FM 3-19.4
(Formerly FM 19-4)
MILITARY POLICE LEADERS’
HANDBOOK
HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION:
Approved for public release;
distribution is unlimited.
*FM 3-19.4
Change 1
C1
Field Manual
Headquarters
No. 3-19.4
Department of the Army
Washington, DC, 2 August 2002
Military Police
Leaders' Handbook
1. Change FM 3-19.4, 4 March 2002 as follows:
Remove Old Pages
Insert New Pages
G-7 through G-12
G-7 through G-12
G-15
G-15
2. A bar ( ) marks new or changed material.
3. File this transmittal in front of the publication.
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release;
distribution is unlimited.
FM 3-19.4
C1
2 AUGUST 2002
By Order of the Secretary of the Army:
ERIC K. SHINSEKI
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
Official:
JOEL B. HUDSON
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
0216902
DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, Army National Guard, and US Army Reserve: To
be distributed in accordance with the initial distribution
number 111047, requirements for FM 3-19.4
This publication is available on the
General Dennis J. Reimer Training
And Doctrine Digital Library at
www.adtdl.army.mil
FM 3-19.4 (FM 19-4)
Field Manual
Headquarters
No. 3-19.4
Department of the Army
Washington, DC, 4 March 2002
Military Police Leaders’
Handbook
Contents
Page
PREFACE ................................................................ vii
Chapter 1
MILITARY POLICE OVERVIEW ........................... 1-1
Introduction ............................................................ 1-1
Military Police Functional Areas ............................. 1-2
Threat..................................................................... 1-6
Military Police Platoon Organization
and Leadership ................................................ 1-7
Force Protection (FP) Measures .......................... 1-12
Military Police Platoon Mission,
Capabilities, and Limitations .......................... 1-13
Peacetime Training .............................................. 1-15
Chapter 2
BATTLE COMMAND ............................................. 2-1
Overview ................................................................ 2-1
Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP)............ 2-2
Troop-Leading Procedures .................................. 2-11
Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is
unlimited.
_____________________
i
*This publication supersedes FM 19-4, 7 May 1993.
FM 3-19.4
Page
Orders and Reports .............................................. 2-20
Rules of Engagement and Rules of
Interaction (ROI)............................................. 2-21
Situational Awareness .......................................... 2-22
Command Post Operations .................................. 2-26
Chapter 3
SHOOT, MOVE, AND COMMUNICATE ................ 3-1
Shoot ...................................................................... 3-1
Move ..................................................................... 3-40
Communicate........................................................ 3-58
Chapter 4
COMBAT OPERATIONS ....................................... 4-1
Prepare for Combat ................................................ 4-1
Construct Fighting and Survivability Positions ...... 4-24
Defend a Site ........................................................ 4-41
Patrols................................................................... 4-46
Clearing Techniques ............................................. 4-52
Chapter 5
MANEUVER AND MOBILITY SUPPORT .............. 5-1
Maneuver Support .................................................. 5-1
Mobility Support .................................................... 5-19
Chapter 6
AREA SECURITY .................................................. 6-1
Reconnaissance Operations................................... 6-1
Area Damage Control ........................................... 6-14
Base Defense ....................................................... 6-17
Air Base Defense .................................................. 6-21
Enemy Delay ........................................................ 6-49
Battle Handover to a Tactical Combat Force ........ 6-56
Critical Site, Asset, and High-Risk
Personnel Security ......................................... 6-64
Chapter 7
INTERNMENT AND RESETTLEMENT.... .............. 7-1
Overview ................................................................. 7-1
Enemy Prisoners of War and Civilian Internee ....... 7-2
ii
FM 3-19.4
Page
United States Military Prisoner
Handling (Field Detention Facilities) .............. 7-21
Populace and Resource Control (PRC) ............... 7-25
Dislocated Civilian Resettlement .......................... 7-27
Evacuation Operations ......................................... 7-29
Chapter 8
LAW AND ORDER ................................................ 8-1
Overview ................................................................ 8-1
Law and Order Augmentation Detachment ............ 8-3
Company and Platoon Level Law and
Order Operations ............................................. 8-6
United States Customs Support ........................... 8-14
Multinational Law and Order Operations .............. 8-17
Chapter 9
POLICE INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS .............. 9-1
Overview ................................................................ 9-1
Police Information Assessment
Process ............................................................ 9-2
Police Information................................................... 9-3
Responsibilities ...................................................... 9-7
Appendix A
METRIC CONVERSION CHART ........................... A-1
Appendix B
MEDIA RELATIONS .............................................. B-1
Overview ................................................................ B-1
Media Interaction .................................................... B-1
Appendix C
TRAINING EXECUTION MODEL .......................... C-1
Overview ................................................................ C-1
Task Identification .................................................. C-1
Appendix D
ORDERS AND REPORTS ..................................... D-1
Orders .................................................................... D-1
Reports................................................................... D-4
iii
FM 3-19.4
Page
Appendix E
PRECOMBAT INSPECTIONS .............................. E-1
Modified Precombat Inspection Checklist .............. E-1
Precombat Inspection Checklist ............................ E-3
Appendix F
FRATRICIDE AVOIDANCE... ................................. F-1
Fratricide ................................................................. F-1
Fratricide Effects ..................................................... F-2
Fratricide Causes.................................................... F-2
Fratricide Risk Assessment .................................... F-3
Preventive Measures .............................................. F-5
Friendly Fire Incidents ............................................ F-7
Leader Responsibilities........................................... F-9
Appendix G
MK19 QUALIFICATION TABLES......................... G-1
Primary Gunner, MK19 Qualification and
Zero/Practice Tables ....................................... G-1
Assistant Gunner, MK19 Firing Table, Mounted .. G-10
MK19 Scorecard .................................................. G-15
Appendix H
COUNTERMINE OPERATIONS ........................... H-1
Overview ................................................................ H-1
Detect .................................................................... H-2
Report .................................................................... H-6
Mark ....................................................................... H-6
Appendix I
ROUTE CLASSIFICATION AND SIGNING
SYSTEM .................................................................. I-1
Overview .................................................................. I-1
Route Classification Formula ................................... I-2
Calculations ........................................................... I-15
Temporary Route Signing ...................................... I-23
Main Supply Route Signs ...................................... I-37
Portable Sign-Making Kit ....................................... I-41
iv
FM 3-19.4
Page
Appendix J
NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL
DEFENSE .............................................................. J-1
Overview ................................................................ J-1
Hazard Detection and Reporting ............................ J-2
Contamination Marking .......................................... J-4
Radiological Contamination Detection
and Monitoring ............................................... J-11
Chemical Agent Detection .................................... J-14
Biological Agent Detection ................................... J-16
Self-Defense Measures ........................................ J-17
Military Police Leaders' Responsibilities............... J-22
Mission-Oriented Protection
Posture Levels, Alarms, and Signals ............. J-23
Biological Defense................................................ J-24
Nuclear Attack Defense........................................ J-26
Chemical Attack Defense ..................................... J-29
Symptoms and Treatment of Casualties .............. J-30
Unmasking Procedures ........................................ J-31
Appendix K
CIVIL-DISTURBANCE MEASURES ..................... K-1
Overview ................................................................ K-1
Civil Disturbances on Department of
Defense Installations Outside the
Continental United States ................................ K-2
Crowd Behavior...................................................... K-3
Crowd Tactics......................................................... K-4
Company Level Operations .................................... K-7
Nonlethal Munitions................................................ K-9
Appendix L
WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT.............................. L-1
Friendly Vehicles .................................................... L-1
Friendly Weapons .................................................. L-4
Friendly Nonlethal Equipment and Munitions ......... L-6
Friendly Communication, Single-Channel,
Ground-to-Air Radio System (SINCGARS).... L-24
Threat Weapons and Equipment.......................... L-25
v
FM 3-19.4
Page
GLOSSARY .............................................. Glossary-1
INDEX .............................................................. Index-1
BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................. Bibliography-1
vi
Preface
This field manual (FM) addresses military police (MP) maneuver
and mobility support (MMS), area security (AS), internment and
resettlement (I/R), law and order (L&O), and police intelligence
operations (PIO) across the full spectrum of Army operations.
Although this manual includes a discussion of corps and division MP
elements, it primarily focuses on the principles of platoon operations
and the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) the platoon uses
to accomplish its mission.
This FM provides the capabilities and organization of the MP,
demonstrates the flexibility and diversity of MP in adapting to any
mission throughout the full spectrum of Army operations, and
characterizes the MP as a combat-force multiplier. Additionally,
this manual identifies the fact that the Army will not conduct
operations alone and defines the role of the MP in support of joint,
multinational, and interagency operations.
The MP TTP are organized by the MP functions of MMS, AS, I/R,
LO, and PIO with supporting tasks, both individual and collective,
to help illustrate the functions.
NOTE: United States (US) policy regarding the use and
employment of antipersonnel land mines (APLs) outlined in
this FM is subject to the convention on certain conventional
weapons and executive orders (EOs). Current US policy
limits the use of non-self-destructing APLs to (1) defending
the US and its allies from armed aggression across the
Korean demilitarized zone and (2) training personnel
engaged in demining and countermine operations. The use
of the M18A1 claymore in the command-detonation mode is
not restricted under international law or EO.
Appendix A complies with current Army directives which state that
the metric system will be incorporated into all new publications.
Appendix B deals with media relations.
vii
FM 3-19.4
The proponent of this publication is Headquarters (HQ) United
States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Send
comments and recommendations on Department of the Army (DA)
Form 2028 directly to Commandant, US Army Military Police
School, ATTN: ATSJ-MP-TD, 401 MANSCEN Loop, Suite 2060, Fort
Leonard Wood, Missouri 65473-8926.
Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and
pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.
viii
Chapter 1
Military Police Overview
This chapter provides information about how
MP are organized, equipped, and trained to
provide combat support (CS) across the full
spectrum of Army operations.
INTRODUCTION
1-1. As a flexible economy-of-force organization, MP
provide a wide range of diverse support because of their
agility and versatility to adapt to any mission or
environment. As a combat multiplier, they support the
maneuver commander through the five MP functions.
MP contribute to the commander’s overall combat power
by integrating efforts with those of other combat, CS,
and combat service support (CSS) elements.
1-2. In addition to single-service operations, MP also
support joint, multinational, and interagency activities.
MP support air base defense in concert with Air Force
Security Forces, operate joint and multinational
checkpoints, conduct combined police patrols, and
exchange police information and criminal intelligence
with the host nation (HN), military, and civilian police
agencies.
1-3. MP have the capability to expedite the movement of
combat resources, provide critical asset security and
protection, conduct I/R, contribute to force protection
efforts through L&O operations, and gather and
disseminate police information and intelligence.
Military Police Overview 1-1
FM 3-19.4
MILITARY POLICE FUNCTIONAL AREAS
1-4. With th e old ba ttlefield m i ssion s, the ter m
"operations" was used extensively and carried too broad
of a meaning. To clarify the specific tasks of the MP, the
battlefield missions have been redefined into the
following five functional areas:
•
MMS
•
AS
•
I/R
•
L&O
•
PIO
1-5. Each of these MP functions have task areas and
tasks that support them. MP functions are the broadest
areas for which tasks are placed. Some of these tasks
will require groupings that might not be related to the
entire function. Therefore, task areas were created to
group specific tasks. Specific tasks consist of two types—
collective and individual. Individual tasks are further
divided into leader and soldier tasks (Figure 1-1). The
collective and individual tasks that support the MP task
areas are found in the MP mission training plans (MTP)
and MP soldier’s manuals (SMs).
1-6. MP procedures are the lowest level of detail. They
explain the "how to" at the task level. Procedures
i nc l u d e th e sta n d i ng m eth o ds us ed b y a u n i t to
accomplish tasks, weapon and equipment operating
steps, crew drills, and staff action and coordination.
They are the building blocks of individual and collective
task accomplishment and serve as the foundation of
tactics and techniques. Procedures are explained in the
unit standing operating procedures (SOPs), MTPs, SMs,
and similar publications.
MANEUVER AND MOBILITY SUPPORT
1-7. The MMS function involves the measures necessary
to enhance combat movement and the ability to conduct
1-2 Military Police Overview
FM 3-19.4
MP functions
Task areas
Tasks
Collective
Individual
Leader
Soldier
Figure 1-1. Relationship Between MP Functions and Tasks
movement of friendly resources in all environments. MP
conduct MMS to ensure that the commanders receive
personnel, equipment, and supplies when and where
they are needed. The task areas that support the
function of MMS include—
•
MP support for river crossings, breaching, and
passage-of-line operations.
•
Straggler and dislocated civilian control.
•
Route reconnaissance and surveillance.
•
Main
supply
route
(MSR)
regulation
enforcement.
1-8. The security and viability of the operational and
tactical lines of communications (LOC) will be critical to
continuous sustainment and recovery operations. MP
ensure that logistics and supply operations are kept on
time and arrive at the right place. Refer to Chapter 5 for
more information about MMS.
AREA SECURITY
1-9. The AS function consists of those security measures
designed to give commanders freedom of maneuver and
Military Police Overview 1-3
FM 3-19.4
flexibility to conduct operations. The task areas that
support AS include—
•
Reconnaissance operations.
•
Area damage control (ADC).
•
Base and air base defense.
•
Response force and tactical combat force (TCF)
operations.
•
Critical site, asset, and high-risk personnel
security.
•
Force protection and physical security.
•
Antiterrorism.
1-10. MP performing AS contribute to securing and
protecting the force and preserving combat power. Refer
to Chapter 6 for more information about AS.
INTERNMENT AND RESETTLEMENT
1-11. The I/R function consists of those measures
necessary to provide shelter, sustain, guard, protect, and
account for people (enemy prisoners of war [EPWs] and
civilian internees [CIs], US military prisoners, and
dislocated civilians [DC]). The task areas that support I/R
include—
•
EPW and CI handling.
•
Populace and resource control.
•
US military prisoner confinement.
•
DCs control.
1-12. The international community, media, and public
perceptions have increased sensitivity to the protection
of human rights and the need for absolute accountability
of interned, detained personnel, and refugees in military
operations. Refer to Chapter 7 for more information
about I/R.
1-4 Military Police Overview
FM 3-19.4
LAW AND ORDER
1-13. Task areas and tasks that minimize the effects of
a criminal threat on friendly forces support the L&O
function. MP conduct L&O to remove the conditions and
opportunities that promote crime, thereby preventing
diversion of military resources and maintaining military
discipline. The task areas include—
•
Law enforcement.
•
Criminal investigations.
•
US customs operations.
•
Related L&O training.
1-14. Whether patrolling an installation’s housing area,
conducting counterdrug operations, enhancing security,
or investigating war crimes, MP L&O capabilities are
invaluable to the commander. Refer to Chapter 8 for
more information about L&O.
POLICE INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS
1-15. The PIO functi on supports, enha nces, and
contributes to the commander’s protection program,
situational awareness, and battlefield visualization by
portraying relevant threat information that may affect
the operational and tactical environment. The task
areas that support PIO include—
•
Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB).
•
Active and passive roles.
•
Police assessment process.
1-16. Whether in support of peacetime installation L&O
or detecting threat forces in the battle space, the MP
force employment pr ovides th e com mander with
substantial information and an intelligence source,
particularly where the criminal element is the same as
or closely aligned with the opposing forces (OPFOR) and
government. Refer to Chapter 9 for more information
about PIO.
Military Police Overview 1-5
FM 3-19.4
THREAT
1-17. Today, friendly forces encounter a broad range of
traditional and nontraditional threats. No single
dominating threat will be the undisputed focus of US
security policy. Although overt attacks on the US and its
strategic interests may be less common, stability
operations and support operations will likely increase.
Economic development and demographics, as well as the
progression of social and cultural movements, will
encompass an array of threat forces including nonnation
forces (ethnic conflicts and terrorist activities) which
challenge traditional nation and state environments.
Additionally, nation and state forces (internal security
forces and infantry-based and armor-mechanized-based
armies) continue to present a global threat. These forces
possess varying levels of m il itar y a nd advanced
technology capabilities.
1-18. In recent military operations, a nontraditional
criminal threat has emerged. The evolving criminal
threat operates most often in the rear area, near ports,
in built-up areas, and where troop populations are high.
This threat is most likely to be detected at border
crossings trying to disrupt the relocation efforts of DCs.
They may commit crimes against particular ethnic
groups or be at checkpoints and roadblocks trying to
p o s i t i o n w e a p o n s , e x p l o s i v e s , o r p e r s o n n e l i n
s u s t a i n m e n t a r e a s i n o r d e r t o d i s r u p t m i l i t a r y
operations or kill friendly forces. Such a threat requires
commanders to minimize its negative impact on friendly
forces, resources, and operations. The MP continue to
respond to nonmilitary threats including famine, health
epidemics, illegal immigration, illegal drug traffic, and
population dislocation.
1-6 Military Police Overview
FM 3-19.4
MILITARY POLICE PLATOON ORGANIZATION
AND LEADERSHIP
1-19. There are two basic MP platoon organizations,
corps and division. Corps MP platoons are organized and
equipped basically the same. Each division MP platoon
supporting a different kind of division (such as heavy,
light, airborne, or air assault) is designed under a
different table(s) of organization and equipment (TOE).
CORPS MILITARY POLICE
1-20. Depending on the nature of the operation, corps
MP are usually among the first forces deployed to
support military operations around the world. They
deploy early to areas devastated by natural or man-
made disasters to assist disaster relief and damage
assessment efforts. They provide security and force
protection to friendly forces, critical facilities, and
resources as units organize for military operations. In a
developing theater, corps MP concentrate mission
support to the main effort. Units whose assistance to the
main effort is vital normally receive the highest priority
for protection. Key facilities, such as traffic choke points,
critical tunnels and bridges, and ammunition and fuel
storage points may require special protection. As the
theater matures, the focus may quickly change to other
functions as MP adjust priorities to accommodate the
change.
DIVISION MILITARY POLICE
1-21. Division MP are organized somewhat different
depending on the type of division they are supporting.
For example, a heavy division has one MP platoon
providing direct support (DS) to each maneuver brigade
and two MP platoons providing general support (GS) to
the division’s rear. Both airborne and air assault
divisions have four MP platoons providing GS. A light
infantry division is supported by three MP platoons.
Military Police Overview 1-7
FM 3-19.4
1-22. In heavy divisions, where highly mobile forces are
designed to move quickly over open ground, the overall
need for MMS is significant. Division MP are likely to
focus on expediting the forward movement of the critical
combat resources into the division area. However, the
priority could change quickly to removing EPWs from
forward areas to freeing maneuver forces from guarding
and caring for captives.
1-23. In airborne and air assault divisions, priority of
MP support is most often needed for EPW operations
and then for MMS to speed the movement of CS vehicles
within the airhead.
1 - 2 4 . F o r M P s u p p o r t i n g a n y d i v i s i o n , c e r t a i n
employment considerations remain constant. MP
provide dedicated security for assets deemed critical by
the division commander. This includes the division’s
main command post (CP) where MP operate outside the
CP perimeter conducting screening missions designed to
detect, disrupt, and delay enemy forces from disrupting
the division’s primary CP. Another consideration is MP
accepting EPWs from capturing troops as far forward as
possible.
SEPARATE BRIGADES
1-25. MP support to a separate brigade is normally
provided by a four-squad MP platoon. The platoon is
assigned to the brigade headquarters and headquarters
company (HHC). The brigade has a separate provost
marshal (PM) cell that serves as the command and
control (C2) element for the platoon. The brigade PM cell
has operational control (OPCON) of all MP assets the
same way the division PM has OPCON of the division
MP assets. The brigade HHC provides sustainment
support for both the PM cell and the MP platoon. The
PM advises the separate brigade commander on matters
pertaining to MP operations. The platoon leader directs
the execution of the platoon’s missions based on the
1-8 Military Police Overview
FM 3-19.4
priorities set forth by the PM and the supported
commander.
1-26. The platoon can perform any of the five functions.
The platoon leader may task organize the squads
according to mission, enemy, troops, terrain, time
available, and civilian considerations (METT-TC), and
provide one squad to operate the EPW collecting point,
one squad to provide a mobile security screen and occupy
observation posts (OPs) around the brigade’s CP, and
two squads to conduct MMS and AS throughout the
brigade’s rear area.
INITIAL BRIGADE COMBAT TEAMS (IBCTs)
1-27. MP support to an IBCT may differ from that of
other separate brigades. The IBCT is a preconfigured,
ready-to-fight, combined-arms package. It is designed
and optimized primarily for employment in small-scale
contingencies operations (SSCO) in complex and urban
terrain, confronting low-end and mid-range threats. The
IBCT participates in war, with augmentation, as a
subordinate maneuver component within a division or
corps, in a variety of possible roles. It also participates in
stability and/or support operations as an initial entry
force. Ci vil unrest or complete turmoil normally
characterizes these environments.
1-28. Organically, MP support to the IBCT is a two-
person PM planning cell. The PM planning cell is located
with the HHC’s maneuver support cell and under the
direct supervision of the brigade Operations and
Training Officer (US Army) (S3). The role of the PM cell
is significantly different from that of a traditional
d i v i s i o n P M o r s e p a r a t e b r i g a d e P M. T h e m a i n
difference is the lack of organic or habitual MP assets in
the IBCT. The absence of organic MP assets makes the
job of the PM much more critical. The PM must—
•
Understand the organization, capabilities, and
limitations of the IBCT.
Military Police Overview 1-9
FM 3-19.4
•
Conduct effective liaison with higher HQ PM
elements.
•
Become an effective planner and anticipator of
MP requirements.
•
Task organize MP units effectively and efficiently.
•
Assume C2 of incoming MP forces or, if operating
under a division, relinquish C2 to a division or
c o r p s P M ( i f a p p r o p r i a t e f o r e f f e c t i v e
employment of MP forces).
1-29. Depending on METT-TC, the IBCT may be
augmented by MP elements ranging from a platoon to a
battalion. Once the brigade receives MP augmentation,
the PM then becomes a staff planner and coordinator for
all MP activities.
1-30. Since the IBCT is a divisional brigade, the division
P M a nd th e IB CT P M pl a y a n i mp orta n t r o l e i n
developing an optimum MP force package to support the
brigade commander’s concept of the operation. Despite
the brigade’s early time lines, the PM must consider and
plan for MP augmentation forces as early as possible to
free up valuable combat resources. SSCO that result in
numerous EPWs, CIs, and refugees will hamper the
maneuver force's freedom of movement.
1-31. Initially, MP priority of effort during the offense
may be providing MMS for ground combat, CS, and CSS
forces and taking control of EPWs and CIs. During the
defense, the priority of MP support ma y shift to
conducting AS and counterreconnaissance along the
LOC, C2 centers, and CSS bases. MP may also be
required to conduct response force operations or become
part of the TCF.
1-32. During stability and support operations, MP
support may include—
1-10 Military Police Overview
FM 3-19.4
•
Order restoration.
•
Crowd control.
•
AS or force protection.
•
DC operations.
•
Noncombatant-evacuation operations.
PLATOON LEADER
1-33. The MP platoon leader is responsible to the
company commander for the platoon's combat readiness,
training, and discipline and the maintenance of its
equipment. To be successful, the platoon leader must
demonstrate an ability to lead soldiers and manage an
organization, material, and time. He must be able to
articulate the capabilities and limitations of the platoon
to various non-MP staff sections. In combat, the platoon
leader is responsible for accomplishing all the missions
assigned to the platoon according to the commander’s
intent and preserving the platoon’s fighting capability.
PLATOON SERGEANT (PSG)
1-34. The PSG leads elements of the platoon as directed
by the platoon leader and assumes command of the
platoon in the absence of the platoon leader. He directs
the day-to-day activities of the platoon and ensures that
the platoon has individual and team training and
logistics needed to accomplish its mission. During
tactical operations, he may assist in the control of the
platoon.
TEAM AND SQUAD LEADER
1-35. The MP team leader is responsible to the squad
leader for individual and team training and team
discipline. He is responsible for the tactical employment
and control of the team and the maintenance and
operation of all vehicles and equipment organic to the
team. During combat operations or anytime there is a
threat, the team leader quickly assesses the situation,
Military Police Overview 1-11
FM 3-19.4
reports to his superiors, and takes appropriate action to
protect the team according to the rules of engagement
(ROE). A squad leader has the same responsibility for
the squad as the team leader has for the team.
FORCE PROTECTION (FP) MEASURES
1-36. MP l eaders at all levels must examine FP
requirements and integrate FP measures throughout all
the operations. Once higher HQ has established local FP
policies, leaders set the example by complying with
them. Leaders reduce the soldiers’ exposure to hazards
by strictly enforcing all the protective postures that may
include—
•
Traveling with at least two vehicles armed with
at least one automatic weapon.
•
Hardening of the vehicles.
•
Wearing KevlarВ® and body armor.
•
Not driving off the road or cross-country.
•
Placing
off-post
facilities
off
limits
during
nonduty hours.
1-37. MP leaders analyze and compensate for other
threats such as disease, weather, crime, complacency,
terrorism, morale, safety, and other considerations.
1-38. At the operational level, team and squad leaders
establish a safety zone around their teams. The safety
zone is the immediate area around the team where
threat forces or events could harm the team or inflict
casualties. In open terrain, the safety zone may extend
out to the maximum effective range of the team's
organic-weapon systems. However, when searching
vehicles at a checkpoint or conducting crowd control, the
safety zone may only be an arm's length from the team.
1-39. Team and squad leaders remain alert to threats
that enter the team's safety zone. They must quickly
assess any threat to the team and take appropriate
1-12 Military Police Overview
FM 3-19.4
action within the ROE to reduce the threat or move the
team.
1-40. When required to operate in crowds, maintain eye
contact with team members. Establish and maintain a
safe distance between the team and the crowd. Never
allow the team to become separated or surrounded.
1-41. When patrolling in built-up areas, the gunner
scans the upper floors of the buildings and the streets to
the vehicle's front, rear, and flanks and immediately
reports any suspicious activity. The driver concentrates
on the area directly in front of the vehicle looking for any
unexploded munitions, scatterable mines, or other road
hazards. All team members should stay awake, alert,
and ready to react to danger.
MILITARY POLICE PLATOON MISSION,
CAPABILITIES, AND LIMITATIONS
1-42. The platoon has one critical wartime mission
which is to provide MP CS to an assigned area of
operations (AO). MP CS consists of all five MP functions.
The platoon performs its missions primarily mounted,
taking full advantage of the high mobility multipurpose
wheeled vehicle's (HMMWV's) versatility and the added
protection and firepower of the armor security vehicle
(ASV).
CAPABILITIES
1-43. The MP platoon is capable of operating day or
night, in various terrain conditions, and under all
weather and visibility conditions. Thei r mode of
operation is possible through the deployment and
employment of the three-person team throughout the
battlefield. However, it is dependent on its parent unit
Military Police Overview 1-13
FM 3-19.4
for sustainment support. The platoon has self-protection
capabilities such as nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC)
detection equipment and a Platoon Early-Warning
System (PEWS). The platoon’s radio transmission range
is increased with an OE-254 antenna. Because of
extensive police training and law enforcement missions,
the MP are highly skilled in the use of force and the
employment of lethal and nonlethal technologies,
information-collecting and dissemination, observation
and surveillance, and crowd control. The MP platoon has
a tremendous combat and noncombat information-
collecting capability. This capability is the result of
extensive area, zone, and route reconnaissance; daily
contact with local nationals; conducting combined police
patrols with HN military and civilian police agencies;
and conducting field interviews. An MP platoon is
capable of covering 500 square kilometers in rolling
t e r r a i n ; h o w e v e r , m o r e s e v e r e t e r r a i n s u c h a s
mountains, METT-TC, and mission objectives will affect
this capability. For example, consider one mobile MP
team per 10 kilometers of route coverage. For area
coverage, begin with an estimate of one mobile MP team
per 55 square kilometers.
