theaters or
to units that may deploy into any region. The
following agencies provide daily support to
soldiers and their family members:
•Defense Finance and Accounting Service.
•Legal Services Agency.
•Chaplaincy Service Support Agency.
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•Community and Family Support Center.
•Other Army staff field operating agencies.
The ASCC may coordinate augmentation of
this support through other services or allies.
Combat health support (CHS) of soldiers
includes all services performed, provided, or
arranged by the Army Medical Department to
promote, conserve, or restore the mental or
physical well-being of personnel in the Army
and, as directed, in other services, agencies,
and organizations. The surgeon general has
overall worldwide responsibility for Army
health care. Senior army commanders and
service components must ensure their soldiers
and their soldiers’ family members receive
these services effectively. In theater, the CHS
system provides care in Echelons I through IV,
ultimately leading to treatment in the US.
Senior commanders ensure that the Army
health care system provides preventive
measures, progressive treatment,
hospitalization, and evacuation of service
members and their families. In developed
theaters the support structure is available to
support peacetime operations. This structure
includes host nation, contract, and interservice
support agreements. Forces conducting
peacetime operations integrate their
operations into this structure.
When operating forces require support not
present in theater or operate in an austere
theater, the ASCC plans and coordinates
support arrangements either unilaterally or
with joint support agencies. Army commanders
develop tailored support packages to provide
essential support for the ARFOR. This could
include functional and area army commands to
provide large-scale or long-term support. These
considerations provide operational-level
commanders with general synchronization
requirements applicable to most peacetime
operations.
Training
Training for war is the Army’s top priority.
The ASCC provides the direction, purpose, and
necessary motivation to his subordinates to
successfully accomplish the training mission.
The ASCC outlines his intent and then ensures
that his subordinates focus on missionessential
task lists (METLs). Most missions
during peacetime can be accomplished by a
disciplined force proficient in METL tasks.
Subordinate METLs must support the CINC’s
theater strategy.
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The ASCC goes beyond these fundamental
training considerations. Since much of the
operational-level EAC support structure
resides in the reserve components, the ASCC
must be involved with active and reserve
component training as well as with joint
requirements and potentially multinational
training. Training during peacetime must
prepare ARFOR for missions across the range
of military operations and support the national
defense policy of strategic deterrence. Training
for leaders may be much broader than the
subordinate METL indicate to ensure the
leader flexibility required for conducting both
warfighting and MOOTW missions. Peacetime
operations take advantage of the established
support structure and capabilities of the
support and service support elements that
sustain the routine peacetime activities.
OPERATIONS IN PEACETIME
ASCC peacetime operations include, but
are not limited to, security assistance, nation
assistance, search and rescue, CA, NEO,
peacekeeping, shows of force, support to
counterdrug operations, and humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief.
SECURITY ASSISTANCE
The Army conducts security assistance
operations to provide military articles,
training, and defense-related services
authorized by statute law. Security assistance
is a key element of US foreign policy, with DOS
as the lead agent supported by DOD. These
operations are strictly controlled by the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which deals
with international military education and
training (IMET), or the Arms Export Control
Act of 1976, which deals with foreign military
sales. The US Government provides security
assistance on a credit or cash basis to the host
nation. Senior army commanders must be
careful not to commit the US Government to
providing any assistance that could be
construed as security assistance without
following the statutory requirements.
The in-country security assistance office
(SAO) is the military focal point for
formulating, planning, and executing these
programs. Theater CINCs make significant
contributions, to include supervision, support,
selection, and command of SAOs. The ASCC
contributes to developing assistance
requirements. CONUS-based units are usually
called on to provide security assistance
training teams. Still, in-theater or OCONUSbased
units could also provide the training.
Training provides the most lasting military
contribution for security assistance efforts.
Security assistance officials, in rare
circumstances, may direct the Army to transfer
military hardware or materiel to foreign
nations in response to a crisis requiring a surge
of military support.
NATION ASSISTANCE
Nation assistance programs promote
stability and orderly progress, thus
contributing to the prevention of conflict. If
internal conflict has begun, the goal of nation
assistance is to aid in removing its root causes.
Nation assistance becomes a primary means of
bringing the conflict to a successful resolution
according to the internal defense and
development strategy. Nation assistance
consists of general missions such as assisting
with development-related infrastructure
projects, training health care workers, and
improving the professionalism of national
military forces. Nation assistance missions can
generate useful good will toward the US and
assist friendly governments.
SEARCH AND RESCUE
Search and rescue operations are
sophisticated actions requiring precise
execution. They may be clandestine or overt.
They may include the rescue of US or foreign
nationals or items critical to US national
security. Rescue operations require timely
intelligence and detailed planning. They
usually involve highly trained special units but
may be supported by general-purpose forces.
Search and rescue operations may be required
in peacetime as well as in conflict and war.
NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION
NEOs are normally conducted to evacuate
US civilian noncombatants and nonessential
US military personnel from locations in a
foreign (host) nation to a safe haven, preferably
the US. An NEO is normally conducted to
evacuate US citizens whose lives are in danger
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FM 100-7
from a hostile environment or natural disaster.
NEOs may also include the selective
evacuation of citizens of the host nation and
third-country nationals.
NEOs involve swift, temporary occupancy
of an objective, perhaps using temporarily
disabling technologies to minimize casualties
and end with planned withdrawals. They may
include the use of force. Under ideal
circumstances, little or no opposition to the
operation exists. Still, commanders must
anticipate and plan for possible hostilities. If
military forces are employed in an NEO, they
usually comprise units from more than one
service. The regional CINC, on being ordered to
support an NEO, designates a JFC to exercise
overall control of the operations involved in the
NEO.
Evacuation operations differ from other
military operations, since direction of the
operation may remain with the American
ambassador at the time of the evacuation.
Further, the order to evacuate is a diplomatic—
rather than a military—decision, with
extensive ramifications. FM 90-29 provides
details on NEO operations.
PEACEKEEPING
Military peacekeeping operations support
diplomatic efforts to achieve or maintain peace
in areas of potential or actual conflict. The
single, most important requirement of a
peacekeeping operation is consent to the
operation by all the parties to the dispute. Such
consent represents an explicit agreement,
permitting the introduction of a neutral third
party.
The US may participate in peacekeeping
operations under the sponsorship of the UN or
other IOs, such as the Organization of
American States, or in cooperation with other
countries. The UN has been the most frequent
sponsor of peacekeeping operations.
Peacekeeping often involves ambiguous
situations that require the peacekeeping force
to deal with extreme tension and violence
without becoming a participant. Based on the
peacekeeping mandate and the stationing
agreement, specific TOR, follow-on command
directives, and ROE are established.
SHOWS OF FORCE
Shows of force lend credibility to the
nation’s promises and commitments, increase
its regional influence, and demonstrate resolve.
These operations can influence other
governments or politico-military organizations
to respect US interests and international law.
These operations can take the form of aircraft
and ship visits, multinational training
exercises, forward deployment of military
forces, and introduction or buildup of military
forces in a region. The appearance of a credible,
trained military force underscores national
policy interests and commitment, improves
host-nation military readiness and morale, and
provides an insight into US values.
COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS
Support to counterdrug operations
complies with the national drug control
strategy, complements the efforts of law
enforcement agencies, and supports foreign
governments. At the level of national strategy,
the NCA places increasing importance on the
role of DOD in controlling the flow of drugs
across US borders. The objective of military
counterdrug efforts is to reduce the flow of
illegal drugs into the US. Military support is
therefore a balanced effort to attack the flow of
illegal drugs at the source, while in transit, and
during distribution in the US. Military
counterdrug activities may also be used to
support insurgences and counterinsurgencies
and to combat terrorism.
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND
DISASTER RELIEF
Humanitarian assistance and disaster
relief operations are unique peacetime
operations because they could be conducted
within CONUS. Recent examples in the US
have included assistance rendered in the
northwest states to contain forest fires and
relief operations following Hurricanes Hugo in
1989 and Andrew in 1992. These operations fall
within the category of support to domestic civil
authorities. Examples of in-theater operations
include famine relief efforts in Somalia and
hurricane relief operations in Hawaii following
Hurricane Iniki.
Humanitarian assistance and disaster
relief operations provide emergency relief to
victims of natural or man-made disasters.
These operations may include refugee
assistance, food preparation and distribution
programs, medical treatment and care, damage
assessment and control, forensic identification,
maintenance of law and order, reestablishment
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of communications networks, and sanitation/
water facilities.
ARFOR are committed to these operations
when localities become overwhelmed by the
extent of the situation and can no longer
provide basic human needs and protection. The
ability to respond on short notice with a wide
array of capabilities is a unique attribute of the
Army. The length of commitment is normally
limited to the time that communities and other
government and private agencies can handle
continued operations by themselves. When
properly executed, military participation in
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
operations has long-term positive effects.
Overseas, such participation demonstrates
good will and engenders mutual respect. At
home, it provides soldiers the opportunity to
demonstrate their skills while helping their
fellow citizens.
CIVIL AFFAIRS AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
Although not a peacetime operation, CA
and PSYOP are critical operations that aid
commanders in accomplishing their peacetime
objectives. Commanders at all levels must
understand the depth and capabilities of CA
and psychological support found throughout
any given command. Commanders must
understand the CA and PSYOP ability to
support US and allied armed forces.
Civil Affairs
ARFOR execute CA programs to support
the unified commander. During peacetime, CA
support is often provided as an ancillary
benefit to deployments for training. CA units
are suited to both short-term and longer-term
involvement. To be effective in short-term
operations, these programs require continuous
preparation, regional expertise, and consistent
coordination between civil and military
authorities. This preparation is best achieved
through peacetime involvement in the theater.
Psychological Operations
ARFOR PSYOP forces execute PSYOP to
support the unified commander and US
national interests. Throughout the range of
military operations, PSYOP is a vital force
employed to optimize the influence of US
national policy on foreign target audiences,
whether neutral, hostile, or friendly. In
MOOTW, PSYOP provides the commander
with the capability to project the purpose and
mission of US forces and to influence target
audience behavior to support the commander’s
mission.
PSYOP is a force multiplier, providing
long-range, mid- to long-term support of the
unified commander’s intent. While classified as
SOF, PSYOP is a general force multiplier. This
support exists at all levels of command and
operations—from strategic to tactical. PSYOP
units are regionally focused and maintain
extensive historical research and expertise on
the sociological, economical, and religious
practices and on the languages of a given AO.
ARFOR PSYOP support US Army, Navy,
Marine Corps, Air Force, and allied forces.
Except for PSYOP-unique equipment and
military occupational specialties (MOS), the
unit of attachment sustains PSYOP elements.
For PSYOP to achieve maximum effectiveness,
planners must include it in the planning
process early.
TRANSITION TO HOSTILITIES
Operations conducted in peacetime are The theater CINC organizes his AOR for
designed to preclude the onset of conflict. Due orderly and rapid transition from a peacetime
to factors that may not be controlled, conflict posture to different levels of hostility. This
may evolve. Because the transition to conflict process is sequential and sufficiently flexible to
may occur in a gradual or abrupt manner, the respond to any situation. The transition
ARFOR commander must prepare for either process must be responsive enough to
eventuality. The operational METT-T diplomatic initiatives to be halted or reversed
assessment provides the mental process for the once it has begun. The CINC must be sensitive
continuing reevaluation of the operational to the fact that a prolonged state of heightened
environment. That reevaluation aids the readiness for combat without action may drain
identification of needed Army capabilities in resources and adversely affect morale.
the event of conflict. Such identification assists
national-level decision makers in determining The ASCC translates mission orders from
mobilization requirements. the CINC into plans and military operations. If
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FM 100-7
mobilization is required, AMOPES—the Army
system that supports JOPES—provides a
disciplined planning procedure for conducting
Army mobilization, deployment, planning, and
execution (see also FM 100-17). The ASCC and
appropriate Army commanders review the
mobilization requirements established in
AMOPES, CONPLANs, and OPLANs to meet
the situation. C2 relationships are likely to
change as levels of hostility and military
involvement increase.
Commanders participate in joint and
multinational planning efforts and coordinate
and prepare ARFOR for deployment and
employment. Finally, commanders contribute
ARFOR ready to meet joint and multinational
operational requirements and to establish a
logistical base to support fielded Army units.
RESPONSIBILITIES
IN CONFLICT
The theater CINC, with concurrence from
the NCA, determines when all or part of his
AOR is in a state of conflict. Conflict is a state
of hostile opposition among organized parties
or groups within a nation, or between or among
nations, and usually involves irregular forces
to achieve limited diplomatic or military
objectives. Conflict is often protracted, and
irregular forces often dominate.
Military actions may be confined to
geographic areas. When US Army units are
directly engaged in conflict, they can expect
guidelines on weaponry and the degree of force
authorized. Diplomatic leaders will likely limit
objectives to those achievable with short,
focused, and direct application of military
force. Even though limited in scope, these short
applications of force may be part of a campaign
or major operation phased over an extended
period. The NCA or the CINC may further limit
the conduct of military operations to a specific
geographic area.
The Army’s Role
The Army’s role in conflict is to assist a JFC
in gaining control, deterring escalation, and
restoring order. Conflict operations are
challenging because they require a measured
application of military force sufficient to
accomplish the designated objectives.
Typically, conflict occurs in diplomatically—
charged situations within specific legal
boundaries. ARFOR operate in a hostile
environment with a high probability of physical
confrontation; though sometimes, combat
operations may not occur. Army leaders may
conduct operations very similar to operations
during war but execute them with both
restraints and constraints placed on the use of
firepower and maneuver.
Factors
Senior army commanders must keep four
factors in mind when considering operations in
conflict: coordination, balance, planning for
uncertainty, and identification of risk.
Coordination
Coordination is critical to establishing the
basis for the operations being conducted. The
Army must cooperate with other government
agencies, services, and nations to deal
effectively with the diplomatically sensitive
situations present in conflict.
Balance
Commanders must balance the combat
posture and readiness of their soldiers against
the volatile environment in which they
function. A balance must also be struck
between diplomatic goals and the scale,
intensity, and nature of Army operations
supporting those goals.
Planning for Uncertainty
Commanders must build flexibility into
their plans and operations. Conflict situations
are full of uncertainty as presented by both the
threat and the diplomatic conditions that limit
Army options.
Identification of Risk
Commanders must seek to increase their
options while limiting the enemy’s options.
Successful commanders do not run out of
options. Risks and gambles are part of option
decisions. The decision to take risks is weighed
against the mission, probability of success,
available intelligence, and as many other
factors as are available to the commander in
his decision cycle.
ARMY SERVICE COMPONENT
FUNCTIONS IN CONFLICT
Operations during conflict present a
challenge to Army leadership. The military, as
one of four elements of national power, may not
dominate events but may adapt its operations
to fit those of other lead agencies. In coalition
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and interagency operations, the ASCC must
achieve unity of effort through cooperation,
liaison, negotiation, and compromise. Where
practicable, agreements should be formalized
in writing as TOR, memorandums of
understanding (MOUs), or similar
instruments. Tasks required of the ARFOR will
vary relative to the success of returning the
area in conflict to a state of peace. ARFOR must
be flexible enough to meet a wide range of
operational requirements. The conflict
environment will challenge the versatility of
the force.
Movement and Maneuver
Movement and maneuver in conflict are
characterized by planning that reflects the
restrictions and constraints placed on military
operations. These restrictions and constraints
form a set of requirements and prohibitions
imposed by the NCA. They usually have a
diplomatic basis that outweighs militarily
preferred alternatives. The NCA articulates
these restrictions and constraints in different
manners.
ROE are the translation of circumstances
and limitations for the initiation and conduct of
engagements with hostile forces. Personnel
ceiling caps restrict the level of forces that can
become involved in a conflict within prescribed
geographical boundaries. Designated AOs
define restrictions on the commander’s battle
space. These factors combine to influence the
movement of forces into the AO. After that
movement, maneuver is influenced by these
same factors.
Army Force
In conflict, the Army force needed is a key
consideration. Often the presence of
overwhelming force in the conflict area
discourages enemy actions. Senior army
commanders must forthrightly articulate the
resources required to achieve quick and
decisive victory with minimum casualties.
Based upon the diplomatic situation and other
competing priorities, the Army commander
may have to achieve his goals with
considerably fewer resources than he desires.
The sequencing of major operations in this
environment requires patience and a clear
understanding of the diplomatic realities that
apply to the particular conflict.
Forcible Entry
Conditions may require a forcible entry.
This capability requires the staging of forces
over time and space. Chapter 6 addresses some
considerations for forcible entry. Among the
key considerations is the element of force mix.
Combat forces are key to seizing the lodgment
area, but support forces become immediately
critical thereafter. Strategic planners and force
commanders must ensure that logistics forces
and sustainment resources are deployed in
theater as soon as possible to enable combat
forces to conduct continuous operations.
Reception and Onward
Movement
The mission of reception and onward
movement is to integrate rapidly arriving
forces and supplies into the theater without
disrupting the operation’s tempo. This mission
must be balanced against support to current
operations, as both are logistically intensive.
Accordingly, the ASCC must carefully plan and
execute reception and onward movement to
maintain the proper balance to support
arriving forces and the operation’s tempo.
Early base development efforts are key
considerations for the Army commander. Units
and facilities for the reception of forces are
critical, especially in the initial phase and in an
undeveloped theater.
Disposition of Forces
The final consideration for maneuver
during conflict is the disposition of forces.
Deployment of forces into their initial positions
is critical. This positioning must support both
current and subsequent operations as
envisioned by the Army commanders. ARFOR
may operate from noncontiguous bases that
require the Army commander to develop lines
of operation and support with a minimum
amount of protection. To be able to rapidly
mass his forces and prevent the enemy from
gaining the initiative, the commander must
have a finely tuned intelligence capability, a
detailed understanding of the physical
disposition of friendly forces, and a high degree
of operational-level mobility.
Fires
Operational-level fires during conflict
revolve around two key considerations: ROE
and coordination of joint fires. The types of fires
permitted are likely to be limited, and the fires
used will require a higher level of precision and
greater reliance on temporary disabling
techniques and technology. Collateral damage
is less tolerable in conflict. Failure to control
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FM 100-7
and limit collateral damage can endanger the
long-term effects supporting stability.
The Army may find itself in a supported
role in the area of operational fires. For
instance, the precision and depth of the fires
required may dictate a predominant Air Force
role. To achieve his operational objectives and
complement the JFC’s plan, the Army
commander selects targets for Army resources
to attack and nominates targets for other
resources to attack. The joint coordination
process is critical to ensuring that resources
are not wasted and that fires create a
synergistic effect.