1-4 4 . Unl ike most comb at a rms pl atoons, w hic h
maneuver together in formation, the MP platoon most
often operates independently and dispersed over a large
area. The platoon conducts combat operations, when
required, through the employment of mobile combat
sy s t e m s c o n t a i n i n g t h r e e - m a n t e a m s o p e r a ti n g
independently or in concert, and having vehicle crew-
served and individual weapons capable of defeating a
Level II threat and defending a position against
dismounted threats.
1-45. Based on METT-TC, the platoon leader may task
organize the platoon for certain missions. Normally, MP
1-14 Military Police Overview
FM 3-19.4
are employed as squads; however, individual teams may
execute many MP tasks.
LIMITATIONS
1-46. During combat operations, the platoon is not
organized and equipped to fight for extended periods
unless it is augmented with indirect fire or close air
support (CAS). Although the MP team is a lethal and
highly mobile platform, it is not structured or equipped
for prolonged autonomous missions. Leaders must use
the MP team as a task organizational building block and
avoid over tasking based solely on the number of teams
available. The platoon has limited antiarmor capability
and normally uses antiarmor weapons for self-protection
and to break contact.
PEACETIME TRAINING
1-47. MP units train as they will fight. Peacetime
training must replicate battlefield conditions and
conform to Army doctrine. Leaders and soldiers must
understand standardized doctrinal principles found in
applicable manuals to ensure that training is conducted
to standard. The following manuals provide the basic
foundation for Army training:
•
FMs.
•
Training circulars (TCs).
•
MTPs.
•
Drill books.
•
SMs.
•
Army regulations (ARs)
1-48. FM 25-100, FM 25-101, and TC 25-10 provide MP
leaders with established training doctrine and assist the
leaders in the development and execution of the training
programs. These manuals introduce the concept of lane
training and define it as a technique for training
company, team, and smaller units on a series of selected
Military Police Overview 1-15
FM 3-19.4
soldier, leader, and collective tasks using specific
terrain.
1-49. Lane training uses multiechelon techniques to
maximize the efficient use of limited terrain and control
conditions for formal or informal evaluations. Lane
traini ng i s externally supported, resourced, and
evaluated. It enables similar units to simultaneously or
sequentially train on mission-related scenarios. Lane
training is resource intensive, so commanders must
maximize its benefit. Commanders narrow the focus
and select only the most critical mission-essential task
lists (METLs) items or collective tasks for training.
Lane training is especially valuable for conducting
specific METL tasks, situational training exercises
(STXs), and other training events. It is often associated
with training requiring movement over terrain; for
example, movement to contact or conducting a route
reconnaissance. Lane training can be modified to
achieve benefits in L&O scenarios, such as special-
reaction team (SRT) incidents, patrol incidents, traffic
accidents, and so forth.
1-50. The lane training doctrine outlined in FM 25-101
and TC 25-10 can be tailored for small MP units by
using the training execution model (TEM). The TEM
follows the Army doctrine and training philosophy of
hands-on METL training as outlined by FMs 25-100 and
25-101. Before the TEM can be implemented, the
concept of the operation must be approved, evaluated,
and directed from two levels up. For example, a squad
leader must receive approval through the chain of
command from his company commander to execute the
training event; a platoon leader gets approval from the
battalion commander and so forth.
1-51. The TEM incorporates the combined-arms training
methodology and adjusts it to meet the MP training
requirements. The TEM focuses the unit on the time
available during the training cycle to train the most
1-16 Military Police Overview
FM 3-19.4
critical collective and individual tasks. The TEM consists
of an eight-step training methodology that is based on
leader certification of the lane expert and an observer/
controller (OC) as well as subordinate unit leaders. For
more information about TEM refer to Appendix C.
Military Police Overview 1-17
Chapter 2
Battle Command
This chapter provides the techniques and
procedures used by MP leaders at company and
platoon level to C2 their organizations.
OVERVIEW
2-1. Battle command is the art of battle decision
m a k i n g , l e a d i n g , a n d m o t i v a t i n g s o l d i e r s a n d
organizations into action to achieve victory with the
least cost to the organization. Commanders must
visualize the current and future state of both friendly
and enemy forces. The commander positions himself
where he can guide and motivate the soldiers and
influence the outcome of the missions.
2-2. The company commander is responsible for all that
the unit does or fails to do. He cannot delegate this
responsibility, and the final decision and responsibility
rest with him. He discharges his responsibility through
an established chain of command and holds each
subordinate leader responsible for the actions of the
platoon or the section.
2-3. The commander must be proficient in the tactical
employment of the unit. He must know the capabilities
and limitations of the soldiers and the equipment. A
commander does this through a continuous cycle of
planning, executing, and assessing training. Through
this training, the commander gets to know the soldiers.
2-4. MP commanders prioritize, assign missions, and
allocate resources where they can best support the
higher echelon commander’s intent. The company
Battle Command 2-1
FM 3-19.4
commander makes most of the tactical decisions.
T e c h n o l o g i c a l a d v a n c e s i n t o d a y ’ s o p e r a t i o n a l
environments have reduced the time available for
decision making while increasing the possibilities that
must be considered.
2-5. Thorough and sound operational planning is the
k e y t o s u c c e s s f u l c o m b a t a n d C S o p e r a t i o n s .
Commanders must identify the opportunities and
anticipate and avoid problems. They must analyze their
o p t i o n s b e f o r e m a k i n g t h e d e c i s i o n s o n w h i c h
s u b o r d i n a t e l e a d e r s w i l l b a s e t h e i r a c t i o n s .
Commanders balance competing risks and then identify
and develop the best course of action (COA).
MILITARY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
(MDMP)
2-6. The MDMP is a single, established, and proven
analytical process used at all the echelons of the
commands. This is a seven-step process used when
adequate planning time and enough staff support are
available (Table 2-1). This process is a detailed,
deliberate, sequential, and time-consuming process that
helps the commander and his staff examine a battlefield
situation and reach logical decisions. The commander
uses the entire staff during the process to explore the
full range of probable and likely enemy and friendly
C O A s a n d t o a n a l y z e a n d c o m p a r e h i s o w n
organization’s capabilities with the enemy’s.
Table 2-1. MDMP
Step
Action
Step
Action
1
Receipt of the mission
5
COA comparison
2
Mission analysis
6
COA approval
3
COA development
7
Orders production
4
COA analysis
2-2 Battle Command
FM 3-19.4
2-7. At company level, the commander normally uses
the MDMP in a time-constrained environment without
enough staff. A unit can shorten the process if it fully
understands the role of each step of the process and the
requirements to produce the necessary products. The
application of the MDMP at company level and below is
called the troop-leading procedures (TLP). Figure 2-1,
page 2-4 shows the relationship between MDMP and
TLP.
2-8. MP commanders plan successful operations by
anticipating possible future events and planning
contingencies. MP leaders enhance both planning and
execution of the operations when they—
•
Use the military planning and decision-making
process.
•
Develop short- and long-range goals.
•
Identify goals and objectives with a recognizable
end-state.
•
Coordinate
goals and
actions
internally and
externally.
•
Base their plans on objective planning factors.
•
Review their plans, continuously, in light of the
METT-TC and updated information.
•
Assign responsibilities and express expectations.
•
Identify the options that may develop during an
operation.
•
Stand ready to accommodate the changes.
MILITARY PLANNING
2-9. Commanders select and carry out the developed
COAs using military planning. Military planning
guidelines include—
•
Forecasting
requirements
by
analyzing
and
evaluating facts and trends to predict what may
occur.
Battle Command 2-3
FM 3-19.4
TLP
MDMP
1. Receive and analyze
Mission analysis (METT-TC)
the mission.
- Mission
- Enemy
- Terrain (and weather)
- Troops
2. Issue the warning order
- Time available
(WO).
- Civilian considerations
3. Make a tentative plan.
COA development
COA analysis
COA comparison
4. Initiate movement.
5. Conduct reconnaissance.
6. Complete the plan.
COA selection (approval)
Refinement of plan orders
production
7. Issue the order.
8. Supervise, refine, and rehearse.
Figure 2-1. Relationship Between TLP and the MDMP
2-4 Battle Command
FM 3-19.4
•
Examining probable requirements and establishing
priorities for further preparation.
•
Studying implications and interrelationships of
probable requirements.
•
Analyzing the mission to determine tasks, their
complexity, and their relative importance.
•
Establishing guidance for further planning that will
hel p keep a ll the el ements focused on the
commander’s intent.
•
Preparing studies and estimates to help formulate
the COA and assess its feasibility.
•
Selecting the COA, identifying the best course, and
retaining other feasible courses for use in
contingencies as alternate plans.
•
Preparing the plan in detail and conducting
rehearsals when time, resources, and security
permit.
2-10. Use the following military planning guidelines to
answer the three key questions of operational planning:
•
What military condition must be produced to
achieve the goal?
•
What sequence of actions is most likely to produce
that condition?
•
How should resources be applied to accomplish that
sequence of actions?
2-11. If the plan is not implemented immediately, retain
it for later use. As events occur or new information
b e c o m e s a v a i l a b l e , r e v i e w a n d r e v i s e t h e p l a n
accordingly.
ANALYSIS, FORECASTING, AND RISKS
2-12. Conducting a mission analysis is crucial to
planning. The process begins by gathering facts and
ascertaining current conditions, such as the—
•
Higher-level mission and the commander's intent
(one and two levels up).
Battle Command 2-5
FM 3-19.4
•
Current task organization (two levels down).
•
Current
unit
status
(locations,
operation
capabilities, and activities).
•
Logistics situation (refer to FM 101-5 for the logistic
estimate format).
2-13. When facts are not available, the commander will
need to develop assumptions. Assumptions must
substitute for fact where information is not known. Keep
in mind that as time passes between the receipt of a
m i s s i o n a n d t h e e x e c u t i o n o f a p l a n , f a c t s a r e
increasingly likely to have changed. Develop sound
assumptions that can be used in place of facts.
2-14. Analyzing the higher-level mission and the
commander's intent will help identify what tasks are
required to accomplish the mission. As the mission is
analyzed, identify both the specified and the implied
tasks to be performed. Specified tasks are those stated in
higher HQ orders and plans. Implied tasks (like crossing
a river or passing through the lines of a unit lying
between you and the objective) are not so stated, but
must be accomplished to satisfy the overall operation.
From among the specified and implied tasks, essential
tasks that are crucial to the mission's success must be
identified.
2-15. Integral to mission planning is the analysis of
mission requirements in terms of time, space, and
personnel. If MP are to balance the benefits of detailed
planning against the need for immediate action, they
must—
•
Determine how much time there will be between
receiving the mission and the deadline for having
completed it.
•
Know how long it will take to obtain and process
information, make decisions, and issue orders.
2-6 Battle Command
FM 3-19.4
•
Know how long it will take subordinates to execute
the orders, complete the mission, or carry out the
operation.
2-16. Because each unit involved in an operation
performs its planning based on the plans of the next
higher level, allocation of adequate time for subordinate
units to plan is a consideration at each level. Publishing
SOPs reduces the number of details to be explained. It
also promotes understanding and teamwork among
commanders, staff, and troops.
2-17. When doing reverse planning, consider the classic
allotment of one-third time for planning and two-thirds
time for execution (Table 2-2). Move backward from the
time of execution to—
•
Allocate time to accomplish each phase of an
operation.
•
Determine how much time is needed to rehearse.
•
Determine how much time is needed for developing
the plan.
Table 2-2. Reverse Planning Timetable
Time
Action
2230
Execute the mission.
2130-2215
Conduct inspection(s).
1845-2130
Conduct rehearsal(s).
1815-1845
Issue an operation order (OPORD).
1745-1815
Complete the plan.
1715-1745
Conduct the leaders’ reconnaissance.
1630-1715
Issue a tentative plan.
1630
Issue a WO.
1600
Receive the mission.
2-18. When using terrain analysis, consider the layout
of the battlefield. Appreciate the opportunities and
Battle Command 2-7
FM 3-19.4
limitations of the major terrain features, transportation
networks, and built-up areas. Fit the operational
concept and planning to that environment. Use the IPB
to evaluate the area in terms of the military aspects of
the terrain. Consider how to exploit the opportunities
afforded by weather while minimizing its adverse
effects.
2-19. Use current information on the threat to identify
known enemy activities and threat capabilities that
could affect this and future operations. Attempt to
anticipate the enemy's objectives and intentions.
2 - 2 0 . C o n s i d e r a v a i l a b l e a s s e t s a n d d e t e r m i n e
acceptable levels of risk. At every echelon, MP disperse
their assets and prioritize operations to meet the echelon
commander's needs within the limits of the resources at
hand. MP leaders must concentrate their efforts on key
locations and accept risks elsewhere. When possible,
recognize and moderate such risks in the choice of
operations and in the contingency planning. The five
steps to identify, analyze, and reduce risks are listed in
FM 100-14.
COURSE OF ACTION IDENTIFICATION, DEVELOPMENT,
AND SELECTION
2-21. The commander’s selected COA will become the
actual plan for accomplishing the mission. To ensure the
best plan possible, identify several possible COAs, each
significantly different from the others. In identifying
COAs, do not overlook a check of the "basics" that
include the—
•
Commander’s intent.
•
Essential tasks.
•
Effective use of C2.
•
Principles of war.
•
Ethical considerations.
•
Relative force ratio.
2-8 Battle Command
FM 3-19.4
2-22. Consider preparing a COA statement (and sketch,
if appropriate) for each option. The COA statement is
the "how" of the operation. Ensure that it includes the
following five elements:
•
What – the type of action.
•
When – the time the action will begin.
•
Where – the assigned area.
•
How – the use of available assets.
•
Why – the purpose of the operation.
2-23. When developing the COA, analyze the relative
combat power. Consider the initial array of the forces
and develop the schemes of maneuver. Determine C2
means and maneuver control measures.
2-24. Base doctrinal capabilities and planning on
historical p lann in g fac tors, an d then r elook the
estimates in light of the available assets, the factors of
METT-TC, the echelon commander's intent, and the
mission's priorities. For example, when planning
distribution of mobile assets for route coverage, begin
wi th an estimate of one mobile MP team p er 1 0
kilometers. For area coverage, begin with an estimate of
one mobile MP team per 55 square kilometers.
2-25. When dispersing the assets into small combat
elements, consider the classic ratios of friendly to enemy
forces (3 to 1) to help ensure that the elements can
concentrate enough combat power to accomplish the
mission. Consider the speed and ease of reassembling
the elements if dispersing them to distant sites.
2-26. Attempt to anticipate the enemy's likely moves.
Consider ways to obstruct dangerous approaches to the
area and avenues leading away from potential landing
zones. Plan ways to combine the efforts of different
resources, like enhancing the combat power for the base
response and counterreconnaissance operations with fire
Battle Command 2-9
FM 3-19.4
support from field artillery or aviation. Attempt to
determine the outcome of the operations by—
•
Conserving unit strength through economy of force.
•
Using terrain, weather, deception, and operations
security (OPSEC) to your advantage.
•
Focusing your efforts on enemy vulnerabilities.
•
Ensuring unity of effort among subordinates and
with your peers.
2-27. When planning for combat operations, whenever
possible, develop a COA that avoids an enemy's strength
and strikes at his weaknesses. Avoid head-on encounters
with an enemy's forces. Seek to gain the element of
surprise. When moving, plan to use indirect approaches
and flank positions that do not attract immediate
attention. Plan for fire support to increase MP combat
power. Plan to operate on the enemy's flanks and rear,
where direct fire is most effective, psychological shock is
the greatest, and the enemy is least prepared to fight.
Respond to and implement changes quickly and plan
supplementary or alternative control measures to
modify the plan as the situation dictates.
2-28. For a combat operation, the COA statement and
sketches include the following:
•
Allocated forces.
•
Unit boundaries.
•
Axes of advance.
•
Routes for a forward or rearward passage of lines.
•
Air axes for the maneuver of attack helicopters.
•
Other control measures which may include—
Phase lines.
Assembly and holding areas.
Zones or sectors.
Battle positions.
Objectives.
Obstacles.
Routes.
2-10 Battle Command
FM 3-19.4
2-29. Assess all of the feasible COAs after developing
them. Consider constraints and restrictions on each
COA. Weigh the available COA for the AO, for the level
of responsibility, the commander's intent, and the
mission's priorities. Decide on the best COA. For more
information about the MDMP process, refer to FM
101-5.
2-30. Once the commander decides on a COA, he
announces it in the form of orders that include his intent
and concept of the operation. Based on these orders, the
platoon leader uses TLP to organize his time during
pl ann ing a nd pr epar ati on for the missi on. Ti me
management is the key. The platoon leader normally
uses one-third of the available time to plan, prepare, and
issue the order. The squad leaders have the remaining
two-thirds of the time to prepare the squads for the
mission. Whenever possible, TLP are integrated and
accomplished concurrently rather than sequentially.
Relationships between TLP and the MDMP are shown
in Figure 2-1, page 2-4.
TROOP-LEADING PROCEDURES
2-31. TLP begin when the platoon leader is alerted for a
mission and starts again when he receives a change or a
new mission. Conducting TLP is an eight-step process
(Table 2-3, page 2-12). Steps 3 through 8 may not follow
a r i g i d s e q u e n c e . S e v e r a l o f t h e s t e p s m a y b e
accomplished concurrently. In CS operations, platoon
leaders rarely have enough time to go through each step
in detail. However, the procedure must be followed, if
only in abbreviated form. This ensures that nothing is
left out of the planning and the preparation.
2-32. Risk management is an integral part of TLP and
mu st be integrated into every a spec t of m issi on
Battle Command 2-11
FM 3-19.4
Table 2-3. The Eight Steps of TLP
Step
Action
1
Receive and analyze the mission.
2
Issue a WO.
3
Make a tentative plan.
4
Initiate movement.
5
Conduct a reconnaissance.
6
Complete the plan.
7
Issue the order.
8
Supervise, refine, and rehearse.
planning and execution. Identifying hazards and
implementing control measures to mitigate those
hazards will minimize operational accidents, thereby
preserving combat power. Risk management is not a
separate process, but rather infused into the entire
TLP. For more information about risk management,
refer to FM 100-14.
RECEIVE AND ANALYZE THE MISSION
2-33. TLP begin when the platoon leader is alerted for a
mission and start again when he receives a change or a
new mission. When the platoon leader receives the
mission, he—
•
Analyzes the mission.
•
Considers the operations underway.
•
Identifies the hazards associated with the mission,
and considers the aspects of the current and future
situations, environment, and known historical
problems.
•
Considers the time needed to plan and carry out the
new mission. For example, will sleep plans be
needed to ensure that all the teams are on a similar
rest posture?
2-12 Battle Command
FM 3-19.4
•
Plans the use of available time. The most critical
resource may be time, especially during daylight
hours.
•
Uses reverse planning to make a timetable. The
timetable—
Identifies what must be done.
Works backwards from the time the soldiers
have to be ready, allowing them time to do
each task.
•
Uses no more than one-third of the time for
planning. The subordinate leaders need the
remaining time to make preparations.
2-34. If time is too short to do the rest of the troop-
leading steps in detail, at least do a fast mental review
and—
•
Make a quick map reconnaissance while sending for
the subordinate leaders, depending on the level of
the mission.
•
Have the minimum control measures needed posted
on their maps.
•
Give an abbreviated order.
•
Cite enemy and friendly situations.
•
State the mission of the team, squad, or platoon and
the concept of the operation.
2-35. If there is not enough time to do these actions,
have the unit move out, then issue a fragmentary order
(FRAGO) by radio or at the next scheduled halt.
Continue the plan while moving.
ISSUE A WARNING ORDER
2-36. Issue an oral or written WO to the subordinate
leaders as soon as possible. Give enough information for
the unit to begin preparing for the mission. If needed,
issue several WOs to keep subordinates informed. Refer
to Appendix D for more information about WOs.
Battle Command 2-13
FM 3-19.4
2-37. The unit SOP should detail what actions to take
when a WO is received. Such actions may include
d r a w i n g
a m m u n i t i o n ,
r a t i o n s ,
w a t e r ,
a n d
communi cations gea r and checking vehi cles and
equipment. Keep all the personnel informed of what
they are to do and why they are to do it.
MAKE A TENTATIVE PLAN
2-38. Develop the plan based on the factors of METT-TC
(using the OPORD format and the higher HQ order).
The order may be specific about the tasks the unit is to
do. The time available may be limited and the scheme of
maneuver may be dictated. Nevertheless, the leader still
must evaluate the mission in terms of METT-TC to see
how MP elements can best carry out the commander's
order. The leader must—
•
Consider each factor and compare the COA to form
a base for the plan.
•
Include concepts for reconnaissance, coordination
with adjacent and/or supporting units, and troop
movement.
•
Assess the identified hazards. Consider the impact
of each hazard in terms of potential loss based on
probability and severity.
•
Identify control measures that will eliminate the
hazards or mitigate them to an acceptable level.
Make decisions on acceptable levels of risk based on
potential benefits versus cost.
•
Issue the plan, when firm, as an order . Appendix D
contains the OPORD format.
INITIATE MOVEMENT
2-39. Instruct subordinate leaders to start moving to the
assembly area (AA). Allow subordinate leaders enough
time for their actions if the element has to move and
reorganize for the mission.
2-14 Battle Command
FM 3-19.4
CONDUCT A RECONNAISSANCE
2-40. Ensure that the terrain where the operation is to
be conducted is reconnoitered. At a minimum, conduct a
map reconnaissance. (A map reconnaissance is the
easiest, but least reliable form of reconnaissance. It is a
supplement to other types of reconnaissance.) Study the
map for terrain features, natural barriers, and other
characteristics. Have subordinate leaders help identify
key terrain features. Refer to FM 21-26 for map-reading
skills. Follow up with a visual reconnaissance of the area
to be used and the terrain over which you will operate. A
visual reconnaissance can be done—
•
On the ground. A ground reconnaissance is time
c o n s um i n g , b u t t he m o s t r e l i a b l e t y p e o f
reconnaissance. MP see terrain features up close
and can note problems not easily seen using other
reconnaissance methods.
•
In the air. If available, air reconnaissance can cover
terrain quickly. To do an air reconnaissance, show
the pilot a map of the terrain to be reconnoitered.
Specify the type of information to be gathered.
Have one person in the plane track the patrol's
route on a map. At critical points, if the aircraft can
land, have part of the patrol dismount to make a
ground reconnaissance while the rest of the patrol
goes back into the air to provide overwatch security.
If the aircraft cannot land, make a visual search for
enemy activity or for the required information.
2-41. Use the information from the reconnaissance to
verify or to change the plan and to modify the risk-
assessment process. Adapt your tactics to the terrain
and the abilities of the force. If the reconnaissance
cannot be finished due to distance or enemy pressure,
m a k e t h e p l a n f r o m w h a t h a s b e e n s e e n . G i v e
instructions for later actions in general terms and
confirm or change while moving over the terrain.
Battle Command 2-15
FM 3-19.4
Provide a sketch that will aid with a sand table to help
in the OPORD issue, if time permits.
COMPLETE THE PLAN
2-42. Add details or makes changes to the tentative plan
(as a result of the reconnaissance and coordination with
nearby and/or supporting agencies) and identify specific
tasks for all the subordinate elements.
ISSUE THE ORDER
2-43. Issue an OPORD or FRAGO ensuring that—
•
The soldiers know the plan.
•
The instructions are stated clearly and concisely
(use the OPORD format). Platoon and squad orders
are usually issued orally. However, if time permits,
they can be written. When the order is written,
delete the service support and command and signal
paragraphs if covered by the SOP.
•
The soldiers are thoroughly briefed on the hazards
associated with the mission and the control
measures identified to mitigate the hazards.
•
The subordinate leaders back brief the order and
spot-check the soldiers.
•
When possible, the order is given from the
advantage point where soldiers can see the area in
which they will operate. This lets the leader point
out terrain features on the ground as well as on a
map. If this cannot be done, use a terrain model
(sand table) or a sketch to help explain the order.
SUPERVISE, REFINE, AND REHEARSE
2-44. Supervise, refine, and rehearse the preparation to
ensure that the soldiers are ready for the mission. This
includes—
•
Using the feedback received from subordinates.
2-16 Battle Command
FM 3-19.4
•
Ensuring that every soldier knows the mission and
understands the commander's intent for the
operation. The unit must be able to carry out the
mission in the absence of the leader that developed
the plan.
•
Continuing to prepare when the troop-leading steps
have been completed.
•
Having the soldiers rehearse their actions if there is
enough time before an operation.
Rehearsals
2 - 4 5 . R e h e a r s a l s b u i l d c o n f i d e n c e a n d i m pr o v e
performance. They allow faults in a plan to surface. If
possible, soldiers should rehearse on terrain and under
conditions like those at the operation site. Give priority
to actions to be taken in the objective area. A rehearsal
i s e s pec i a l l y h e l pf ul w hen op er a t i ng i n r e d uc e d
visibility.
2-46. Each type of rehearsal reflects an increase in
mission realism and a corresponding increase in
rehearsal benefit. Each technique increases the realism
of the enemy, terrain, team and squad actions, and
actual time and distance relationships. Rehearsal
techniques fall into the following four categories:
•
Back brief.
•
Rock drill.
•
Walk-through.
•
Full-scale.
2-47. Regardless of the rehearsal technique, leaders
must demand that soldiers demonstrate the known
hazards associated with the mission and understand the
control measures identified to counter them. Insist that
rehearsals include prescribed control measures (either
actions or equipment).
2-48. Back Brief. The back brief rehearsal is an event
that occurs after an OPORD has been issued. The back
Battle Command 2-17
FM 3-19.4
brief is the quickest rehearsal technique. Subordinate
leaders repeat back to the commander what he expects
them to do and why, using a map or a sand table to
explain their mission. The subordinate leader identifies
all specified and implied tasks, determines their
mission-essential tasks, and restates the mission. Items
essential to the back brief are the—
•
Commander’s intent.
•
Concept of the operation.
•
Scheme of maneuver.
•
Time to complete the tasks.
2-49. Rock Drill. A rock drill rehearsal is done by
acting out the friendly and enemy actions based on the
scheme of maneuver and the situation. Subordinate
leaders rehearse their actions by moving objects, such as
rocks, that represent them or the platoon. In acting out
the plan, leaders can talk through their missions,
critical tasks, actions, and decisions. All subordinate
leaders act out their parts simultaneously so problems
and disconnects in synchronization can be more clearly
identified.
2-50. Walk-Through. A walk-through rehearsal is the
acting out of actions that will occur during a mission
using the actual vehicles and equipment that will be
u s e d t o c o n d u c t t h e o p e r a t i o n . P a r t i c i p a n t s
communicate with the same type of equipment they will
use during the operation. During a walk-through,
subordinate leaders rehearse—
•
Movement
techniques,
both
mounted
and
dismounted.
•
Critical actions.
•
Decision making.
2 - 5 1 . S i n c e t h e l e a d e r s a r e i n a m o r e r e a l i s t i c
environme nt, the y reh ear se the finer asp ects of
synchronization, C2, and squad and team actions.
Aggressive portrayal of OPFOR is critical in walk-
2-18 Battle Command
FM 3-19.4
through rehearsals because it increases the rehearsal
realism. This type of rehearsal is more difficult to
orchestrate. It is the optimum balance between resource
constraints and realism. Ensure that a walk-through
rehearsal is the minimum goal for all the units.
2-52. Full-Scale. During a full-scal e rehearsa l,
participants use real-time mounted and dismounted
movements over the actual or similar terrain. It is
normally conducted with all teams and squads to be
used for the actual mission. At a minimum, one subunit
must participate for a full-scale rehearsal. This type of
rehearsal is the most resource intensive, but provides
the most realistic training environment for the unit. It is
often used to rehearse the operation plan (OPLAN) or
OPORD when time is not an immediate constraint.
Inspection
2-53. The last action before an operation is inspecting.
Allow ample time for subordinate leaders to correct
problems. Inspect soldiers by checking their mental and
physical readiness. Inspect their equipment and check
for the following:
•
Accountability.
•
Serviceability.
•
Weapons.
•
Ammunition.
•
Individual uniforms and equipment.
•
Mission-essential equipment.
•
Water and rations.
•
Communications equipment.
•
Vehicles.
•
Camouflage.
2-54. The equipment used during a mission is based on
t h e u n i t ' s S O P , a r i s k a s s e s s m e n t , a n d s p e c i a l
considerations. Ensure that the SOP specifies a combat
Battle Command 2-19
FM 3-19.4
load and a list of ammunition and equipment usually
carried on missions. Base changes from the SOP combat
load on the METT-TC.
2-5 5. Append ix E contai ns a sa mple precomb at-
inspection (PCI) checklist. Ensure that the soldiers have
everything they need for the mission. Ensure that
they—
•
Know their duties.
•
Have only the equipment needed.
•
Are wearing their equipment correctly and securely.
ORDERS AND REPORTS
2-56. MP leaders translate their thoughts, evaluations,
and decisions into understandable reports and orders.
Battlefield communication requires standardized,
streamlined procedures. Despite personal exhaustion or
battle confusion, you must be able to rapidly report
information or issue instructions that are simple, clear,
and brief.
ORDERS
2-57. Combat orders are written or oral communications
giving details of tactical operations and administration.
The three most common types of combat orders at
company level and below are—
•
WO
•
OPORD
•
FRAGO
2-58. WOs and OPORDs generally have set formats.
This helps ensure that the receiver understands the
intent of the message and that all needed information is
provided. Standardization helps save time in writing as
well as interpreting orders. FRAGOs enhance what has
been previously sent out in the OPORD, such as a
2-20 Battle Command
FM 3-19.4
change in the situation or mission. Refer to Appendix D
for examples of orders.
Reports
2-59. MP report to higher HQ and provide information
on which plans, decisions, and orders can be based. The
information included in MP reports must be accurate
and timely, and complete negative information ("There is
no enemy at . . . . ") is often as important as positive
information. Reports are the main record of operational
events. The three broad categories of reports are—
•
Administrative.
•
Operational.
•
Intelligence.
2-60. Commanders may specify report formats in their
local tactical SOP. Treat friendly information, including
administrative reports, as classified or sensitive in
nature to keep information from falling into the enemy's
hands. FM 101-5-2 and Appendix D of this manual
CONTAIN STANDARD REPORTING FORMATS.
SOPs
2-61. SOPs detail how forces will execute unit-specific
t e c h n i q u e s a n d p r o c e d u r e s t h a t c o m m a n d e r s
standardize to enhance effectiveness and flexibility.
Commanders use the SOP to standardize routine or
r e c u r r i n g a c t i o n s n o t n e e d i n g t h e i r p e r s o n a l
involvement.
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT AND RULES OF
INTERACTION (ROI)
2-62. MP usually are among the first CS forces deployed
to troubled areas around the world. As a direct result of
a peacetime L&O mission, MP continually train in the
prudent use of force, crisis management, and operations
requiring restrictive ROE and ROI.
Battle Command 2-21
FM 3-19.4
2-63. ROE are the directives established by higher HQ
that delineate the circumstances and limitations under
which soldiers will initiate and/or continue engagement
with belligerent forces. ROE may reflect the law of
armed conflict and operational considerations, but are
primarily concerned with the restraints on the use of
f o r c e . R O E a r e t h e p r i m a r y m e a n s b y w h i c h
commanders convey legal, political, diplomatic, and
military guidance to soldiers. Leaders at every level
must train their soldiers carefully and thoroughly
concerning ROE and laws that govern armed conflict
before deployment. During the conduct of the operation,
leaders continue to train soldiers and stress firm,
determined, and impartial execution of ROE to preclude
inviting challenges from any of the belligerent parties.
2-64. ROI embody those human dimension skills needed
to successfully interface with various categories of
p eo p l e . Th e y sp e l l o u t w i t h w h o m , u n de r w h a t
circumstances, and to what extent soldiers may interact
with other forces and the civilian populace. ROI, when
applied with good interpersonal communication (IPC)
skills, improve the soldier’s ability to accomplish the
mission while reducing possible hostile confrontations.
ROI and IPC, by enhancing the soldier’s persuasion,
negotiation, and communication skills, also improve his
survivability. ROI founded on firm ROE provide the
soldier with the tools to address nontraditional threats
s u c h a s p o l i t i c a l f r i c t i o n , i d e o l o g i e s , c u l t u r a l
idiosyncrasies, and religious beliefs and rituals. ROI
must be regionally and culturally specific. MP leaders
must train soldiers on ROE and ROI using tactical
vignettes or simulated events.
SITUATIONAL AWARENESS
2-65. Situational awareness is the ability to maintain a
constant, clear mental picture of the tactical situation.
This picture includes an understanding of both the
2-22 Battle Command
FM 3-19.4
friendly and enemy situations and of relevant terrain. It
also includes relating events in time to form logical
conclusions and make decisions that anticipate events.
Since MP platoons normally operate dispersed, it is
essential that all MP leaders maintain situational
awareness so that they can make quick, sound tactical
decisions. Situational awareness also permits MP
leaders to anticipate events and relate separate pieces of
information to form logical conclusions. One of the
critical outcomes of situational awareness on the part of
all MP is a reduction in fratricide incidents. Refer to
Appendix F for fratricide avoidance.
BATTLEFIELD FRAMEWORK
2-66. The commander will structure the battlefield
b a s e d o n t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f M E T T - T C a n d h i s
commander's intent. How he does this affects the MP
platoon leader's mission planning and his ability to
maintain situational awareness. Geographically,
available assets, mission, and the AO influence the
dispersion of MP assets. The framework of this AO can
vary from an area that is dominated by several towns or
large cities to an area that includes several bases and
base clusters. MP can expect to operate in sustainment
areas where there may be clear boundaries and closely
tied adjacent units or in a decentralized structure with
few secure areas and unit boundaries. Between these
e x t r e m e s a r e a n u n l i m i t e d n u m b e r o f p o s s i b l e
variations. Maintaining situational awareness becomes
more difficult as the battlefield becomes less structured.
Modern, highly mobile operations with small forces lend
themselves to a less rigid framework that challenges the
MP ability to maintain an accurate picture of the
battlefield. MP are the echelon commander’s critical link
t o t h e b a t t l e f i e l d , c o n s t a n t l y g a t h e r i n g p o l i c e ,
operational, and combat information.
Battle Command 2-23
FM 3-19.4
BATTLEFIELD PICTURE
2-67. To have a clear picture of the battlefield, the MP
leader must have virtually perfect knowledge of the
friendly situation one level higher. This means the MP
platoon leader must know the company situation and
the location and mission of the adjacent company and
platoons. It is also important that the platoon leader
update his subordinate leaders periodically regarding
the higher situation. The platoon leader must have a
relatively complete knowledge of the terrain, and he
must know as much as possible about the enemy. The
requirement to maintain a real-time picture of the
battlefield one level higher does not relieve the platoon
leader of the requirement to understand the situation
and the commander's intent two levels higher. The
difference is that this understanding of the situation two
levels higher does not have to be as specific or in real
time.
2-68. Most of the information the platoon leader needs
comes in the form of reports over communication
c h a n n e l s . S u b o r d i n a t e l e a d e r s a r e r e q u i r e d t o
periodically report their status. If an MP team is
operating in an area that does not allow uninterrupted
communications, the team leader coordinates with
adjacent teams to relay his report. If an MP team does
not report in a timely manner, the platoon leader must
quickly determine the status of the overdue team.
2-69. If possible, the platoon leader monitors his platoon
and company net. How effectively he can accomplish this
is, to some degree, experience-dependent; however, there
are techniques he can apply to relate the information he
is receiving to the map and thereby track the tactical
situation.
2-70. The platoon leader's map is the key to maintaining
situational awareness. He plots all friendly position
reports up to one level higher than his own and plots
information from spot reports (SPOTREPs). He uses
2-24 Battle Command
FM 3-19.4
different colors for friendly and enemy elements to allow
quick distinction. To avoid cluttering the map, he places
a dot or symbol on the map where the element is located
and labels the point with a number. The same number is
then written in the map’s margin (or beyond the AOs)
with the complete SPOTREP or unit identification (ID)
next to it. Include the time on this notation. As positions
or reports are updated, the old symbol is crossed off and
a new one with a corresponding notation is added; it is
critical that updates to previous reports be clearly
identified as such during transmission. This simple
system can greatly increase the ability to track both
friendly forces and enemy activity in a particular AO.
BATTLE SPACE
2-71. As mentioned earlier, an accurate picture of the
battlefield provides the platoon leader with important
tactical information, including friendly and enemy
positions and relevant terrain. In turn, complete
understanding of the military significance of this picture
requires knowledge of the concept of battle space, the
key element in the intellectual process of visualizing the
battlefield.
2-72. At the most fundamental level, battle space is the
three-dimensional bubble or area in which the platoon
can acquire enemy forces and influence them with
effective fires. This space is defined by the following
numerous battlefield factors:
•
The locations of the friendly forces, including the
platoon's individual teams, OPs, and patrols.
•
The effects of the terrain, weather, and movement.
•
The ranges of all the available platoon weapons and
sensing systems.
2-73. Each squad has its own battle space; the platoon
battle space is the sum of the individual squads battle
spaces. Platoon battle space is not restricted by
boundaries; it can overlap with the battle space of
Battle Command 2-25
FM 3-19.4
adjacent units. For example, an enemy element that is
spotted outside of the platoon’s AO can still adversely
affect the platoon’s mission. Coordination is made with
adjacent units to detect and destroy the threat.
2-74. Battle space has applications in all phases of
mission planning and execution. During the planning
process, it is a critical factor in selection of the routes
and tentative positions. Once mission execution begins,
the platoon leader's knowledge of the battle space is
critical to issuing timely and effective orders as the
situation changes.
2-75. The importance of battle space demands that the
platoon leader direct most of his battle command effort
toward managing and enhancing his space. He must be
aware at every moment how battle space is changing as
friendly a nd enemy forces move and terrain and
visibility conditions change. He must evaluate how these
changes affect his squads.
2-76. As the operation progresses, the platoon leader
must take active measures to shape the battle space to
his best advantage. One vital step in this process is to
eliminate any gaps, or dead space, that exist within the
bubble. The platoon leader can accomplish this in
s e v e r a l w a y s , i n c l u d i n g m a n e u v e r i n g t e a m s ,
repositioning OPs, and deploying patrols or remote
sensors.
COMMAND POST OPERATIONS
2-77. Company- and larger-size elements have a tactical
operations center (TOC) and platoons have CPs. The CP
is wherever the platoon leader goes. It can be mobile or
stationary. No matter the location, there must be
communication with and command of the unit and a
method for battle tracking. CP activities are a 24-hour
2-26 Battle Command
FM 3-19.4
operation. The leadership must ensure that there is a
plan for continuous operations.
2-78. A mobile CP may be a HMMWV and an ASV. The
platoon leader can make decisions on the move while
having communication capabilities nearby. A leader’s
book can hold information on battle rosters, report
formats, and a map of the battlefield.
2-79. A stationary CP may be the platoon leader’s tent
or office. Communications may be telephonic, by
messenger, or by radio. Track the status of equipment
and personnel by using charts. Use large maps to track
the battle. Keep in mind that moving to another location
requires taking charts and maps, so everything needs to
be mobile.
2-80. Key personnel for CP operations are the platoon
leader, the PSG, and the radio/telephone operator
(RTO).
PLATOON LEADER
2-81. The platoon leader is responsible for C2 of his
organization and—
•
Planning
the
missions
according
to
the
commander’s guidance.
•
Planning security to include the placement of crew-
served weapons.
•
Issuing orders and providing work priorities to
subordinate leaders.
•
Conducting PCI.
•
Planning and conducting platoon rehearsals.
•
Battle tracking (knowing) on a map the exact
location of all the MP teams, to include the position
of friendly platoons and known enemy, and a
platoon-sector sketch.
•
Adapting to new situations, making necessary
adjustments, and issuing FRAGOs.
Battle Command 2-27
FM 3-19.4
•
Controlling the movement of the subordinate units.
•
Ensuring
that
the
communication
net
is
established.
•
Conducting risk assessment and continuously
updating it.
•
Reporting to higher HQ using the correct report
format.
PLATOON SERGEANT
2-82. The PSG is responsible for the logistics of the
operation and—
•
Coordinating and providing all the needed class
items.
•
Ensuring equipment serviceability and account-
ability.
•
Supervising the maintenance.
•
Establishing and supervising a sleep plan.
•
Supervising the security plan's execution.
•
Supervising the maintenance of work priorities.
•
Supervising PCIs.
•
Supervising sanitation and hygiene.
•
Adjusting, manning, and cross leveling the soldiers,
weapons, and equipment.
•
Coordinating and supervising morale services.
•
Assisting the platoon leader in rehearsals.
•
Supervising test firing.
•
Assisting with battle tracking.
•
Consolidating subordinate units' status reports for
the platoon leader.
•
Assisting with the reports.
•
Providing technical and tactical advice to the
platoon leader.
•
Maintaining situational awareness.
2-28 Battle Command
FM 3-19.4
RADIO/TELEPHONE OPERATOR
2-83. The RTO should be an experienced MP who is also
the platoon leader’s driver. The RTO—
•
Communicates with higher HQ and separate units.
•
Submits the required reports according to orders
and SOPs.
•
Maintains a record of communications.
•
Maintains the radio and communication equipment.
•
Assists with battle tracking.
Battle Command 2-29
Chapter 3
Shoot, Move, and Communicate
The ability of an MP unit to shoot, move, and
communicate ensures its ability to detect,
disrupt, and defend against the enemy and
immeasurably adds to its survivability and
maneuverability. MP are structured to be
strategically, operationally, and tactically agile
to respond to the increased range of worldwide
MP requirements.
SHOOT
3-1. It is important that MP understand their shooting
capabilities and limitations. Just as important is the
understanding of firing techniques and associated fire
distribution, reacting to air and armor attacks, calling
for fire, and obtaining various fire support.
UNDERSTAND FIRE TECHNIQUES
3-2. Fire techniques include fire from or at a moving
vehicle, fire distribution and control, and suppressive
fire.
Fire From or at a Moving Vehicle
3-3. The key to forward maneuver is firing on the
enemy. When maneuvering, the fire element—
•
Attempts to destroy or suppress the enemy.
•
Covers and protects the maneuver element as it
advances.
•
Moves, when possible, into its firing position
undetected. Fire from an unexpected direction
Shoot, Move, and Communicate 3-1
FM 3-19.4
has a greater effect than fire from a known
position.
3-4. Firing on the move is less accurate than firing from
a halt. However, to halt and fire takes more time and is
more dangerous. A stationary vehicle is more likely to be
hit than a moving vehicle. The team leader must decide
whether to fire while moving or to fire from a short halt.
He bases his decision on sound judgment and evaluation
of the threat.
3-5. Crew-served weapons engage all targets on the
move with free gunfire. To deliver this type of fire, the
gunner removes the traversing and elevating (T&E)
mechanism from the bottom of the receiver, allowing the
gun to move freely in any direction. Accurate firing with
crew-served weapons while moving is affected by—
•
The terrain.
•
The vehicle's speed.
•
The team's proficiency.
3-6. When aiming from a moving vehicle or at a moving
vehicle, or both, the gunner must lead the target. The
speed of the firing vehicle, the time of flight, and the angle
of engagement affect the amount of lead required. The time
of flight is the required time it takes the projectile to move
from the firing vehicle to the target. The angle of
engagement is the angle found between the centerline of
the vehicle and the gun when laid on the target. When a
round is fired from the flank of a moving vehicle, the round
drifts in the same direction and at the same speed as the
vehicle. The longer the flight time and the larger the
engagement angle, the greater the drift. Thus, the gunner
must apply more lead to the shot. If a lead is required and
the gunner is traversing left to keep on target, the gunner
must lead left. If the gunner is traversing right to keep on
the target, the gunner must lead right. This is true
whether the firing vehicle is moving, the target is moving,
or both are moving. Table 3-1 shows the responsibilities of
an MP team when firing on the move.
3-2 Shoot, Move, and Communicate
FM 3-19.4
Table 3-1. Team Responsibilities When Firing While Moving
Position
Actions
Team
•
Directs the driver.
leader
•
Keeps the gunner oriented.
•
Senses the impact of the rounds–long, short, left, or right
of the target.
•
Identifies additional targets.
•
Assists the gunner with reloading, if required.
•
Observes the surrounding terrain.
Gunner
•
Develops a feel for the moving vehicle.
•
Tracks the position of the target with the MK19 grenade
machine gun (GMG) despite the movement of the
vehicle.
•
Remains alert to the sounds of the engine and
transmission. These sounds indicate the type of terrain
over which the vehicle is traveling and helps the gunner
anticipate vehicle movements.
Driver
•
Tries to maintain a steady gun platform while the gunner
engages the targets.
•
Attempts to time the gear and direction changes so they
occur immediately after firing and do not interfere with
accuracy.
•
Informs the gunner of obstacles in the vehicle’s path that
might affect the gun's accuracy.
•
Announces "depression," "turn," and the like to warn the
gunner of vehicle movements.
•
Announces, "steady" to let the gunner know when the
vehicle is once again on a stable platform. The gunner
assumes he has a stable platform unless the driver
informs him otherwise.
Distribute Fire
3-7. MP leaders must distribute the fires of their
organic weapons to destroy or suppress enemy positions.
The following are the two methods to distribute fire on a
target:
•
Point fire. Point fire (Figure 3-1, page 3-4)
is
directed against one target (such as a machine
gun position) with all the troops firing at the
Shoot, Move, and Communicate 3-3
FM 3-19.4
Point fire
Area fire
Figure 3-1. Fire Distribution
same target. Spreading out the base-of-fire
element makes this type of fire particularly
effective because the fire is directed from many
sources.
3-4 Shoot, Move, and Communicate
FM 3-19.4
•
Area fire. Area fire (Figure 3-1) permits rapid
cover of an entire area with fire from the left to
the right and in depth, even if the enemy cannot
be seen. This method is used without command
and is the quickest and most effective way to
bring all parts of a target under fire. Each
member in the element is assigned a portion of
the target. Fire is placed on likely locations for
enemy positions rather than in a general area. If
the leader wants fire on a wood line, he may
shoot tracers to mark the center of the target.
Soldiers to the left of the leader fire to the left of
the tracers and soldiers to his right fire to the
right of the tracers.
3-8. A rifleman fires his first shot on the part of the
target that corresponds to his individual position. If he is
left of the leader, he fires to the left of the leader's
tracers. He then distributes his remaining shots over the
part of the target extending a few meters right and left
of his first shot. He covers the part of the target that he
can hit without changing position.
3-9. A grenadier fires into the center of the target area
of his team. He then distributes his shots over the
remaining target area from the center to each side and
from front to rear. A machine gunner covers part of the
target depending on his position and how much of the
target is in range. When possible, he covers the entire
target of the team. When placing automatic suppressive
fire on the enemy, the tendency is to shoot high.
Therefore, he places the first bursts low and works up to
the target. The squad leader tells the machine gunners
where to shoot by assigning sectors of fire.
3-10. An MK19 gunner engages area targets with
traversing and searching fire after the leader designates
the width and depth of the target. If one MK19 GMG is
being fired, the gunner engages the area target by
adjusting his fire on the center of the mass, then
Shoot, Move, and Communicate 3-5
FM 3-19.4
traverses and searches to either flank. When he reaches
the flank, he reverses direction and traverses and
searches in the opposite direction. If two MK19 GMGs
are being fired as a pair, the point of the initial lay and
adjustment for both guns is on the midpoint of the
target. After adjusting the fire on the center of the mass,
fire is distributed by applying direction and elevation
changes that give the most effective coverage of the
target area. Usually, the right gun (number 1) fires on
the right half, and the left gun (number 2) fires on the
left half. Appendix G describes the MK19 qualification
and familiarization tables and provides a sample
scorecard.
Control Fire
3-11. Fire control is an essential component of fire
distribution. A platoon leader must know what means
he will direct the fire element to use when engaging the
t a r g e t s . H e w i l l c o m m u n i c a t e d i r e c t l y o r u s e
prearranged signals to identify the location of the target
to the other units. He may use sound signals (such as
voice, a horn, or a whistle), but must remember that
they are only good for short distances and that their
reliability and range are reduced by battle noise,
weather, terrain, and vegetation. Use a radio to direct
the base-of-fire element or adjust fires from reference
points or landmarks, because a radio offers immediate
voice communication. For example, he may say, "From
the burning scout vehicle, northwest 50 meters, machine
gun position." If portable radio equipment is not
available, he uses prearranged visual signals, such as
sm oke o r f lare s. A sm oke r ou nd fr om a gr en a de
launcher, unless it is being used for some other purpose,
and a smoke canister can be used as a signal. Use these
items during reduced visibility in addition to aiming
stakes, illumination, night-vision devices, infrared
chemical lights, and so forth.
3-6 Shoot, Move, and Communicate
FM 3-19.4
Use Fire Commands
3-12. Leaders use fire commands to direct fire. A fire
command has the following six parts:
•
Alert. The leader alerts the soldiers to receive
further instruction. He alerts the soldiers by
name or unit designation, some type of visual or
sound signal, personal contact, or any other
practical way.
•
Direction. The leader tells the soldiers the
general direction to the target. In some cases, he
pinpoints a target. The following are the three
ways the leader can give the direction to the
target:
в–
Points with his armor rifle.
в–
Fires tracer ammunition at a target.
в–
Uses either target reference points (TRPs) or
easily recognized man-made objects or
terr ai n featur es. He gives the general
direction just before giving the reference
points.
•
Description. The leader describes the target
briefly but accurately and always gives the
formation of the enemy soldiers.
•
Range. The leader tells the soldiers the range to
the target in meters.
•
Method of fire. The leader tells the soldiers
which weapons to fire, the type and amount of
ammunition to fire, and the rate of fire.
•
Command to fire. The leader tells the soldiers
when to fire by using an oral command or
visual signal. When he wants to control the exact
moment of fire, he says, "At my command" (then
pauses until ready to commence firing). When he
wants to start firing on completion of the fire
command, he just says, "Fire."
Shoot, Move, and Communicate 3-7
FM 3-19.4
Use Subsequent Fire Commands
3-13. These commands adjust or change information
given in the initial fire command. Only the elements
that change are given.
Terminate Fire
3-14. Fire is terminated by the command or signal for
cease fire, end of mission.
Suppress Fires
3-15. When the fire element is in position, it lays a
heavy volume of fire on the enemy to suppress them.
When the leader senses that the enemy is suppressed,
he instructs the fire element to reduce its rate of fire as
long as it keeps the enemy suppressed. As the movement
element nears its objective, the fire element increases
the rate of fire to keep the enemy down. This lets the
movement element close enough to assault the enemy
before the enemy can react. When the assault begins, or
on a signal, the fire element stops firing, shifts its fire to
another target, or walks its fire across the objective in
front of the movement element, and then shifts or ceases
fire.
3-16. Positions for fire elements are located so that
movement of the maneuver element does not mask their
fires. Fire element positions are often higher and usually
to the flank of the maneuver element. The maneuver
element neither masks the fire of the fire element nor
moves outside the protective umbrella provided by the
fire. A platoon or squad can point fire at one target or an
area of several targets. In both cases, the leader must
control the fire. He must ensure that the fire is directed
on the enemy, not on the maneuver element.
3-8 Shoot, Move, and Communicate
FM 3-19.4
Use Nonlethal Weapons (NLW)
3-17. The Department of Defense (DOD) defines NLW
as weapons that are explicitly designed and primarily
employed to incapacitate personnel or material while
minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to personnel,
and undesired damage to property and the environment.
Unlike conventional weapons that destroy the targets
p r i n c i p a l l y t h r o u g h b l a s t , p e n e t r a t i o n , a n d
fragmentation, NLW employ means other than gross
ph y si c a l d es t ru c t i o n t o p r e v en t t h e ta r g e t f ro m
functioning.
3-18. NLW doctrine and concepts of operation are
designed to reinforce deterrence and expand the range of
options available to commanders. They enhance the
capability of US forces to accomplish the following
objectives:
•
Discourage, delay, or prevent hostile actions.
•
Limit escalation.
•
Take military action in situations where use of
lethal force is not the preferred option.
•
Protect US forces.
•
Disable equipment, facilities, and personnel
temporarily.
NOTE: The zero probability of producing fatalities
or permanent injuries is not a requirement of
NLW. However, while complete avoidance of these
effects is not guaranteed or expected, when
properly employed, NLW significantly reduce
them as compared with physically destroying the
same target.
3-19. When drafting the ROE, it must be clearly
articulated and understood that the role of NLW is an
additional means of employing force for the particular
purpose of limiting the probability of death or serious
injury to noncombatants or belligerents. However, the
use of deadly force must always remain an inherent
Shoot, Move, and Communicate 3-9
FM 3-19.4
right of individuals in instances when they, their fellow
soldiers, or personnel in their charge are threatened
with death or serious bodily harm. NLW add flexibility
to the control of disturbances within the I/R facility and
prov ide a n en vir onm ent where g uard for ces can
permissively engage threatening targets (Figure 3-2)
with limited risk of noncombatant casualties and
collateral damage. Refer to FM 90-40.
3-20. The use of lethal force, employed under the
standing ROE, will never be denied. At no time will
forces be deployed with ou t the ab il ity to defend
themselves against a lethal threat, nor will they forego
normal training, arming, and equipping for combat.
N o n l e t h a l o p t i o n s a r e a c o m p l e m e n t t o , n o t a
replacement for, lethal force and seek to expand a
pr o a c t i v e r e s po n s e a c r o s s t h e r a ng e o f m i l i t a r y
operations. Refer to FM 90-40.