The Army operational-level commander
must have an organic staff capability to plan
and coordinate operational-level fires. This
staff element is the DOCC. His staff must also
have the capability to augment the joint staff
for planning and coordinating joint operational
fires. Because of potential restraints and
constraints caused by concerns over collateral
damages, other systems may take on a role of
greater utility. Other systems’ fires are
designed to impair, disrupt, or delay the
performance of enemy operational forces,
functions, and facilities. PSYOP, SOF, EW
(jamming), and other C2 countermeasures are
all disabling fire options.
Protection
Protection of the force requires heightened
awareness as conditions move toward direct
confrontation. As the likelihood of
confrontation increases, so does the
vulnerability of the force, unless additional
protection measures are implemented.
Protection conserves the fighting potential of a
force and is every soldier’s responsibility.
Protection has four components.
•The first component includes OPSEC and
deception operations. Successful execution
of this component prevents the enemy from
locating and causing harm to friendly forces.
•The second component supports keeping
soldiers healthy and maintaining their
fighting morale. It includes protecting their
equipment and supplies and taking care of
their basic needs.
•The third component is safety. It is a
principal element and must be an integral
part of all military operations. Soldiers
conducting military operations are placed at
risk; still, commanders must ensure that
soldiers are not placed in an undue risk
situation. Strong command and levels of
discipline and training lessen those risks.
Training in peacetime must be realistic and
equate to requirements for fighting in war.
•The fourth component is avoiding
fratricide— the unintentional killing or
wounding of friendly personnel by fire.
Commanders must maintain situational
awareness of the enemy and their
personnel. This situational awareness,
along with strong command presence,
disciplined operations, and anticipation of
future operations helps limit probability
and occurrences of fratricide.
Commanders implement the
THREATCON system. Table 8-1 briefly
describes THREATCONs Normal, Alpha,
Bravo, Charlie, and Delta. The implementation
decision is based upon—
•The threat assessment.
•Personnel and facility criticality and
vulnerabilities.
•Resource availability.
•Operations and morale impacts.
•Damage control considerations.
•International relations.
•Possible terrorist retaliatory responses.
The commander must recognize that
information on the threat is difficult to obtain
prior to an incident. Army Regulation 525-13
discusses the combatting terrorism program in
detail. The identification of friendly force
vulnerabilities and geopolitical assets are key
steps in protection. Essential facilities must be
identified. Communications must be protected
from interference and interception. While the
basic principles for deception hold true during
conflict, they are often more difficult to apply.
OPSEC is significantly harder to sustain in
an open society where national survival is not
at stake. Deception is more difficult to achieve
when the operational-level objectives have
more diplomatic content than military
significance. The Army commander must
ensure that his deception plans support the
unified command’s plans and are not
compromised by information leaks. The
environment of conflict often appears peaceful,
requiring commanders to remain vigilant to
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Chapter 8
guard against complacency. Terrorism is most
effective when the threat is not highly visible
and surprise is likely to be achieved.
Command and Control
During conflict, the ASCC contributes to
the CINC’s theater strategy of limiting
hostilities. These efforts often involve direct
use of military power to complement diplomatic
initiatives. The principal C2 problem is how to
integrate US military actions with lead
agencies of our own or foreign governments.
The Army has a variety of operations to select
from in supporting conflict situations, all of
which have some common C2 considerations.
Structure
Military leaders conduct conflict operations
without a declaration of war. The absence of
this declaration restricts the structuring of the
theater for operations. In MOOTW, the CINC
does not establish a theater of war or theaters
of operation unless it is a major conflict.
Normally, he establishes smaller areas, such as
a JOA, for conducting operations. Diplomatic
considerations predominate over purely
military requirements and constrain C2. The
senior military leader has a greater level of
freedom than in peacetime but must coordinate
closely with nonmilitary agencies. Whatever
the geographic organization, the ASCC must
establish clear C2 structures for conducting
operations in conflict.
Command Relationships
Command relationships and structure
usually begin with existing peacetime
arrangements that require a degree of
transition to a state of conflict footing. Conflict
planners may have to consider combined
relationships. The level of international
integration will affect C2. The unified command
structure serves as the C2 structure to build
upon. C2 may emanate straight from the
national level if operations include actions of
direct strategic importance.
As operations in theater transition to
conflict, in-theater forces and existing C2
relationships may be adequate to accomplish
the mission. ARFOR from CONUS or other
theaters could increase the complexity, scope,
and level of forces executing operations beyond
the capabilities of the normal theater
structure. This would thereby require
augmentation or restructuring. In austere
theaters, an Army force may have to arrive in
theater prepared to support itself and execute
operations unassisted. Later, the theater
ASCC may control all operations, or the CINC
could task the ASCC to support operations
while he directly controls the execution of
operations through a separate operational
chain of command.
Planning
Army operational-level commanders are
active participants in the development of all
conflict plans. They may participate in
deliberate planning (JOPES, Volume VI) to
prepare for anticipated or potential actions.
Unanticipated or rapidly developing situations
may require operational-level commanders to
conduct CAP. Planning for conflict, especially
at the operational level, is a continuous
process. Rapidly changing diplomatic
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FM 100-7
conditions may change the desired objective,
composition, and sequencing of conflict
operations. Planners must prepare multiple
branches and sequels to enhance their ability
to provide timely support. Senior army
commanders require a flexible force structure
to enable their organization to achieve the
desired strategic end.
Intelligence
Early establishment of an ACE is critical
for successful operations. ACE operations
should commence within the theater of
operations before hostilities. Intelligence
communications established between the
theater intelligence center and the national
systems provide the critical intelligence that
US military forces require immediately upon
arrival and until tactical intelligence flow is
established.
Operational intelligence must support the
targeting effort of operational fires and/or
set the stage for operational-level maneuver.
Success requires sound IPB. In conflict, IPB
may follow the process used for a conventional
battlefield or a modified process that focuses on
nonmilitary information. Civilian trends are
often as important as operational information.
Weather analysis remains an important part of
IPB. Doctrinal templates for guerrillas,
surrogates, and narcotics traffickers do not
exist.
Intelligence personnel need different
collection techniques and background
information, which may require continuous
updating. The process must react to the
dynamics of the specific situation it supports,
as well as to the worldwide situation.
Intelligence agencies must exploit the full
range of both US and host nation intelligence
and counterintelligence production
capabilities. This includes the collection and
analysis of SIGINT, IMINT, and HUMINT,
which are particularly valuable in determining
hostile intentions.
The ASCC provides theater-specific
intelligence integration for the Army
operational-level commander. The Army
commander develops his picture of the
operational area, based upon the threat he
faces and the information gathered by the
intelligence system. Intelligence should be the
basis for all action.
During foreign internal defense operations,
the Army’s intelligence organization works
closely with the host government to develop
and improve the intelligence capabilities of all
security forces. During counterinsurgency
operations, intelligence provides the basis for
all US and host nation plans. Prior to
commitment, US military forces provide
specific intelligence requirements to the US
national intelligence community. This ensures
that national-level collection focuses on force
requirements. Cooperative or multinational MI
activities at the operational level are integral
to effective intelligence collection and
production. Army intelligence units provide
technical expertise, management, and advice to
develop host nation intelligence capabilities.
They help establish objectives and, where
desirable and feasible, develop common
procedures.
The Army can provide tactical intelligence
support in conflict situations. ARFOR can
contribute experience and expertise to
establish and manage all-source intelligence
operations and enhance overall management of
the intelligence effort. This management of
intelligence information includes data on
internal unrest, on external support for
insurgencies, and on host nation military
capabilities, including intelligence and
counterintelligence.
The threat of sabotage, terrorism, and
subversion requires MI staffs to focus their
counterintelligence collection efforts. These
efforts require close coordination with host
nation police and legal officials. In countries
where cooperative or multinational intelligence
systems already exist, newly arrived Army
tactical units normally work with the area
itelligence elements on a mutual support
basis. When the situation forces Army units to
move frequently, they should not assume
responsibility for long-term, area-oriented
intelligence programs. Still, they may
contribute significantly to short-term collection
and production efforts. All Army personnel
during conflict provide information which,
when tied into the data-gathering system, can
produce useful intelligence.
Logistics
In conflict, the ASCC tailors logistics to
provide basic requirements in an austere
situation. He stages logistics and uses
intermediate support bases, leading to full base
development if necessary. He does this with the
use of HNS. Early deployment of the LSE from
USAMC ensures a positive link from the
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Chapter 8
deploying units to the national logistics system
and may be required to fill gaps in the TOE
logistics infrastructure or projected selected
elements of the national/industrial base into
theater. The LSE could provide an initial C2
structure to orchestrate USAMC resources and
the logistics efforts of contractors and HNS.
The degree of development of the host nation’s
infrastructure has a significant influence upon
the Army commander’s long-range logistics
operations. In an austere environment,
logistics operations can take precedence over
near-term combat operations.
organizations. These logistics responsibilities
include—
•Patient evacuation and medical regulation.
•Hospitalization.
•Health service Iogistics/blood management.
•Preventive medicine, dental, veterinary,
medical laboratory, and combat stress
control services.
•Area medical support.
•Command, control, and communications
(C3).
The Army commander takes a long-range Logistics operations may become the
view of the conflict situation and plans his
logistics for the anticipated duration of combat
primary Army weapon in conflict. Critical
logistical skills supplied by the Army may
operations, plus a transition period. He is responsible for providing HSS to ARFOR and, allow the host nation to focus on combat requirements in the particular conflict, with
as directed, to other services, agencies, and little or no US Army participation.
OPERATIONS IN CONFLICT
In conflict, the ASCC executes a variety of a terrorist act. Antiterrorism includes those
operations that contribute to the achievement of defensive measures that reduce the
theater-strategic goals. These may include the vulnerability of individuals and property. The
continuation and expansion of the full range of extent of these defensive measures varies
previously discussed operations begun in based on assessment of the local threat. These
peacetime, as well as attacks, raids, UW, measures include—
support of insurgences and •Being personally aware and knowledgeable counterinsurgencies, peacemaking, security
assistance surges, and operations to combat of personal protection techniques.
terrorism. Sometimes operations are in •Implementing crime and physical security
response to a crisis or other rapidly developing programs to harden the target.
situation. At other times operations may call for
long-term planning and sequenced execution to •Making installations and personnel less
support theater goals. Chapter 4 provides Army appealing as terrorist targets.
planning and deployment considerations for
crisis situations. FM 100-17 addresses Army
planning and deployment considerations across
the range of military operations.
TERRORISM
Terrorism is the calculated use of violence
or the threat of violence to inculcate fear.
Terrorism is intended to coerce or intimidate
governments or societies pursuing goals that
are generally diplomatic, religious, or
ideological. Combatting terrorism consists of
defensive (antiterrorism) and offensive
(counterterrorism) actions.
Antiterrorism
Counterterrorism
Counterterrorism includes the full range of
offensive measures to prevent, deter, and
respond to terrorism. These measures are
normally carried out by SOF under the
direction of the NCA. Local measures include
only those actions taken to terminate an
incident or apprehend individuals responsible
for terrorist acts. Other countermeasures—
preemption, intervention, or retaliation with
specialized forces operating under the direction
of the NCA—have the characteristics of attacks
or raids.
The Army commander may conduct actions
before, during, or after a terrorist incident.
Antiterrorism includes all measures that Although DOS has the lead in combatting
installations, units, and individuals take to OCONUS terrorism, the Army commander and
reduce the probability of their falling victim to his staff must understand the threat and its
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FM 100-7
tactics, as well as current US policies, when
dealing with terrorists. The Army may be the
lead or a supporting force in an effort to combat
terrorism during a specific operation.
ATTACKS AND RAIDS
Attacks and raids can support rescue or
recovery operations to destroy or seize
equipment or facilities that demonstrably
threaten national collective security interests.
They can also support counterdrug operations
by destroying narcotics production or
transshipment facilities (if authorized by the
NCA) or by supporting a host government’s
actions in this regard. The principles of combat
operations directly apply.
Attacks by ground, air, and naval forces
damage or destroy high-value targets or
demonstrate the capability to do so. Raids are
usually small-scale operations involving swift
penetration of hostile territory to secure
information, seize an objective, or destroy
targets. Attacks and raids end with a
withdrawal. Successful attacks and raids can
create situations that permit seizing and
maintaining the diplomatic initiative. To be
successful, they require the proper focus of
planning, organization, training, and
equipment. Attacks and raids may involve
conventional forces and SOF. The JFC usually
plays a larger role than the Army operationallevel
commander in planning and executing
these types of operations.
UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE
UW is a series of military and paramilitary
operations conducted in enemy-held, enemycontrolled,
or diplomatically sensitive territory.
UW includes, but is not limited to, guerrilla
warfare, evasion and escape, subversion,
sabotage, and other operations of a low
visibility, covert, or clandestine nature. US
military support to UW operations can include
the use of both conventional forces and SOF.
UW is usually a long-term effort.
Techniques and tactics for certain UW
operations are similar to those employed in
support of insurgences. However, support for
insurgency differs from that for UW.
Insurgency accomplishes strategic goals
directly, whereas UW typically supports
conventional operations. The difference affects
the operational and strategic design of the
operation. For example, operations in support
of insurgences give priority to infrastructure
and diplomatic development, while UW
emphasizes military actions.
INSURGENCY AND
COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS
Insurgency and counterinsurgency are two
aspects of the same process. However, they
differ in execution. Insurgents assume that
appropriate change within the existing system
is not possible or likely. Insurgency therefore
focuses on radical change in diplomatic control
and requires extensive use of covert
instruments and methods. Counterinsurgency
uses principally overt methods and assumes
appropriate change within the existing system
is possible and likely. The US supports selected
insurgences that oppose oppressive regimes
which work against US interests. Since
support for insurgences is often covert, many
operations connected with them are special
activities. Because of their extensive UW
training, SOF are well-suited to provide such
support.
Conventional forces may be called on when
the situation requires their functional
specialties. Their tasks may include support
and advice. The CINC may direct the ASCC to
provide equipment, training, and services to
insurgent forces. In the following types of
operations, ARFOR can assist insurgents:
•Recruiting, organizing, training, and
equipping forces to perform unconventional
or guerrilla warfare.
•PSYOP.
•Institutional and infrastructure
development.
•Intelligence-gathering.
•Surreptitious insertion.
•Linkups.
•Evasion and escape of combatants.
•Subversion.
•Sabotage.
•Resupply.
The US uses its military resources to
provide support to a host nation’s
counterinsurgency operations in the context of
foreign internal defense (FID). FID is the
participation by civilian and military agencies
in any of the action programs another
government takes to free its society from
8-17
Chapter 8
subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. The
US ambassador, through his country team,
provides the focal point for interagency
coordination and supervision of FID.
Military support to FID is provided
through the unified CINC. Military resources
provide materiel, advisors, trainers, and
security assistance forces to support the host
nation government’s counterinsurgency
operations through SAOs. ARFOR operations
that support a host nation conducting a
counterinsurgency may include, but are not
limited to, intelligence-gathering, joint and
combined exercises, civil-military operations,
humanitarian or civic assistance, logistical
support operations, populace and resource
control operations, drug-interdiction
operations, and tactical operations.
PEACE ENFORCEMENT
(OPERATIONS TO RESTORE ORDER)
When in the national interest to stop a
violent conflict and force a return to diplomatic
methods, the US conducts peace enforcement
(PE) operations with its military forces. The US
typically undertakes PE operations at the
request of appropriate national authorities in a
foreign state or to protect US citizens as part of
an international multilateral or unilateral
operation. The PE force does not represent a
wholly disinterested power or such a drastic
commitment would not be made. However, the
interests of the country or countries that
provide forces for these operations are served
best by a cessation of violence and a negotiated
settlement.
Conflict within a given area eventually
affects adjacent areas. These effects are seldom
desirable and can include refugee movements,
arms marketing, proliferation of weapons, and
environmental contamination. A further
potential exists for the expansion of the conflict
beyond its original boundaries.
The long-range goals of a PE operation are
two-fold. The first goal is to contain the conflict
to prevent the destabilization of adjacent areas.
The second goal is the agreement to a
negotiated settlement by the parties to the
conflict. This settlement must resolve the basis
for the conflict and establish the foundation for
the transition to peacekeeping operations and
peacetime operations. The diplomatic
complexities of operations to restore order
require that available force be sufficient but its
use be applied with discretion. The operation
also requires that the forces be appropriate to
the environment.
The senior army commander must
understand the constraints and diplomatic
sensitivities of this environment and recognize
that local law and customs often influence his
actions. PE operations require continuous
mission analysis, clear C2 relationships,
effective communications facilities, joint and
multinational force liaison, and effective public
diplomacy and PSYOP.
SECURITY ASSISTANCE
SURGES
The US accelerates security assistance
when a friendly or allied nation faces imminent
threat. In these surges, operations usually
focus on logistical support. Geography, the
magnitude of the logistics effort, and time
limitations determine airlift and sealift
requirements. US support to Israel during the
1973 Arab-Israeli War illustrates this kind of
operation. The Yom Kippur War demonstrates
the importance of airlift in the initial stages of
conflict and the follow-on strength of sealift.
The CINC may direct the senior army
commander to provide equipment from his
command as part of security assistance surges.
The senior army commander may also provide
some of the logistical support (port operation
and line haul units) needed to transfer surge
equipment to the friendly nation.
TRANSITION TO PEACETIME
OR WAR
The successful termination of conflict operations and prepare the way for the use of
operations leads to a return to peacetime. The diplomatic, informational, and economic
unsuccessful termination of conflict endangers elements of power in a peacetime environment.
US interests or threatens a possible transition As the level of hostility lessens, the ASCC
to war. In either case, the ASCC must be changes the composition of his force. He
prepared for these outcomes. The ASCC plans replaces those combat arms forces—essential
consolidation operations to terminate combat during combat operations—with CS and CSS
8-18
FM 100-7
forces as hostilities subside. Finally, he and reconstitution of forces, which facilitates a
positions nation-assistance forces to complete return to peacetime activities. As a part of
the transition to peacetime operations. postoperation reporting, the commander
The ASCC plans an orderly redeployment develops lessons learned for incorporation into training during peacetime activities.
of forces. This redeployment includes recovery
8-19
Appendix A
Army Service Component Command
Responsibilities and Organization
This appendix focuses on the functions, responsibilities, and
capabilities of those operational-level organizations formerly known as
echelons above corps. It addresses the dynamic nature of the theater
strategic and operational requirements in the states of peacetime,
conflict, and war. It contains requirements for establishing and
designing a theater. It describes responsibilities, functions, and
organizations required to conduct major operations and provide
logistical support. It pinpoints the functional, operational, and support
responsibilities of the Army service component commander (formerly
known as the theater army commander) in the theater.
The Army service component serves as the senior Army echelon in
a theater and is the Army service component command of a unified
command. It includes the service component commander and all Army
personnel, organizations, units, and installations that have been
assigned to the unified command. The Army’s operational-level
organizations assist and augment tactical (corps and division)
organizations.
THEATER ARCHITECTURE
During periods of peacetime deployments
and training where Army forces pass through
the area or operate within a CINC’s AOR, but
are not assigned to that CINC, the ASCC
coordinates with the ASCC of the appropriate
CINC to ensure those forces are supported.
However, except as the NCA directs, all forces
operating within the geographic area assigned
to a combatant command shall be assigned or
attached to and under the command of that
combatant commander. The architecture of the
Army in a theater is flexible enough to meet the
needs of combatant commanders. The ASCC
has a number of capabilities and options for
organization and provides the capabilities that
support a force-projection concept—from an
austere to a fully developed theater.
The total capabilities the ASCC provides
may not be initially required in theater for the
early stages of a force-projection operation.
Rather, the ASCC structure represents
capabilities that would be task-organized into
a selected force based upon the mission,
assessment of the operational environment,
constraints, restraints, and the commander’s
risk assessment. Each theater is unique. The
functional requirements of a theater
organization remain somewhat constant. The
variable is the level of capability required.
The ASCC tailors units to provide the specific
capabilities the CINC requires and echelons
those capabilities as required into the
theater.
ECHELONS OF COMMAND
Historically, echelons of command at the headquarters—the field army—to control
operational level of war (EAC) have gone multiple corps. The World War II structure
through an evolutionary process. During the expanded this, using army groups and field
Civil War, the Army began evolving toward armies between the theater and corps
larger, Army-level units with a single commanders. These Army groups were formed
commander directing large forces dispersed in to control two to five field armies. In turn, the
multiple locations. Then, during World War I, field army could control a like number of corps.
the theater commander used an intermediate Essentially, an army group could control a
maximum of 25 corps.
A-O
FM 100-7
With the structuring of the Army around a
four-corps base, the requirement for the army
group and field army was eliminated. However,
the functions performed by the army group and
field army were not eliminated, resulting in
those functions (Title 10) being performed by a
forward-deployed theater army and its
requisite subordinate organizations
performing specific functions. Additionally, the
requirement for a multiple corps operation
required the capability to constitute at least an
operational-level headquarters (a numbered
army) for C2 of the operations.
Should multinational forces be added to a
conflict, as we anticipate to be the case, larger
formations are possible. The issue then
becomes one of span of control for the theater
CINC. Modern forces have a significant
mobility advantage over their World War II
counterparts, where the US Army last formed
army groups. That mobility advantage permits
smaller formations to operate over larger AOs.
Army echelons reflect the unified command
structure, increased span of control
capabilities, and improved weapons
technology. Corps serve as the Army
centerpiece for structure and are normally the
building blocks upon which the Army
organizes. The ASCC, formerly called the
theater army commander, carries out the
Title 10 responsibilities within the theater.
Subordinate JFCs may control multiple US
Army corps without an intermediate Army
headquarters. Then, the ASCC carries out the
Title 10 responsibilities in lieu of the theater
army. However, the ASCC may choose to
organize a numbered army as an intermediate
headquarters between the corps and the JFC to
command and control operations when
required by METT-T. Army organizations are
structured to enable them to perform the
missions to which they are assigned. At corps
and below, those missions are primarily
tactical. Corps and below units must be
augmented to perform at the operational level.
Still, units that normally operate at the tactical
level may not have the operational perspective
necessary to skillfully link tactical operations
to strategic objectives.
When a corps or division is fully engaged at
the tactical level, it cannot be expected to
assume responsibility for the additional
functions and command responsibilities that
correspond to the operational level. It has
neither the personnel nor materiel resources to
perform both responsibilities. Chapter 6
discusses these additional requirements in
detail. Under the force-projection concept, a
tactical-level unit may conduct operationallevel
operations. In principle, these operations
should be performed by an echelon not directly
responsible for commanding tactical
operations. The tactical force commander must
be free to concentrate resources on the tactical
mission. Whereas, the operational-level
commander must be free to concentrate
resources on the performance of the three
operational-level tasks—joint, multinational,
and interagency linkage; conduct of Army
operations; and support of Army operations.
The Army contributes operational-level
organizations to support joint and
multinational operations. Operational-level
units fight and support, as well as make up a
support base. Operational-level forces may be
part of a forward presence that serves as a
symbol of US national resolve. Other forces
remain in the US to provide rapid force
projection to forward-deployed units or to
execute contingency operations. Whatever the
case, Army leaders need to be familiar with
those Army operational-level forces that
contribute capabilities to joint and
multinational operations. US Army levels of
command include—
•Army service component command.
•Numbered army.
•Corps.
•Division.
•Brigade, regiment, or group.
•Battalion or squadron.
•Company, battery, or troop.
These echelons of command provide a means for
commanders to achieve operational- and tacticallevel
objectives. Each of these echelons has its
own set of capabilities and considerations.
THEATER REQUIREMENTS
The Chief of Staff of the Army, with the unified commands to meet theater
CJCS and unified command authorities, requirements.
configures the Army service component to the
A-1
Appendix A
PEACETIME
In peacetime, the CINC normally exercises
COCOM through the ASCC. The ASCC must
have a strategic and operational perspective
while executing his responsibilities. He serves
as the principal advisor to the CINC for
supporting and employing ARFOR in theater.
The ASCC participates in mid- and long-range
planning to support the CINC's theater
strategy and campaign plan, conducts major
operations that support the CINC's campaign
plan, and provides sustainment and support of
all ARFOR assigned or attached to the theater.
The ASCC may exercise OPCON of selected
forces. He may command forces executing
combat operations or MOOTW.
The ASCC performs three strategic and
operational-level tasks—
•Establish linkages and coordinate with the
joint force head quarters and other service
component commanders.
•Conduct operations.
•Conduct support operations to sustain the
ARFOR assigned to the theater.
The ASCC’s strategic task in peacetime is
to carry out the strategic logistics tasks and
priorities for the CINC. The ASCC’s
operational role in peacetime is to plan and
conduct operations and exercises to execute the
CINC’s theater strategy and plans. The ASCC
is responsible for sustaining all forces in
theater and maintaining the capability to
expand to accommodate ARFOR required for
theater operations plans. For a complete
discussion of service component
responsibilities, see Joint Pub 0-2, Chapter 3.
CONFLICT AND WAR
As the theater transitions to conflict or
war, the CINC may choose one of several
options to exercise COCOM. Each of these
options has different impacts on the
employment of ARFOR. The CINC may choose
to continue to exercise COCOM through the
ASCC. The ASCC would conduct major
operations and continue to provide
sustainment and support of all ARFOR
assigned or attached to the theater. The CINC
may assign the ASCC support-related tasks
solely or a combination of both sup. .port and
operational tasks.
The CINC may choose to exercise COCOM
through a JTF for a limited duration mission.
The ASCC would place ARFOR under OPCON
of the CJTF for the conduct of operations. The
CINC also could designate the ASCC as the
CJTF. The ASCC would focus on all three
operational-level tasks. The CJTF may choose
to organize his command by service element,
functional component, subordinate JTF, or any
combination of these. The ASCC, if not the
GJTF, would continue to focus on sustainment
and support of all ARFOR assigned or attached
to the theater.
The CINC may choose to exercise COCOM
directly over specific forces. The ASCC would
place ARFOR under the direct OPCON of the
CINC for the conduct of operations. The ASCC
would continue to focus on sustainment and
support of all ARFOR assigned or attached to
the theater. If the CINC chooses to exercise
COCOM through functional component
commanders, three scenarios are possible.
•The functional component commander
might also be the ASCC. The ASCC would
conduct major combat operations and
support operations for the theater.
•The functional component commander
might also be an Army commander—but not
the ASCC. In this scenario, the ASCC could
establish a numbered army, and the
numbered army commander could be the
functional component commander. The
ASCC would place ARFOR under OPCON of
the numbered army commander for the
conduct of operations. Within the functional
organization, the numbered army
commander would perform the three
operational-level tasks. However, the ASCC
would continue to focus on sustainment and
support of all ARFOR assigned or attached
to the theater.
•The functions component commander
might also be a commander from another
service such as the Marine Corps. In this
scenario, the ASCC would place ARFOR
under rider OPCON of the functional component
commander for the conduct of operations.
Within the functional organization, the
ARFOR commander would perform the
three operational-level tasks. The ASCC
would continue to focus on sustainment and
support of all ARFOR assigned or attached
to the theater.
As the theater transitions to conflict or
war, the probability increases that the CINC
will separate the ASCC’s operational
A-2
responsibilities from its support role. The the ASCC concentrates on conducting support
CINC may designate another commander to operations.
focus on conducting combat operations, while
SUPPORT AND OPERATIONS FUNCTIONS
The ASCC provides to the CINC a
collection of capabilities, functions, and C2
elements to accomplish the mission. With the
initial deployment of forces, the ASCC, based
on METT-T, tailors his organization to provide
the required support to conduct major
operations, battles, and engagements. The
ASCC’s support function has a major impact on
the design and conduct of campaigns and major
operations. The ASCC must get the right
ARFOR to the right place at the right time to
enable the CINC to strategically concentrate
forces and logistics to generate decisive combat
power. Figure A-1 illustrates the capabilities
and functions the ASCC provides.
The ASCC becomes intimately involved
with decisions concerning competing demands
for limited resources. He assists the theater
CINC in the development of support priorities,
A-3
Appendix A
particularly those affecting other services. To
support the force-projection concept and in
addition to projecting forces and support, the
ASCC must also coordinate the projection of
additional required support from CONUS,
another theater, or an intermediate support
base, using air lines of communication (ALOCs)
and sea lines of communication (SLOCs).
Figure A-2 illustrates this situation.
In contingency operations, upon entry into
the AO, US forces may be either opposed or
unopposed. Each type entails a different mix of
forces and capabilities. The existence of little or
no in-theater support base may require that a
large logistics organization, with augmentation
from strategic and operational-level logistics
organizations, accompany the deploying
tactical unit. The synchronization of the
deployment of CSS units, supplies, and C2 with
the increase in combat capabilities is critical.
Theater logistics support requires a
seamless logistics profile, from strategic
logistics—DLA, USAMC, and General Services
Administration—to logistics field units. The
historical C2 and support structure provided in
a mature theater may not be in place. Units
must rely on a logistics system that operates on
the basis of projecting and supporting force
capability instead of supporting units and
echelons. Implementation of concepts, such as
split-based operations, total asset visibility, intransit
visibility, real-time communications,
and pre-positioned materiel (on land and
afloat), along with improved strategic lift
capability, ensures sustainment of the
projected force. FM 100-16 describes these
concepts in detail.
Because of the changing nature of the force
size, necessary time frame, and resource
constraints, units must be capable of providing
mission-essential support before the arrival of
doctrinal logistics units or when deployment of
logistics units would exceed what is required to
support the force’s mission. Mission- and
capability-oriented modular elements are
designed to support combat-essential
requirements through sequencing capabilities
into the AO. The capability projection of
logistics support must focus on two critical
areas: essential requirements and the strategic
end state. Decisions made early in the process
affect the end result. If a developed support
infrastructure is absent or eliminated in an
area, an ASCC headquarters could serve as the
nucleus for a theater base development
process. One example of a possible ASCC
headquarters organization is shown in
Figure A-3. For other examples refer to
FM 101-5.
The ASCC headquarters conducts planning
and coordinates major operations and support
through flexible combinations of area and
A-4
FM 100-7
functionally oriented organizations.
Headquarters management involves managing
the organization and administration of the
headquarters, including—
•Coordinating and supervising movement,
internal arrangement, space allocation, and
administrative support.
•Supervising agencies that service the
command, such as the American Red Cross;
civilian safety personnel; morale, welfare,
and recreation personnel.
•Recommending manpower allocation,
especially in the use of personnel authorized
in large numbers to the headquarters.
•Allocating shelter in the headquarters area
for troops, in coordination with the G3 for
area organizations and the G4 for provision
of shelter.
•Providing control and standardization of
procedures within the headquarters. All
staff officers are responsible for proper
administrative activities within their own
staff sections.
The ASCC is responsible for managing the
Army’s support base in a developed theater.
Besides managing the Army’s support base, the
unified commander may designate the ASCC
as the JRAC responsible for surface security of
the entire JRA, organization and operation of
the theater support base, and conduct of rear
operations for all land component services
(Joint Pub 3-10.1).
SUPPORT FUNCTIONS
A developed theater consists of forwarddeployed
resources and forces with some level
of installation and HNS. In war, this theater
support base, or JRAC, would be located in the
intratheater COMMZ or in a dispersal area.
The ASCC operates within the theater’s
developed infrastructure and CINC's strategic
priorities to receive forces and resources
through seaports of debarkation (SPOD) and
aerial ports of debarkation (APOD). The ASCC
establishes the logistics infrastructure for the
theater of operations and assists in
establishing and adjusting theater LOCs. The
ASCC receives, equips, marshals, stages, and
moves units forward to the tactical assembly
A-5
Appendix A
Logistics Command and Control
Headquarters
areas for employment. The ASCC continues to
support and reconstitute these deployed
ARFOR. Upon termination of conflict, the
ASCC continues to provide support to the
ARFOR to allow redeployment and
reconstitution of the force. The theater
organization with a COMMZ is depicted in
Figure A-4.
Multifunctional Logistics
Support
The CINC, with advice from the ASCC,
may organize logistical support in his AOR
with single, subordinate commanders
responsible for large geographic areas.
Normally, the ASCC places these areas under
the command of a logistics C2 headquarters.
The ASCC may further divide the support
areas into smaller areas assigned to a logistics
task-organized support element. The ASCC
establishes as many logistics headquarters and
logistics task organization elements as needed
to efficiently support his force in theater.
Figure A-5 illustrates this area command
structure.
The ASCC must provide total support to all
ARFOR in theater. If the ASCC chooses to
focus on operations and streamline his span of
C2, he may establish a deputy commander for
support and make him responsible for
oversight of the total support mission. Or, he
may choose to retain control of the support
function and orchestrate it through his deputy
chief of staff for support or appropriate
coordinating staff office—that is, DCSPER,
deputy chief of staff for logistics (DCSLOG), or
deputy chief of staff for resource management
(DCSRM).
To orchestrate the many supply and service
missions, the ASCC establishes a logistics C2
headquarters in the COMMZ. It provides
reception and operation staging to units
located in or passing through the COMMZ.
This reception and operation staging includes
personnel and administration support, direct
support (DS) maintenance, and supply, field
services, and local transportation provision.
The logistics C2 headquarters provides
backup logistical support to corps or other
subordinate units and performs general
A-6
FM 100-7
support (GS) maintenance to support the Joint
Theater Logistics System (JTLS) under work
load direction of its materiel management
center (MMC). The logistics headquarters
coordinates area functions, such as traffic
circulation and population control, with host
nation agencies and MPs and coordinates
property maintenance activities with the
engineers. This headquarters provides an
organization for centralized control of all Army
EOD efforts in the theater. This provision
allows the ordnance organization commander,
with direction from the ASCC’s staff, to quickly
focus EOD assets to critical locations or
operations. FM 9-15 covers EOD structure and
operations.
Working with the deputy chief of staff for
engineers (DCSENG), the ordnance
organization plans and coordinates
counterunexploded ordnance operations.
Either in the corps or in logistical bases, EOD
units can be quickly reassigned to meet any
battlefield requirement. When EOD
detachments are not readily available, the
ASCC may direct engineer units to conduct
counterunexploded ordnance operations.
Additionally, unit level organizations must
train to identify unexploded ordnance (UXO)
and perform self-extraction from submunitions
and scatterable mines on the battlefield. The
ordnance unit (EOD) within the logistics C2
headquarters acts as the information flow
manager for technical intelligence dealing with
UXOs. It is responsible for channeling this
information out of the theater and back down to
each detachment.
Additionally, the ASCC, through the
logistics C2 headquarters, plans and executes
rear security operations in the COMMZ. The
ASCC may task the logistics headquarters to
provide out-of-sector support. Figure A-6
shows a typical logistics C2 organization that
the ASCC could design to provide the logistics
C2 functions (less provision for Class VIII and
classified maps). The attached organizations
are METT-T dependent.
Area Support
The ASCC tailors LSE organization to
provide area support based on its subordinate
organizations, unit missions, and services
required by the forces within the specific AOR.
The most common situation requires an
element to command and control a mix of DS
and GS units, though emphasis is on DS to the
units in or passing through its servicing area.
Functions normally provided on an area
basis include maintenance, supply and
services, and petroleum supply. Strategic
logistics organizations (DLA, USAMC), as
determined by memorandum of agreement
(MOA) or MOU with appropriate commands,
also provide support on an area basis.
Additionally, medical units provide HSS on an
area basis but maintain a separate C2 element.
A-7
Appendix A
The C2 element may also coordinate and
execute rear security operations. An area
support C2 organization is shown in
Figure A-7.
Specific Functions
The ASCC must provide special functions
to provide GS in both the COMMZ and CZ. A
deputy commander for operations, a deputy
commander for logistics, or someone reporting
directly to the ASCC may provide the functions
to the command. If the theater matures for a
long-standing mission with forward-deployed
troops, then functional commands, based on
METT-T, could be established for the areas
of—
•Signal.
•Personnel service support.
•Public affairs and news media.
•Finance.
•Engineer.
•Transportation.
•Combat health service support.
•Air defense.
•Special operations support.
•Civil affairs.
•Aviation support.
•Intelligence structures.
•Petroleum functions.
•Ammunition supply and storage.
•Movement control
•Materiel management
Signal
The ASCC, through his G6, provides
information system support to all US Army
elements within the theater. The ASCC signal
function requires an integrated communication
network within the COMMZ, out-of-theater
access, and interface with the CZ systems.
During the planning phase of any operation,
planners must consider initial deployment
through a fully mature theater, sustained
operations, contingency plans, phased
reduction of signal support as units redeploy,
and signal support requirements supporting
posthostility activities.
The ASCC tailors the organizational-level
signal organization to meet his requirements
for C4 support. This support includes
communication, automation, visual
A-8
FM 100-7
information, printing and publications, and
records management. Specific signal
capabilities employed from initial entry into
the theater to a mature theater are dependent
upon the operational environment of the
particular theater. The CINC acquires DCS
access primarily through TACSAT, DSN, and
MILNET/DISNET trunks. The CINC takes
maximum advantage of the host nation
communication infrastructure. FM 11-45
discusses the operations of operational-level
signal organizations and details the
information mission area (IMA) support
provided by the various organizations. If
required, the ASCC may establish an
operational-level signal C2 organization as
depicted in Figure A-8.