3-21. The decision to use NLW against an adversary
during a confrontation is delegated to the lowest possible
level, preferably to the platoon or the squad. However,
this requires that all personnel, not just the leaders,
ha v e a c l ea r u nd er sta n di n g of th e R OE a n d the
commander’s intent. Refer to FM 90-40.
3-22. Commanders and public affairs officers must be
prepared to address media questions and concerns
regarding the use and role of NLW, and they must make
it clear that the presence of NLW in no way indicates
abandoni ng the option to employ deadly force in
appropriate circumstances.
3 - 2 3 . A d v a n t a g e s o f E m p l o y i n g N o n l e t h a l
Weapons. NLW provide the commander with the
flexibility to influence the situation favorably with
reduced risk of noncombatant fatalities and collateral
damage.
3-10 Shoot, Move, and Communicate
FM 3-19.4
02
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
1
00
X
X
XX
1
5
XX
XX
X
X
XX
59
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X
X
nozla
56
X
X
XX
htleno
05
XXX
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X
N
rste 553
X
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X
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0
XX
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X
n
n
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z
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ht
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5
al
eth
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n
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area
ter
ter
ter
ter
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ro
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N
lar
lm
M
ball
bang
ro
hand
du
nt
CC
nt
tun
ing
Mo
co
(M
S
grenade
12-gauge
12-gauge
40-milli
poi
66-milli
st
66-milli
flash
66-milli
grenade
Figure 3-2. Range of Munitions Contained
in a Nonlethal Capability Set
Shoot, Move, and Communicate 3-11
FM 3-19.4
3-24. NLW can be more humane, be consistent with the
p o l i t i c a l a n d s o c i a l i m p l i c a t i o n s i m p l i c i t i n
humanitarian missions, be used during peacekeeping
missions, and facilitate post-incident stabilization by
reducing internee alienation and collateral damage.
3-25. The force that properly employs nonlethal options
gains advantages over those who rely on lethal options
alone, because the degree of provocation required to
emp lo y these op tions is substantially le ss. This
advantage provides a more proactive posture and
quicker response as well as a diminished likelihood of
having a situation escalate to a point where deadly force
is required to resolve a conflict within the I/R facility.
3-26. NLW options are less likely to provoke others and
the use of NLW, in fact, may provoke a negative
response. However, demonstrated restraint greatly
diminishes feelings of anger and remorse when deadly
force is required after nonlethal options fail.
3-27. Military Police Nonlethal Weapons. I/R
facility commanders consider the use of force options
discussed in Chapter 2 and AR 190-14 when dealing
wi t h d i s r u pt i o n s w i t hi n t he c o m po un d . Fa c i l i t y
commanders are encouraged by AR 190-14 to substitute
nonlethal devices for firearms when it is considered
adequ ate for MP to saf ely pe rfo rm their du tie s.
Currently, MP have such nonlethal options as riot-
control agents chlorobenzul-malononitrile (CS) and
oleoresin capsicum (OC), military working dogs (MWD),
an MP club, and a riot baton for crowd control. There are
other nonlethal devices currently being tested and
fielded that will be available to the I/R commander in
the future.
3-28. Nonlethal Training. Soldiers and their leaders
must be trained in the correct employment of NLW
available to them. Soldiers and their leaders must
u n de r s ta n d th e l i m i t ed u se of th e se s y st em s i n
environments with restrictive ROE. Their training must
3-12 Shoot, Move, and Communicate
FM 3-19.4
be continuous at all levels to ensure that NLW are
properly employed and that the leaders and the soldiers
understand when and how to effectively employ them.
They must understand that the incorrect application of
NLW can have significant operational and political
ramifications. Well-trained MP leaders, providing timely
and clear guidance to MP soldiers using NLW, will
ensure the mission's successful accomplishment.
3-29. Many NLW have both maximum effective and
minimum safety ranges. Individuals struck short of the
minimum safety range often suffer severe injuries or
death while the effects of most nonlethal devices are
greatly mitigated at longer ranges. In order to be
effective, engage the threat within the effective zone,
beyond the minimum safety range, and short of the
maximum effective range.
3-30. When training with and planning for the use of
NLW consider the following:
•
Never apply NLW in a situation where deadly
force is appropriate.
•
Never apply NLW in a situation that will place
troops in undue danger.
•
Always cover NLW with deadly force.
3-31. Nonlethal Tactics. FM 90-40 provides an in-
depth discussion on the tactics associated with the
e m p l o y m e n t o f v a r i o u s N L W a v a i l a b l e t o t h e
commander, such as—
•
Riot formations. Riot formations establish riot-
control teams with a minimum response time.
Because of the physical nature of riot control,
individuals in riot control formations should not
carry long rifles. Nonlethal attachments should
follow closely behind the riot control formation.
Lethal coverage should be provided for this
entire formation. Refer to FM 90-40.
Shoot, Move, and Communicate 3-13
FM 3-19.4
•
Designated
marksman.
During
a
nonlethal
engagement, the use of a designated marksman
(DM) provides confidence and safety to those
facing a riot. If a lethal threat is presented, the
DM who is in an overwatch position and armed
with a standard infantry rifle, mounted with a
high-powered scope, can scan a crowd and
i d e n t i f y a g i t a t o r s a n d r i o t l e a d e r s f o r
apprehension as well as fire lethal rounds if
warranted. Additionally, he is ideally suited for
flank security and countersniper operations.
Refer to FM 90-40.
React to An Air Attack
3-32. Passive and active air defense measures are used
by MP to protect themselves from enemy air attacks
during all missions.
3-33. Passive Air Defense Measures. MP employ
passive air defense measures that include actions to
avoid detection and air attack, and actions to limit
damage if they are attacked. MP use active air defense
measures to fight back against enemy aircraft. Enemy
aircraft will attack and attempt to destroy any target
seen. The passive air defense methods that limit enemy
detection include—
•
Concealment.
•
Camouflage.
•
Cover.
3-34. Dispersion is another passive air defense method.
I t s p u r p o s e v a r i e s f r o m t h o s e o f c o n c e a l m e n t ,
camouflage, and cover. While they are designed to hide
MP and their vehicles and equipment from the view of
the enemy, dispersion is employed to reduce the effects
of an enemy air attack. Dispersion is important when
MP are occupying a static position (such as a company
TOC or platoon CP) or when they come under air attack.
If MP come under air attack, they quickly disperse with
3-14 Shoot, Move, and Communicate
FM 3-19.4
their vehicles, move to a concealed position, if possible,
and stop. Stationary vehicles are more difficult for the
enemy to detect than moving vehicles.
3-35. Early warning (quick recognition of enemy air-
craft) is a passive air defense method that affords MP an
opportunity to take cover and one that may lead into
active air defense measures. The warning may come
through communication channels, OP and listening
posts (LPs), or from convoy air guards. A whistle, a
voice, a radio, or any other method can provide a warn-
ing.
3-36. All OP/LPs watch for enemy aircraft as a standard
duty. When air sighting, the first person to see an enemy
aircraft shouts, "Aircraft," then, "Front (Right, Left, or
Rear)." In a convoy, air guards are given sectors of the
sky to observe for enemy aircraft. When an enemy
aircraft is spotted, the predetermined alarm (such as a
horn or hand signal) is given until all vehicles are aware
of the situation.
3-37. When an alarm is given, all dismounted troops
take cover at once. They go below ground level, if
possible. If the aircraft is not firing, MP withhold their
fire to avoid disclosing their position and they allow the
aircraft to pass. They stay concealed until the all clear is
given. The MP leader initiates a size, activity, location,
unit, time, and equipment (SALUTE) report (or refer to
the SOP) for the sighting of hostile aircraft.
3-38. Active Air Defense Measures. Although passive
measures are the first line of defense against air an
attack, MP must be prepared to engage enemy aircraft.
Low-flying hostile aircraft may appear suddenly from
behind low hills, trees, or a haze. To gain surprise, they
may attack with the sun behind them. Before MP fire at
enemy aircraft, they must positively identify the aircraft
as hostile. If the aircraft is making a firing run on the
p a t r o l , t a k e c o v e r a n d r e t u r n f i r e . H o w e v e r ,
commanders may restrict active air defense when
friendly aircraft are in the area.
Shoot, Move, and Communicate 3-15
FM 3-19.4
3-39. In convoys, drivers alternately pull their vehicles
off the road to the right and left, seeking concealment
from air observation. Caution must be used if mines are
a known threat. If the enemy aircraft is not attacking,
the same actions stated earlier are taken. If the aircraft
is attacking, MP dismount and seek cover away from the
vehicle (the vehicle may be the aircraft's target) and
return fire. All personnel remain under cover until the
command is given to continue the mission.
3-40. Fire small arms at attacking aircraft during or
after the first attack. MP direct fires to saturate the
airspace through which the aircraft will fly without
trapping the aircraft. For more detailed information
refer to FM 44-8. When engaging hostile aircraft—
•
Fire only on command unless under direct attack
(being fired on by aircraft).
•
Ensure that the direction of fire does not place
rounds on friendly personnel, equipment, or
positions.
•
Deliver a large volume of fire.
•
Lead a slow-moving aircraft and adjust fire by
observing the flight of the rounds, especially if
tracer rounds become available, using the free-
gun technique of fire.
•
Aim at the center mass of a grounded or
hovering helicopter and a helicopter that is
coming directly at your position. Cease-fire when
the aircraft passes out of range.
3-41. Slow-moving rotary-winged aircraft that are on
the ground, hovering, taking off, or landing are most
successfully engaged by the MK19. The MK19 GMG's
40-millimeter ammunition is fired at a relatively slow
speed and has a high trajectory at a long distance. The
MK19 GMG rounds that do not hit the aircraft will
detonate on impact with the ground. The location of
friendly elements within range of the weapon must be
3-16 Shoot, Move, and Communicate
FM 3-19.4
considered at all times. Figure 3-3 depicts the rules for
selecting aiming points of various aircraft.
Two football fields in front of the nose.
Type of
Course
Aim Point
Aircraft
Aim
Two football fields in
Jet
Crossing
front of the nose
Two football fields in
Nose
Jet
Overhead
front of the nose
Directly at
Slightly above the
Jet
you
aircraft’s nose
One-half football field in
Helicopter Crossing
front of the nose
Slightly above the
Helicopter Hovering
helicopter's body
Directly at
Slightly above the
Helicopter you
helicopter's body
Figure 3-3. Rules for Selecting the Aim Point
REACT TO ARMOR
3-42. MP maneuver and operate in much of the battle
space and can expect to encounter pockets of by-passed
enemy armor within the rear area. MP engage enemy
armor targets only for self-defense or when total
surprise can be achieved. MP place antiarmor weapons
on avenues of approach to defend against enemy armor.
After initial contact, MP relocate immediately to avoid
the fast-moving enemy armor and its firepower.
Shoot, Move, and Communicate 3-17
FM 3-19.4
3-43. The (M136) antitank (AT) 4 provides antiarmor
capability for MP teams. The AT4 is primarily employed
against light armored vehicles, such as personnel
carriers. It has a very limited capability against main
battle tanks. The AT4 is issued as ammunition rather
than as an individual weapon. It is carried and employed
in addition to the basic weapon of MP.
3-44. The most stable firing positions for the AT4 are
standing supported, prone, and prone supported.
Whenever possible, use a supported position which
provides more stability and aids in aiming.
Engage Armored Vehicles
3-45. The four methods to engage armored vehicles with
the AT4 are—
•
Single firing.
•
Sequence firing.
•
Pair firing.
•
Volley firing.
3-46. Refer to Table 3-2 for a description of the four
methods. The best methods of engaging armored
vehicles are pair and volley. Regardless of the method
used, the closer the target, the better the chance for a
first-round hit. Aim for the center mass of the target.
The most vulnerable spots of armored vehicles are the
top and the rear. The sides of the armored vehicles can
also be penetrated.
3-47. An armored vehicle without the protection of
dismounted infantry is vulnerable to a close attack by
well-armed dismounted units. When an armored vehicle
is buttoned up, visibility of the crew is restricted. This
provides an opportunity for an armor-killer team to
approach the vehicle with less risk of detection. The
types of vehicles and the methods to engage enemy
armored vehicles are—
3-18 Shoot, Move, and Communicate
FM 3-19.4
•
Stationary targets. Place the center post at the
center of the visible mass for stationary targets.
The firer does the same for vehicles that are
moving toward or away from him.
•
Slow-moving targets. Place the center post on
the front leading edge of the vehicle (less than 10
miles per hour [mph]). This method is also
applied to oblique moving targets.
•
Fast-moving targets. These targets are moving
more than 10 mph. If the target is moving to the
left, place the right lead post at the center of the
mass. If the target is moving toward the right,
place the left lead post at the center of the mass.
Table 3-2. Methods of Engagement with the
Light Antiarmor Weapon (LAW)/AT4
Method
Gunners
Firing Sequence
Probability of a Hit
Single
One
One gunner fires
Low. Use only at ranges up to
firing
one AT4 at the
200 meters for AT4s.
target.
Regardless of the method
used, the closer the target the
better the chances of a hit.
Sequence One
One gunner fires
Good. If the first round misses,
firing
two or more AT4s in
the gunner adjusts the range
turn. He prepares
and the lead of the succeeding
several weapons for
rounds until he gets a hit and
firing before
fires until the target is
engaging the target.
destroyed.
He gets the weapon,
estimates the sight
picture, and shoots
the weapon in turn.
Pair firing Two or
Each gunner fires
Better. Two or more gunners
more
one or more AT4s at track the target at one time,
a target, one at a
letting them get a target hit
time. They prepare
sooner. They can be ready to
several weapons for shoot as soon as an earlier
Shoot, Move, and Communicate 3-19
FM 3-19.4
Table 3-2. Methods of Engagement with LAW/AT4 (Continued)
Method
Gunners
Firing Sequence
Probability of a Hit
firing before
round hits. The first gunner
engaging the target.
sees a target, identifies it, and
states the estimated range
and lead to use. For example,
the gunner, on spotting a fast-
moving scout reconnaissance
vehicle, says, "BMP 150
meters; fast target." He then
fires at the target. If the first
gunner misses, the second
gunner gives a revised range
and lead. This continues until
one gets a hit. Once the
correct range or lead has been
found, all the gunners fire until
the target is destroyed.
Volley
Two or
Each gunner fires
This is the best method of
firing
more
one or more AT4s
engagement for an AT4
on command or on
because the gunners shoot
signal until the target more rounds at a target at one
is destroyed. They
time. This method is used only
prepare several
when the range and lead to
weapons for firing
the target have been
before engaging the
determined. Range can be
target.
determined by using the map,
pacing, or the results of pair
firing after a target has been
hit.
Estimate the Range of the Targets
3-48. A gunner has a better chance of hitting a target
with the AT4 if he knows the range to the target.
Determining the range is a learned skill and must be
mastered by anyone who fires the AT4. Methods of range
determination include—
•
Using range finders.
•
Measuring the distance on a map.
3-20 Shoot, Move, and Communicate
FM 3-19.4
•
Pacing.
•
Firing the pair and sequence method.
•
Using visual range estimation.
3-49. Visual range estimation is the least desirable
m e t h o d o f r a n g e d e t e r m i n a t i o n b e c a u s e o f i t s
inaccuracy. However, in the offense or in a hasty
defense, it may be the only method available.
Disable Armored Vehicles
3-50. Armored vehicles are hard to destroy when firing
at their front. Use the following three ways to disable
them:
•
Mobility kill. In this disabling method, the
vehicle has stopped moving because a track or
road wheel has been destroyed, or the vehicle
has been hit in the engine compartment. The
vehicle can no longer move but can return fire.
•
Firepower kill. When a firepower kill has
occurred, the main gun cannot return fire
because of a hit in the turret, knocking out its
capability to fire. The vehicle can still move,
thus enabling it to get away.
•
Catastrophic kill. In this kill, the vehicle is
destroyed. To obtain a catastrophic kill, firers
prepare to fire a second or third shot to destroy
the vehicle.
CALL FOR FIRE
3-51. A call for fire is used to obtain fire support from
other units. Fire support may be needed in the rear area
if the enemy endangers key units or facilities. Fire
support may come from mortars, artillery, Army
aviation, and US Air Force aircraft. Before a mission,
the commander will outline the TRPs and the priority of
fires in the OPORD that will affect the call for fire
Shoot, Move, and Communicate 3-21
FM 3-19.4
response time. All MP must know how to call for and
adjust fire. To call for fire the—
•
Leader tells the RTO that a target has been
seen.
•
RTO initiates the call for fire while the target
location is being determined.
•
RTO sends the information as it is determined
instead of waiting until a complete call for fire
has been prepared.
3-52. MP may either go directly to the fire direction
center (FDC) of the firing unit for artillery fire support
or relay communications to MP leaders, the rear area CP
fire support element, or when so directed, a TCF.
Use an Initial Call for Fire
3-53. Artillery fire support can provide the rear area
with on-order fires to assist in countering threat
incursions. A standard call-for-fire message is used to
obtain artillery or other fire support. Regardless of the
method of the target location used, the call for fire
consists of six elements transmitted in three parts.
There is a break and a read back after each part.
3-54. First Transmission. Send elements one and two
during the first transmission.
•
Element 1 includes the identification of the
observer. This element tells the FDC who is
calling and clears the net for the remainder of
the call.
•
Element 2 includes the WO. The type of fire
support mission and the method of locating the
target are identified in this element. See Table
3-3 for the types of fire missions.
3-55. Second Transmission. Element 3 is sent during
this transmission and includes the target's location. A
target location may be provided by the grid coordinate
3-22 Shoot, Move, and Communicate
FM 3-19.4
Table 3-3. Types of Artillery-Fire Missions
Mission
Description
Adjust fire
This mission is used when the observer is uncertain of
the exact location of the target. The observer says,
"Adjust fire."
Fire for effect
The observer uses this mission when he is certain of the
location of the target. He is requesting a first-round fire
for effect in this mission to validate the desired effect on
the target with little or no adjustment. The observer
says, "Fire for effect."
Suppress
This mission is used to quickly bring fire only on a
preplanned target. A target description is not provided
when requesting this mission. It is a simplified call for fire
and is sent in one transmission. An example of what an
observer may say is, "P25—this is P59—suppress
AB2502—over."
Immediately
This mission is similar to that of suppression. The
suppress
difference is a planned target or a target of opportunity is
firing at friendly soldiers or aircraft in this mission. The
observer may say, "P25—this is P59—immediate
suppression AB2503—over."
(normally six digits), a polar plot, or a shift from a
known position method.
3-56. Third Transmission. Send elements 4, 5, and 6
during this transmission.
•
Element 4 includes the target's description. A
brief description of the target is given to the FDC
using size, nature, activity, protection (SNAP).
SNAP represents the size or shape, the nature or
nomenclature, the activity, and the protection or
posture of the target.
•
Element 5 includes the method of engagement.
This element consists of the type of adjustments,
danger close, trajectory, ammunition, and
distribution. The observer specifies how he
wants to attack the target.
Shoot, Move, and Communicate 3-23
FM 3-19.4
•
Element 6 includes the methods of fire and
control. The observer states who will give the
command for fire to begin. If the observer wishes
to control the time of firing, he will say, "At my
command." If the observer does not say this, the
FDC will fire as soon as the element is ready.
3-57. At a minimum, a call for fire must include the first
four elements. Untrained observers need to send only
the first four elements, and the FDC will decide the
methods of engagement, fire, and control. Every MP
must know that in order to put indirect fire on a target,
the following information must be given to the FDC:
•
Who he is.
•
Where and what the target is.
•
How close the target is to friendly troops.
•
Where the target is in relation to his or other
known positions.
•
The direction from himself to the target.
Determine the direction during—
в–
Daylight with the mini-eye safe-laser infra-
red observation set (MELIOS), AN/PVS-6.
The lightweight laser rangefinder is capable
of determining ranges 50 through 9,995
meters. Refer to TM 11-5860-202-10.
в–
Hours of darkness with the infrared (IR)
illuminator, AN/PEQ-2A. The AN/PEQ-2A is
for use with night vision devices (NVD) and
can be used as either a handheld illuminator
or pointer or can be weapon-mounted. In the
weapon-mounted mode, the AN/PEQ-2A can
be used to accurately direct fire as well as
illuminate and designate targets. This item
is fully waterproof and can be taken down to
extended depths without risk of leakage.
3-58. Determining the direction to a target is an
essential skill for the observer. Direction is an integral
part of terrain map association, adjustment of fire, and
3-24 Shoot, Move, and Communicate
FM 3-19.4
target location. Use the following paragraphs to
manually determine the direction to a target.
•
Use a compress. Using an M2 or lensatic
c om p r e ss , t h e fo r w a r d o b se r v er (F O ) c a n
measure the direction. The FO will add or
subtract the grid of magnetic (GM) angle to
determine the grid direction to send to the FDC.
•
Scale from a map. Using a protractor or an
observed fire (OF) fan, the FO can scale the
direction from a map to an accuracy of 10 mils.
•
Measure from a reference point. Using a
reference point with a known distance, the FO
can measure the angle between the reference
point and the target and add or subtract the
measured angle to or from the known direction
to determine the direction to the target. The
angle between the reference point and the target
can be measured with binoculars or with the
hand measurement technique depicted in Figure
3-4.
•
Estimate. With a thorough terrain-map analysis,
the FO can estimate the direction by visualizing
the 8-cardinal directions (north [N], northeast
[NE ], ea st [E ], south ea st [SE] , so uth [S] ,
southwest [SW], west [W], and northwest [NW]).
Estimating
30
70
100
125
180
300
angles in mils
mils
mils
mils
mils
mils
mils
with your hand
extended at
arm’s length.
Figure 3-4. Determine the Direction to a Target
NOTE: The observer tries to be as accurate as
possible, and the use of mils is preferred. All
measured directions sent to the FDC will be
rounded to the nearest 10 mils.
Shoot, Move, and Communicate 3-25
FM 3-19.4
Identify the Elements of a Call for Fire
3-59. FDC personnel will help in the call for fire and
subsequent adjustments by asking leading questions to
obtain the information needed. Refer to FM 6-30 for call
for fire. The elements of a call for fire include the
following:
•
Observer identification. The observer identifica-
tion tells who you are. Use the call signs from
the signal operating instructions (SOI).
•
Warning order. The WO alerts the firing units of
the—
в–
Type of mission. This includes adjusting fire,
fir ing for effect, suppressin g fi re, a nd
immediately suppressing fire.
в–
Size of element to fire. Omission indicates a
request for one field artillery (FA) battery. If
the fire mission requires an element larger
than a FA battery, state the size needed,
such as 2 FA batteries (battalions).
в–
Method of the target's location. The grid has
no announcement. Announce the word
"polar" for the polar plot. Shift from a
known point by announcing the word "shift"
followed immediately by the designation
(target number) of the known point.
•
Target location. The target location enables the
FDC to plot the target.
в–
Grid: Two-character, 6-digit grid, such as
NA123456.
в–
Polar: Direction (grid azimuth) and distance
(meters) to the target from the observer's
position. Give the difference in elevation if
there is a vertical shift of over 35 meters
between the observer and the target.
в–
Shift from a known point or the direction to
the target (grid azimuth). The three types of
shifts are the lateral shift (left or right) in
3-26 Shoot, Move, and Communicate
FM 3-19.4
meters, the flange shift (add or drop) in
meters, and the vertical shift (up or down)
over 35 meters from the known point and
target.
•
Target description. The target description helps
the FDC to select the type and the amount of
ammunition. A word picture of the target (for
example, the number and type of vehicles or
personnel observed).
•
Method
of
engagement.
The
method
of
engagement tells the FDC how to attack the
target, which includes the following:
в–
Type of engagement. Area fire is standard
without a request. Request precision fire
only to destroy a point target.
в–
Trajectory.
A
low-angle
trajectory
is
standard without a request. An high-angle
trajectory is at the request of the observer or
when required due to masking terrain.
в–
Danger close.
Danger close is announced
when applicable.
в–
Ammunition. Ammunition is the type of
projectile, the type of fuse action, and the
volume of fire desired in the fire-for-effect
phase stated in rounds per howitzer.
в–
Distribution. Distribution is the type of
sheaf desired and paral lel is standard
without request.
•
Method of fire and control. The method of fire
and control tells the FDC how you want to
control the delivery and adjustment of the fire.
в–
Method of fire. In area fire, the adjustment
normally is conducted with one howitzer or
with the center gun of a mortar platoon or
section. If for any reason the observer
Shoot, Move, and Communicate 3-27
FM 3-19.4
determines that platoon right (left) will be
m o r e a p p r o p r i a t e , h e m a y r e q u e s t i t .
Adjusting at extreme distances may be
easier with two guns firing. The normal
interval of time between rounds fired by a
platoon or battery right (left) is 5 seconds. If
the observer wants some other interval, he
may so specify.
в–
Method
of
control.
Use
the
following
methods of control: Fire when ready is
standard and no request is required; use at
my command when weapons fire at the
observer's command; use cannot observe
when fire will not be observed; use time on
target when rounds land at a specified time;
use continuous illumination when the FDC
will determine when to fire; use coordinated
illumination when illumination rounds are
fired only when the target is engaged; use
cease loading when missions have two or
more rounds in effect, causing the firing unit
to stop loading rounds; and use check firing
when there is a temporary halt in firing.
•
Danger close. Include the term danger close in
the method-of-engagement portion of the call for
fire when the target is within 400 meters of any
friendly troops or mortars and 600 meters for
field artillery. When adjusting naval gunfire,
announce "danger close" when the target is
located within 750 meters when using naval
guns that are 5 inches or smaller. For naval
guns larger than 5 inches, announce "danger
close" when the target is within 1,000 meters.
The creeping method of adjustment will be used
exclusively during danger close missions. The
FO makes range changes by creeping the rounds
to the target using corrections of less than 100
meters.
3-28 Shoot, Move, and Communicate
FM 3-19.4
Plot a Target Location
3-60. Selecting a targeting method includes giving the
directions in mils, degrees, or cardinal points of the
compress (N, NE, S, SW, E, SE, W, and NW). Give a
deviation of left or right and the distance in meters. Use
the foll owing paragraphs when plotting a target
location:
3-61. Grid. Determine a 2-character, 6-digit grid for the
target. Then, determine a grid direction to the target,
and send it after the call for fire and before a ny
subsequent corrections.
3-62. Polar. Determine the grid direction to the target.
Determine the distance from the observer to the target.
Determine if any significant vertical interval exists.
3-63. Shift. Refer to Figure 3-5 and determine—
BMP
500 meters
AA 4165
Direction: 3,570 meters
70 meters
Shift factor: 4.2
Direction: 3,500 miles
4.2 x 70 = 204
Distance: 4,200 meters
294 expressed as 290
Figure 3-5. Call for Fire Elements
•
The grid direction to the target.
•
The lateral shift to the target from the known
point. W = R times m (mil relation formula),
when—
W = R x m
Shoot, Move, and Communicate 3-29
FM 3-19.4
W = width of the lateral shift (the unknown)
R = shift factor, the distance to the known point divided
by 1,000 and expressed to one decimal place
m = measured angle in mils from the known point to the
target
•
The range shift from the known point to the
target.
•
Any significant vertical interval that may exist.
Example of plotting a target location: Complete target
location – direction 3,570, right 290, add 500
Adjust Fire
3-64. The objective in adjusting fire is to move the
center of the impact to within 50 meters of the center of
the target. The observer accomplishes this by sending
the FDC subsequent corrections, which are deviation
(lateral) and range corrections. The FDC can talk the
observer through the adjustments if they are necessary.
The burst is moved to, and kept on, the observer target
line in order to get a positive range spotting. The
observer target line is the line of sight (an imaginary
line) between the observer and the target. When range
spotting cannot be determined, the observer makes a
request for a lateral correction to place the burst on the
observer target line.
3-65. The observer makes range corrections to bracket
t h e t a r g e t b e t w e e n tw o s u c c e s s i v e r o u n d s . T h e
successive bracketing technique is used. After the first
definite range spotting is determined, a correction is
sent to the FDC to establish a bracket of known distance
around the target (such as, one round over the target
and one round short of the target). The observer then
successively splits this bracket until he is within 50
meters of the target and calls for fire for effect.
3-66. Hasty bracketing is used if the nature of the target
dictates that effective fires are needed faster than the
3-30 Shoot, Move, and Communicate
FM 3-19.4
above procedures can provide. Hasty bracketing depends
on a thorough terrain analysis to give the observer an
accurate initial-target location. A bracket is obtained on
the first correction in a manner like that used for
successive bracketing. Once the initial bracket is
established, it is used as a yardstick to find subsequent
corrections. The observer sends the FDC the correction
to move the rounds to the target and calls for fire for
effect. Ha sty b racketing improves with ob server
experience and judgment. Fire for effect consists of one
or more rounds from each gun of the unit firing at the
target. Dispersion of the guns will cause the rounds to
saturate the area with shell fragments. To end a fire
mission, the observer states, "End of mission," and
reports the results of the fire for effect. The observer
may say, "End of mission, three T-62s neutralized,
estimate two casualties, over."
Illuminate the Battlefield
3-67. Battlefield illumination can provide MP with
enough light to aid in ground operations at night.
Illumination can—
•
Mark the targets for CAS.
•
Increase visibility in areas of suspected enemy
activity.
•
Furnish the direction to the patrol activity.
3-68. Illumination is called for and adjusted like other
indirect fires except the methods of engagement, fire,
and control differ. The observer requests illuminating
shells. The methods of fire and control differ in that the
adjustment is based on how much visibility is needed in
the target area. If the observer calls for—
•
"Illumination," the observer gets one round from
one gun.
•
"Illumination, two guns," the observer gets one
round each from two guns. The rounds will burst
simultaneously.
Shoot, Move, and Communicate 3-31
FM 3-19.4
•
"Illumination, range and lateral spread," the
observer gets one round each from four guns.
The rounds will burst simultaneously in a
diamond pattern.
3-69. The initial request for illumination must include
the—
•
Date when the illumination is needed, if
illumination is preplanned.
•
Purpose of the illumination.
•
Requested time and duration of the illumination
(for example, three minutes at 2150 hours or
three minutes on call).
•
Grid reference and, if needed, the height of the
points or areas to be illuminated.
•
Method of controls (any restrictions in the time
and the place before and during the operation).
OBTAIN ARMY AVIATION FIRE SUPPORT
3-70. Army aviation provides the echelon commander
with the ability to move combat resources across the
battle space with little regard for the terrain's barriers.
These units can provide surveillance or screen over a
wide area in adverse weather and at night. Attack
helicopter units provide the sustainment area with
highly maneuverable antiarmor firepower. They are
ideally suited for situations in which rapid reaction time
is critical.
Control the Fire
3-71. While en route to a target area, the attack
helicopter will contact the caller on the radio. For
example, "1L22, this is 1X47, fire team arrives at
estimated target area in 4 minutes, over." At this time, a
call for fire is transmitted consisting of—
•
The target's location and description.
3-32 Shoot, Move, and Communicate
FM 3-19.4
•
The proximity of the friendly unit to the target.
The words danger close must be included when a
friendly unit is 600 meters or less from the
target. Danger close is required because some
types of ordnance ca nnot be used in close
proximity to friendly ground forces. When
danger close is included, MP must mark the
unit's location. The method of marking should be
one that least reveals the position to the enemy,
such as using panels or mirrors.
•
The protection of the friendly units (such as good
fighting positions, hasty positions, or exposed
positions).
•
The direction of the friendly unit from the target
(cardinal direction).
•
Other
friendly
fire
support
considerations,
including artillery and mortars firing in the area
and tactical aircraft (attack direction and
altitude).
•
Dangers to the flight. Report locations of known
or suspected enemy antiaircraft weapons or
other dangers to the flight (wires in the target's
area, enemy artillery fire impacting in the
target's area, or enemy aircraft).
3-72. When the helicopter arrives over the objective, the
helicopter's fire team contacts the caller. The caller
marks the target and states the method of adjustment.
The caller can use the three following methods to mark
the target:
•
A reference either to a prominent terrain feature
that can be identified from the air or to a known
point.
•
A direction to the target from a reference point,
stated in mils or degrees.
•
References to friendly fire (such as smoke
grenades, tracers, smoke streamers, mortars,
artillery, or marking rockets).
Shoot, Move, and Communicate 3-33
FM 3-19.4
Use the Fire Adjustment Method
3-73. The three methods used to adjust the fire of a fire
team are impact-observed, impact sound, and observer
target. The preferred methods of adjustment for an
attack helicopter in support of a ground force are impact
observed and impact sound. Once established, the caller
does not change the method of adjustment unless the
situation dictates. If the method of adjustment is
changed, the caller informs the fire team. When any
adjustment is 50 meters or less, the observer transmits
the adjustment and calls for fire for effect.
3-74. When using the impact-observed method of
adjustment, the observer estimates the direction to the
target by using a cardinal heading. He estimates the
distance from the point of impact to the target in meters.
When the observer cannot see the point of impact, he
may use the impact sound method of adjustment. For
this method of adjustment, the observer transmits,
"Adjust fire. Impact sound. Over." The impact sound
method differs from the impact-observed method in that
the observer senses by sound, rather than sees, the
direction of the impact and makes his corrections
accordingly.
3-75. Although the impact-observed method is most
preferred for adjusting the fire of the attack helicopters,
the observer target method, which is less desirable, may
be used. When using the observer target method, the
observer must mark his location, possibly compromising
his location.
3-76. To use the observer target method, the observer
senses the direction, left or right, and the distance, in
meters, from the impact to a point on the observer target
line. Then, he senses the position of the point on the
observer target line relative to the target, long or short,
and the distance along the observer target line to the
target. The sensing of the observer must be converted to
corrections, such as right, left, add, and drop, and
3-34 Shoot, Move, and Communicate
FM 3-19.4
transmitted to the fire team. The chance of error for this
m e t h o d i s g r e a t e r t h a n f o r t h e o t h e r m e t h o d s .
Unobserved rounds are handled the same as for the
o t h e r m e t h o d s . A n e x a m p l e o f a n e x c h a n g e o f
information between an observer and a fire team using
the observer target method follows:
•
Observer: "Left, five-zero. Add 100. Fire for
effect. Over."
•
Fire team: "Roger. Out." (The team commits
against the target.)
3-77. When the target is suppressed or destroyed, the
following transmission would occur:
•
Observer: "End of mission. Target suppressed
(destroyed). Over."
•
Fire team: "End of mission. Out."
3-78. Reference points are used to visually locate the
target. The eyes of the pilot are led to the reference point
and from the reference point to the target, sometimes
through a series of decreasingly obvious reference
points. It is much harder for a pilot to find a target than
to keep a target in sight. Any reference point must stand
out or contrast with its surroundings.
Adjust Fire
3-79. Attack helicopter fire allows the pilot to observe
the impact and effect of the ordnance on the target. This
simplifies the adjustment procedure. However, the
observer must still be prepared to adjust direct aerial
fire. When adjusting aerial fire—
•
Establish a reference point. The point of impact
of the first round is the recommended reference
point.
•
Adjust for target strike. Do not try to bracket the
target. The helicopter crew has direct visual
contact with the target and needs only specific
directions to fix the location.
Shoot, Move, and Communicate 3-35
FM 3-19.4
•
Transmit the corrections.
3-80. The following is a typical exchange of information
between the observer and the fire team:
•
Observer: "Adjust fire. Impact observed. Over."
•
Fire team: "Impact observed. Out." (The team
fires at the target.)
•
Observer: "Northwest, seven-five. Over."
•
Fire team: "Roger. Out." (The team fires at the
target.)
•
Observer: "North, three-zero. Fire for effect.
Over."
•
Fire team: "Roger. Out" (The team commits
against the target.)
•
Observer: "End of mission. Target suppressed
(destroyed), over."
•
Fire team: "End of mission. Over."
3-81. If the observer does not see the impact, the
transmission would be—
•
Observer: "Unobserved. Over."
•
Fire team: "Unobserved. Over." (The team fires
at the target.)
3-82 . Adjustments con tinue unti l the m issi on is
accomplished. Table 3-4 shows how to direct a pilot to
the target.
Table 3-4. Directing the Pilot to the Target
Ways of Directing the
How Used
Pilot
Ammunition
Smoke
Mortars, artillery, or grenade launchers.
rounds
Phosphorous is usually the best because
smoke clouds blossom quickly and are highly
visible.
Ordnance
Ordnance impacting the ground may be an
adequate reference point.
3-36 Shoot, Move, and Communicate
FM 3-19.4
Table 3-4. Directing the Pilot to the Target (Continued)
Ways of Directing the
How Used
Pilot
Illumination
Good for guiding the strike aircraft to the
rounds
target at night, but will not pinpoint small
targets if the flares function at the usual
height
Trace fire
Used at night. The intersection of the two
streams of traces or the impact point of one
stream marks the target.
Fires
Grass or
Sometimes used near the target as a night
other
reference
Recogniz-
Terrain
If clearly visible from the air, it can help when
able known
features or
used with another location method (streams,
points
landmarks
roads, bridges, tree lines, cultivated areas,
prominent hills).
Friendly
When clearly recognizable from the air, it may
positions
be used day or night for locating close-in
targets.
OBTAIN AIR FORCE TACTICAL-AIRCRAFT FIRE
SUPPORT
3-83. During major enemy incursions in the rear area,
fighter aircraft may be available to support ground
operations by providing immediate CAS. CAS consists of
air attacks against enemy targets that are close to the
friendly forces. CAS requires detailed coordination with
the maneuver of the ground forces to be effective. The
coordination must be responsive, integrated, and
controlled. Typical CAS targets are—
•
Enemy troop concentrations.
•
Fixed positions.
•
Armored units of immediate concern to the
ground forces.
3-84. CAS missions are flown at the request of the
comma nd level. They a re pl anned, directed, and
Shoot, Move, and Communicate 3-37
FM 3-19.4
controlled by the Air Force through the Tactical Air
Control System.
3-85. Air Force support is directed through a forward air
controller who, in turn, talks to the pilots. The controller
can be in an aircraft or operating on the ground. In most
cases, the controller will come forward to a point where
he can see the target. Once the target is in sight, he can
adjust the aircraft to the target. If the controller cannot
see the target, the observer will have to tell him how it
can be identified. The observer must make sure that the
controller knows where all the friendly elements close to
the target are located.
3-86. If the observer is unable to talk to a forward air
controller, he must contact a fire-support team operating
in the maneuver area. Fire support teams have the
equipment to talk directly to the pilots of the aircraft
and are trained observers for CAS.
Mark Friendly Positions
3-87. Friendly positions are marked during close air
strikes if there is no danger of compromise to enemy
observers. This may require only a message (such as "All
friendly positions are south of the target. Nearest are
500 meters."). As a rule, a mark is usually necessary
when friendly troops are within 300 meters of the target.
Marking of friendly positions may be overt or covert and
include the following:
•
Weapons fire. Weapons fire is useful as a signal
if it is distinguishable from other types of fire.
Tracers are especially useful.
•
Smoke. Smoke grenades are the most commonly
used overt marker, but they have limitations.
Wind may move the smoke awa y from the
source. Red and white smoke show up well with
most backgrounds while some colors blend with
their background.
3-38 Shoot, Move, and Communicate
FM 3-19.4
•
Mirrors. Signal mirrors and panels are probably
t h e b e s t c o v e r t g r o u n d - t o - a i r d e v i c e s f o r
attracting attention. When the operator is
proficient and the sun is shining, pilots can see a
mirror flash for many miles away. Mirror
signaling requires practiced training.
•
Balloons. Balloons make a good covert marking
system for use above a thick forest canopy.
•
Flares. Rockets or 40-millimeter flares are good
for attracting attention at night. If flares are
fired in the direction of the aircraft, they can be
mistaken as ground fire.
•
Lights. Strobe lights produce a bright pulsing
f l a s h t h a t i s v i s i b l e a t n i g h t f r o m 2 to 5
kilometers. Vehicle lights, such as unshielded
red taillights, are visible to a pilot for several
kilometers at night. Chemical glow lights may
also be used.
•
Ground commander’s pointer. The pointer is a
handheld device that is invisible to the naked
eye, but its beam is visible through NVDs. It
may be used by ground troops to clearly show air
elements the location of friendly elements.
Select Attack Headings
3-88. A fighter aircraft is more likely to destroy its
target if it attacks along the long axis of the target. Once
the fighter aircraft knows where all the friendly units
are and where the target is, the forward air controller
tells the fighter pilot which attack heading to use.
However, if the controller cannot see the target, the
obs er ve r m a y ha ve to r ec om m en d a d ir ec tio n of
approach. The observer must remember that fighters
should not attack across friendly positions.
3-89. An attack toward friendly units is undesirable
because of ordnance dispersal patterns. An attack from
behind and over friendly lines is also undesirable for
Shoot, Move, and Communicate 3-39
FM 3-19.4
several reasons. Some fighters dump empty cartridges
overboard as they strafe. An empty 20-millimeter case
weighs 114 grams and hits the ground at 167 kilometers
p e r h o u r . A n e v e n g r e a t e r h a z a r d w o u l d b e a n
inadvertent bomb release as the pilot repeatedly selects
and arms his weapons systems while in the attack
pattern.
MOVE
3-90. Movement by MP teams, squads, or platoons in
combat is dependent on the mission, the terrain, and the
likelihood of enemy contact. MP apply the fundamentals
of movement which include—
•
Moving on covered and concealed routes.
•
Avoiding likely ambush sites.
•
Enforcing
camouflage,
noise,
and
light
discipline.
•
Maintaining all-around security, to include air
guards.
•
Using formations and movement techniques
based on METT-TC.
3-91. In addition to applying the fundamentals of
movement, MP leaders ensure that they—
•
Maximize the capabilities of HMMWVs and
ASVs. This includes considering the speed,
mobility, and firepower of the vehicles. Fire and
move both vehicles as a weapon system.
•
Make contact with the enemy using the smallest
force possible. MP move with a small force in the
lead with the rest of the unit ready to react. A
team leads a squad and a squad leads a platoon.
One team leads another when two vehicles are
moving. This prevents the whole unit from being
pinned down by enemy fire and provides the unit
with the flexibility to maneuver.
3-40 Shoot, Move, and Communicate
FM 3-19.4
•
Use the terrain. The terrain offers natural cover
against enemy fire and conceals them from
enemy observation. MP leaders must devote
constant attention to protect vehicles and
prevent them from skylining. MP make use of all
natural cover and concealment when moving or
stopped. When MP do stop, they stagger their
vehicles on the roadway.
•
Control subordinate elements. MP leaders issue
cl ear a nd complete o rd ers to subordinate
elements in order to maintain control. They
issue OPORDs, which cite MP actions to be
taken on contact and the immediate actions the
teams should accomplish. The OPORDs also
e x p l a i n s h o w t h e M P l e a d e r w i l l d i r e c t
subordinate elements through the use of hand
and arm signals, pyrotechnics, and other visual
signals.
USE MOVEMENT TECHNIQUES
3-92. Movement techniques are designed to minimize
the exposure of the platoon to enemy fire and to place
the platoon in a good position to react to enemy contact.
They provide varying degrees of control, security, and
flexibility. The selection of their use is based on METT-
TC and the likelihood of enemy contact. Their effective
use results in the platoon's contact with the enemy with
the smallest platoon element.
3-93. MP employ the following three techniques of
movement on the battlefield:
•
Traveling.
•
Traveling overwatch.
•
Bounding overwatch.
3-94. While these techniques provide a standard method
of movement, the leader must use common sense and
sound judgment when employing them as he performs
his missions and encounters different situations. The
decision of which technique to use is based on terrain
Shoot, Move, and Communicate 3-41
FM 3-19.4
considerations and whether enemy contact is not likely,
possible, or expected. The techniques are used in both
the mounted and dismounted modes of movement.
Traveling
3-95. An MP leader selects the traveling method of
movement when contact with the enemy is not likely
and speed is required. This technique allows the lead
and trail elements to move together as a unit. It is the
fastest but least secure movement technique. Movement
i s c o n t i n u o u s , a n d i n t e r v a l a n d d i s p e r s i o n a r e
maintained between the squads as terrain and weather
permit. The platoon does not intend to engage in combat,
but it is dispersed to prevent destruction in case of
unexpected air or ground attack. The distance between
the vehicles is based on the factors of METT-TC. This
method of movement, with MP mounted, is depicted in
Figure 3-6.
Figure 3-6. Traveling
3-42 Shoot, Move, and Communicate
FM 3-19.4
Traveling Overwatch
3-96. Use the traveling overwatch method of movement
when contact with the enemy is possible and speed is
desirable. The lead element moves continuously along
the best, covered and concealed routes for protection
from possible enemy observation and direct fire. The
trail element moves at variable speeds, continuously
overwatching. It normally maintains contact with the
lead element and may stop periodically for better
observation. The trail element tries to stay one terrain
feature behind the lead element, but close enough to
provide immediate suppressive fire and maneuver for
support. However, it remains far enough to the rear to
avoi d contact with the same enemy force that is
engaging the lead element. This technique, with MP
mounted, is depicted in Figure 3-7.
A
A. Lead
B. Overwatch
B
B
Figure 3-7. Traveling Overwatch
Shoot, Move, and Communicate 3-43
FM 3-19.4
Bounding Overwatch
3-97. When MP expect to make contact with the enemy,
t h e y s e l e c t t h e b o u n d i n g o v e r w a t c h m e t h o d o f
movement. It is the slowest, but safest method of
movement. In bounding overwatch, the trail element
occupies a good, covered and concealed position to
overwatch the lead elements. While one element moves,
another is always stopped in position to overwatch the
bounding element. Although, bounding overwatch is
used when enemy contact is expected, use it when time
is available regardless of the likelihood of enemy
contact. It provides for immediate, direct suppressive
fire on an enemy force that engages the bounding
element with direct fire. A three-vehicle team uses the
V-form ation with boun ding overwatch . Th e l ead
elements advance to a point (first move) where they can
support the advance of the overwatch element. On
signal, the overwatch element moves forward to a
position abreast of the lead elements (second move) and
halts. During its move, it is overwatched by both lead
elements. The lead elements then move forward, secured
by the overwatch. Maximum use is made of folds of the
earth and concealment to mask movement from likely
enemy positions. MP are mounted in this method of
movement as shown in Figure 3-8.
PLATOON LEADER RESPONSIBILITIES
3-98. In the conduct of most tactical missions, the MP
platoon moves as separate squads under the C2 of the
p l a t o o n l e a d e r . R e g a r d l e s s o f w h i c h m o v e m e n t
technique is directed, the platoon leader issues the
squads an order explaining what each squad will do.
This action becomes more critical as the likelihood of
enemy contact increases. The platoon leader tells, and if
possible, shows the squads—
•
The enemy situation as he knows or suspects it
to be.
3-44 Shoot, Move, and Communicate
FM 3-19.4
A
B
B
A. Bounds
B. Overwatches
Figure 3-8. Bounding Overwatch
•
The next overwatch position (objective for the
bounding element).
•
The route of the bounding element to that
position.
•
What he wants the squad to do after the
bounding element gets to the next position.
USE EXTENDED AND TEMPORARY HALTS
3-99. When an MP platoon moves as an element, it uses
the coil formation for extended halts. This formation
provides the platoon with 360-degree observation and
fields of fire. The coil is always executed from either the
column or staggered column formation. The platoon uses
the four-team organization. The lead team assumes the
12 o'clock position (the direction of travel). Teams occupy
the 3, 6, and 9 o'clock positions in twos, facing in the
Shoot, Move, and Communicate 3-45
FM 3-19.4
appropriate direction. Ensure that there are 50 to 100
meters between the team's vehicles. The interval
between the teams will be 100 to 200 meters (terrain
dependent). The HQ element occupies the center of the
formation. Each platoon must have its own SOP for the
formation based on its METL, war plans, and most
common organization; it should practice the SOP as a
drill to ensure correct execution. Figure 3-9 depicts an
MP platoon in a coil formation.
3 o'clock
100-150 meters
100-150 meters
6 o'clock
12 o'clock 2 3 5 6 1 4
7
8
9
0
(Direction
of travel)
A
B
HQ
C
D
100-150 meters
100-150 meters
9 o'clock
Figure 3-9. Platoon Coil Formation
3-100. MP use the herringbone formation for temporary
halts from the march column. It provides them with a
360-degree observation and field of fire (Figure 3-10).
USE GRAPHIC CONTROL MEASURES
3-101. MP leaders use graphic control measures to
regulate or direct the movement, positions, and fire of
the platoon. Control measures—
3-46 Shoot, Move, and Communicate
FM 3-19.4
Figure 3-10. Herringbone Formation
•
Are not intended to restrict the exercise of
initiative (the function of command). Leaders
use control measures to clarify their intent, focus
the pl a to on a n d sq ua d ef for t, a nd en su re
synchronization. Each control measure should
have a specific purpose that contributes to
mission accomplishment. If a control measure
fails the purpose test, leaders should not use it.
•
Can be drawn on a map, an overlay, a sketch, or
a terrain model. Leaders should strive to keep
control measures easily identifiable and simple.
Graphic control measures may include the AA,
the route, the release point (RP) and start point
(SP), checkpoints, and so forth. FM 101-5-1
d i s c u s se s c on t r o l m e a s u r e s a n d p r ov i d es
examples of their use.
Shoot, Move, and Communicate 3-47
FM 3-19.4
CROSS A DANGER AREA
3-102. Danger areas are specific areas where there may
be potential danger because of the increased risk of
detection. Plan a way in which the patrol crosses danger
areas to reduce the chances of a fight. MP make specific
plans for crossing each known danger area and general
plans for crossing unexpected danger areas. Patrols
must be able to quickly modify these plans to fit the
tactical situation. Typical danger areas include the
following:
•
Curves and blind spots on roads and trails.
•
Streams.
•
Open areas.
•
Hill tops.
3-103. MP move cautiously at danger areas, using the
bounding overwatch or variations of it to cross them.
The MP leader decides how a patrol will cross danger
areas based on the—
•
Amount of time available.
•
Size of the patrol.
•
Size of the danger area.
•
Fields of fire into the area.
•
Amount of security available.
3-104. To cross a danger area, a patrol must designate
nearside and farside rally points, secure the nearside
and farside, and cross the danger area.
3-105. A small patrol may cross all at once, in pairs, or
one element at a time. A large patrol normally crosses
its elements one at a time. The leader positions security
teams far enough out on both flanks and to the rear of
the crossing point to give warning of the approaching
enemy and to overwatch the crossing element. Once
flank and rear security are positioned, the team crosses
the danger area. The team crosses quickly, reconnoiters,
and secures the far side of the danger area. The area on
3-48 Shoot, Move, and Communicate
FM 3-19.4
the farside must be large enough for a full patrol
employment. When the team leader knows the farside is
safe, he signals the rest of the patrol to cross. As each
element crosses, it moves to an overwatch position or to
the farside rally point until told to continue movement.
When the patrol has crossed the danger area, the
security teams cross and rejoin the patrol.
3-106. Open areas frequently afford the patrol the
opportunity to observe the enemy from long ranges.
Conversely, they often require that the patrol be exposed
to possible enemy observation and fire for long periods of
movement. The leader must make maximum use of the
terrain and employ effective observation techniques to
avoid exposing the patrol to a well-concealed and
camouflaged enemy.
3-107. Before moving across a large open area, the
patrol takes a thorough visual scan of the area. This
should be done both dismounted and mounted, using all
available optics. This scan focuses not only on finding
potential enemy positions, but also on locating covered
and concealed routes for bounding and a covered and
concealed position to move to. If time and terrain permit,
use dismounted troops to move to the far side of the open
area and secure it. In very large open areas, use of
dismounts may not be feasible because of the distances
between covered and concealed positions.
3-108. Once the area has been cleared using visual
means and/or dismounts, the squad or platoon moves
across it. The patrol uses bounding overwatch because of
the likelihood of enemy contact. If the open area is very
large, the overwatch vehicle remains stationary until
the bounding vehicle has moved a distance equal to half
the ef fec ti ve r a ng e of th e w ea po n s yste m of the
overwatching vehicle. When that point is reached, the
overwatch vehicle must move out, even if the bounding
vehicle has not yet reached a position of cover and
concealment.
Shoot, Move, and Communicate 3-49
FM 3-19.4
MOVE WHILE IN CONTACT
3-109. Maneuver is the technique used for moving while
in contact with the enemy. Maneuver involves two
actions that occur at the same time. One element moves
to a position where it can engage the enemy while
another element supports that movement with a base of
fire. A patrol maneuvers to move forward, either to close
with the enemy or to gain a better position for firing at
t h e e n e m y . M P c a n a l s o m a n e u v e r t o g e t m o r e
information on the position and strength of the enemy.
When the position of the enemy is unknown, it may
result in an unexpected encounter known as a chance
contact. MP use maneuver to move away and withdraw
safely.
3-110. When maneuver begins, the MP leader most
often goes with the base-of-fire element and controls its
fire. The base-of-fire element covers the movement
elemen t by shooting at the enem y position. The
movement element advances within the supporting
range of the base-of-fire element, taking a position from
which it can fire on the enemy. The movement element
then becomes the base-of-fire element, and the former
base-of-fire element begins moving. Depending on the
distance to the enemy position and the amount of cover
and concealment available, the base-of-fire element and
the movement element alternate roles as needed to
continue moving.
3-111. MP can maneuver mounted, dismounted, or in a
combination of both. A fire element using the MK19
GMG will have difficulty moving dismounted. MP move
mounted when the terrain protects them from enemy
fire, and look for covered and concealed routes.
3-112. When receiving direct fire, the movement
element uses maneuver while the base-of-fire element
suppresses enemy fire. If the movement element is not
receiving direct fire, it uses bounding overwatch or
maneuvers internally.
3-50 Shoot, Move, and Communicate
FM 3-19.4
3-113. MP of a dismounted movement element move
based on the intensity of the enemy's fire. When facing
intense enemy fire with little or no cover, MP may be
forced to crawl. They will use the low or high crawl
depending on the situation, the need for speed, and the
example set by the leader. Although crawling is slow, it
reduces exposure to enemy observation and fire. When
MP are not moving forward, they place suppressive fires
on the enemy. They may need to advance all the way
into and through enemy positions by crawling.
3-114. Dismounted MP can use short rushes from one
covered position to another when enemy fire allows brief
exposure. To do this they should—
•
Advance by short rushes to avoid the enemy's
fire.