To support the force-projection army,
operational-level information services mesh
seamlessly with those of the sustaining base,
which may be located within CONUS or
another theater. This connectivity and reachback
capability allows for split-based
operations and is achieved using means such as
military or commercial satellite
communications, high frequency radios, or
commercial fiber optic links. Interoperable
gateways provide the means to interface
between tactical and strategic systems via DCS
entry points. These gateways also provide
connectivity with joint and allied forces. The
net effect is to allow forces to deploy worldwide
without sacrificing their ability to exchange
securely and reliably information in theater
and with CONUS-base information resources.
See Figure A-9.
Personnel Service Support
The ASCC, through the deputy chief of
staff for personnel (DCAPER), is responsible for
all GS personnel operations. The theater
DCSPER manages critical personnel systems
and synchronizes personnel network
operations throughout the theater. The
operational-level personnel C2 organization
must be flexible and able to adjust to specific
A-9
Appendix A
.
A-10
theater support requirements. The ASCC may
initially deploy elements to perform the
personnel management function. This element
would be comprised of key sections from each
functional personnel area and a C2 section.
Additional elements deploy in follow-on
echelons according to conditions dictated by
METT-T. Further adjustments take place
through changes in subordinate unit number
and type.
Operational-level major personnel
functions are strength accounting, replacement
operations, postal operations, casualty
operations, personnel information systems,
and personnel readiness. FM 12-6 provides
detailed discussions of operational-level
personnel functions. An operational-level
personnel organization is illustrated at
Figure A-10.
When established, the operational-level
personnel functional command organization is
under the staff supervision of the theater
DCSPER. In fulfilling its responsibilities to
synchronize the tactical functions of manning
and the personnel services the personnel
organization exercises C2 and provides
technical guidance on personnel management
to the subordinate personnel organizations.
The personnel organization can taskorganize
a functional area staff element. This
element sustains personnel readiness, directs
theaterwide personnel systems, synchronizes
personnel network operations, directs GS postal
FM 100-7
activities, and manages
services. When established,
and replacement
essential personnel
the element draws personnel from personnel
operations and replacement, postal, and
personnel service areas within the personnel C2
organization. HQDA, US Total Army Personnel
Command (USTAPERSCOM), DCSPER,
provides a civilian support cell, which does not
include the C2 elements.
The operational-level personnel
organization uses the theater communications
network to transmit reports and statistics in
theater and to CONUS. It must have access to
voice and digital communications capabilities
with USTAPERSCOM to exchange information
and data on personnel strengths, casualty
operations, and replacement operations. The
information exchange priority between these
organizations demands direct, real-time
electronic communication, both voice and
digital. The personnel community must also
maintain close coordination with medical,
mortuary affairs, provost marshal, and other
communities that provide replacements (such
as hospital or straggler returnees) or casualty
information. The total theater personnel
community, comprised of personnel units and
personnel staff elements, including the theater
DCSPER and the G1-S1 staffs, is responsible
for the support of personnel operations. Its
primary mission at the operational level is to
sustain theater personnel strength and
manage theater personnel support systems. As
such, it enhances soldier combat capability
A-11
Appendix A
through a full range of sustainment activities
and thereby increases combat power. The
theater personnel community must perform
the following functions:
•Report total Army theater strength to Army
PERSCOM and HQDA.
•Integrate all personnel support activities
within the theater.
•Establish general theater-unique personnel
policies and manage services to soldiers,
civilians, and joint or allied personnel.
•Assist the ASCC in evaluating and
influencing the theater command climate.
•Direct morale, welfare, and recreation
activities; alcohol and drug abuse
prevention and control; equal opportunity;
and safety programs.
•Prepare the personnel estimate.
•Recommend theater replacement priorities
to the DCSPER HQDA.
•Prepare personnel service support plans and
orders to support the theater campaign plan
and its branches and sequels and ensure
subordinate plans support the commander’s
desired end state.
•Direct GS activities within the postal and
replacement management systems.
•Track the force, project replacement needs,
and ensure subordinate unit personnel
plans support branches and sequels of the
campaign plan.
•Prepare to function as the J1, if designated
by the theater CINC and augmented by
additional joint personnel.
Whether committed to MOOTW or war,
personnel service support organizations are
tailored to satisfy the operational requirement
of the theater independently or with allied
forces. To ensure unity of effort, joint personnel
services require formal agreements, MOUs,
and exchanges of liaison officers.
Public Affairs and News Media
A key factor that must be considered at the
strategic, operational, and tactical levels is the
presence of national and international media
representatives and the effects of global
visibility on the planning and execution of
operations. Leaders must understand that the
perception of an operation can be as important
to success as the actual execution of the
operation. Leaders must recognize that the
global visibility of today’s media is bridging the
gap between the strategic and tactical levels, so
that a tactical victory can be an operational or
strategic loss and vice versa. The media’s
ability to provide detailed, graphic, and live
coverage of events from anywhere in the world
has made military operations into spectator
events watched in real time by the American
public, allies, and adversaries. This allows
media personalities, politicians, pundits,
critics, and academics to become active
participants in the debate about the way the
operation is being executed.
Also, the American people have a right to
know about Army operations. More
importantly, the Army has a vital interest in
ensuring an expedited flow of complete,
accurate, and timely information about Army
operations. Doing so fulfills the Army’s
obligation to keep the American people
informed. It also helps to establish the
conditions that lead to confidence in America’s
Army and its conduct of operations in
peacetime, conflict, and war. When soldiers,
their families, the nation’s political leaders,
and the general public perceive that the Army
is conducting operations competently,
professionally, and ethically, the morale,
esprit, and effectiveness of the Army force is
enhanced. This is critical to successful mission
accomplishment.
The key to achieving an expedited flow of
complete, accurate, and timely information
about Army operations is the integration of PA
estimates and recommendations into the
planning and decision-making process. PA
elements must assess internal and external
information needs and expectations and
analyze what is being published by the media.
They must develop strategies that support
open and independent reporting. They must
ensure that their strategies are synchronized
with the PA guidance of higher headquarters.
They need to carefully coordinate their effort
with related information communication
functions, such as combat camera, as well as
CA and PSYOP. PA success comes from open,
honest, proactive information communication.
PA personnel serve as the interface between
the military and the media. They work to
communicate the Army perspective and to
ensure that reporting is fair and balanced.
They try to educate media representatives on
the military and the operation, and they
A-12
FM 100-7
Finance
prepare military personnel to interact with the
media. Although the commander and the PAO
are the organization’s official spokespersons,
all soldiers are potential spokespersons. The
media often perceive junior soldiers as
especially candid, honest, insightful, credible.
PA personnel play a key role in facilitating
media-soldier interaction.
Besides serving as the interface between
the military and the media, PA supports the
commander’s program to ensure that the
information needs of soldiers and their families
are met. PA personnel develop a strategy based
upon the critical information soldiers and their
families need to understand the operation and
the mission and the information they need to
maintain their morale and esprit. This strategy
identifies the product requirements for
communicating information within the theater
and between the theater and home station. It
synchronizes commercial contract services and
Army production capabilities to most
effectively and efficiently provide those
products.
The ASCC provides finance support to the
force through his operational-level finance unit
commander, who also serves as the staff
finance officer. Separately, the DCSRM
provides the operational-level resource
management support to the ASCC. The
operational-level finance function is to sustain
Army, joint, and multinational operations by
providing timely commercial vendor and
contractor payments, various pay and
disbursing services, and essential accounting.
Military pay, travel, and disbursing are
missions that impact morale support and, as
such, provide an additional combat multiplier.
If established, the operational-level finance C2
organization provides finance support to all
joint and multinational commands, as ordered,
and provides policy and technical guidance to
finance units. FM 14-7 covers finance
activities. A possible operational-level finance
function is shown in Figure A-11.
The finance function includes centralized
theater support missions such as currency
funding, commercial accounts, foreign national
A-13
Appendix A
pay, and appropriated and nonappropriated
fund accounting. When designated by DOD, it
also provides currency funding support to other
US and allied organizations in the theater. The
operational-level finance command—
•Establishes theater financial policy to
ensure consistent application of DOD
finance and accounting policy.
•Coordinates finance support requirements
within the theater.
•Recommends allocations of finance units in
theater.
•Reviews theater operations plans and
prepare annexes to ensure proper support of
operations.
•Coordinates HNS for finance and
accounting requirements.
•Supports NEO.
•Performs/coordinates logistical, operational,
and administrative actions for assigned
finance units.
•Ensures operational readiness of assigned
finance units.
Finance units provide the full range of
finance and accounting services to all soldiers
and units in the theater. These units formulate
command financial policy, establish finance
procedures, and provide finance support for the
AOR within the theater, to include—
•Preparing and paying commercial vouchers.
•Cashing negotiable instruments.
•Preparing and paying foreign national
payrolls.
•Funding tactical exchange facilities and
other nonappropriated fund
instrumentalities (NAFIs).
•Preparing and paying travel vouchers.
•Accounting for pay to EPWs and civilian
internees.
•Providing currencies for local procurement
payments, foreign national payrolls,
imprest funds, combat payments, day
laborer payments, intelligence and
counterintelligence operations, and claims.
During operations, the level of formal
accounting services that finance elements
perform in the theater depends on the
intensity, duration, and location of the
operation. Following coordination by the CINC
or CJTF with the Assistant Secretary of the
Army for Financial Management (ASA-FM),
the ASCC may approve the transfer of
accounting functions to a designated finance
support activity (DFSA) in CONUS. The
finance element continues to ensure that
necessary documentation and data are
provided to the DFSA to accomplish the
accounting function. The ASCC establishes the
amounts of monthly cash payments made to
individual soldiers. Finance support teams
(FSTs) pay soldiers when and where their
commanders desire. FSTs are able to make
contract payments, commercial vendor
payments, and combat payments and process
pay inquiries.
Engineer
The ASCC tailors the engineer structure to
the theater requirements with the staff advice
from his DCSENG. The operational-level
engineer commander provides C2 and a central
organizational framework for the engineer
effort. Engineer forces outside corps focus on
reinforcing and augmenting corps engineer
efforts, developing the theater support base,
and maintaining an infrastructure for
sustainment. This focus involves—
•Planning.
•Ensuring operational mobility.
•Coordinating all theater engineer assets.
•Providing direction of construction, real
property maintenance activities, LOC
sustainment, rear area damage control,
engineer logistics management, and base
development.
The ASCC tailors the engineer structure to
his theater requirements. Engineers must be
closely tied into current and future operations.
Engineer units provide versatility to the
operational commander. All engineer units
(combat, construction, or topographic) focus on
operations in the CZ. In addition, they support
the theater by providing general engineering
support at the operational level. The engineer’s
operational-level topography unit and a variety
of specialized engineer teams support or
augment engineer forces throughout the
theater. Combat heavy engineers weight the
main effort and provide sea, air, and land
operational and strategic mobility. A typical
operational-level engineer C2 organization is
shown in Figure A-12. FM 5-116 discusses the
operational-level engineer function.
A-14
FM 100-7
Theater construction management often
spans multiservice requirements. The CINC
may direct the establishment of a regional
contingency engineering manager (RCEM) to
control all theater-level engineering. The
operational-level engineer commander can
perform this role if the CINC designates the
ASCC as the RCEM and the ASCC designates
the operational-level engineer commander as
his agent. To support force-projection
requirements for early deploying engineer
units, an engineer element may deploy by
sections to meet highly variable work loads and
situations. The US Army Corps of Engineers
(USACE) may establish field offices that
specialize in contract construction, real
property management, and host nation
construction support.
Transportation
The ASCC provides theaterwide
transportation support. This operational-level
transportation function includes mode
operations that involve inland waterways, rail,
motor, and air and terminal services, to include
water, beach, air, motor transport, and rail.
The operational-level transportation units
move personnel, mail, and materiel, except
bulk fuel, from point of arrival in theater to the
CZ. The operational-level transportation units
must coordinate with the MCA and interact
with joint and allied transportation managers.
The transportation function requires flexible
organizations that the ASCC configures to
meet theater needs. FM 55-1 discusses the
operational-level transportation function. A
typical operational-level transportation
organization is shown in Figure A-13.
Combat Health Support
In the theater, CHS encompasses ten
functional areas to meet the needs of the
service member. These functional areas are—
•Patient evacuation and medical regulation.
•Hospitalization.
A-15
Appendix A
•Health service logistics/blood management.
•Dental services.
•Combat stress control services.
•Preventive medicine services.
•Veterinary services.
•Area medical support
•C4I.
•Medical laboratory services.
The senior command surgeon and CHS C4I
organization in theater provide centralized C2
of all Army medical department (AMEDD)
units assigned to the ASCC and located in the
COMMZ. The operational-level army medical
force structure under the CHS C41 organization
provides support to both forward-deployed and
nonforward-deployed ARFOR. This C2
organization provides the capability and
flexibility to shift assets to support additional
numbered army or corps buildups, to reallocate
medical assets to accommodate patient work
loads, and to reconstitute tactical-level CHS
units.
Since all CHS units in the COMMZ are
under the senior CHS C4I organization, units
without organic CHS receive CHS on an area
basis. This is the most efficient and economical
way to provide support to all COMMZ units.
The senior CHS unit commander located
within the geographical boundaries of a major
unit normally provides CHS staff advice to the
unit commander. The senior CHS C4I
commander and ASCC develop standing
operating procedures to govern the
relationship between each unit commander
and the senior CHS unit commander in his
area. CHS units are not subordinate to the
logistics area support units but do provide CHS
on an area basis.
The senior CHS C4I organization provides
advice on CHS matters to adjacent and
subordinate commanders. When directed by
the ASCC, the CHS commander may provide
CHS to other US and allied forces. FM 8-10
discusses the operational-level CHS function. A
typical CHS C4I functional structure is
displayed in Figure A-14.
A-16
FM 100-7
Air Defense
The Army air defense function is required
for each theater. Air defense organizations
provide the Army’s contribution to theater air
and missile defense in joint and multinational
operations. The air defense commander
ensures that—
•Army air defense is integrated into joint and
multinational counterair and TMD
operations and plans.
•Theater force projection, protection, and
sustainment requirements are achieved.
•The air defense mission is to—
•Execute and coordinate integrated theater
air and missile defense operations
throughout the theater of operations.
•Provide theater air and missile defense
expertise for campaign planning to the joint
land, sea, and air component commanders.
•Recommend air and missile defense
priorities for protection of the force and
geopolitical assets, to include force
allocation.
•Execute active and passive air and missile
defense measures to deny enemy
surveillance.
•Centralize command (less engagement
control) of all operational-level air defense
organizations through all phases of force
projection in peacetime, conflict, or war.
All air defense operations are joint.
FM 44-100 discusses the operational-level
Army air defense function. The relationships of
air defense in a theater are shown in
Figure A-15.
The senior Army air defense commander is
the operational-level ADA commander and the
Army ADA coordinator (ADCOORD) to the
ASCC and JFACC (see Figure A-16). The
senior Army air defense commander provides
the majority of Army rear area (theater air
defense) DCA and active missile defense forces.
He is the theater ADA integrator, which
ensures that Army air defense elements
provide optimum force and geopolitical asset
protection throughout the theater. He
integrates corps air defense brigade
requirements during counterair planning and
assists in developing Army OCA and DCA
input to the air campaign plan.
The operational-level air defense unit
commander performs the following functions:
•Plans theater air and missile defense force
projection and sustainment operations.
•Integrates the air defense communications
systems with the AADC and operationallevel
ADA brigades, corps, AOC (BCE),
control and reporting center (CRC), and
AWACS (airborne warning and control
system).
•Coordinates the theater air and missile
defense linkages with the ACC, NCC, and
A-17
Appendix A
allied ADA forces. These linkages include
interface with intelligence sources, OCA,
TMD attack operations, space operations,
logistics, and so forth.
•Trains and evaluates all Army ADA
organizations assigned to operational-level
air defense C2 according to FM 25-100.
•Transitions all Army ADA organizations
assigned to the theater from peacetime, to
conflict, to war.
•Recommends priorities for allocation of
logistics requirements (manning, arming,
fixing/maintaining, moving, fueling, and
sustainment of the soldier) for all ADA
organizations within the theater.
level SOF. These SOF normally fight as joint
entities. The ASCC, in his service component
role, must sustain ARSOF in theater. The
ASCC, in coordination with the US Army
Special Operations Command (USASOC),
identifies the support organization to serve as
the link between ARSOF in theater, Army and
other service support resources, and the
CONUS-based USASOC. This support
structure is responsible for planning,
coordinating, and monitoring the reception,
onward movement, basing, and sustainment of
ARSOF in a theater of operations. Note that
CA and PSYOP units not assigned to the SOC/
JSOTF (joint special operations task force)
receive sustainment from the conventional
force unit of assignment or attachment.
•Identifies and recommends pre-positioning The SOF support element does not
of war reserve materiel stocks related to air normally support and sustain ARSOF since it
defense missions. has no dedicated support infrastructure that
duplicates the capabilities of other ASCC
Special Operations Support
functions. The ARSOF support element
mission is ARSOF sustainment, not the
Each regional CINC establishes a conduct of special operations and therefore
subordinate unified special operations does not layer itself as a warfighting
command (SOC) to exercise OPCON of theater- headquarters between operating forces and
A-18
FM 100-7
other higher commands. FM 100-25 discusses
ARSOF in detail.
Civil Affairs
The senior CA unit in a theater is normally
regionally aligned to the ASCC. A CA
organization commands attached CA units and
provides staff support to an SOC, other
component services, and the joint theater staff,
as required. The CA organization has organic
language team and government economic
public facilities in special function teams that
coordinate the following CA functions:
•Civil defense.
•Civilian labor.
•Legal services.
•Public administration, education, finance,
health, safety, and welfare.
•Civilian supply.
•Economics and food aid.
•Agricultural assistance.
•Property control.
•Public communications and transportation.
•Public works and utilities.
•Civil information.
•Dislocated civilian control.
•Arts, monuments, archives, and cultural
affairs.
FM 41-10 describes CA doctrine. The CA
function is illustrated in Figure A-17.
Aviation Support
Operational-level army aviation support,
normally an aviation brigade, provides C2 and
air movement support for the ASCC. SOF rely
heavily on this brigade for in-theater support.
The brigade has the capability to conduct joint
or multinational air maneuver to support
theater campaigns and major operations.
Aviation support provides combat capabilities
to assist in COMMZ rear security operations.
A-19
Appendix A
The ASCC tailors the aviation support to
provide maximum flexibility for his particular
theater. However, support normally has a
limited organic maintenance capability.