•
Try to stay up no more than 3 to 5 seconds. This
keeps the enemy from having time to track and
engage them.
•
Select the next covered position before beginning
the rush.
•
Rush from cover to cover.
•
Not hit the ground just because 3 to 5 seconds
are up.
3-115. MP of a mounted maneuver element move based
on enemy fire and the terrain. When they move, they
should—
•
Use the terrain to mask their movement.
•
Move quickly between protected positions so
that the enemy cannot engage their vehicles.
•
Dismount when the terrain no longer provides
protection.
EXECUTE ACTIONS ON CONTACT
3-116. When MP encounter enemy forces, they must
quickly execute actions on contact. Whether they remain
undetected or are identified by the enemy, MP must
Shoot, Move, and Communicate 3-51
FM 3-19.4
first take measures to protect themselves, find out what
they are up against, and then decide on a COA. To
properly execute actions on contact, MP must take
action consistent with the following fundamentals of
reconnaissance:
•
Remain focused on the reconnaissance objective.
•
Report quickly and accurately.
•
Maintain contact with the enemy.
•
Retain the freedom to maneuver.
•
Develop the situation rapidly.
3-117. The platoon leader specifies the actions on
contact for the platoon. These specific instructions
include the engagement criteria and the desired COA,
based on the size and activity of the enemy force
encountered. By knowing these details ahead of time,
MP can develop the situation more rapidly and arrive at
and execute the desired COA. The platoon strives to
make contact with the smallest possible element. Visual
contact in which the enemy is observed, but MP remain
undetected, is the goal. This gives the platoon the
greatest possible flexibility to maneuver and develop the
situation.
3-118. The steps that make up the actions on contact
must be thoroughly trained and rehearsed so that the
platoon can react instinctively as a team whenever it
encounters enemy forces. The four steps which are
executed to allow the platoon to accomplish its mission
according to the reconnaissance fundamentals are—
•
Deploy and report.
•
Evaluate and develop the situation.
•
Choose a COA.
•
Execute a COA.
3-52 Shoot, Move, and Communicate
FM 3-19.4
Deploy and Report
3-119. The MP patrol that gains initial visual contact
with the enemy deploys to covered terrain that has good
observation and fields of fire. The MP patrol in visual
contact sends a report using the SALUTE format. If the
element in contact is unable to report or cannot report
quickly, another squad or team must report. The
elements not in contact temporarily halt in covered
terrain, monitor the report, and plot the situation on
their maps. The platoon or patrol leader immediately
determines the COA.
Evaluate and Develop the Situation
3-120. The patrol concentrates on defining what they
are up against. If they have not sent a SPOTREP at this
point, they initially focus on getting enough information
to send one. If the enemy has not detected them and
time is available, the patrol attempts to confirm or
determine in detail the enemy's size, composition,
activity, orientation, and the locations of the enemy's
weapon systems. They search for any additional
information regarding the enemy that can help define
the situation and update the SPOTREP.
Choose a Course of Action
3-121. Once the patrol has developed the situation and
the platoon or patrol leader has enough information to
make a decision, he selects a COA. The COA will be
within the capabilities of the patrol and allow the patrol
to continue the commander's concept of the operation.
The platoon or patrol leader considers various possible
COAs, including—
•
Breaking contact and bypassing the enemy. This
COA may be selected when the enemy sees the
Shoot, Move, and Communicate 3-53
FM 3-19.4
patrol before the patrol sees them and comes
under—
в–
Sniper fire. In this situation, the patrol
returns fire in the direction of the sniper and
conducts the maneuver (fire and movement)
to break contact with or destroy the sniper.
в–
Indirect fire. The patrol quickly gets out of
the impact area and does not seek cover, as
it may be pinned down by doing so. By
continuing to move, the patrol is more
difficult to hit. The patrol uses the clock
system (described later) to break contact.
в–
Ambush. In an ambush, a patrol takes
immediate action. Personnel in the kill zone
return fire immediately and quickly move
out of the kill zone. Elements not in the kill
zone lay down a base of fire (and smoke if
available) to support the withdrawal of the
elements in the kill zone. The patrol breaks
contact and reorganizes at the last rally
point. After or while the elements in the kill
zone are being extracted, the leader decides
whether to destroy the ambush element or
break contact based on the situation and the
m i s s i o n . I f n o g u i d a n c e i s g i v e n , t h e
immediate action of the patrol is geared to
breaking contact.
•
Maintaining contact to support a hasty attack.
This COA is appropriate when the MP patrol
discovers enemy elements that the higher HQ
wants destroyed. The patrol cannot destroy the
enemy because it does not have the combat
power (level III threat) or because it has other
tasks to perform. In this situation, the patrol
maintains contact and continues to develop the
situation, focusing on supporting the hasty
attack by a TCF. The patrol conducts additional
reconnaissance and monitors any changes in the
3-54 Shoot, Move, and Communicate
FM 3-19.4
enemy's situation. It focuses on information to
support a friendly hasty attack.
•
Conducting a hasty attack. If contact is made
and the MP patrol and the enemy element
become aware of each other at the same time
and at such a close range that maneuver is not
feasible, the patrol may make an immediate
assault. The elements nearest the enemy open
fire and shout, "contact, front (right, left, or
rear)." The patrol moves swiftly into the assault.
It stops the assault if the enemy withdraws and
breaks contact. If the enemy fights, the assault
is continued until the patrol can break contact,
the enemy is destroyed, or the enemy breaks
contact. In most cases, the patrol cannot, or
should not, mass its combat power to defeat an
enemy force. If the patrol concentrates, it risks
losing the capability to complete its mission and
jeopardizes its ability to conduct subsequent
missions. If the patrol attacks an enemy, it
should only attack small dismounted formations
or lightly-armored or unarmored reconnaissance
vehicles. Except in self-defense, patrols should
avoid attacking heavily armored vehicles or
large formations.
•
Establishing a hasty defense. The patrol will
establish a hasty defense if it cannot bypass the
enemy, all the teams are fixed or suppressed,
and the patrol no longer has the ability to break
contact by maneuver. Patrols should use a hasty
defense when the enemy executes a ha sty
attack. The patrol maintains contact or fixes the
enemy in place until additional combat power
arrives or the patrol is ordered to move. If the
patrol is required to conduct a hasty defense, the
co mm ander then b ecomes resp onsible f or
continuing to develop the situation.
Shoot, Move, and Communicate 3-55
FM 3-19.4
Execute a Course of Action
3-122. The platoon leader updates his SPOTREP to the
co mm a n de r w i t h a ny ne w i n fo r m a t i o n a nd th e n
recommends a COA to the commander. The commander
approves or disapproves the recommended COA based
on how it will affect the parent unit’s mission.
3-123. If the commander has anticipated the enemy
situation the platoon is reporting, he will already have
addressed the contingency in the OPORD and given
guidance to his subordinates on what COA the platoon
executes. In such a case, the platoon leader can evaluate
the situation, choose a COA consistent with the higher
commander’s intent or concept, and execute it without
further guidance. He keeps the commander informed of
what he is doing as he executes the COA.
BREAK CONTACT
3-124. To break contact with the enemy without
disorder, use the clock system. Use this system when the
patrol and a larger enemy element see each other at the
sam e tim e. The p atro l mu st b re ak con ta c t or be
destroyed. The direction the patrol moves is always 12
o'clock. When contact is made, the leader shouts a
direction and distance to move (such as "4 o'clock, 300
meters" tells the patrol to move in the direction of 4
o'clock for 300 meters). If contact is broken, the patrol
rallies at the designated distance and continues with the
mission. If contact is not broken, then another direction
and distance is given. This action continues until contact
is broken. The leader can also use the clock system to
shift or direct fire at a certain location.
CONSOLIDATE AND REORGANIZE
3-125. Once enemy resistance has ceased or the platoon
or patrol has broken contact, leaders must quickly take
steps to consolidate and prepare to defend against a
counterattack. In consolidating on the objective, all-
3-56 Shoot, Move, and Communicate
FM 3-19.4
around security is critical because the enemy might
counterattack from any direction. The leader must
evaluate the terrain thoroughly. Platoons and patrols
use the following two techniques when consolidating:
•
Clock technique. In using this method, the
leader designates either a compass direction or
the direction of attack as 12 o'clock. He then uses
clock positions to identify the left and right
boundaries for squads. The leader positions key
w e a p o n s a l o n g t h e m o s t l i ke l y a v e n u e o f
approach based on his assessment of the terrain
(Figure 3-11).
Medium
weapons
MG crew
MG crew
2d squad
1st squad
3d squad
11
12
1
9
3
Figure 3-11. Clock Technique
•
Terrain feature technique. In a similar manner,
the leader identifies obvious terrain features
(Figure 3-12, page 3-58) as the left and right
limits for squads. In both techniques, he ensures
that squad sectors of fire overlap each other and
provide mutual support for adjacent units.
Shoot, Move, and Communicate 3-57
FM 3-19.4
#2 MG crew
#1 MG crew
Medium
weapons
2d squad
3d squad
1st squad
Figure 3-12. Terrain Feature Technique
3-126. Once platoons or patrols have consolidated, they
begin to reorganize. Platoons reorganize to continue the
mission. Reorganization involves the following:
•
Reestablishing C2.
•
Remanning key weapons and redistributing
ammunition and equipment.
•
Clearing the objective of casualties and EPWs.
•
Assessing and reporting the status of platoon
personnel, ammunition, supplies, and essential
equipment.
COMMUNICATE
3 - 1 2 7 . O n t h e b a t t l e f i e l d , y o u m u s t b e a b l e t o
communicate. Communication is the means through
w h i c h b a t t l e c o m m a n d i s e x e r c i s e d . M P o n t h e
3-58 Shoot, Move, and Communicate
FM 3-19.4
battlefield must be able to communicate to maintain C2
of their elements, call for fire or request other support,
and respond to orders. The chain of command and
succession of command must be known throughout the
o r g a n i z a t i o n . T h e r e m u s t b e o p e n l i n e s o f
communication up, down, and laterally. Situations on
the battlefield can change rapidly, and losing the ability
to communicate for even a short duration can have a
major impact on an operation. Commanders must
provide for redundancy in means of communications.
MP companies have the capability to place backup
communication systems at key locations within an area
of responsibility. METT-TC and the battlefield situation
usually determine communication means. MP use any
combination of the following systems:
•
Sight and sound.
•
Messenger.
•
Wire and radio.
USE SIGHT-AND-SOUND SIGNALS
3-128. Visual signals are useful for sending prearranged
messages over short distances, during radio silence, or
when jamming interferes with radio transmissions.
Arm-and-hand signals, flashlights, and pyrotechnics
may send quick visual signals. Visual signals have some
disadvantages, which include the following:
•
They are less effective when visibility is limited.
•
They may be seen and intercepted or imitated by
the enemy.
•
They may be masked by terrain features,
reducing the chance of a message being received.
•
They are easy to misunderstand.
NOTE: To overcome this last disadvantage, each
man in the unit must be able to send, receive, and
understand messages using visual signals.
Shoot, Move, and Communicate 3-59
FM 3-19.4
3-129. Although arm-and-hand and light signals are
st a n d a r d t h r o u g h ou t t h e A r m y , t h e m e a n i n g o f
pyrotechnic signals must be set in the C2 portion of the
OPORDs and in the SOI. To ensure that a pyrotechnic
message was correctly received, confirm the message by
some other mea ns as soon as possibl e. For more
information on visual signals, refer to FM 21-60.
3-130. Sound signals, like visual signals, work well only
for short distances. Simple devices (such as whistles,
horns, gongs, and explosives) may be used. Sound
signals can be used to—
•
Attract attention.
•
Transmit prearranged messages.
•
Spread alarms.
3-131. A well-known sound signal is the use of metal-on-
metal to indicate an NBC hazard or attack. Battlefield
noise may blend with or override sound signals, causing
confusion and misunderstandings. Sound signals—
•
Must be simple to understand.
•
May be restricted for security reasons.
•
Can be intercepted by the enemy.
USE MESSENGERS
3-132. Using messengers is the most secure way to
communicate long messages and documents. However, it
is also the slowest and messengers are vulnerable to
enemy action. When using a messenger—
•
Put the message in writing.
•
Make the text clear, concise, and complete.
•
Choose the most expedient transportation on
hand.
•
Encode the message (using the operational code
in the SOI) if there is a risk that the messenger
might be captured.
3-60 Shoot, Move, and Communicate
FM 3-19.4
•
Send a second messenger by a different route if a
backup message is needed.
USE WIRE AND RADIO COMMUNICATION
3-133. Often, wire communication is more useful than
radio. It is hard to jam, and unlike radio, more than one
person can talk at one time. It is used most often for
communicating with static posts. Wire communications
cannot be secured and may be cut by the enemy. When a
wire line has to be checked, MP are sent out in pairs.
One MP looks for the cut and the other MP provides
overwatch security. The enemy can take prisoners by
cutting a line and capturing the soldiers who go to repair
it.
3-134. Use a radio to communicate with mobile or
distant elements. A secure voice radio is best. The
enemy can intercept messages on an unsecured radio
net. Regardless of the radio type, if the transmission is
heard, the enemy may be able to detect the location of
the radio or learn what the unit is doing. Keep the
transmissions short. Know and use signal security and
electronic counter-countermeasures. MP deny the
enemy information from friendly telecommunications by
following the SOI. To keep transmissions secure, MP—
•
Authenticate all transmissions.
•
Use only authorized codes.
•
Use secure voice transmissions.
•
Use encoded messages.
3- 13 5 . The enem y i s kept fr om di srup ti ng r ad io
communications, and friendly emitters are protected
from enemy detection, location, and identification by—
•
Setting radios at low power.
•
Placing antennas where terrain blocks the
enemy's interception.
•
Using remote radios and antennas.
•
Using directional antennas.
Shoot, Move, and Communicate 3-61
FM 3-19.4
•
Using wire whenever possible.
•
Observing listening silence.
•
Using short transmissions.
•
Using a random transmission schedule.
•
Transmitting only when there is a need to do so.
3-62 Shoot, Move, and Communicate
Chapter 4
Combat Operations
This chapter provides the MP leader with the
information needed to successfully complete a
combat mission. When MP platoons conduct the
tasks addressed in this chapter, they will
mirror the actions of the company.
PREPARE FOR COMBAT
4-1. Units that are not directly engaged in combat often
find it necessary to travel in order to position themselves
for combat operations. During these movements, the
battalion supports the company and the company
supports and monitors the platoons with the movement
plan. The move’s success depends on the unit's discipline
and ability to execute the plan. (Refer to Appendix E for
precombat inspection checklists.)
MAINTAIN AND MOVE A COMBAT LOAD
4-2. Combat load is the quantity of supplies, in all
classes, that the company must have on hand to sustain
operati ons for a prescrib ed number of days. The
company must be capable of moving the combat load,
using organic transportation assets, into combat in a
single delivery. To save time, the company combat loads
vehicles while the quartering party readies the new site.
The combat load ensures that a unit is ready for combat
even when it is on the move.
4-3. The principles of combat loading are standard. All
equipment, ammunition, and gear are loaded on the
vehicles in a logical order and put in predesignated
places. Knowing the location of each item allows for
Combat Operations 4-1
FM 3-19.4
quick retrieval during the move. Combat loading also
lends to a fast set up at the new site. Like the basic load,
the company's combat load is mission-dependent. No
single load plan can satisfy all the situations. MP
leaders must consider the following:
•
METT-TC.
•
Vehicle and trailer capacities.
•
Weight limits of the unit's vehicles and trailers,
being careful not to overload them.
•
Whether or not the equipment will fit (cube out).
For equipment data, see the applicable technical
manual (TM).
4-4. Unit SOPs has load plans tailored for various
mission activities. Having a choice of load plans for
various deployments reduces the load time. Load plans
and diagrams are modified to suit METT-TC and vehicle
and trailer capacities. The modifications are shown on
the load diagram in the vehicle. HMMWVs may be
loaded in many configurations, which include—
•
Loading the basic equipment in the mounted
standard brackets on the vehicle.
•
Modifying and moving the brackets to meet
mission or unit requirements.
PLAN A TACTICAL ROAD MARCH
4-5. The basic considerations in planning any road
march are the METT-TC factors (especially the enemy
situation and the mission); the march order; and the
type, number, and characteristics of vehicles available
for the movement. A company conducts a tactical road
march for relocating and facilitating rapid movement of
the vehicles with a prescribed speed and interval
between the vehicles. When preparing for a tactical road
march, the company uses the following planning
sequence when time permits:
•
Prepare and issue the WO as early as possible to
allow maximum time for preparation.
4-2 Combat Operations
FM 3-19.4
•
Prepare an estimate of the situation, specifying
the organization of the march column.
•
Organize
and
dispatch
reconnaissance
and
quartering parties.
•
Prepare detailed movement plans based on the
organization of the march column and a review
of the available reconnaissance information.
•
Use the reconnaissance information to—
в–
Choose sites for halts and RPs.
в–
Spot problem areas along the route.
в–
Select bypasses or alternate routes.
•
Select fairly secure locations for halts.
•
Choose
areas
that
provide
cover
and
concealment.
•
Avoid choosing highly populated areas, curves in
the road, or other hard-to-secure areas.
•
Plan the timing so that the unit arrives at the
SP just before it is scheduled to cross it. The
time a unit must cross the SP is provided to the
unit. As other units may be planning to use the
route, each unit must cross the SP on time.
•
Prepare and issue the march order.
•
Prepare the overlays and issue them to the
vehicle commanders and subordinate leaders.
The road march overlay includes, at a minimum,
the location of the SP, RP, scheduled halts, and
checkpoints at critical points along the route.
COORDINATE AND DIRECT THE MARCH
4-6. The chain of command controls the column. The
march leader—
•
Coordinates the road march through the chain of
command with the local movement control unit.
•
Determines if the convoy needs a movement
credit or a clearance to use the given route. If so,
the march leader submits a Department of
Combat Operations 4-3
FM 3-19.4
D e f e n s e ( D D ) F o r m 1 2 6 5 t h r o u g h t h e
appropriate movement control center.
•
Informs higher HQ and the supported units of
the dates and times that the operations will stop
at the old site and begin at the new site.
•
Tasks subordinate leaders to attend a briefing to
discuss unit readiness and load plans and
forecast support requirements.
•
Submits requests for support based on the
forecast developed during the briefing. Requests
may include fire support, refueling, vehicle
recovery operations, and other support needed to
complete the march.
•
Issues an OPORD for the movement.
•
Requests HQ personnel to prepare a movement
table. Refer to Appendix E of FM 55-10 for
detailed information on the movement tables.
•
Requires unit personnel to analyze the route
reconnaissance information looking for likely
enemy ambush sites.
•
Ensures that a strip map, which may be
i n c l u d e d a s a n a n n e x t o t h e O P O R D , i s
prepared. The strip map shows SPs; RPs; route
n u m b e r s ; p l a c e n a m e s ; c r i t i c a l p o i n t s ;
directional arrows; distances between the points;
scheduled halt locations; and petroleum, oils,
and lubricants (POL) refill points. Give copies to
the unit drivers.
•
Ensures that the drivers and assistant drivers
are briefed.
•
Ensures that radio communication is kept to a
minimum during movement.
•
Tasks subordinates to ensure that the road
march plan is followed.
•
Ensures that safety briefings are conducted and
understood.
4-4 Combat Operations
FM 3-19.4
CONDUCT THE MARCH
4-7. The commander sets the conditions under which
military traffic moves at night. The march leader
ensures that personnel are aware of and abide by the set
lighting conditions when the company moves at night.
Conditions that are more restrictive may be imposed
contingent on the threat environment (such as air raids).
Lighting conditions may include normal lighting,
reduced lighting, or blackout. If the situation warrants,
travel by total blackout (use of night-vision goggles
[NVGs]) may be prescribed. More often, travel is under
partial blackout, using only enough light to see the road
and to be seen by other road users. Minimal lighting
reduces visibility from the air while it permits drivers
to—
•
Travel as quickly and safely as possible.
•
Apply brakes in time.
•
See the side of the road.
Movement Techniques
4-8. During a tactical road march, the unit leaders (such
as the march leader and the platoon sergeant) travel in
separate vehicles. This decreases the chance of a unit's
primary leaders being lost in one enemy action. The
convoy moves en route by close or open column march or
by infiltration. In dusty conditions, space the vehicles so
that the dust from one vehicle does not blind the driver
of the next.
4-9. Close Column. In a close column, the elements are
close together. Use a close column for marches during
limited visibility, blackout conditions, and radio silence.
Under these conditions, space the vehicles so that the
driver can see the two lights in the blackout marker of
the vehicle ahead. Visibility determines the set distance
between the vehicles. A close column—
•
Reduces the time it takes for the column to pass
points on the route.
Combat Operations 4-5
FM 3-19.4
•
Requires fewer guides, escorts, and markers for
control than an open column does.
•
Enhances movement through congested areas or
over poorly marked routes.
4-10. Open Column. In an open column, elements are
widely spaced as a passive defense measure. Generally,
an open column is used during daylight, but may be used
at night with infrared lights, blackout lights, or night-
vision equipment. A distance of 50 to 100 meters or more
may be designated between vehicles depending on
METT-TC. Use an open column—
•
When enemy contact is likely.
•
To enhance security.
•
Over dusty roads. Reducing dust is especially
i m p o r t a n t w h e n m o v i n g t h r o u g h a r e a s
contaminated by radioactive fallout.
4-11. Infiltration. Infiltration is the best passive
defense against enemy observation and attack, although
it may be difficult to control. To move by infiltration,
vehicles are dispatched one at a time or in small groups
at irregular intervals to keep traffic density low and to
prevent undue massing of vehicles. Use infiltration—
•
When time and road space allow.
•
When
maximum
security,
deception,
and
dispersion are needed.
•
To maintain security during the march. When
the unit approaches likely danger areas (such as
bridges and tunnels), have one or more teams
dismount. The teams check both sides of the
road before the vehicles pass. This is critical
when only a map reconnaissance was conducted
before the move.
Movement Considerations
4-12. Consider events and control measures that are
used during the move in order for the tactical road
4-6 Combat Operations
FM 3-19.4
march to be successful. These measures include the SP
and RP, checkpoints, restrictions, speed control, halts,
disabled vehicles, and mined areas.
4-13. Start Point. A SP gives the vehicles of a march
column a common point for starting their movement.
When vehicles use more than one route, each route has
an SP. The SP is a recognizable place along the route of
march (such as a road intersection). It should not be in a
defile, on a hill, or at a sharp curve in the road that could
cause movement to slow. Ensure that the SP is far
enough away from the AAs to allow the vehicles to be
organized and move at the prescribed speed when they
reach it. Elements of the company reconnoiters the route
to the SP to determine the times needed for the serial to
arrive at and clear the SP before starting the march.
4-14. Release Point. A RP provides all the vehicles of
the march column with a common point for reverting to
the commander’s control. It is a point on the march route
that is easy to recognize on the map and on the ground.
Guides meet the vehicles as they arrive at the RP and
lead them to their new positions, usually in an AA.
Multiple routes and cross-country movement from the
RP to the assembly areas allow vehicles to disperse
rapidly. When leaders select a RP, avoid hills, defiles,
and sharp curves that may cause elements to slow or
stop on the route. Ensure that vehicles are not required
to countermarch or pass through another element to
reach their new position.
4-15. Checkpoints. Use checkpoints on a route for
reference when providing instructions and identifying
places where interference with movement might occur or
timing may be critical.
4-16. Restrictions. Restrictions are points along the
march route where the movement may be limited or
obstructed during certain time periods (such as bridges,
intersections, ferries, or bypasses). The march planner—
Combat Operations 4-7
FM 3-19.4
•
Starts the move early enough to pass such a
point before a restriction begins.
•
Delays the start of the move to pass a restriction
after it has ended.
•
Plans to halt the column along the route until
the restriction is lifted.
4-17. Speed Control. Vehicles in a column of any
length may simultaneously encounter different types of
routes and obstacles. This causes sections of the column
to move at different speeds at the same time, producing
an undesirable accordion or whip effect. The movement
order specifies the march speed, march rate, and the
ma xi mum saf e c a tc h-up sp eed t o r educ e colu mn
whip ping . The lead veh ic le m ust not e xceed the
authorized maximum speed of the slowest vehicle in the
column. To minimize vehicle congestion on the nearside
of an obstacle, vehicle commanders and drivers must be
alert and maintain the prescribed minimum following
distance. Vehicles should make only gradual speed
changes while maintaining their prescribed interval.
Vehicle commanders must constantly be aware of the
vehicle interval to their front and rear and adjust their
speed accordingly.
4-18. Halts. Halts are conducted for various reasons.
They—
•
Allow following traffic to pass.
•
Provide time for rest, mess activities, and
personal comfort and relief.
•
Permit refueling and maintenance of vehicles.
•
Provide for maintenance and inspection of equip-
ment.
•
Allot time for adjustments in the schedule.
4-19. The time and duration of the halts are usually
specified in the movement order or prescribed in the unit
SOP. The SOP prescribes actions to take during halts. A
4-8 Combat Operations
FM 3-19.4
short rest halt of 15 minutes is usually taken after the
first hour of marching. A 10-minute short halt is taken
every 2 hours thereafter. The prescribed march rate
includes the time required for short halts. When
possible, march elements using the same route should
stop at the same time. Route characteristics may make
it necessary to halt at a particular point on the route
rather than simultaneously at a fixed time.
4-20. Long halts are planned in advance. The length of
the halt is added to the total travel time. Locations for
long halts are normally selected to allow all the vehicles
to clear the road and permit proper dispersion. The unit
commander schedules halts for refueling in advance.
4-21. The herringbone formation is used to provide
security for the march column during temporary halts.
During temporary halts, the MP teams move their
vehicles to alternate sides on or off the road in a
herringbone pattern that lets vehicles pass down the
center of the column. Movement commanders give
permission for execution of unscheduled halts. The first
priority at any halt is local security. OPs are established
and sectors of fire are assigned to each vehicle. These
actions should be automatic and part of the unit SOP.
4-22. Disabled Vehicles. Disabled vehicles must not
obstruct traffic. Their crews must move them off the
road and report their status immediately to the PSG.
Crews must immediately signal the follow-on vehicles to
bypass and continue movement. They then establish
security and post guides to direct traffic. If possible,
crews repair their vehicles and rejoin the rear of the
column just ahead of the trail element. Vehicles that
have dropped from the column return to their positions
only when the column has halted. The trail party
recovers vehicles that cannot be repaired by their crews.
4-23. Mined Areas. When a company encounters
mined areas, it must remember that the safety of the
unit is the most important factor. It bypasses mined
Combat Operations 4-9
FM 3-19.4
areas whenever possible, but considers how the delay
will affect the outcome of the mission. Remember to—
•
Be cautious. Mines may be used to force an
element to take an alternate route into an
ambush site.
•
Screen the bypass route, if possible, before
diverting an element.
NOTE: Refer to Appendix H for countermine
operations.
4-24. Ensure that all efforts are made to bypass mined
areas; however, if the element must cross a mined area
when engineer assets are not available to breach the
minefield, act quickly and cautiously. Mined areas, like
other obstacles, are often covered by enemy fire. Before
crossing—
•
Detonate mines from a protected position.