In instances where the ASCC does not have
an assigned aviation unit, he may choose to
establish that capability using resources and
assets available in theater. Once mobilized,
Army National Guard maintenance units can
be used to provide the required maintenance
capability that would not otherwise be
available. FM 1-111 provides detailed doctrine
for the operational-level army aviation
function. Figure A-18 illustrates the
operational-level army aviation function.
Intelligence Structures
The intelligence battlefield operating
system architecture provides specific
intelligence and communications structures at
each echelon, from the national level through
the tactical level. These structures include
intelligence organizations, systems, and
procedures for collecting, analyzing,
processing, and delivering intelligence to
warfighters.
The intelligence function is a seamless,
unified system that anticipates and satisfies
the intelligence needs of commanders.
Commanders drive intelligence and ensure its
proper employment by clearly articulating
intent, decisively designating PIR, and boldly
prioritizing the types of targets they want
engaged. Commanders exploiting the full
potential of the intelligence system realize the
total effect of this combat multiplier.
The intelligence system simultaneously
supports multiple commanders at multiple
echelons. Each echelon has organic intelligence
capabilities and staffs to meet the planning and
execution needs of the commander at that
echelon. Each echelon also supports the
intelligence needs of commanders at other
echelons.
Organizational Tailoring. The IEW organization
at the operational level is a deployable,
scalable MI organization designed specifically
to support the theater or major region in
which it operates. It can conduct split-based
operations in force-projection missions by
early deployment with a force of small, highly
technical elements. The DISE is a flexible,
scalable support package that acts as a conduit
for theater and national intelligence. Its
size and capability can be expanded as the
scope of operations expands. The operationallevel
Ml organization serves as a C2 headquarters
for subordinate and attached MI
elements. The operational-level analysis and
control element (ACE) is the principal organization
for producing all-source intelligence.
It controls, manages, tasks, processes, analyzes,
synthesizes, and disseminates intelligence.
The ACE supports OPSEC and
deception, sensor cueing, target development,
situation development, and force projection.
It also coordinates with and provides
connectivity to national, joint, allied, and
multinational intelligence sources.
The operational-level MI organization
supports unified, joint, allied, and
multinational commands; other US Army
operational-level commands within the
theater; and CONUS major Army commands
(MACOMs). Operational-level MI
organizations are under the command of the
US Army Intelligence and Security Command
(INSCOM) and are under OPCON of the
respective theater commander during
peacetime. During conflict, they revert to the
A-20
FM 100-7
command of the ASCC. FM 34-37 discusses the
operational-level MI organization in detail.
Figure A-19 shows an operational-level MI
organization.
The Army technical control and analysis
element (TCAE) serves as the single focal point
between the NSA and forward-deployed
operational- and tactical-level forces for
providing technical support to SIGINT
operations. Collocated with the NSA, the TCAE
is positioned uniquely to provide tailored
products to support operational- and tacticallevel
MI units operating worldwide. It also
serves as the Trojan system and network
manager for all Army Trojan system users.
The DISE is a new and integral part of the
concept for MI support to force-projection
operations. It is a tactically tailored
organization that brings together
communications capabilities, automated
intelligence fusion systems, and broadcast
downlinks in a small package able to deploy
with the early entry forces of a force-projection
operation. It is not a specific piece of equipment
or a particular configuration of equipment. The
DISE is a flexible organization able to support
any type of ground force whether from army,
joint, or allied/coalition forces. Through splitbased
operations, the DISE provides tactical
commanders a link from their forward-based
C2 element to an intelligence support base
located in CONUS or outside the AO. This link
provides commanders access to multisource
corps, theater, and national intelligence assets
and data bases. The intelligence support base
is normally a division, corps, or operationallevel
ACE.
The mission of the DISE is to provide the
deployed commander accurate, detailed,
continuous, and timely intelligence during the
rapid introduction of US forces across the
range of military operations. It is tailored
tactically from MI units according to the factors
of METT-T, lift, and pre-positioned assets. The
two types of tailorable DISE configurations are
mini-DISE (manpack) and DISE (vehicular).
Basic tactics and techniques call for the
DISE to deploy with the initial assault forces.
The DISE works closely with the organic
intelligence element of the supported unit. This
unit could be anything from an airborne
battalion S2 to the G2 of a MEF, depending on
the operation. The DISE works with the
supported force during both planning and
execution of operations to ensure corps,
theater, and national intelligence is
synchronized with the ground commander’s
scheme of maneuver and intent. The
supporting ACE stays abreast of changes in the
friendly situation through close coordination
with the DISE. Together, they ensure assets
stay focused on the needs of the commander
A-21
Appendix A
and allow the commander and his staff to pull
intelligence based on actual need.
Depending on the size of the deployed force,
the DISE may be the only intelligence asset
actually deployed in country receiving
processed intelligence from its supporting ACE
located outside the AO. In large-scale
deployments, the DISE is deployed with the
forward-deployed assault element until the
main or tactical CP arrives with the complete
processing capability of the all-source analysis
system (ASAS) and the ACE. In that case, after
the main CP arrives and is functioning, the
DISE could move forward to support the
tactical CP, remain in the rear area, or move
wherever its capability is required, based on
METT-T.
Intelligence Tasks. MI accomplishes its
mission through six primary tasks. These tasks
generate intelligence products tailored to the
mission for warfighters and other consumers.
The products derived assist the combat
commander in focusing and leveraging his
combat power. The six tasks can be thought of
as the METL for intelligence. As such, in a
broad sense, these tasks should serve as a
framework for training (see TRADOC
Pam 11-9). The six intelligence tasks provide
information to aid a commander in decision
making and include—
•Providing I&W.
•Performing IPB.
•Developing the situation.
•Supporting target development and
targeting.
•Developing force protection intelligence.
•Performing BDA.
The operational-level MI organization
focuses on providing multidiscipline IEW
support to the JTF, ASCC, and ARFOR (see
Figure A-20). Army operational-level MI
organizations provide—
•Deployable, scalable, high-frequency,
intercept, direction-finding, and jamming
support (Trackwolf, AN/TLQ-17A Sandcrab,
Army High-Frequency Electronic Warfare
System [AHFEWS], and single-source
processor [SIGINT]).
•Overt HUMINT collection, interrogation,
document exploitation, and CI support.
•Battlefield technical intelligence.
•Operational intelligence products such as
graphic templates, annotated imagery, and
tailored weather forecasts.
•Ground component intelligence support to
the JICs.
•Reinforcement to corps intelligence
operations in the form of a corps military
intelligence support element (CMISE). The
CMISE and operational-level MI
organization in each theater create smart
bridges between echelons to ensure a truly
seamless system of intelligence systems
focused on supporting the warfighter.
Petroleum
The ASCC must provide centralized
distribution of bulk petroleum products for all
US forces in theater. The ASCC establishes an
operational-level army petroleum organization
to receive petroleum products in theater and
distribute them throughout the COMMZ and
rear of the CZ. If the theater uses pipeline
systems for bulk distribution, other
transportation assets distribute the products
from the pipeline terminal to the user. The
operational-level petroleum organization
interfaces with the MMC for product
distribution and coordinates with host nations
for additional product and distribution
support. FM 10-67 details the operational-level
petroleum function. Figure A-21.
Ammunition Supply
and Storage
The ASCC is responsible for in-theater
receipt, accountability, management, and
establishment of storage sites; coordination of
distribution between storage sites and between
storage sites and forward transfer points; and
direct issue to using units from storage sites on
an area support basis. This responsibility will
most likely be a joint service/multinational
forces mission in the theater of operation.
The operational-level ammunition
organization interfaces with the MMC for
Class V distribution, coordination with joint
service and multinational force support, and
requirements determination. The ASCC's
responsibility continues throughout the
conduct of operations in the theater, with
emphasis directed to the critical Class V
functions of retrograde, management of
captured and recovered ammunition, and
A-22
Appendix A
recovery and redeployment of stocks following
mission completion.
Support is provided within theater from a
sequentially deployed ammunition logistics
support structure initially consisting of
ammunition accountability detachments (port)
and modular, platoon-sized container handling
and noncontainer ammunition units. As the
theater matures and the number of modular
units increase, a conventional C2 structure is
templated over these modular units, creating
company-sized units for large volume/area
mission capability. Specialized ammunition
surveillance and quality assurance support
throughout the ammunition system from the
CONUS base to the forward ammunition
support units is provided by quality assurance
specialist ammunition surveillance (QASAS)
teams of trained Department of the Army (DA)
civilians.
Movement Control
The operational-level Army MCA is
responsible for coordinating and administering
transportation policy, managing strategic and
operational-level movement responsibilities,
and managing theaterwide transportation
assets. The MCA prepares movement and port
clearance plans, conducts liaison with higher
and lower movement control elements, and
commands and controls transportation
battalions and movement control teams. The
MCA may be designated as the validation
authority for Army theater airlift requests.
This organization often coordinates with allied
and host nation MCAs and coordinates and
validates theater airlift for Army units.
FM 55-10 discusses MCA activities in detail.
Figure A-22 illustrates an operational-level
Army MCA.
Materiel Management
The operational-level MMC manages the
theater’s supply and maintenance operations.
Management involves balancing maintenance
efforts and ensuring visibility of critical item
shortages. The MMC centrally manages the
supply and maintenance activities of the area
logistics C2 organizations, coordinates with
subordinate organizations in the CZ, and
serves as the primary interface with the
CONUS-sustaining base. The MMC is
connected electronically with the MCA,
appropriate supply and service organizations,
and the COSCOM MMC to coordinate
distribution of GS supply and maintenance
requirements. It may coordinate with joint or
multinational agencies. FM 100-16 discusses
MMC operations. An operational-level Army
MMC is depicted in Figure A-23.
A-24
M 100-7
OPERATIONS FUNCTIONS
In peacetime, the ASCC must conduct the
three operational-level tasks while
continuously supporting all ARFOR in theater.
As the situation changes from peacetime to
conflict or war, the theater may develop in
complexity and scope, requiring the expansion
of combat, combat support (CS) and CSS forces.
On transition to conflict or war, the CINC may
choose one of six options to exercise COCOM.
Refer to Chapter 2 for detailed discussion of
each option. Each of these options has different
impacts on the employment of the ARFOR in
theater.
The CINC may exercise COCOM through a
subunified commander for operations on a
continuing basis. The subunified commander
exercises functions, authority, and
responsibilities similar to those of a unified
command CINC, except for COCOM. The
subunified commander exercises OPCON of
assigned commands and forces within the
assigned AOR or functional area. ASCCs of
subunified commands operate in the chain of
command within the subunified command.
They normally communicate directly with the
unified command ASCC on specific Army
A-25
Appendix A
matters and inform the subunified commander
as required.
The CINC may choose to continue to
exercise COCOM through the ASCC or a JFC.
If the requirement to conduct major operations
becomes severely complex, the ASCC, with the
CINC's approval, might choose to create a
numbered army to direct the major operation.
If he does establish the numbered army, the
ASCC would continue to focus on sustainment
and support of all ARFOR assigned or attached
to the theater. Figure A-24 shows the functions
provided by a numbered army organization.
The CINC may choose to exercise COCOM
through a JTF. The ASCC would establish the
ARFOR (numbered army, corps, division, and
so forth) and place it under OPCON of the
CJTF for the conduct of operations. As the
senior army command in a JTF, the numbered
army could serve as the ARFOR, the JFLCC
headquarters, or the nucleus around which a
subordinate JTF could be built. The numbered
army commander would conduct the three
operational-level tasks within the JTF. The
ASCC would continue to focus on sustainment
and support of all ARFOR assigned or attached
to the theater.
The CINC may choose to exercise COCOM
directly over specific forces. The roles of the
numbered army in these situations are similar
to those in the JTF discussion. Generally, the
CINC does not employ ARFOR in a singleservice
operation. The CINC usually exercises
COCOM in these situations through the ASCC.
The CINC establishes a numbered army in
coordination with the ASCC. He does this
usually when the span of control becomes too
great for the theater army commander or JFC.
He may also establish a numbered army when
forces are widely dispersed geographically.
Establishment may occur when operations
require more than one large formation
composed of multiple corps to execute distinct,
simultaneous campaigns or focus on different
major threats. This situation would likely
include the division of a theater of war into
separate theaters of operation.
The CINC may establish a numbered army
when a political situation requires a US
operational headquarters as a counterpart to
an allied headquarters or to ensure satisfactory
distribution of multinational responsibilities.
Intermediate headquarters of this nature exist
within combined organizations such as a
NATO army group. If the CINC chooses to
exercise COCOM through functional
component commanders, three different
scenarios are possible.
•The functional component commander
might also be the ASCC. In such a case, the
numbered army would be employed in a
similar manner as COCOM through the
ASCC.
•The functional component commander
might also be an Army commander—but not
A-26
FM 100-7
the ASCC. In this scenario, the numbered
army commander could be the functional
component commander. The ASCC would
place ARFOR under OPCON of the
numbered army commander for the conduct
of operations. The ASCC would continue to
focus on sustainment and support of all
ARFOR assigned or attached to the theater.
•The functional component commander
might also be from another service. In this
scenario, the numbered army is not likely to
be deployed because of the size of the units,
and operations would not require an
additional level of control.
Structure
The ASCC would normally form a
numbered army from existing assets and
structure it to meet specific operations
requirements. The numbered army is primarily
an operational (as opposed to support)
headquarters designed to control from two to
five corps. Its commander must have an
operational-level perspective. The
administrative and support activities of the
numbered army are much less than those of the
ASCC. As a result, the numbered army staff is
austere. The staff focuses on situation
assessment, estimate formulation, planning,
and functional area coordination. The
numbered army probably would make
extensive use of liaison representatives to
enhance its effectiveness. In conducting
operations, the numbered army may direct
assigned or attached forces to gain and control
terrain, populations, and resources. These
operations often involve directing deployment
and fires, as well as directing movement and
maneuver of large formations over great
distances. Figure A-25 illustrates a typical
numbered army headquarters.
A-27
Appendix A
Support
The numbered army rarely executes
support operations. It provides requirements
and priorities to the ASCC, which provides
logistical support. The headquarters itself
receives support from a nearby area support
organization in the COMMZ. Assigned ARFOR
are normally self-sufficient and rely on the
normal theater functional command support
network or contingency support arrangement.
The ASCC could allocate support forces to the
numbered army if independent operations are
required. This could occur if the numbered
army executes a deep operational maneuver or
deploys to a geographically separate area. The
ASCC would provide a tailored support
package—an Army support element (ASE)—
for the duration of the requirement.
The numbered army usually operates from
a main and an alternate CP. These
headquarters may be located in the COMMZ or
CZ. The main CP controls current operations,
collates information, integrates all-source
intelligence (ASI), and coordinates logistical
support. The main CP also develops plans for
future operations.
The numbered army commander
designates an alternate CP to ensure
continuity of operations. The alternate CP may
be a subordinate headquarters. In the event
that a numbered army executes support
operations, the numbered army commander
could establish a rear CP to control logistical
support assets as well as coordinate rear
security operations.
In addition to the headquarters element,
the numbered army consists of a signal unit, an
Army aviation element, an MP company, an
intelligence support element, and a variable
number of maneuver elements. The numbered
army is a flexible organization that is taskorganized
to accomplish assigned missions.
The Army will not likely configure any two
numbered armies with the same types of units.
The signal unit provides dedicated C3 interface
with other systems in theater. The aviation
element provides C2 aircraft and intratheater
mobility for the headquarters. The MP element
provides CP security. The intelligence element
supports the commander’s ASI needs.
The ASCC may allocate SOF to provide
HUMINT, PSYOP, or CA capabilities. In rare
circumstances, SOF units could execute longrange
reconnaissance or strike missions.
Engineer support would likely be provided on
an area basis or, in an unusual situation, be
attached to the ASE.
OTHER MAJOR ARMY COMMANDS
Other MACOMs influence operationallevel
army units. The US Army Information
Systems Command commands the operationallevel
signal organization during peacetime and
conflict. The US Army Intelligence and
Security Command commands the operationallevel
MI organization at theater level during
peacetime and conflict. The Criminal
Investigations Command commands the
criminal investigation division (CID)
organization and subordinate detachments
during peacetime, conflict, and war. CID
elements conduct sensitive investigations,
support logistics security operations, manage
criminal and terrorist-related intelligence, and
conduct criminal investigations.
USACE operates civil works divisions and
resident offices within theater to design and
execute major construction projects during
peacetime. The Military Traffic Management
Command (MTMC) serves as the
USTRANSCOM executive agent for moving
and sustaining unit equipment by surface from
CONUS into theater for all services. USAMC is
the Army’s provider of Army-unique logistical
support. USAMC may establish elements of the
LSE in the theater to enhance communications
between the Army in theater and CONUSbased,
USAMC-supporting organizations, as
well as USAMC operations in theater.
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES
The vast majority of special operations in support Army operations. It is therefore
a theater of operations are joint special appropriate to briefly discuss the inherently
operations. Since the SOC evaluates the SOF joint SOF organizations available to support
support requirements in terms of the total SOF theater operations.
capability, SOF from other services may
A-28
Special operations require centralized,
responsive, and unambiguous C2, which is
achieved through a joint operational
headquarters exercising OPCON of SOF. Since
special operations are conducted continuously
(peacetime, conflict, and war), a permanent
structure is necessary. To provide the
necessary unity of command, each theater
combatant commander has elected to establish
a subordinate unified command for SOF (see
Figure A-26).
These commands—the theater SOCs—are
the principal joint headquarters through which
the theater CINCs exercise COCOM or
OPCON of SOF within their theaters. The
commander of the SOC (COMSOC) is also the
permanent theater JFSOCC since the SOC has
a functional basis. His duties include those of a
subunified commander (joint SOF) and a
functional component commander (SOF
component of a joint operation). These basic
duties, as described in Joint Pubs 0-2 and 3-0,
are subject to modification by the theater
CINC. They include—
•Exercising OPCON over forces assigned or
attached.
•Conducting continuing operations.
•Advising the proper employment of SOF.
•Coordinating special operations planning,
conduct, and support.
FM 100-7
THEATER SPECIAL OPERATIONS
FUNCTIONS
To perform his four basic duties, the
JFSOCC organizes the special operations units
to—
•Perform deliberate and time-sensitive
planning.
•Conduct special operations as directed.
•Organize assigned and attached forces.
•Coordinate special operations with
conventional operations.
•Participate in the joint targeting process.
•Obtain special operations intelligence
support.
•Establish and maintain effective liaison.
•Plan and conduct joint and multinational
special operations training exercises.
•Allocate SOF resources and establish SOF
sustainment priorities.
•Coordinate and monitor sustainment of
SOF.
•Coordinate and monitor establishment and
sustainment of SOF operational project
stocks.
•Exercise technical control over SOF
communications.
•Identify and articulate theater SOF
requirements to the theater CINC for
transmission to USCINCSOC.