•
Detonate mine trip wires by rigging an object
near the trip wire to fall on the wire.
•
Use a hand grenade or direct fire to detonate
mines.
•
Detonate pressure-sensitive mines by rigging an
A-frame over the mine and placing a heavy
object, attached to a rope, over the mine. Take
cover and allow the object to fall on the mine.
•
Devise other methods to detonate the detected
mines.
•
Send a report to the next higher command when
mines have been neutralized. Refer FM 20-32
and FM 21-75 for information on mines and
countering mines.
ESTABLISH A NEW OPERATIONAL SITE
4-25. MP elements most often will collocate as part of an
established base or base cluster. On occasion, MP may
need to set up a base of their own. To set up at a new
location, whether as part of an established base or base
4-10 Combat Operations
FM 3-19.4
cluster or separately as a company or a platoon base, you
must—
•
Reconnoiter new sites.
•
Pick the most favorable site and its alternate.
Choose a site that—
в–
Is easily accessible.
в–
Can accommodate all the unit's vehicles and
equipment.
в–
Has a firm, well-drained surface.
в–
Has some natural cover and concealment.
в–
Is relatively easy to defend.
•
Prepare and secure the site.
•
Complete the move and establish communication.
•
Establish local security to sustain survivability.
USE A QUARTERING PARTY
4-26. A quartering party is needed whenever a unit
relocates. The quartering party's mission is to—
•
Reconnoiter the area for enemy presence, booby
traps, NBC contamination, and other hazards.
•
Establish the dismount point and perimeter
security.
•
Establish communication.
•
Identify the company CP.
•
Designate vehicle locations.
•
Position guides at the RP to meet the main
party.
•
Prepare the area for occupation and assist the
units with occupation.
4-27. The platoon leader or PSG designates vehicles and
personnel from the platoon that will be part of a
battalion or company quartering party. The entire
p l a to o n m a y s e r v e a s th e b a t ta l i o n o r c o m p a n y
quartering party.
Combat Operations 4-11
FM 3-19.4
4 - 2 8 . W h i l e t h e u n i t l o a d s f o r d e p l o y m e n t , t h e
quartering party moves to and readies the new site. The
quartering party's job ends when the last vehicle in the
ma in body arri ves at the new si te. The siz e of a
quartering party is based on the tactical situation and
the amount of work required to prepare the site for
occupancy. A quartering party for platoon relocation
would be smaller than that of a company. A company
quartering party is likely to have personnel from the
unit's HQ, each platoon, the maintenance and dining
sections, and communications.
4-29. The quartering party leader ensures that the
equipment and supplies are available to clear, secure,
and set up the new site. A quartering party may need—
•
NBC detecting and monitoring equipment.
•
Mine detectors.
•
Saws or axes to clear the wooded areas.
•
White engineer tape.
•
Portable route signing material.
4-30. The quartering party leader assigns tasks to the
teams based on the size of the quartering party, the
work to be done, and METT-TC. He ensures that each
team has the equipment needed to complete its tasks
(refer to FM 7-10) and that they are at the proper
mission-oriented protection posture (MOPP) level if they
are operating in an NBC environment.
March Halts
4-31. At march halts, quartering party teams set up
local security. If the vehicles can leave the road, the
teams form a 360-degree perimeter around the convoy. If
the vehicles cannot leave the road, they are parked at an
angle so alternate vehicles face opposite sides of the
road. Each team is assigned a sector to observe, with
sectors overlapping between the vehicles. Each team
member has a specific area of responsibility. The troops
4-12 Combat Operations
FM 3-19.4
remain alert and ready to take action on contact with
the enemy. All personnel watch for enemy aircraft.
Site Arrival
4-32. When the quartering party arrives at the site, it
clears and then secures the site. One or more teams,
after dismounting their vehicles, search the area for
mines, booby traps, items of intelligence value, or other
signs of enemy presence.
4-33. If nuclear weapons have been used, at least one
t e a m us i ng r a d i a t i o n d e t e c t i o n, i n d i c a t i o n , a n d
computation (RADIAC) meters monitors the site for
radioactive contaminants. Monitoring for chemical and
biological agents must be continuous because it is
difficult to detect their first dispersal.
4-34. In urban areas, team members clear buildings
that will be used by the unit. Team members clear the
structures outside the perimeter if there is a possibility
of enemy presence. The priority of buildings to be
cleared and the number of teams needed are based on
METT-TC. Refer to FM 90-10-1.
4-35. When the area is cleared, one or more teams
perform the following functions:
•
Set up the OPs and the LPs.
•
Set up defensive positions on likely enemy
avenues of approach. These positions provide
early warning and limited protection during the
occupation of the new site.
•
Prepare the new site for the main body's arrival.
Company Move
4-36. When setting up a company site, the quartering
party—
•
Chooses a tentative location for the company CP.
Combat Operations 4-13
FM 3-19.4
•
Sets up the company CP where it can best
control the company, be well defended, and have
LOC to the subelements.
•
Uses buildings (in an urban area) to conceal the
CP.
•
Considers cover and concealment when choosing
the CP location.
•
Makes use of natural cover and concealment
when possible.
•
Uses camouflage screens and man-made cover
and concealment where needed.
•
Sets up the wire communication net. Marks
those areas where other unit elements will be
positioned, using signs or materials that cannot
be easily seen by the enemy.
•
Picks roads and trails that permit an easy flow
of traffic.
•
Chooses alternate exits and marks them for use
as emergency exits.
•
Designates parking areas for the heaviest, most
awkward vehicles, such as 5-ton trucks.
•
Selects a troop area and—
в–
Marks the areas where latrines, garbage
dumps, and tents will go.
в–
Uses ground guides for vehicle movement in
areas where troops are sleeping. (For safety,
unit personnel should sleep only in the troop
area).
в–
Chooses a structure (in an urban area) that
protects the troops from natural elements
and has adequate latrine facilities.
•
Locates the following:
в–
The
food
service
section
inside
the
perimeter, well away from interior roads to
keep dust from contaminating the food.
Locate the serving line to take advantage of
4-14 Combat Operations
FM 3-19.4
cover and concealment. In urban areas,
select a b uilding fo r se rv ice a nd me al
activities.
в–
The latrines away from the bivouac area.
Place latrines at least 30 meters down slope
from wells or other water sources, and at
least 100 meters from the dining facility,
downwind and down slope, if possible. In
urban areas, use existing latrines if they can
serve at least 8 percent of the unit at one
time.
в–
The maintenance section where vehicles can
arrive easily from the main road through the
site. Ensure that vehicles are able to enter
the maintenance tent at one end and exit at
t h e o t h e r . U s e e x i s t i n g g a r a g e s f o r
maintenance operations in urban areas.
в–
The supply section to meet space, roadway
access, and drainage needs. In urban areas,
use warehouse-type buildings for supply
operations.
в–
The tactical communication section where it
has space enough to support the whole
operation. Usually it collocates with the
maintenance section or the operations
section.
4-37. When the main body arrives, the quartering
party—
•
Maintains security as the main body moves into
the site.
•
Maintains noise and light discipline.
•
Ensures that the vehicles rapidly clear the
approach route while maintaining vehicle
intervals.
•
Dismounts all personnel except drivers at the
dismount point.
Combat Operations 4-15
FM 3-19.4
•
Briefs the leader of the main body on the
situation and the operational status.
4-38. The leader of the main body informs the higher
HQ that the move has been completed. He reports the
location coordinates for both the CP and the alternate
CP by messenger or other secure means. The leader
ensures that the entire party prepares fighting positions
and other defensive measures.
Platoon Relocation
4-39. A quartering party, in advance of the platoon's
relocation, has the same considerations scaled to size
and need, as one in advance of a company. An MP
platoon may collocate with a company HQ or an existing
base. However, more often, a platoon's base must be set
up where a platoon HQ can best—
•
C2 its squads.
•
Communicate easily with its squads and higher
HQ.
•
Link
squads,
the
company
CP,
and
the
supported unit.
4-40. The platoon HQ can operate from a static base or
vehicles. If the platoon elements are going to operate in
one location (as they would for an EPW holding area),
the platoon leader sets up a static platoon HQ base. If
the platoon elements must operate dispersed over a
large area, the platoon leader must remain mobile. In
such cases, a platoon leader could elect to set up a
temporary platoon base as a rally point to report,
resupply, and reorganize the platoon's resources.
4-41. The platoon bases are set up the same. The PSG
selects a site that offers good cover and concealment.
The site must be defendable and allow the HQ vehicle to
be located near the tent. A small tent houses the
platoon's HQ. Use a radio set control group to relay
remote communication into the tent. An antenna
4-16 Combat Operations
FM 3-19.4
increases the transmission distance and is located based
on OPSEC principles. Wire communication is limited to
the platoons that can hook into an existing wire net.
CONDUCT MILITARY POLICE BASE SELF-DEFENSE
4-42. When collocated with a base or a base cluster, the
platoon is integrated into that base's or base cluster's
self-defense planning and operations. Although bases
and base clusters are more prevalent at corps and
echelon above corps (EAC), the same principle applies to
MP located at the division or brigade support areas.
When an MP base is set up on its own, the base is
responsible for its own security and protection.
Collocated
4-43. An MP platoon collocates with a base or a base
cluster for logistical support and a means to conduct
oper ations. When c olloc ated , the platoon leader
coordinates with the base defense operations center
(BDOC) and the base cluster operations center (BCOC)
to integrate the platoon's efforts with the base's and base
cluster's efforts. The platoon's portion of the base's or
base cluster's defense is to help provide early warning of
the threat by area security and/or maneuver and
mobility support in the area near the base or the base
cluster. Because MP resources are austere, the platoon
only shares sector efforts on the base's perimeter. MP
are used as static posts (such as gates) only under
extreme conditions. An MP platoon may be tasked to
serve or augment the base cluster's response force.
Before the platoon leader accepts this tasking, he
consults with the company commander to—
•
Ensure that the company commander knows
that he may have one less platoon if he is tasked
for the TCF or response force for the battalion.
•
Allow the company commander to advise the
base commander that the MP platoon could
Combat Operations 4-17
FM 3-19.4
serve as a response force to the base if it is not
committed.
4-44. Each base has a BDOC that plans, coordinates,
and supervises base defense operations. The BDOC
initiates contingency planning that enables the base
to—
•
Increase the manning posture of the base
contingent on the threat.
•
Detect and defeat the threat within their
capabilities.
•
Hold
against
heavier
enemy
forces
until
response forces arrive.
•
Maintain control of the fight within the base.
•
Support the fire and movement of the response
force operating outside the base.
4-45. Each base cluster has a BCOC to monitor base
defense plans and establish the base cluster reaction
force. The BCOC—
•
Provides C2 of the resources for planning,
coordinating, and supervising the base cluster’s
defense.
•
Coordinates base defense operations.
•
Maintains communication with bases within the
c l u s t e r a s w e l l a s M P , B D O C s , a n d t h e
sustainment area operations center. A great deal
of intelligence is provided to a BDOC and BCOC
through the rear operations net, which helps in
planning the defense.
4-46. The platoon's plans for the interface of MP support
into the base's self-defense plans address—
•
Cover and concealment of personnel and equipment.
•
Signal security.
•
Reliable and redundant communication systems
at all guard locations (such as land lines, radio
4-18 Combat Operations
FM 3-19.4
links to the BDOC, and telephone hookups to the
center switch).
•
Deception.
•
Contingency planning.
•
Improvement of base defense positions.
•
Assistance of the area MP.
•
Coordination with the BCOC or rear-area operation
center (RAOC), as required.
•
OPs/ LPs.
•
Noise and light discipline.
•
Immediate reaction to enemy threat or attack.
•
Rehearsals of defense measures.
4-47. All plans and overlays depicting MP support are
forwarded to the BCOC. There they are consolidated and
forwarded to the RAOC. (If a base is not part of a base
cluster, the base forwards all the plans and overlays
directly to the RAOC.)
Separate Setup
4-48. Set up an MP platoon separately only when there
is no other alternative. This is the least desirable means
for a platoon to set up. When the platoon sets up as a
base separately, it must be able to defend against a wide
range of enemy activity. It integrates the defense of its
base (including indirect-fire systems, air defense
artillery, and tactical aircraft) with the defense efforts of
other bases in the sustainment area. Engineers,
dismounted troops, armored vehicles, and helicopters
contribute to the overall security of the bases. Bases
coordinate and synchronize their defense efforts to
enhance their strengths and reduce their vulnerabilities.
A base’s defense priorities include—
•
Establishing initial base security.
•
Positioning crew-served weapons and troops on
assigned sectors of fire.
•
Clearing fields of fire and preparing range cards.
Combat Operations 4-19
FM 3-19.4
•
Preparing fighting positions.
•
Installing communication.
•
Emplacing obstacles and mines.
•
Improving primary fighting positions to include
overhead cover.
•
Preparing
alternate
and
supplementary
positions.
•
Stockpiling ammunition, food, and water.
•
Preparing
routes
and
trenches
between
positions.
•
Developing a counterattack plan.
4-49. Using the IPB process can help the platoon predict
threats to base security. Platoons must be aware of the
enemy's location, organization, direction of movement,
and strength. In the same regard, platoons must have
effective OPSEC to deny similar friendly information to
the enemy. Platoons can continually improve base
defenses by considering what avenues of approach and
methods of attack the enemy could use, given the
vulnerabilities of the platoon's base. The base defense
plan must have overlays depicting weapons positions,
sectors of fire, final protective fires, and reaction force
contingencies. Plans are updated as often as possible.
4-50. The base’s reaction force efforts are coordinated
with the designated-area response force. Platoon leaders
develop detailed employment plans and exchange as
much information as possible with the response force
and TCF commander before they are needed. Although
the base’s reaction force usually would not fight beyond
the perimeter of the base, the reaction force must be
ready to assist the response force or TCF when it
arrives. The following should be considered:
•
Command relationships before, during, and after
linkup.
•
Coordination of fire support before, during, and
after linkup.
4-20 Combat Operations
FM 3-19.4
•
Recognition
signals
and
communication
procedures to be employed.
•
Follow-on operations required.
•
Area damage control.
Setup in a Hide Position (Temporary Defensive Position)
4 - 5 1 . I f th e p l a to o n st e p s d o w n f r om s u s ta i n e d
continuous operations and cannot return to its base or
base cluster, it may need to operate briefly from a
temporary defensive position. When used properly, a
temporary defensive position can enable the platoon to
rest, recover, repair damaged equipment, and plan for
future operations. It offers concealment with little
chance of detection by the enemy. Platoons want to get
the best security they can while tasking a minimum of
soldiers to provide security. When the platoon leader
decides to operate from a temporary defensive position,
he notifies the company HQ.
4-52. Locate the position in or near the area of normal
operations so that sustained operations can be resumed
immediately, on order. METT-TC should be a primary
concern. Easily defendable positions are preferred over
those that are more difficult to defend. Ensure that the
position has more than one exit route and provides
communication with the next higher HQ that are
enhanced or at least not interfered with by terrain.
While built-up, urban areas afford suitable concealment
for temporary defensive positions, it is essential that the
capability to communicate be assessed before the
selection of such a site. Other considerations of a
temporary defensive position include—
•
Keeping vehicles secure and available in a
nearby location.
•
Positioning vehicles so that key equipment can
be moved or removed without displacement of
the entire unit.
Combat Operations 4-21
FM 3-19.4
•
Concealing
equipment
from
the
sides
and
overhead. This prevents detection from aerial
observers and some side-looking airborne radar.
•
Covering and concealing to reduce security and/or
defense requirements.
•
Providing enough space between vehicles to
allow a vehicle to bypass another vehicle that is
inoperable.
•
Ensuring that the platoon follows signal security
and uses noise and light discipline.
•
Setting up fighting positions if the situation calls
for them.
SET UP LOCAL SECURITY
4-53. Self-defense planning and coordination is done as
soon as the base is set up. Prior planning and mission
analysis are essential elements of a base defense. MP
must be able to defend the site even before occupation is
complete. When an MP element is located as part of an
established base, it helps defend a portion of the larger
unit's perimeter. Elements that set up separately
usually defend their sites by deploying in a 360-degree
perimeter. The techniques and principles of defense are
the same for defending a separate squad, platoon,
company, or base. To plan a perimeter defense, evaluate
t h e s i t u a t i o n . A n a l y z e t h e t e r r a i n i n t e r m s o f
observation and fields of fire, cover and concealment,
obstacles, key terrain , an d avenu es of a pproach
(OCOKA). Defenses are placed where the threat is
greatest.
4-54. The platoon leader establishes the CP and the OP.
He locates the CP and the OP where he can best see and
control the platoon. If this is not possible, he locates it
where it can cover the most likely avenue of enemy
approach. An alternate CP and OP, operated by the
PSG, is placed where it can control the portion of the
perimeter that cannot be seen or controlled by the main
4-22 Combat Operations
FM 3-19.4
CP and OP. The platoon leader then decides what other
security measures and means of communication to use.
4-55. Platoon leaders must plan more than cover and
concealment to counteract threat infrared, radar,
thermal, and other sensors. The platoon leader uses the
principles of camouflage and counters the recognition
f a c t o r s t h a t m a k e a n o b j e c t s t a n d o u t f r o m i t s
background by—
•
Locating soldiers, equipment, or
structures
where they are least discernible. This alone can
reduce or eliminate many recognition factors.
•
Using any mix of hiding, blending, disrupting, or
disguising that conceals visibility.
•
Maintaining camouflage discipline continuously.
4-56. When the number of soldiers that will defend a
360-degree perimeter is small, the platoon leader
must—
•
Vary the size of the defensive sectors.
•
Identify alternate fighting positions.
•
Retain flexibility of thinking.
•
Decide what equipment—
в–
Is needed to set up a perimeter defense.
в–
Should stay in the vehicles.
в–
Must be requisitioned or picked up later.
4-57. The equipment to improve defensive positions
includes concertina wire, sandbags and tape (for cover
and concealment), trip flares, pyrotechnic devices,
mines, or PEWS, and other lethal and nonlethal
technologies.
4-58. Platoons must be able to defend during day or
night, in reduced visibility, and in a variety of weather
conditions. The platoon leader or sergeant ensures that
the platoon has the equipment it needs to defend under
these conditions. The platoon must know how and when
to use the equipment. During reduced visibility—
Combat Operations 4-23
FM 3-19.4
•
Take steps to keep the enemy from observing or
surprising the platoon.
•
Require OPs and LPs. There should be at least
one OP and one LP per squad. OPs and LPs
r e p o r t t h e e n e m y ' s a d v a n c e a n d c a l l f o r
i ll u mi n a ti o n a nd sup por t i ng fi re . A s i n a
daylight defense, MP manning OPs and LPs
withdraw before they become engaged in close
combat.
•
Use patrols, illumination, PEWSs, and NVDs to
help detect the enemy's advance.
•
Use trip flares to provide warning and give some
illumination. As a rule, do not fire until the
targets are visible.
•
Use camouflage, movement control, and light
and noise discipline.
•
Limit radio traffic to essential information.
•
Ensure strict fire control to keep from disclosing
the fighting positions.
•
Ensure that gunners with crew-served and
antiarmor weapons use NVDs.
•
Provide illumination by using handheld flares or
grenade launchers with illuminating rounds.
Added light may be provided by fire support.
•
Ensure that platoon leaders plan the use of
messengers, visual signals, personal contact, or
whistles to communicate with the squad leaders.
Squad leaders plan to communicate with their
team leaders and teams using personal contact
or sound and visual signals.
CONSTRUCT FIGHTING AND SURVIVABILITY
POSITIONS
4-59. Fighting positions help protect soldiers and their
equipment from the enemy and from the enemy's small-
4-24 Combat Operations
FM 3-19.4
arms fire and fragmentation weapons, while allowing
soldiers full weapon system engagement. A fighting
position provides cover and concealment from which to
engage or defend against the enemy. See FM 7-8 for
individual fighting position construction.
4-60. Fighting positions do not protect against the
destructiveness of artillery and other area weapons.
Nevertheless, a dug-in fighting position may be the key
to survivability. Digging in cannot remove a soldier's
vulnerability by itself. It does reduce exposure to the
enemy's acquisi ti on, targeting, and engagement
systems. Platoons must be able to construct their
s u r v i v a b i l i t y p o s i ti o n s , o f t e n w i t h o u t e n g i n e e r
assistance.
4-61. Locate fighting positions for crew-served weapons
where gunners can stop dismounted attacks. The sectors
of fire must cover infantry avenues of approach and
provide the most grazing fire across the platoon or squad
front. Overlap the sectors of fire with each other and
those of adjacent squads. Prepare fighting positions so
that their primary sectors of fire have the guns firing
across the front of the unit. Prepare secondary sectors of
fire so that the guns fire to the front.
4-62. Usually, one MP team occupies an M249 or MK19
fighting position. One member is the gunner, one is the
assistant gunner, and one is the ammunition bearer or
rifleman. Each gunner has a primary and a secondary
sector of fire. The gunner fires in the secondary sector
only on order or when there are no targets in the
primary sector. Each gunner uses aiming stakes to set
his weapon for a final protective line (FPL) or a principal
direction of fire (PDF) within the primary sector. The
FPL and PDF are control measures to help defend a
position. In an attack, the gunner knows the primary
areas. He engages the greatest threat and, on the order
of the platoon leader or PSG, fires the FPL.
Combat Operations 4-25
FM 3-19.4
PREPARE SECTOR SKETCHES
4-63. After the crew-served weapons are in position, the
squad leader positions the remaining MP to protect the
gunners and to cover areas not covered by the gunner’s.
Using the range cards, the squad leader makes a squad
sector sketch. He includes a rough sketch of the terrain
around the weapon (Figure 4-1). The squad sector
sketches are used to plan defense and to control fire.
Squad sector sketches show the following:
•
The main terrain features in each sector of fire
and the ranges to the features.
•
Each primary fighting position.
•
The primary and secondary sectors of fire for
each position.
•
MK19 and M249 FPL or PDF.
•
The type of weapon at each position.
•
The OP and LPs and squad leaders' positions.
•
Dead space.
•
Mines and obstacles.
4-64. The squad leader checks the range cards and the
squad sector sketch for gaps or other flaws in the fire
p l a n . H e a d j u s t s t h e w e a p o n s o r t h e s e c t o r s a s
necessary. If the squad leader finds dead space, he takes
steps to cover it with mines, grenade-launcher fire, or
indirect fire. He then prepares two copies of the squad
sector sketch. He keeps one copy and forwards the other
copy to the platoon leader who makes a platoon sector
sketch (Figure 4-2, page 4-28). The platoon sector sketch
shows the following:
•
Squad sectors of fire.
•
The crew-served and antiarmor weapons posi-
tions and sectors of fire, including FPL or PDF
for the crew-served weapons and target refer-
ence points for the antiarmor weapons.
•
Positions of the mines and the obstacles.
4-26 Combat Operations
FM 3-19.4
Figure 4-1. Squad Sector Sketch
•
Indirect fire planned in the platoon's sector of
fire.
•
The OP and LPs and patrol routes (if any).
•
The platoon CP and OP.
4-65. The platoon leader coordinates with the nearby
units. He usually coordinates from left to right and from
front to rear. The fires of units within the perimeter
must be closely coordinated with the platoon's defensive
fire plan. Squad leaders coordinate their fire plans with
adjacent squads. All positions and units near the platoon
are mutually supporting. The platoon leader makes sure
gaps between the units are covered by fire, observation,
patrols, OPs and LPs, or sensors. The units exchange
information on—
Combat Operations 4-27
FM 3-19.4
Figure 4-2. Platoon Sector Sketch
•
The location of dead space between the elements
and how to cover it.
•
The
locations
of
primary,
alternate,
and
supplementary positions and sectors of fire for
automatic weapons, antiarmor weapons, and
subordinate elements.
•
The locations of the OPs and LPs.
•
The locations and types of obstacles and how
they are covered by fire.
•
Any patrols to be conducted, giving their size,
type, times of departure and return, and routes.
4-28 Combat Operations
FM 3-19.4
PREPARE RANGE CARDS
4-66. The FPL for the M249 is the line where an enemy
assault is to be checked by interlocking fire from all
weapons. Use the M249 on the FPL for grazing fire no
more than 1 meter above the ground, about hip high,
across the front of the element. Use the MK19 or M203
to cover the dead space. To figure the dead space on the
FPL, the gunner watches a person walking down the
FPL and marks spaces that cannot be grazed. The
gunner records all the dead space data on the range card
(Figure 4-3, page 4-30). He prepares at least two copies
of the range card, keeping one card at the position and
giving one copy to the squad leader. Fire on a gunner's
FPL is its final protective fire (FPF). FPF is usually used
as a last resort to stop an enemy assault. All weapons
fire on command, continuously, until the call to stop
FPF is given.
4-67. When terrain prevents the use of an FPL, the
gunner uses a PDF instead. He directs his fire toward
the most threatening avenue of approach that leads to
his position. His weapon is positioned to fire directly on
this approach rather than across the squad's front.
4-68. Construct fighting positions for the MK19 like
M249 fighting positions. However, be aware that it takes
added effort to keep the M3 tripod from moving because
of the recoil of the MK19. If gunners are using the M249
machine gun, they should use the tripod when firing at
an angle and the bipod when firing to the front. When
gunners change their fires from the oblique to the front,
they must move the machine gun, but leave the tripod in
place. If gunners are using the MK19, they position the
tripod toward the primary sector of fire. However,
because there is no bipod for the MK19, gunners must be
prepared to adjust both the weapon and the tripod to the
secondary sector, if required. After a crew is positioned
and is assigned an FPL or a PDF, the team—
Combat Operations 4-29
FM 3-19.4
Figure 4-3. Standard Range Card
•
Marks the tripod's position and the limits of
their sectors of fire with aiming stakes.
•
Outlines the hole.
4-30 Combat Operations
FM 3-19.4
•
Digs the firing platform first. This lessens their
exposure if they have to shoot before the position
i s c om p l e te l y c o n s tr u c t e d . D i g t h e f i r i n g
pl atform at a l evel that a llows the gun to
traverse the sectors of fire.
•
Lowers the gun to reduce the gunner's profile.
This also reduces the height of the frontal cover
needed.
•
Digs the hole deep enough to protect itself and
stil l al low the gunner to shoot i n com fort
(usually about armpit deep).
•
Places the dirt where frontal cover is needed.
•
Uses the rest of the dirt to build the flank and
rear cover when the frontal cover is high enough
and thick enough. Sandbags, wire, hatchets, or
saws can be useful for building overhead cover or
improving the fighting positions.
4-69. The ammunition bearer digs a one-man fighting
position to the flank. He positions himself where he can
see and shoot to the front and the oblique. Usually the
ammunition bearer is on the same side as the FPL or the
PDF. From there he can see and shoot into the machine
gun's secondary sector. He can also see the gunner and
the assistant gunner. The ammunition bearer connects
his position to the machine gun position by a crawl
trench. This allows him to provide ammunition or
replace one of the gunners.
SELECT FIGHTING POSITIONS IN BUILT-UP AREAS
4-70. Planning a defense of a platoon on urban terrain is
similar to planning a defense in the countryside.