A-29
Appendix A
The COMSOC is the JFSOCC for the
theater combatant commander. He commands
the SOC and is the principal special operations
advisor in theater. As COMSOC, he reports
directly to the theater combatant commander
and exercises OPCON of theater SOF. He may
form subordinate headquarters as required.
This may include the formation of a JSOTF.
JSOTFs may remain OPCON to COMSOC or
be placed OPCON to other subordinate
commanders (normally a JFC) to perform
missions of limited scope or duration.
Figure A-27 illustrates a theater with a joint
special operations aviation component
command (JSOACC).
COMSOC must be familiar with the day-today
issues working within the theater
combatant command. The COMSOC may also
serve as a special staff officer. In this situation,
he may appoint a deputy to represent him
permanently on the staff. A typical SOC is based
upon standard joint staff functions. Ideally,
each theater should have adequate, experienced
SOF personnel to staff the SOC. If the JFSOCC
lacks the manpower to fill these positions, he
must coordinate for external support or extend
his resources to cover all required functions (for
example, a combined J3/5).
SUBORDINATE C2
ORGANIZATIONS
Organization of SOF subordinate to the
JFSOCC—ARSOF, Air Force special
operations forces (AFSOF), and Navy special
operations forces (NAVSOF)—differ,
depending upon the situation, theater of
employment, and requirements of applicable
OPLANs and CONPLANs. Below the SOC,
organization normally takes place along
service or functional lines but also may take
the form of independent JSOTFs tasked to
complete specific missions (see Figure A-27).
FUNCTIONAL C2
ORGANIZATION
The COMSOC may choose to organize
subordinate forces along functional lines.
Functional components may be used in lieu of
or in combination with service components.
One of the most commonly used special
operations functional organizations is the
JSOACC. The JSOACC is the subordinate
commander within a SOC or JSOTF
responsible for planning and executing joint
special operations aviation missions and for
coordinating and deconflicting special
operations aviation and conventional air
operations. (SOC includes Air Force and Army
platforms.) The JSOACC is normally the
commander of the special operations aviation
(SOA) component providing the preponderance
of SOA forces, or the one most capable of
conducting, commanding, and controlling
special operations missions. Depending upon
the mission, the JFC may assign OPCON or
TACON of conventional air assets to the
JFSOCC, who may exercise the authority
through the JSOACC.
JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS
TASK FORCE
The NCA, theater CINC, or COMSOC may
form a JSOTF. JSOTFs may be small and
temporary or large and enduring, depending
upon the national or theater objective. They
may be formed from theater SOF, theater SOF
augmented by or augmenting headquarters
assigned or attached for a specific mission, or
SOF external to the theater. They may be
formed around an existing service force
structure. For example, to accomplish a series
of related DA missions, the COMSOC may
designate a Naval special warfare task group
A-30
FM 100-7
(NSWTG) as the nucleus of a JSOTF
headquarters. The NSWTG would require
ARSOF and AFSOF augmentation to function
effectively in this situation. The JSOTF is
normally dissolved after its mission is
completed.
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
FUNCTION
The operational-level PSYOP organization
plans and conducts authorized PSYOP
activities and implements worldwide support
of all nonmobilization contingencies during
crises and open hostilities short of declared
war. This organization also develops,
coordinates, and executes peacetime PSYOP
activities. In addition, should war be declared,
the operational-level PSYOP organization
assists in planning and executing strategic and
operational PSYOP for the theater CINC.
Figure A-28 depicts the operational-level
PSYOP function.
In MOOTW and conflict, the active
component PSYOP organization deploys to the
theater to provide a planning cell and assume
the duties of the senior PSYOP headquarters.
This mission is continued until US Army
Reserve (USAR) units are mobilized and the
appropriate reserve component PSYOP
organization arrives and assumes those duties.
As these units arrive, they are placed under
OPCON of the senior PSYOP headquarters and
assigned to their predetermined subordinate
commands. OPCON is normally retained at the
senior PSYOP headquarters with TACON
being passed to the appropriate unit. Examples
of PSYOP support to conventional operations
include—
• Assessing the psychological impact of
military operations.
•Analyzing target audiences in the objective
area.
•Advising the commander or mission director
of possible PSYOP COAs.
•Developing and conducting PSYOP to
support military operations.
•Countering hostile propaganda.
•Supporting commander’s information and
awareness programs.
•Supporting, planning, or conducting
deception operations.
•Providing target audience intelligence,
regional and language expertise, and a
means for disseminating information and
products that describe the intent of military
operations.
•Supporting commander’s handling of EPW
and civilian internees.
THEATER CHEMICAL FORCE
FUNCTION
Chemical forces perform combat functions
in wartime and offer a variety of mission
capabilities in MOOTW. The focus at the
functional level allows task organizations of
the correct mix of forces to accomplish the
mission. Chemical mission areas fall into the
following categories:
•NBC defense.
•Smoke and obscurants.
•Temporarily disabling techniques and
technologies.
•Flame.
A-31
Appendix A
Chemical units are indispensable to
operations. They offer a range of capabilities
necessary to a versatile force. They can support
operations as individuals, teams, or units. A
mix of different units (decontamination units,
NBC reconnaissance elements, smoke units,
and biological identification/detection [BIDS]
units) is often necessary to achieve the proper
balance of capabilities—force protection and
mission accomplishment. Forces deployed in
countries with WMD or chemical industrial
complexes require support from both NBC
battle staffs and units.
A chemical C2 organization can provide
battle command for a variety of supporting
units. It can provide training support and
technological and consultative operations for
nuclear accident- and incident-response
operations and chemical accident- and
incident-response operations that involve NBC
material, flammable and combustible
substances, and industrial chemical hazards.
NBC reconnaissance units are equipped to
conduct surveys and determine the type and
extent of toxic contamination with mobile, realtime
analysis. NBC reconnaissance and
decontamination units perform chemical and
nuclear hazard surveying, detection,
identification, monitoring, and personnel and
equipment decontamination.
Smoke units, both mechanized and
motorized, provide large-area smoke and
obscurant support. Additional capabilities
include providing local security, vector control,
limited water transfer, spray, storage, limited
personnel showers, and limited firefighting.
Chemical units can provide training and
consultation in—
•Use of defoliants.
•Employment of riot control agents.
•Use of smoke and obscurants.
•Construction and employment of flame field
expedient devices and commercial chemical
threats.
•Collection, packaging, storage, disposal, and
cleanup of hazardous materials and wastes.
FMs 3-100 and 3-101 provide
missions and mission requirements.
details on
A-32
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Appendix B
Subordinate Campaign Plan Model1
Copy No.
Issuing Headquarters
Place of Issue
Date/Time Group of Signature
CAMPAIGN PLAN: (Number or code name)
References: Maps, charts, time zones (zulu), and other relevant documents
COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS. Briefly describe the command organization
(composition and relationships) for the campaign/subordinate campaign.
Include detailed information in the command relationships annex (see also
paragraph 5a).
1. Situation. Briefly describe the politico-military situation that the plan
addresses (see commander’s estimate).
a. Theater Guidance. Provide a summary of directives, letters of
instruction, memorandums, or theater war plans that apply to the plan,
including a theater campaign plan received from the theater
commander.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Relate the theater commander’s strategic intent to operational
requirements in the theater of operation or joint operations area,
including its subregional space and multinational elements.
List the theater commander’s strategic and operational objectives
and tasks assigned to the subordinate command.
List actions that are prohibited or required by higher authority
(ROE and so forth).
Include predeployment (C-Day) actions as necessary.
b. Enemy Forces. Provide a summary of pertinent intelligence data,
including information on the following:
(1) Composition, location, disposition, movements, and strengths
major enemy forces that can influence action in the theater
operations or joint operations area.
of
of
1.Joint Pub 5-O describes how campaign logic and principles fit into OPLAN format and the JOPES
process. Joint Pub 5-03-series further explains the process, including models of planning,
messages, estimates, and OPLANs/CONPLANs.
(SECURITY CLASSIFICATION)
B-1
Appendix B
(SECURITY CLASSIFICATION)
(2) Operational concept (if known), to include the enemy’s perception of
friendly vulnerabilities and the enemy’s intentions regarding those
vulnerabilities.
(3) Major operational objectives.
(4) Commander’s idiosyncrasies and doctrinal patterns.
(5) Operational and sustainment capabilities.
(6) Vulnerabilities related to the enemy’s center of gravity.
NOTE: Assumed information should be identified as such.
Reference may be made to the intelligence annex for
detailed information.
c. Friendly Forces. State information on friendly forces not assigned that
may directly affect the command.
(1) Mission of higher, adjacent, and supporting US commands.
(2) Mission of higher, adjacent, and supporting allied or other coalition
forces.
(3) Protection of own operational center of gravity or other critical
elements.
d. Assumptions. State assumptions applicable to the plan as a whole.
Include both specified and implied assumptions.
e. Legal Considerations. State laws or agreements binding on the plan.
f. Public Affairs Considerations. Identify impact of global visibility,
public interest, and media presence on the plan.
2. Mission. Integrate the operational objectives and tasks of the command and
their purposes and relationships to achieve the theater strategic objectives
(who, what, when, where, and why).
3. Joint Operations.
a. Operational Concept. Integrate the fundamentals of the campaign
into a who, what, where, and how statement of operational intent.
Restate the assigned operational concept for each phase of the theater
strategic concept. Include the phased sustainment of major forces in the
command. Include other concepts such as deception and psychological
warfare during the subordinate campaign. State how the joint
operations are a part of the CINC’s unified operations. Include all
aspects of operational design. State how operational advantage is to be
achieved.
(1) Subordinate organization.
(2) Operational objectives.
(3) Maneuver (operational).
(4) Fires (operational).
(5) Phases of campaign, major operation, or battle.
(6) Timing.
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B-2
FM 100-7
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b. Phase 1.
(1) Operational or tactical concept. Include operational or tactical
objectives, scheme of maneuver, and timing for this phase.
(2) Forces required by function or capability. Consider Army, Navy, Air
Force, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, and special operations and
space forces.
(3) Tasks of subordinate commands and adjacent components.
(4) Reserve forces location and composition. State “be prepared”
missions.
(5) Fires. Include general missions and guidance to subordinates and
components. Ensure that fires are complementary.
(6) Mobility. Consider transportation; ports; lines of communication;
transit and overflight rights; reinforcement, reception, and onward
movement; and host nation support arrangements.
(7) Annexes. Reference all annexes relating to each phase of the
concept of operation. Such references show how activities such as
deception, psychological operations, nuclear operations, special
operations, rules of engagement, airspace management,
interdiction operations, mine warfare operations, and so forth,
relate to the overall concept.
(8) Deployment. State briefly how deployments of units, replacements,
and supplies into the theater affect the sequencing of operations.
Include the details of such deployments in paragraph 4 and/or a
logistics annex.
c. Phases II through IV. Cite information as stated in each subsequent
phase. Provide a separate phase for each step in the subordinate
campaign, at the end of which a major reorganization of forces may be
required and another significant action initiated.
d. Coordinating Instructions. If desired, place instructions here that
apply to two or more phases or multiple elements of the command. The
execution checklist may be placed in an annex.
4. Logistics. Give a brief, broad statement of the sustainment concept for the
campaign, with information and instructions applicable to the campaign by
phase. The concentration of logistics in phases must be concurrent with
operational phases. This information may be issued separately and referenced
here. At a minimum, this paragraph should address the following:
a. Assumptions (including coalition requirements).
b. Supply aspects.
c. Maintenance and modifications.
d. Medical service.
e. Transportation.
f. Base development.
g. Personnel service support.
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B-3
Appendix B
(SECURITY CLASSIFICATION)
h. Foreign military assistance.
i. Administrative management.
j. Lines of communication.
k. Reconstitution of forces.
l. Joint and multinational responsibilities.
m. Sustainment priorities and resources.
n. Interservice responsibilities.
o. Host nation considerations.
5. Command and Signal.
a. Command.
(1) Command relationships. State generally the command
relationships for portions of the campaign or the entire campaign.
Indicate any shifts of command contemplated during the campaign,
indicating the time of the expected shift. These changes should be
consistent with the operational phasing in paragraph 3. Give the
location of the commander, command posts, and succession to
command.
(2) Delegation of authority.
b. Signal.
(1) Communications. Plans of communications may refer to a standard plan or
be attached in an annex. Include the time zone to be used; rendezvous,
recognition, and identification instructions; code; liaison instructions; and axis
of signal communications as appropriate.
(2) Electronics. Plans of electronic systems may refer to a standard plan or be
attached in an annex. Include electronic policy and other information as
appropriate.
(Signed)
(Commander)
ANNEXES: As required (see Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan and
campaign plan)
DISTRIBUTION:
theater
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Appendix C
Major Operations Plan Model
Operational-Level1
Copy No .
Issuing Headquarters
Place of Issue
Date/Time Group of Signature
MAJOR OPERATION PLAN:
References: Maps, charts, and
(Number or code
other documents
name)
TASK ORGANIZATION/COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS: Briefly describe
the organization of the Army in theater to support the CINC’s long-range
strategy and campaign plan, specifically identifying the command conducting
the operation. In a plan for a major operation composed of several phases, put
the task organization in a separate annex (Annex A) that also outlines
command relationships and their changes, if any, as the operation progresses
from one phase to the next. Include task organizations for Army component
support to contingencies in the annexes referring to the plans for those
operations. The structure of Annex A deals with the following factors:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
Civil-Political Relationships. Embassies, country teams, non-DOD
US Government agencies (CIA, Drug Enforcement Agency [DEA],
Agency for International Development [AID]).
Multinational Force Relationships. Host nations, allies, forces from
regional/treaty organizations.
Joint Relationships. DOD agencies (DIA, National Security Agency),
unified and specified commands (subunified commands and JTFs when
appropriate), other services in uniservice roles.
Relationships with Other Army Commands. HQDA, USAMC, US
Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), other CONUS
MACOMs, and their stovepipe organizations in the theater and army
components of other unified commands.
Army in Theater Relationships. The structure that reflects unity of
command within the ASCC or ARFOR.
(1) Army components of subunified commands and JTFs.
(2) Functional commands.
1.This OPLAN format conforms to the format delineated in Joint Pub 5-03.2, as amended by CJCS
Instruction 3122.03 JOPES, Volumes I and II (draft) and FM 101-5, Command and Control for
Commanders and Staffs (final draft), August 1993.
(SECURITY CLASSIFICATION)
C-1
Appendix C
(SECURITY CLASSIFICATION)
(3) Area commands.
(4) Major combat and combat support organizations directly under
ASCC command in peacetime.
(5) Army organizations providing operational-level support to the BCE
and ACEs.
(6) ARSOF, especially the theater army special operations support
center.
1. Situation. Thoroughly describe the operational environment as well as
appropriate aspects of the strategic environment in which the major operation
will be conducted. Include tactical information for the early phases of the
operation. Refer to command and staff estimates, country studies, or OPLANs.
Designate the trigger event that signals execution of the OPORD.
a. Intelligence. Use this subparagraph to refer to a separate intelligence
annex (Annex B) or the intelligence estimate. The two main components
should include the following:
(1) A summary of information concerning the area of operations, which
consists of—
(a) A strategic overview of the area, to include its climate, politics,
geography, topography, demography, economics, and social/
cultural factors.
(b) Specific, localized information about conditions affecting the
early phases of the operation, especially if a forced entry is
anticipated. Include weather, key terrain, observation, cover
and concealment, obstacles, avenues of approach, drop zones,
landing zones, and beach and hydrographic data.
(2) A description of the enemy, which consists of—
(a) Strategic and operational factors such as the political roots and
objectives of enemy activity, personalities, outside support,
sanctuaries, logistics capabilities, levels of training and combat
experience, morale, strategic and operational centers of gravity,
and vulnerabilities to PSYOP.
(b) Factors of immediate concern during the early phases of the
operation such as locations, strengths, weapons systems,
tactical capabilities, reserves, mobility.
(c) Information about the military strengths of nations not allied or
affiliated with US forces. Include order-of-battle information,
numbers of major weapons systems, personalities of leaders,
levels of training, or combat experience and affiliation with
major hostile powers.
b. Friendly Forces. Provide information on friendly forces that may affect
the execution of the plan being put forth. These effects may impact
directly on the command or on the organizations subordinate to that
command.
(1) Task organizations/command relationships. State the mission and
applicable parts of the concept of operation of the joint or
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multinational command to which the ARFOR is subordinate. They
will normally be as stated in the theater campaign plan. Provide
sufficient detail so that key individuals know and understand the
higher, joint, or multinational commander’s intent, the end state
desired at the conclusion of the campaign, and how their actions
mesh to attain joint or multinational goals.
(2) Higher headquarters. Include the mission, concept, and intent of
the unified/joint theater CINC. His charter is to further US
interests in the theater and should be stated so that the ASCC/
ARFOR, his staff, and subordinates know and understand the part
they play in achieving the CINC’s strategic aim.
(3) HQDA. Describe the missions, concepts, and intents of HQDA as
they pertain to the theater. In peacetime, the ASCC is a MACOM
responding to CINC direction as well as to HQDA for Title 10
responsibilities. Include references to Army regulations or other
service authorities.
(4) Other service components. Highlight the roles of the Navy, Air
Force, and Marine Corps components of the unified command.
(5) Joint, unified, and specified commands and DOD agencies.
Highlight the roles of other commands that affect the operations in
this theater.
(6) Multinational forces. Highlight the organization, capabilities, and
activities of friendly nations in the theater, with emphasis on their
military forces. State their roles and missions in support of the
CINC’s objectives to further US policies.
(7) Special operations forces. Describe the activities of SOF in the
region that affect the operation.
(8) US Coast Guard. Describe the role of the Coast Guard in the
theater, especially its counternarcotics role.
(9) Department of State. Highlight the contributions of US embassies
and country teams in the theater as they affect and interface with
elements of the ASCC/ARFOR.
(10) Other non-DOD US agencies. Describe the activities of US
Government agencies not included in country teams, such as DEA
and AID, as they affect Army operations.
c. Attachments and Detachments. Highlight critical elements of the
Task Organization/Command Relationship section (Annex A).
d. Assumptions. Provide a summary of the conditions and situations that
must exist when the OPLAN becomes an OPORD. They include
predictions and presumptions concerning the following:
(1) Conditions within host countries and other nations in the region.
(2) Consistency of US policy for the region such as the application of the
War Powers Act.
(3) Involvement by hostile powers, both from outside and within the
region, in the internal affairs of nations in the theater.
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(4) Effects of US actions in the theater on relations with nations outside
the theater.
(5) Adequacy of interagency support.
(6) Bilateral and multilateral consensus on the degree or extent of
common threats, for example, the narcotics trade, and required
actions.
(7) Availability of resources.
(8) Warning times.
(9) Times and locations of anticipated hostile actions.
(10) Anticipated political situations in the host nation and neighboring
nations.
(11) The timing of political decisions in friendly nations.
(12) The timing of the release of the use of special weapons.
2. Mission. Provide a clear, concise statement of the tasks to be achieved in all
phases of the major operation. Include the commander’s visualization of the
end state to be achieved. Examples are restoration of an international
boundary, defeat of enemy armed forces, or clearing of hostile armed forces
from a given geographical area. If for an MOOTW, provide a clear statement of
the long-range, continuing aim of the theater army. Summarize tasks assigned
by the CINC, tasks directed by HQDA, and tasks derived from the
commander’s analysis of the environment and his understanding of his
superiors’ intent. Unlike the single-paragraph narrative common to the
mission statement for a wartime operation, the MOOTW mission statement is
usually a list of tasks. These tasks may include the following:
a. Plan and organize for transition to war.
b. Support and sustain ARFOR and other designated forces.
c. Protect the force, its personnel, and family members.
d. Train ARFOR to maintain readiness.
e. Participate in security assistance efforts.
f. Conduct Army intelligence activities in conjunction with joint and
multinational intelligence efforts.
g. Plan for, rehearse, and participate in contingency operations and
responses to crises. Plans for such operations may be included as
annexes and generally conform to the format for an OPORD for an
ARFOR in a conflict situation. Such peacetime operations include the
following:
(1) Security assistance.
(2) Nation assistance.
(3) Search and rescue.
(4) Humanitarian assistance.
(5) CA.
(6) NEO.
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(7) Peacekeeping.
(8) Show of force.
3. Execution.
a. Commander’s Intent. Provide a statement, in general terms, of the
commander’s visualization (from start to finish) of the mission
accomplishment by his command. This subparagraph links the mission
to the concept of operations. It binds all subordinate activities to the
overall objective.
b. Concept of Operations. Describe the commander’s visualization of
how the mission will be accomplished, to include his intent for the
employment of the command as a whole. At the operational level, divide
the concept into phases; the commander will specify the end state for
each phase so that subordinates know his intent for each phase. The
trigger event for the transition between phases is the achievement of
some intermediate goal. This knowledge will permit subordinates to
plan branches within their own plans. The subordinate commanders are
empowered to demonstrate initiative in supporting the achievement of
the commander’s stated end state. The commander and his subordinates
can also execute sequels within and at the conclusion of phases,
depending on the outcome of battles and engagements. Include an
operations overlay (Annex C) and the deception plan (Annex D) in the
concept.
(1) Phase I. The first operational phase of a contingency is usually the
detailed preparation of the command to execute the operation. In a
highly charged, time-sensitive environment characterized by
political maneuvers from a diplomatic posture, the commander
prepares his concept by—
(a) Organizing his staff to conduct the proposed operation and
integrating those augmentation cells from other components
and agencies and subordinate Army units.
(b) Establishing liaison with the host nation, with the unified
command responsible for the target area, with other unified and
specified commands (especially those involved in deployment),
with SOF already in the target area, and with appropriate US
Government agencies.
(c) Negotiating status of forces agreements, constraints (Annex E),
and ROE (Annex F) for the proposed operation with the host
nation, in coordination with DOS and appropriate embassies
and country teams.
(d) Establishing or preparing to establish intermediate staging
bases in the target region and directing the repositioning of
supplies and equipment.
(e) Conducting necessary operations to support political and
diplomatic initiatives or to rehearse for the planned major
operation.
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(f) Ordering his subordinate organizations to prepare to execute the
major operation.
(g) Stating the commander’s concept to attain the end state for this
phase by the command as a whole.
(h) Setting forth the commander’s scheme of operational maneuver,
(i)
(j)
(k)
including close battle, deep battle, and rear operations when
appropriate.
Describing how operational fires will be employed. Include a
phased fire support annex (Annex G) to show complex
arrangements for fire support, including priorities of fires and
targeting. Augment the annex with appendixes for air support,
chemical support, field artillery support, naval gunfire support,
and nuclear fires.
Including air defense (Annex H), electronic warfare (Annex I),
engineer support (Annex J), and PSYOP (Annex K), rear
operations (Annex L), protection of forces and means
(Annex M), provost marshal functions (Annex N), public affairs
(Annex O), and space operations (Annex P).
Using the subsequent subparagraphs to direct tasks for
subordinate units not already covered in the concept for this
phase.
(l) Stating the initial location and tasks for the reserve. Propose the
employment of the reserve in taking advantage of branches and
sequels.
(m) Providing coordinating instructions applicable to two or more
subordinate elements. If reinforcements from outside the
theater will impact on operations, include that impact here.
Also include instructions for linkups with SOF or ground units
involved in the deep battle.
(2) Phase II. The second operational phase is the execution of the
operation itself. It can be composed of several phases (deployment,
force entry, force buildup and combat operations, decisive combat
operations and achievement of end state). In this phase, the
commander—
(a)
(b)
States his concept in detail to attain the phase’s end state by the
command as a whole. In his narration of the step-by-step
execution of the phase, he specifies exactly which subordinate
and supporting units will accomplish each operational or
tactical task.
Sets forth the scheme of maneuver, as well as the deployment
scheme, to attain initial objectives. Where appropriate, the
scheme should include the forcible insertion of combat elements
and necessary C2 elements and their accompanying support.
1. Changes in the form of maneuver.
2. Changes in the nature of the operation.
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3. Major regrouping of forces.
4. Significant changes in enemy capabilities.
(c) Prescribes the employment of fires necessary to attain initial
objectives according to the fire support Annex (Annex G). The
annex includes targeting priorities and priorities of fire and
may be augmented by appendixes for air support, field artillery
support, and naval gunfire support. In this subparagraph or its
annex, also include joint interfaces such as the joint targeting
board (JTB) and the BCE.
(d) Includes provisions for air defense (Annex H), electronic warfare
(Annex I), engineer support (Annex J), PSYOP (Annex K), rear
operations (Annex L), protection of forces and means
(Annex M), provost marshall functions (Annex N), public affairs
(Annex O), and space operations (Annex P).
(e) In subparagraphs subsequent to (d) above, includes direct tasks
for subordinate units not already covered in the phase concept.
(f) If appropriate, states the location and tasks for the reserve. This
subparagraph proposes the employment of the reserve in taking
advantage of branches and sequels.
(g) Includes coordinating instructions that apply to two or more
subordinate elements. Also includes link-up procedures
between the force and forces already in the operation, if
appropriate.
(3) Phase III. The third operational phase is the consolidation of the
results of a successful end state for this phase. It does not contain
the detail of the preceding phases. In this phase, the commander
includes instructions for the—
(a) Redeployment of combat forces to their original locations.
(b) Deployment of CA, MP, engineer, medical, or other types of units
necessary to restore peacetime stability to the target region in
case a continuing US military presence is required.
(c) Modification of the residual force’s relations with US
Government agencies and the host nation to aid in the
transition to peacetime stability.
c. Tasks for Major Subordinate Commands. Set forth tasks that
encompass two or more phases of the major operation in a subparagraph
for each major subordinate command.
d. Coordinating Instructions. Provide instructions appropriate to two or
more phases of the operation. Coordinating instructions may include—
(1) Airspace management procedures. Include the formation of an A2C2
cell and its relation with the theater airspace control authority.
(2) Operational fires planning guidance. Refer to a separate annex
(Annex G).
(3) Force-protection guidance. Refer to a separate annex (Annex M).
Include the mission-oriented protection posture (MOPP) levels.
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(4) Times, events, or situations that signal the transition between
phases.
(5) Constraints (Annex E). Operations in situations short of general
war are usually constrained significantly by factors other than
military ones. Describe such limitations on military actions in an
annex detailing the provisions of treaties, agreements, and
conventions governing the political, humanitarian, and
informational limits on the military effort.
(6) Rules of engagement (Annex F). In addition to constraints imposed
by international agreements, certain self-imposed ROE govern the
use of military forces and certain weapons effects during the major
operation.
(7) Times, events, or situations that signal the transition between
phases.
(8) Resource management guidance.
(9) Training guidance. Refer to a separate annex (Annex Q).
(10) Operational planning guidance.
(11) Space operations planning guidance (Annex P).
(12) Public affairs operations (Annex O).
4. Support. Provide operational support instructions that are of primary
interest to the elements being supported. An ARFOR without its own inherent
logistical organization will refer to the administrative/logistical plan of the
ASCC for detailed procedures on how operational-level support elements and
other subordinate elements may receive support from operational-level
support organizations. In this paragraph or in a support annex (Annex R), the
ARFOR commander describes those support matters necessary to accomplish
the combat mission of his force. He must ensure that support plan phases
coincide with OPLAN phases.
a. Even without an integral support organization, the ARFOR commander
may choose to include the following subjects in his plan’s support
paragraph or annex.
(1) Priorities of supply and maintenance.
(2) Submission of materiel status reports.
(3) Controlled supply rate for Class V.
(4) Prescribed nuclear load.
(5) Chemical munitions allocations.
(6) Designations of LOCs.
(7) Labor policies (use of EPW, civilian labor).
(8) Medical evacuation policies.
(9) Personnel strength reports.
(10) Replacement policies and priorities.
(11) Reconstitution.
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(12) Reception and onward movement of reinforcements.
(13) NEO.
(14) CA.
(15) Host nation considerations.
(16) Public affairs.
b. If a support organization is placed under command of an ARFOR,
include the detailed information normally found in the ASCC plan.
c. Identify support, such as labor, transportation, and facilities from host
nations and friendly third countries. Set forth in detail the procedures
for making use of these resources.
d. Include procedures for ASCC support of contingency forces from CONUS
or other theaters.
e. Highlight routine daily force sustainment, to include the operation of
installations and military communities.
5. Command and Signal.
a. Command. Provide information concerning command post locations,
succession of command, and liaison requirements.
b. Signal. In this subparagraph or its supporting annex (Annex S),
describe communications procedures and priorities such as radio
silence, CEOI, codes, and interface with joint or multinational
communications nets.
(Signed)
(Commander)
ANNEXES:
A - Task Organization/Command Relationships. This annex is presented in
phases. For each phase, list commands directly subordinate to the
headquarters issuing the OPLAN as major headings. Indent, under the title of
each direct subordinate command, the direct subordinates of that command in
the order prescribed in FM 101-5, Appendix G. In a numbered army, include
corps and maneuver organizations smaller than corps directly under army
control, army field artillery air defense units, and other EAC organizations.
Additionally, this annex—
•Describes the relationships of the headquarters issuing the order with its
higher headquarters/authority and its special relationships with non-DOD
US Government agencies (embassies, country teams, DEA, CIA).
•Describes relationships with host nations and with forces from regional/
treaty organizations, to include their integration into the overall force
structure.
•Unambiguously sets forth the relationships discussed in FM 100-7. The
commander issuing this order may be the JFC whose existing army
headquarters is the nucleus of the headquarters of the JTF. The
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commander may be the commander of ARFOR as discussed in Chapters 2
and 6 of FM 100-7, with the responsibility for the operational and tactical
employment of ground forces. The commander may be the CJTF’s Army
component commander, with command less OPCON of ARFOR. Separate
headquarters may be designated to perform each of the three functions, or
a single headquarters may perform two, or even all three, functions: JTF
headquarters, ARFOR headquarters, and Army component headquarters.
B - Intelligence. This annex includes the following information:
•Analysis of the AO. Climate, geography, political matters, aspects of
economics, and social/cultural affairs affecting the operation.
••Strategic factors.
••Operational/tactical factors.
•Enemy situation. Strengths, vulnerabilities, capabilities, dispositions,
personalities.
••Strategic factors.
••Operational/tactical factors.
•Essential elements of information.
•IPB, to include acquisition tasks.
•Counterintelligence.
•Intelligence administration. Handling of prisoners of war, documents,
materiel, and intelligence reports.
•Joint/multinational intelligence links. Interface with the ASCC's ACE to
provide for the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information by
allies, US strategic means, and joint sources.
C - Operations Overlay. A graphic representation of the concept of operations.
D - Deception. This annex includes a description of the deception objective, the
deception story, resources available, excerpts of higher headquarters deception
plans, and the active and passive deception measures to be taken by
subordinate organizations.
E - Constraints. This annex contains those political, humanitarian, economic,
and social/cultural limitations on the application of military power during the
operation. It references US laws and treaties, conventions, and international
agreements. This annex includes restrictions on the use of certain weapons,
limitations on tactical methods, or entry into certain areas. It may prescribe
the seizure and retention of certain objectives for political and psychological
reasons or the mandatory use of allied or multinational forces in certain
situations. This annex includes policies of nations in or near the target area
that may inhibit military actions.
F - Rules of Engagement. This annex contains those guidelines to subordinate
and supporting organizations regarding the rules for the control of forces and
their weapons systems. The security of the force and its personnel is balanced
against the need to prevent the employment of undue or excessive military
force.
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G - Fire Support. This annex describes the concept for synchronizing
operational fires with operational movement and maneuver. It includes
priorities of fires, targeting considerations, and control measures. Its phases
coincide with those of the OPLAN. It is augmented by appendixes.
•Air Support. This appendix outlines the major roles and tasks to be carried
out by air elements, priorities of allocations for CAS and battlefield air
interdiction, specific control arrangements, and procedures for the
operational SEAD.
•Field Artillery. This appendix describes the organization for combat,
missions for field artillery formations providing operational fires, and
timing of attachments and detachments or changes in artillery unit
missions.
•Naval Gunfire. This appendix describes the concept for employment of
naval gunfire, allocation of observers or spotters, allocations or missions of
ships, and limitations and control measures peculiar to naval gunfire.
•Chemical Support. This appendix includes the concept of employment for
chemical weapons and the prescribed chemical load.
•Nuclear Support. This appendix includes the concept of employment for
nonstrategic nuclear weapons (NSNW), to include coordinating
instructions for nominating NSNW targets, controls, and constraints;
preclusion data for collateral damage and troop safety; arrangements for
the initiation of nuclear operations; and procedures for integrating
conventional weapons with NSNW.
H - Air Defense. This annex includes the joint or multinational air defense
organization, organic and supporting air defense capabilities, ROE, weapons
control procedures, and enemy air capabilities.
I - Electronic Warfare. This annex includes the EW mission, enemy EW
capabilities, defensive and offensive EW measures, and coordination with
other parts of the OPLAN (deception, communications, PSYOP, operational
fires).
J - Engineer. This annex includes priorities of engineer work to mobility,
countermobility, and survival tasks. It also includes planning and execution of
operational obstacles and barriers, engineer organization for combat, and
engineer tasks for subordinate organizations.
K - Psychological Operations. This annex refers to the intelligence annex,
designates PSYOP targets, and describes the PSYOP plan, to include its
integration into higher headquarters plans and deception plan operations or
related tasks for subordinate units.
L - Rear Operations. This annex contains instructions for the protection of the
designated rear area in the host country and neighboring friendly countries
from all levels of threats. It designates a joint/multinational rear area
coordinator, usually the ASCC, and outlines provisions for the defense of bases,
base clusters, and other facilities, using assigned and attached units, host
country resources, and, if necessary, tactical combat forces.
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M - Protection. This annex contains instructions for the protection of bases,
installations, military personnel, family members, and other US nationals in
the theater from terrorism, natural disasters, and other dangers.
N - Provost Marshal. This annex prioritizes the four MP battlefield missions
for employed MP forces: area security, battlefield circulation control, EPW
operations, and law enforcement. It should correlate with Annex M
(Protection) and Annex F (Rules of Engagement).
O - Public Affairs. This annex contains guidance for facilitating the media
effort to cover the operation and for supporting the information needs of the
soldiers and their families.
P - Space Operations. This annex describes planned and available space
support to the OPLAN. It explains how to obtain and coordinate space support,
in addition to listing operational constraints and shortfalls.
Q - Training. This annex contains guidance for the multinational, joint, and
service training of individuals and units assigned or attached to the theater
army.
R - Support. This annex spells out in detail the necessary support for
subordinate formations to accomplish their missions. The information is keyed
to the phases of the OPORD when appropriate. The annex prescribes priorities
of supply and maintenance, requirements for submission of reports, and
sources of support (units in the force itself, the host nation, or the Army
component of the unified command in the region). This annex is organized in
categories and may be presented in separate appendixes if necessary.
•Supply. Levels for each class of supply at organizational, direct support,
and general support echelons. Location of MMC, map, and water supply.
•Transportation and Movements.
••Strategic movements. Coordination with TRANSCOM and other
services for airlift and sealift.
••Establishment of intermediate staging bases.
••Movements in operational area. Ports, airfields, railroads, airlift, LOCs.
••Location and functions of the MCC.
•Services.
••Construction.
••Graves registration.
••Field services.
••Explosive ordnance disposal.
••Local procurement and contracting.
••Postal.
Labor.
•Maintenance.
•Medical evacuation and hospitalization. Evacuation policies.
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•Personnel Service
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Support.
••Strengths. Casualty reports and replacement policies.
••Morale, welfare, and recreation.
••Finance.
••Religious support.
••Discipline, law, and order.
•CA.
•Reconstitution.
•NEO.
•EPW.
S - Communications-Electronics. This annex includes items contained in
subparagraph 5b when its contents are too voluminous to put in the body of the
OPLAN. It describes the link provided by the force headquarters between the
Army tactical command and control system, which exists among its
subordinate units, and the joint and multinational C2 systems, as well as those
of the sustaining base. A joint communications support element can be
attached to the force headquarters to provide joint interface.
•This annex provides for employment of three communications conduits:
area common user (ACU), data distribution system (DDS), and combat net
radio (CNR). These systems are automated, with provisions for parts of the
force (allies, other services, reserve components) not possessing the degree
of automation capability possessed by the bulk of the force.
•This annex describes dealing with the possible degradation of
communications, with provisions for redundancy, electronic
countermeasures, OPSEC, and hardening and the use of radio silence and
messengers.
DISTRIBUTION:
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Appendix D
Digitization of the Battlefield
The concept for information operations describes the explosion in
information technology and the effects on Army operations. It relates
the importance of information and how to win the information war in
military operations, now and into the twenty-first century. The
ability to manipulate, isolate, or negate portions of information
infrastructure systems (electromagnetic spectrum, computers, and so
forth) will be key element of future military operations—in war and
MOOTW. Disrupting an opponent’s ability to effectively use these
systems, while protecting our own, will prove crucial in the future.
INFORMATION AGE TECHNOLOGY
Information Age technology will provide
the means to control and dominate the battle
space in any situation. The Army of today and
into the twenty-first century will meet the
challenges of the Information Age by achieving
force coherence through shared knowledge,
instead of through traditional means such as
graphic control measures or geographical
demarcations. Joint Pub 3-13 and FM 100-6
establish doctrine for this new domain.
Information operations provide commanders
the METT-T-specific knowledge, coupled with
a rapid and precise vision of the battlefield, to
gain dominance in a battle space and control
the tempo of operations.
Rapid advances in automated C2 systems
require commanders and soldiers to operate
highly sophisticated equipment to function
effectively on the battlefield. Information about
the adversary and friendly formations will be
distributed among all committed forces—land,
sea, air, and space-to create a common view of
the battle space and a shared situational
awareness across the force. This shared
situational awareness, coupled with the ability
to conduct continuous operations, will allow
Force XXI armies to observe, decide, and act
faster, more correctly, and more precisely than
their adversaries.
Soldiers do not gain advantage over the
enemy by simply using automated equipment.
Soldiers achieve and exploit the advantage
when they optimize information presented by
digital systems. Optimizing the use of
automated information begins with discretion
in the use of digital reporting. Digital reporting
and the digital display are not substitutes for
hard copy reports or maps; they are aids in
managing and presenting information for the
purpose of decision making.
THE DIGITIZED FORCE
Future information technology will provide conventionally-equipped predecessor. The
the means to collect, process, disseminate, and digitized force has an improved capability to
display information in unparalleled volume, achieve the agility, depth, and synchronization
speed, and accuracy. Digitization of the that characterize successful Army operations
battlefield provides common formats, rapid through the use of shared collective unit
processing, and timely transmission of data. images.
The ASCC/ARFOR commander must be
concerned with asymmetrical capabilities Collective unit images form a battle space
within the force. While modernizing the force, framework. This framework is based on shared
he must be cognizant of units that are real-time awareness of the arrangement of
maintaining current capabilities—not only forces in the battle space, instead of a rigid
ARFOR but also joint and multinational as framework of battlefield geometry such as
well. The digitized force has capabilities and phase lines, objectives, and battle positions.
limitations distinctly separate from its Digitization of the force permits commanders
D-O
FM 100-7
at every level to share a common, relevant
picture of the battlefield scaled to their level of
interest and tailored to their specific needs.
Commanders of digitized units at the same
echelon share a perspective (situational
awareness) of their position in relation to
adjacent units. Combat, CS, and CSS leaders,
horizontally linked by common information,
visualize how they will conduct and support
major operations, battles, and engagements.
Their execution is integrated by a shared vision
of the battle space.
The commander of a digitized force has
significant advantages over commanders of
conventionally-equipped forces. The most
significant advantages are-
•An increased situational awareness.
•Enhancement of the planning and
preparation of orders and the distribution
process.
•Digital aids that enhance the timeliness and
accuracy of the reporting process and
employment of assets.
•An improved capability to achieve mass at
the decisive point. (This includes the
achievement of mass of CS and CSS assets
as well).
•Digitization and automation of reports,
which provide the capability to share
information at each level of the chain of
command. The recipient of a report can look
at the location of the reported enemy
element and compare it to his operational
graphics and friendly unit locations. This
comparison allows the recipient to
determine potential problems with the
disposition or orientation of friendly units
and adjust accordingly.
In offensive operations, automated
reporting is useful in synchronizing the scheme
of maneuver during unexpected contingencies
such as identifying enemy obstacles. This
exchange of automated combat information
provides the commander and his staff critical
information necessary to maintain and exploit
the initiative during offensive operations. In
defensive operations, automated reports
enable commanders of digital units to transmit
all information on enemy activity in sector in
one digital spot report, instead of in many
separate spot reports. With the increased
reliance on digital technology comes the
limitations of the hardware and software
associated with the systems. Limitations in
computer memory and communications
capabilities address the requirement to
maintain conventional control methods for
units.
NONDIGITAL UNIT INTEGRATION
The integration of digitally-equipped
elements with conventionally-equipped
(nondigital) elements into the force presents
special challenges for the commander and staff.
The commander must ensure that both digital
and nondigital procedures are available for
communicating and supporting. The ASCC/
ARFOR commander must establish provisions
to receive automated information from digital
units. Control measures used by digital units
are identical to hard-copy overlays.
SUPPORTING
Application of information operations
(electronic management and information
systems) necessitates the formation of strategic
alliances between Army logistics mechanisms
in theater and civilian industry. This forged
linkage between the sustainment base and the
ASCC/ARFOR commander will negate the
The ASCC/ARFOR commander must use
liaison officers or establish other positive
control measures to ensure proper coordination
between digital and nondigital units. The
ASCC/ARFOR commander must establish
procedures that specify which reports will be
communicated digitally, by voice, or in hard
copy. Digital information will be processed for
distribution to nondigital units.
THE FORCE
requirement for Army-managed, in-theater
stockpiles and incorporate split-based
operations. Because of situational awareness
(the shared knowledge on the digitized
battlefield between combat, CS, and CSS
units), CSS units can maintain an on-time
inventory of supplies and deliver the supplies
D-1
Appendix D
more efficiently. CSS units will push required
support forward—to the right units at the right
time.
Digitization of the battlefield will increase
awareness and coordination over a wide area,
enabling the commander to obtain the near
real-time information he needs in the most
efficient and effective format. This digitization
provides the commander with—
•A common view of the battlefield.
•Situational awareness.
•Battlefield synchronization.
•C2 on the move.
•Horizontal integration.
•Combat identification.
•Fratricide prevention.
To effectively plan the application and
employment of these new technologies within
the force, the ASCC/ARFOR commander must
be aware of their advantages and
disadvantages. Synchronizing digitized and
nondigitized units will be a major task.
D-2
SOURCES USED
These are the sources quoted or paraphrased in this publication.
STATUTES
Public Law 94-329. Arms Export Control Act of 1976. 30 June 1976.
Public Law 87-195. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. 4 September 1961.
Public Law 61-253. National Security Act (NSA) of 1947. 26 July 1947.
Public Law 433. The Goldwater Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act
of 1986. 1 October 1986.
STRATEGIC PUBLICATIONS
Joint Strategic Capability Plan.
National Military Strategy. February 1995.
National Security Strategy. January 1994.
National Security Strategy. January 1995.
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FM 90-12/FMFRP 2-73/TACP 50-50/PACAFP 50-50/USAFEP 50-50/AACP 50-50.
Base Defense - Multiservice Procedures for Defense of a Joint Base.
2 October 1989.
FM 90-23/TACP 50-49/USAFEP 50-49/PACAFP 50-49/AACP 50-49. Rear Security
Operations - Army-Tactical Air Forces Procedures for Rear Security Operations
at Echelons Above Corps. 14 November 1989.
FM 100-103-l/FMFRP 5-61/NDC TACNOTE 3-52.l/ACCP 50-38/USAFEP 50-38/
PACAFP 50-38. Multiseruice Procedures for Integrated Combat Airspace
Command and Control (ICAC2). 3 October 1994.
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Joint Pub 3-07. Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War.
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Joint Pub 3-10. Doctrine for Joint Rear Area Operations. 26 February 1993.
Joint Pub 3-10.1. Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Base Defense.
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Joint Pub 3-56.1. Command and Control for Joint Air Operations. 15 August 1993.
References-0
FM 100-7
Joint Pub 5-O. Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations. 15 August 1994.
Joint Pub 5-00.1. Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Campaign
Planning. 1 July 1994 (first draft).
Joint Pub 5-00.2. Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures.
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ARMY PUBLICATIONS
AR 500-5. Army Mobilization, Operations, and Planning Execution System.
May 1992.
FM 3-3. Chemical and Biological Contamination Avoidance. 16 November 1992.
FM 3-4. NBC Protection. 29 May 1992.
FM 1-111. Aviation Brigades. August 1990.
FM 3-4. NBC Protection. 29 March 1992.
FM 3-100. NBC Defense, Chemical Warfare, Smoke and Flame Operations.
23 May 1991.
FM 3-101. Chemical Staff and Units. September 1993 (final draft).
FM 5-116. Engineer Operations: Echelons Above Corps. March 1989.
FM 6-20. Fire Support in the AirLand Battle. May 1988
FM 6-20-10. Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting Process (to be
published).
FM 7-85. Ranger Unit Operations. June 1987.
FM 8-10. Health Service Support in a Theater of Operations. March 1991.
FM 9-15. Explosive Ordnance Disposal Service and Unit Operations.
20 March 1989.
FM 10-67. Petroleum Supply in Theaters of Operations. February 1983.
FM 11-45. Signal Support: Echelons Above Corps (EAC). April 1993.
FM 11-75. Battlefield Information Services. October 1993.
FM 12-6. Personnel Doctrine. September 1994.
FM 14-7. Finance Operations. August 1994.
FM 22-103. Leadership and Command at Senior Levels. 21 June 1987.
FM 24-1. Signal Support and the Information Mission Area. May 1993.
FM 25-100. Training The Force. 15 November 1988.
FM 27-100. Legal Operations. 3 September 1991.
FM 31-12. Army Forces in Amphibious Operations (The Army Landing Forces).
28 March 1991.
FM 31-20. Doctrine for Special Forces Operations. April 1990.
FM 33-1. Psychological Operations. February 1993.
References-1
References
FM 33-1-l. Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures.
November 1992 (coordinating draft).
FM 34-1. IEW Operations. 27 September 1994.
FM 34-37. Echelons Above Corps Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations.
January 1991.
FM 41-10. Civil Affairs Operations. December 1985.
FM 44-1. US Army Air Defense Artillery Employment. 21 September 1984.
FM 44-100. US Army Air Defense Operations. December 1994 (final draft).
FM 46-1. Public Affairs Operations. July 1992.
FM 54-40. Area Support Group. July 1987.
FM 55-1. Army Transportation Operations (to be published).
FM 55-10. Movement Control in a Theater of Operations. December 1992.
FM 63-3. Corps Support Command. September 1993.
FM 63-4. Combat Service Support Operations - Theater Army Area Command.
September 1984.
FM 71-100. Division Operations. July 1994 (coordinating draft).
FM 90-29. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO). 1 November 1993 (final
draft).
FM 100-1. The Army. December 1991.
FM 100-5. Operations. 14 June 1993.
FM 100-6. Information Operations. 22 July 1994 (coordinating draft).
FM 100-8. The Army in Multinational Operations. December 1994 (revised draft).
FM 100-9. Reconstitution. 13 January 1992.
FM 100-10. Combat Seruice Support. 18 February 1988.
FM 100-15. Corps Operations. September 1989.
FM 100-16. Army Operational Support. 31 May 1995.
FM 100-19. Domestic Support Operations. 1 July 1993.
FM 100-20. Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict. December 1990.
FM 100-23. Peace Operations. 30 December 1994
FM 100-25. Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces. 1 January 1991.
FM 100-103. Army Airspace Command and Control in a Combat Zone.
7 October 1987.
FM 101-5. Command and Control for Commanders and Staffs. August 1993.
TRADOC Pamphlet 11-9. Blueprint of the Battlefield (to be published).
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5. Force XXI Operations. 1 August 1994.
OTHER PUBLICATIONS
AFM 1-1. Basic Aerospace Doctrine. 16 March 1984.
FMFM 1. Campaigning. 25 January 1990.
References-2
FM 100-7
FMFM 1-1. Warfighting. 6 March 1989.
Certain Victory: The US Army in the Gulf War. Washington, DC: Headquarters,
Department of the Army. August 1990.
“Elimination of the Field Army.” Military Review. October 1973.
Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: An Interim Report to Congress. Washington,
DC: United States Department of Defense. July 1991.
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Large Units: Theater Army—Army Group—Field Army. Combat Studies Institute
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Naval Doctrine Publication 1. Naval Warfare. 28 March 1994.
Operational Art in Low-Intensity Conflict. Center for Low Intensity Conflict
Papers. September 1985.
Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College. The Operational Art of Warfare
Across the Spectrum of Conflict. 1 February 1987.
After-Action Report Executive Summary. US Army Forces, Somalia, 10th Mountain
Division (L). May 1993.
Von Clausewitz, Carl. On War. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and
Peter Paret, Princeton University Press, 1976.
Yeosock, John J. “Army Operations in the Gulf Theater.” Military Review.
September 1991.
Yeosock, John J. “H+1OO: An Army Comes of Age in the Persian Gulf.” Military
Review. October 1991.
DOCUMENTS NEEDED
These documents must be available to the intended user of this publication.
AR 523-13. The Army Combatting Terrorism Program. 26 June 1992.
FM 3-100. NBC Defense, Chemical Warfare, Smoke, and Flame Operations.
23 May 1991.
FM 3-101. Chemical Staffs and Units. September 1993 (draft).
FM 63-4. Combat Service Support Operations, Theater Army Area Command.
December 1989.
FM 100-5. Operations. 14 June 1993.
FM 100-6. Information Operations. 22 July 1994 (coordination draft).
FM 100-8. Combined Army Operations. 1 November 1993 (revised final draft).
FM 100-10. Logistics. April 1994 (initial draft).
FM 100-15. Corps Operations. September 1989.
FM 100-16. Army Operational Support. (to be published).
References-3
References
FM 100-17. Mobilization, Deployment, Redeployment, Demobilization.
28 October 1992.
FM 100-20. Military Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict. December 1990.
FM 100-25. Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces. 1 January 1991.
FM 101-5. Command and Control for Commanders and Staffs. August 1993 (final
draft).
Joint Pub 0-2. Unified Action Armed Forces. 11 August 1994.
Joint Pub 1. Joint Warfare for the US Armed Forces. 11 November 1991.
Joint Pub 1-01. Joint Publications System (Joint Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures Development Program). 14 September 1993.
Joint Pub 2-0. Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations.
12 October 1993.
Joint Pub 3-0. Doctrine for Joint Operations. 9 September 1993.
Joint Pub 3-00.1. Joint Doctrine for Contingency Operations (to be published).
Joint Pub 3-01.2. Joint Doctrine for Theater Counterair Operations.
15 March 1993.
Joint Pub 3-01.4. Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Suppression
of Enemy Air Defenses. June 1990.
Joint Pub 3-03. Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations. 11 December 1990.
Joint Pub 3-04. Doctrine for Joint Maritime Operations (Air). 31 July 1991.
Joint Pub 3-05. Doctrine for Joint Special Operations. 17 October 1990.
Joint Pub 3-07. Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low-Intensity Operations.
18 October 1990.
Joint Pub 3-08. Doctrine for Joint Ballistic Missile Defense (to be published),
Joint Pub 3-10. Doctrine for Joint Rear Area Operations. 26 February 1993.
Joint Pub 3-10.1. Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Base Defense.
15 March 1993.
Joint Pub 3-11. Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC)
Defense (to be published).
Joint Pub 3-12.
Joint Pub 3-13.
Joint Pub 3-14.
Joint Pub 3-15.
Joint Pub 3-17.
Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations. 29 April 1993.
C3CM in Joint Military Operations. 10 September 1987.
Joint Doctrine for Space Operations. 15 November 1990.
Joint Doctrine for Barriers, Obstacles, and Mines. 20 June 1993.
Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Theater Airlift
Operations (to be published).
Joint Pub 3-51. Electronic Warfare in Joint Military Operations. 30 June 1991.
Joint Pub 3-52. Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in a Combat Zone.
3 December 1993.
Joint Pub 3-53. Joint Psychological Operations Doctrine. 30 July 1993.
Joint Pub 3-54. Joint Doctrine for Operations Security. 21 August 1991.
References-4
FM 100-7
Joint Pub 3-55. Doctrine for Joint Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target
Acquisition. 15 November 1990.
Joint Pub 3-56. Tactical Command and Control Planning Guidance and
Procedures for Joint Operations. 16 May 1979.
Joint Pub 3-57. Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs. May 1990.
Joint Pub 3-58. Joint Doctrine for Operational Deception (to be published).
Joint Pub 3-59. Joint Doctrine for Meteorological and Oceanographic Support.
1 June 1990.
Joint Pub 4-0. Doctrine for logistics Support of Joint Operations.
25 September 1992.
Joint Pub 4-01. Mobility System Policies, Procedures, and Considerations.
15 September 1983.
Joint Pub 4-01.3. Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Movement Control.
26 January 1994.
Joint Pub 5-00.2. Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures.
3 September 1991.
Joint Pub 5-03 Series. Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (to be
published).
Joint Pub 5-03.1. Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (Execution).
August 1993.
Joint Pub 6-02. Joint Doctrine for Operational/Tactical C3 Systems. 7 March 1978.
Joint Pub 6-04 Series. United States Message Text Formatting. October 1991.
Joint Pub 6-05.1. Employment of Joint Tactical Communications Systems.
24 April 1992.
Joint Pub 6-05.2. Manual for Employing Joint Tactical Communications Systems
Joint Voice Communication Systems. 1 March 1989.
Joint Pub 6-05.3. Manual for Employing Joint Tactical Communications Systems
Joint Record Data Communication. 15 November 1990.
Joint Pub 6-05.4. Manual for Employing Joint Tactical Communications Systems
Joint Transmissions Systems. 1 July 1990.
Joint Pub 6-05.5. Manual for Employing Joint Tactical Communications Systems
Joint Communications Security (C). November 1989.
Joint Pub 6-05.6. Manual for Employing Joint Tactical Communications Systems
Joint Tactical Technical Controls Procedures/Systems. 15 October 1987 (in
revision).
Joint Pub 6-05.7. Manual for Employing Joint Tactical Communications Systems
Joint Network Management and Control Systems. 31 August 1992.
Joint Pub 6-05.2. Manual for Employing Joint Tactical Communications Systems
Joint Voice Communication Systems. 1 March 1989.
Joint Pub 6-05.3. Manual for Employing Joint Tactical Communications Systems
Joint Record Data Communication. 15 November 1990.
Joint Pub 6-05.4. Manual for Employing Joint Tactical Communications Systems
Joint Transmission Systems. 1 July 1990.
References-5
Joint Pub 6-05.5. Manual for Employing Joint Tactical Communications Systems
Joint Communications Security (C). November 1989.
Joint Pub 6-05.6. Manual for Employing Joint Tactical Communications Systems
Joint Tactical Technical Controls Procedures/Systems. 15 October 1987 (in
revision).
Joint Pub 6-05.7. Manual for Employing Joint Tactical Communications Systems
Joint Network Management and Control Systems. 31 August 1992.
READINGS RECOMMENDED
These readings contain relevant supplemental information.
AFM 1-1. Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the US Air Force. March 1992.
FM 22-103. Leadership and Command at Senior Levels. June 1987.
FM 25-100. Training the Force. November 1988.
FM 100-19. Domestic Support Operations. July 1993.
National Military Strategy. February 1995
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5. Force XXI Operations. 1 August 1994.
References-6