Defensive positions must cover likely enemy avenues of
approach, be mutually supporting, and provide cover
and concealment. Use AT weapons on mounted avenues
o f a p p r o a c h . M a c h i n e g u n s c o v e r d i s m o u n t e d
approaches. AT4s and M203 grenade launchers work
well in built-up areas. They are likely to hit enemy
Combat Operations 4-31
FM 3-19.4
armored vehicles on the top or the side where armor is
thin.
4-71. The method of defense (such as in-depth or linear)
in the two areas is based on the same considerations.
Use obstacles to canalize the enemy into kill zones or to
deny key terrain. Orders must be very specific. Due to
limited resources, use obstacles to channel, divert, or
impede movement.
Position Locations
4-72. Select defensive positions in urban areas based on
METT-TC. Often a squad occupies a building, but larger
buildings may be defended by a platoon. Select buildings
that—
•
Are well built. Concrete and steel construction is
preferred.
•
Have strong floors to keep the structure from
collapsing under the weight of debris.
•
Have thick walls and floors so that the enemy
cannot shoot through roofs and walls to kill
defenders.
•
Are
constructed
of
nonflammable
material.
Avoid wood. Strong, fireproof construction
provides protection from a nuclear attack as well
as conventional firepower.
•
Have few glass windows (or break and remove
the glass).
•
Provide good fields of fire. Buildings located next
to vacant lots, alleys, and parks allow better
fields of fire than buildings located next to other
buildings.
•
Allow mutual support between the buildings. No
building should be subject to attack without
troops in another building being able to provide
supporting fire.
4-32 Combat Operations
FM 3-19.4
4-73. Locate positions so as not to establish a pattern.
Avoid obvious firing locations like church steeples
(remember the elements of OCOKA) by—
•
Placing MK19s in the building where they can
cover assigned sectors of fire and FPL.
•
Having the squad automatic riflemen and
grenadiers cover enemy approach routes to the
building.
•
Placing most rifle positions at or near ground
level to have overhead protection and provide
grazing fire on approaches.
•
Positioning some MK19 gunners higher to get a
longer range. In addition, they can fire into
areas that would be dead space for ground-level
weapons.
•
Positioning AT4s (remember the back blast) so
that they can fire down on tracked infantry
f i g h t i n g
v e h i c l e s
a n d
w h e e l e d
s c o u t
reconnaissance vehicles.
Building Improvement
4-74. Change the outside of the building as little as
possible, but inside the building—
•
Improve
the
fighting
positions
to
provide
overhead and frontal cover. Use firing ports to
avoid enemy observation.
•
Cut or blow holes between rooms and floors so
the soldiers can move quickly by a covered and
concealed route to other firing positions in the
building.
•
Seal off unused basements to prevent enemy
entry.
•
Barricade doors, halls, and stairs and take down
fire escapes to keep th e en emy out of the
building.
•
Reinforce positions with sandbags, solid debris,
beds, furniture, and so forth.
Combat Operations 4-33
FM 3-19.4
•
Screen or block windows and other openings.
Th i s k ee p s t h e e n e m y f r o m se e i n g w h i c h
w i n d o w s a r e m a n n e d a n d th r o w i n g h a n d
grenades into the building. When firing from the
windows or holes in the walls, be sure the
muzzle of your weapon does not protrude beyond
the wall. This conceals the muzzle flash.
•
Remove combustible materials to limit the
danger of fire.
•
Turn off electricity and gas.
•
Stockpile water and dirt to fight fires.
•
Wear armored vests, earplugs, and goggles for
protection from dust and debris.
Other Considerations
4-75. Operating in urban terrain can be challenging, so
consider the following:
•
The employment of weapons is different (shorter
ranges).
•
The position locations are different, such as
LAWs and AT4s go on the upper floors of the
buildings (refer to FM 23-25 for the safety
considerations).
•
The target acquisition is more difficult (such as,
a i m i ng st a k e s a n d l a y e re d f i r e s a r e us e d
extensively).
•
The
CSS
will center
more
on
stockpiling
materials in positions rather than on traditional
resupply methods.
•
Controlling indirect fire is more difficult.
•
Primary communication must be by messenger,
wire, or visual signs rather than radio.
•
Avenues of approach are more canalized.
•
The
three
dimensions
of
the
enemy
(aboveground, ground level, or below ground)
4-34 Combat Operations
FM 3-19.4
may be in use. The enemy can easily isolate
subordinate units.
•
Civilians and fire hazards may be present.
ESTABLISH AND OPERATE AN OBSERVATION
POST/LISTENING POST
4-76. OPs/LPs are selected locations from which to look
and listen for enemy activity within an assigned area of
observation. The OPs/LPs, the primary means of
maintaining surveillance of an assigned avenue or a
named area of interest (NAI), are positions from which
MP observe the enemy and direct and adjust indirect
fires against him. From the OPs/LPs, MP send SALUTE
reports (Figure 4-4, page 4-36) to the commander when
observing enemy activity. Use OPs/LPs for the following:
•
On key terrain when the surveillance of a
specific area is required.
•
To prevent the enemy from a surprise attack on
other friendly forces.
•
As an early warning security measure in a
defensive perimeter.
•
For the monitoring of likely enemy avenues of
approach, drop zones (DZ), and landing zones
(LZ).
4-77. OPs/LPs can be performed either mounted or
dismounted. A dismounted OP provides maximum
stealth and has the greatest likelihood of remaining
undetected by the enemy. The disadvantage of the
dismounted OP is the time it takes to remount and move
if necessary. If rapid movement or displacement is
anticipated, the OP mounts or remains mounted.
4-78. A mounted OP/LP offers the advantages of rapid
movement and protection because the enemy can easily
detect them; however, it is potentially much less
effective than a dismounted OP/LP.
Combat Operations 4-35
FM 3-19.4
SIZE: Give the size of the enemy unit as the number of troops or
vehicles seen. Report 10 enemy infantrymen (not an infantry
squad). Report three enemy tanks (not an enemy tank platoon).
ACTIVITY: Report what the enemy was doing. "They are
emplacing antipersonnel mines in the road."
LOCATION: Report where the enemy was seen. Report the grid
coordinates and the direction the enemy was heading. If a map is
not available, relate the location to key terrain, such as the
enemy's location is "on the Hahn Road, 300 meters south of the
Kell River Bridge."
UNIT: An enemy soldier's unit may be hard to determine. Report
markings or other distinctive features seen on the vehicles. Some
countries have special uniforms and headgear. Some have colored
tabs on the uniforms to show the type of unit, or the unit's actions
may show its type. The kind of equipment it has may be peculiar to
a certain type of unit. For example, a scout reconnaissance vehicle
may indicate a reconnaissance unit; an amphibious tracked
infantry-fighting vehicle may indicate an airborne unit.
TIME: Report the time the enemy was seen, not the time you are
reporting.
EQUIPMENT: Report all the equipment the enemy is wearing or
using. If you do not recognize an item of equipment or a type of
vehicle, sketch it. Submit the sketch with the report.
Figure 4-4. Salute Report
SELECT OBSERVATION POST/LISTENING POST SITES
4-79. The platoon leader selects the general location for
the platoon's OP/LP after analyzing METT-TC factors.
From his analysis, he determines how many OPs and
LPs to establish. He decides where they must be
positioned to allow long-range observation along the
4-36 Combat Operations
FM 3-19.4
avenues of approach assigned by his commander and to
provide depth through the sector. Section and squad
leaders select the exact positions for each OP/LP on the
g r o u n d . T h e O P / L P m u s t h a v e t h e f o l l o w i n g
characteristics:
•
Covered and concealed routes to and from the
OP/LP. Ensure that MP can enter and leave
their OP/LP without being seen by the enemy.
•
Unobstructed observation of the assigned area
or sector. Ideally, the fields of observation of
adjacent OPs/LPs overlap to ensure full coverage
of the sector.
•
Covered
and
concealed
positions
that
are
effective. MP select positions with cover and
concealment to reduce their vulnerability on the
battlefield. MP may need to pass up a position
with favorable observation capability, but with
no cover and concealment, to select a position
that affords better survivability.
•
Located where they will not attract attention. Do
not locate OPs/LPs in such locations as a water
tower, an isolated grove of trees, or a lone
building or tree; these positions draw enemy
attention and may be used as enemy artillery
TRPs.
•
Located where they are not silhouetted. Avoid
hilltops and position OPs/LPs further down the
slope of the hill or on the side, provided there are
covered and concealed routes into and out of the
position.
MAN THE OBSERVATION POST/LISTENING POST
4-80. Ideally, an MP team should man an OP/LP to
maintain team integrity. Position OPs/LPs down the
slope or on a flank of a hill, if there are covered with-
drawal routes. Each of the OP's/LP's fields of observa-
tion overlap those of adjacent OPs/LPs. MP may have to
Combat Operations 4-37
FM 3-19.4
selectively clear fields of observation. Ensure that MP
are not seen when entering and leaving an OP/LP.
Equip OP/LP teams to observe the area, report informa-
tion, protect themselves, and call for and adjust indirect
fire. OPs/LPs on a defensive perimeter need secure com-
munications. Use of field phones or secured radios are
usually best. However, messengers can be used. OPs/LPs
may use portable radios to supplement wire communica-
tion. One MP observes the area while a second MP pro-
vides local security and records and reports information.
The third MP rests or provides backup security. The
team members switch jobs every 20 to 30 minutes
because the observer's effectiveness decreases quickly
after that time. The observer needs—
•
A map of the area.
•
A compass.
•
Communication equipment (wire and radio).
•
Observation
devices,
such
as
binoculars,
observation telescope, and NVDs.
•
An SOI extract.
•
The report formats contained in the SOP.
•
A radio (this may be the only means of
communication from a remote site like a DZ or
an LZ).
POSITION OBSERVATION AND LISTENING POSTS
4-81. Place OPs/LPs either in a linear configuration or
in-depth. Linear placement (Figure 4-5) allows the pla-
toon to observe the assigned sector from several OP/LP
sites, reducing the chance of the enemy entering the sec-
tor without being observed. This method works well
when the platoon has been assigned a large sector with
few avenues of approach or is in desert-type terrain. In-
depth OP/LP placement (Figure 4-6, page 4-40) allows
the platoon to observe the entire sector by placing OP/LP
sites where the platoon can observe the most likely ave-
nues of approach in the sector as well as along the sector
4-38 Combat Operations
FM 3-19.4
flanks. This method works well when the platoon is
assigned a sector with several avenues of approach or is
in heavily wooded terrain. In-depth placement allows for
redundancy in observation and better sector coverage.
Figure 4-5. Linear OP/LP Placement
4-82. OP/LP team emplacement at night depends on
METT-TC factors. The platoon leader places OPs/LPs
close to the perimeter and within direct fire range of the
defensive perimeter for protection. The team leader
designates a specific location and primary direction of
fire for the crew-served weapon. The OP/LP team builds
a hasty-fighting position or a prepared-fighting position
depending on METT-TC. The team leader designates a
covered and concealed location behind OPs/LPs for the
vehicle. The OP/LP team has a covered and concealed
withdrawal route to the vehicle from the fighting
position. The team camouflages the OP/LP and their
vehicle while the gunner clears a field of fire and
prepares a range card. The squad leader establishes
communication with higher HQ and tells the team when
and how to report. He tells them—
•
If and when they should fire at the enemy.
Combat Operations 4-39
FM 3-19.4
Figure 4-6. In-Depth OP/LP Placement
•
How to get back to the squad if they must
withdraw.
•
What reentry signals to use.
•
When they will be replaced, if known.
•
To
fight
or
withdraw
according
to
his
instructions.
•
To be careful not to be drawn away by a small
enemy element while the main element attempts
to penetrate the perimeter.
•
When to pull back or under what conditions they
can withdraw without his order.
4-83. The frequency of relief for the OP/LP team
depends on the team's physical condition and morale,
the weather, the number of troops available, and the
4-40 Combat Operations
FM 3-19.4
next operation. The squad leader carefully plans how
each soldier receives rest. When OP/LP team is part of a
defensive perimeter, it—
•
Ensures that it has rearward cover.
•
Builds fighting positions for protection and
concealment.
•
Uses trip flares, noisemaking devices, and NVDs
to detect the enemy.
•
Emplaces claymore mines for added protection.
•
Coordinates with the perimeter on the reentry
procedures to the perimeter from the withdrawal
route.
DEFEND A SITE
4-84. Vigilance is the watchword for local security. When
the OPs/LPs detect enemy elements, they notify their
superior who calls for indirect fire, if it is available. When
the enemy's advance threatens the OP/LP, order the OP/
LP to withdraw. As the enemy approaches platoon
positions, have the platoon increase its volume of fire. The
platoon leader determines if the platoon can destroy the
enemy from its assigned positions. If the platoon leader
determines that the platoon can destroy the enemy, the
platoon continues to fight with the following actions:
•
The platoon leader or the FO continues to call for
indirect fire as the enemy approaches. The
platoon normally begins engaging the enemy at
the maximum effective range. It attempts to
mass fire and initiate them at the same time to
achieve surprise. Long-range fire should disrupt
enemy formations, channelize the enemy toward
engagement areas, prevent or severely limit the
enemy's ability to observe the location of friendly
positions, and destroy the enemy as it attempts
to breach tactical obstacles.
Combat Operations 4-41
FM 3-19.4
•
The
leaders
control
fire
using
standard
commands, pyrotechnics, and other prearranged
signals. The platoon increases the intensity of
f i r e a s t h e e n e m y c l o s e s w i t h i n r a n g e o f
additional weapons. Squad leaders work to
achieve a sustained rate of fire from their
positions by having buddy teams fire their
weapons so that both are not reloading them at
the same time.
•
The platoon and squad leaders consider the
following when controlling and distributing
fires:
в–
The enemy's range.
в–
The priority of the targets (what to fire at,
when to fire, and why).
в–
The nearest or most dangerous targets.
в–
Shifts to concentrate fires on their own or as
directed by higher HQ.
в–
The
ability
of
the
platoon
to
engage
dismounted enemy with grazing fires, and
flank shots against enemy vehicles.
•
The platoon leader initiates FPF as the enemy
closes on the platoon's perimeter. The following
actions occur at the same time:
в–
The
automatic
weapons
fire
along
interlocking PDF or FPLs. Other weapons
fire at designated PDF. The M203 grenade
launchers engage enemy in dead space or
against enem y a ttem pts to br each the
protective wire.
в–
The
platoon
continues
the
fight
with
claymore mines and hand grenades.
в–
The platoon leader requests indirect FPF in
support of his positions, if applicable.
в–
The platoon continues to defend until the
enemy is repelled or until the platoon is
ordered to disengage.
4-42 Combat Operations
FM 3-19.4
4-85. If the platoon leader determines that the platoon
can not destroy the enemy, he—
•
Reports
the
situation
to
the
company
commander.
•
Repositions the platoon to—
в–
Continue
fires
into
the
platoon
sector
(engagement area).
в–
Shift
to
alternate
or
supplementary
positions.
в–
Reinforce other parts of the company.
в–
Counterattack locally to retake lost fighting
positions.
в–
Withdraw from an untenable position using
fire and movement to break contact. (The
platoon leader should not move his platoon
out of position if it will destroy the integrity
of the company's defense.)
N O T E : I n a n y m o v e m e n t o u t o f a de f e n si v e
position, the platoon must employ all direct and
indirect fire means available to suppress the
enemy long enough for the platoon to move.
4-86. The platoon reorganizes after it has completed the
initial battle with the enemy or relocated. The platoon
positions key weapons, reestablishes security, provides
first aid and prepares wounded soldiers for evacuation,
and redistributes ammunition and supplies. The platoon
relocates selected weapons to alternate positions if the
leaders believe that the enemy may have pinpointed
them during the attack and adjusts other positions to
maintain mutual support. The platoon also reestablishes
communication. It reoccupies and repairs positions and
prepares for renewed enemy attack. The platoon repairs
damaged obstacles and replaces mines and booby traps.
When the platoon reorganizes, it performs the following
actions:
Combat Operations 4-43
FM 3-19.4
•
The
squad
and
section
leaders
provide
ammunition, casualty, and equipment (ACE)
reports to the PSG. Team leaders provide fuel
status. The PSG consolidates the ACE reports,
reviews the consolidated ACE report with the
platoon leader, and forwards it to the company
commander.
•
The platoon leader reestablishes the platoon's
chain of command.
•
The
PSG
coordinates
for
resupply
and
supervises the execution of the casualty and
EPW evacuation plan.
•
The platoon continues to improve positions. The
p l a to o n q u i c k l y r e e st a b l i s h e s t h e O P / L P
resumes patrolling as directed.
4-87. If the enemy gets through the FPF, repel it by
close combat. If the perimeter is penetrated, move
teams to block the penetration and cover friendly troops
moving to alternate or supplementary positions. Even
though the counterattack capability is limited, try to
restore the perimeter. When the enemy is repelled—
•
Reestablish security.
•
Send patrols forward to maintain contact.
•
Call for indirect fire on areas where the enemy is
likely to regroup.
•
Reorganize squads.
•
Evacuate seriously wounded MP.
•
Redistribute and resupply ammunition.
•
Repair positions and continue to improve them.
•
Keep the next higher commander informed
throughout the conduct of the defense.
LAY HASTY PROTECTIVE MINEFIELDS
4-88. When possible, lay a hasty protective minefield as
part of the unit's defensive perimeter. It can stop, delay,
or restrict movement. MP often lay mines to restrict
4-44 Combat Operations
FM 3-19.4
enemy movement near a defensive perimeter or at
ambush sites. In the defense, platoons and squads lay
hasty protective minefields to supplement weapons,
prevent surprise, and give early warning of enemy
advance. Hasty minefields must be covered by fire.
Ensure that adjacent units are informed of the mine
locations.
4-89. Platoons and squads must have permission from
higher HQ to install hasty protective minefields. Higher
HQ may, however, delegate approval authority to the
company commander for emplacement of a hasty
protective minefield. Requests for permission go through
the normal chain of command.
4-90. If the company is not authorized mines in its basic
loads, a special request may be needed. The enemy
threat to the rear area requires commanders to issue
mines as an additional protective measure. The M18A1
antipersonnel mine (claymore) and the M21 AT mine are
the two mines most likely to be available to rear-area
units for a hasty protective minefield. Refer to FM 20-32
and FM 21-75.
4-91. MP generally will have claymores available to
them, which is mainly a defensive weapon. However, the
ways in which the claymore is used is limited only by the
imagination. Plan the use of claymore mines to suit
METT-TC. Emplace the mines—
•
On likely dismounted avenues of approach.
•
To cover dead space not covered by FPF of crew-
served weapons.
•
Outside the hand grenade range, but within the
range of small-arms weapons.
•
Where they are covered by observation and fire.
•
Where back blast will not injure friendly forces.
•
Beside buildings or other sturdy structures in
urban terrain.
Combat Operations 4-45
FM 3-19.4
•
Strapped to boards (for detonation from around
corners).
4-92. MP record the exact location of the mines on DA
Form 1355-1-R (Figure 4-7 ) when emplacing the
minefield. This enables anyone to recover them. If
possible, the unit should recover the mines before the
unit relocates, and the same persons who emplaced
them should recover them.
PATROLS
4-93. MP are organized and equipped to conduct
mounted operations. The primary offensive weapon
system is the MK19. It is designed as a mounted or
static position weapon. However, an MP platoon may
conduct limited dismounted operations with its other
organic weapons. Refer to FM 7-8 for more information
about patrol operati ons, incl uding organiza tion,
planning, and execution. In general, an MP platoon may
be required to conduct reconnaissance and combat
patrols.
RECONNAISSANCE PATROLS
4-94. Dismounted reconnaissance patrols are directed
b y h i g h e r H Q a n d c o n d u c t e d t o g a t h e r d et a i l e d
information on the enemy, terrain, specific NAIs, or
avenues of approach. When executed as part of a screen
or other security mission, a reconnaissance patrol can
ensure the security of an OP/LP or the platoon's
defensive perimeter. This is also referred to as a security
p a t r o l . R e f e r t o C h a p t e r 6 f o r a r e a a n d z o n e
reconnaissance.
COMBAT PATROLS
4-95. An MP platoon may conduct a combat patrol to
establish an ambush on a dismounted enemy avenue of
approach.
4-46 Combat Operations
FM 3-19.4
Figure 4-7. Sample DA Form 1355-1-R
Combat Operations 4-47
FM 3-19.4
Ambush
4-96. MP elements, normally no smaller than a platoon,
use an ambush along suspected enemy routes and
elsewhere against Level II threats in the rear area. An
ambush enables a small unit with light weapons to
harass or destroy a larger, better-equipped unit. An
ambush may be a surprise attack from a concealed
position on a moving or temporarily halted target or an
attack by fire only. A successful ambush requires the
following:
•
Surprise. The platoon must seize and maintain
control of the situation.
•
Coordinated fire. The platoon must deliver a
large volume of fire into the kill zone, using
individual and crew-served weapons, mines,
demolitions, and indirect fire (if available), and
isolate the kill zone to keep the enemy from
escaping or being reinforced.
•
Control. Before, during, and after the ambush all
e l e m e n t s m u s t b e a b l e t o c o m m u n i c a t e
effectively with the platoon leader, primarily by
using hand and arm signals.
4-97. The platoon leader organizes the platoon into
assault, support, and security elements. An ambush is
laid on an enemy's expected approach route. The platoon
leader selects the site and members are positioned to
provide—
•
Good visibility of the avenues of approach and
the kill zone.
•
Good fields of fire into the kill zone.
•
Cover and concealment.
•
Obstacles between the teams and the kill zone.
•
Covered and concealed withdrawal routes.
4 - 9 8 . A g o od a m b u s h si te r e s t r i c t s t h e e n e m y ' s
movem ent to one flan k b y natur al or m an -made
obstacles. Natural obstacles include cliffs, steep
4-48 Combat Operations
FM 3-19.4
embankments, swamps, steep grades, sharp curves in
the road, narrow trails, streams, and heavily wooded
areas. Man-made obstacles can include mines, booby
traps, and roadblocks. The ambush is configured to suit
the—
•
Type of ambush.
•
Terrain.
•
Troops available.
•
Weapons.
•
Equipment.
•
Ease of control.
•
Overall combat situation.
4-99. To conduct an ambush, the platoon leader is
positioned so he can best control the ambush elements,
norm al ly wi th c rew-served weap on s or the AT4 ,
especially if the enemy has armor. The platoon leader—
•
Positions the flank security elements.
•
Emplaces obstacles and mines.
•
Improves fighting positions, if time permits.
•
Places a crew-served weapon to cover the left
and right limits of the kill zone. These weapons
must ensure that once an element is in the kill
zone, it cannot leave it laterally.
•
Reports to higher HQ when the ambush is in
place.
4-100. The platoon leader initiates the ambush with a
casualty-producing weapon, such as a claymore mine or
a crew-served weapon. He ensures that there is a back-
up method i n ca se the prima ry means fa ils. The
remainder of the platoon opens fire once the ambush has
begun.
4-101. Most often, platoons will deploy a squad-size
element for an attack on a single kill zone (a point
ambush). If the company is deploying a platoon-size
force to conduct a number of coordinated, related
Combat Operations 4-49
FM 3-19.4
ambushes (an area ambush), the principles are the
same. An area ambush works best where close terrain
keeps enemy movement largely limited to trails or
roads. For an area ambush—
•
Choose one central ambush site around which
you can control and organize the outlying
ambushes.
•
Select outlying ambush sites on the enemy's
possible avenues of approach and escape from
the central site.
•
Set up and maintain communication with all the
outlying sites.
•
Assign the general locations of the outlying sites
to the squad leaders. They will each set and
conduct a point ambush.
•
Direct the squad leaders to let the enemy pass
through the kill zones until the central ambush
begins.
•
Provide specific instructions to the squad leaders
in case the enemy detects an outlying site before
the central ambush begins.
Ambush Types
4-102. There are three types of ambushes. They are the
l i n e a n d L - s h a p e d a m b u s h f o r m a t i o n s a n d t h e
a n t i a r m o r a m b u s h ( r e f e r t o F M 7 - 8 f o r m o r e
information).
4-103. Line Ambush Formation. A line formation
(refer to FM 7-8 for more information) is easy to control
and is useful in all levels of visibility. The assault and
support elements parallel the long axis of the kill zone to
engage the enemy with flanking fire. The target may be
so dispersed that it extends beyond the kill zone.
Leaders must—
•
Position the assault and support elements
parallel to the enemy’s movement route (such as
on a road or trail or at a stream).
4-50 Combat Operations
FM 3-19.4
•
Limit the kill zone to the size area that the
ambush can cover with a great volume of fire.
•
Place obstacles (such as claymore mines or
existing natural obstacles) between the kill zone
and the ambush element to prevent counter-
ambush actions.
•
Leave access lanes through the obstacles so the
kill zone can be assaulted (if directed).
4-104. L-Shaped Ambush Formation. An L-shaped
formation is useful on a straight stretch of a trail, road,
or stream. It also works well at a sharp bend in a trail,
road, or stream. The assault element is the long leg of an
"L," paralleling the kill zone to provide flanking fire. The
support element is the short leg, capping the end of the
kill zone at a right angle to the assault element. The
support element provides enfilade fire to interlock with
fire from the other leg.
4-105. Antiarmor Ambush. The principles for an
antiarmor ambush are the same as for an area or point
ambush. MP are likely to encounter bypassed enemy
armor in the rear area. The primary antiarmor weapon
for MP is an AT4. This is a light antiarmor weapon with
limited capability against medium and heavy armor
vehicles. However, MP may be required to set up a hasty
antiarmor ambush to destroy one or two light enemy
armor vehicles. An antiarmor ambush is best performed
by a platoon. The platoon leader positions the antiarmor
weapons where they can engage the target from the
rear, flank, or top. Multiple AT4s are used to ensure
destruction. The platoon provides support and security.
Combat Operations 4-51
FM 3-19.4
CLEARING TECHNIQUES
HIGH-INTENSITY VERSUS PRECISION CLEARING
TECHNIQUES
4-106. Precision clearing techniques do not replace
other techniques currently being used to conduct
building and room clearing during high-intensity
combat. Specifically, they do not replace the clearing
technique in which a fragmentation or concussion
grenade is thrown into a room before US forces enter.
Use precision room clearing techniques when the
tactical situation calls for room-by-room clearing of a
relatively intact building in which enemy combatants
and noncombatants may be intermixed. They involve
increased risk in order to clear a building methodically,
rather than using overwhelming firepower to eliminate
or neutralize all its inhabitants.
4-107. From a conceptual standpoint, standard high-
intensity room-clearing drills can be thought of as a
deliberate attack. The task is to seize control of the
room, with neutralization of the enemy in the room the
purpose. The fragmentation or concussion grenade can
be thought of as the preparatory fire used before the
assault. As in a deliberate attack against any objective,
the assaulting element moves into position using
covered and concealed routes. The preparatory fire is
initiated when the assaulting element is as close to the
objective as it can get without being injured by the
enemy. The assault element follows the preparatory fire
(fragmentation or concussion grenade) onto the objective
a s c l o s e l y a s p o s s i b l e . A r a p i d , v i o l e n t a s s a u l t
overwhelms and destroys the enemy force and seizes the
objective.
4-108. Compared to the deliberate attack represented
by high-intensity room-clearing techniques, precision
room-clearing techniques are more conceptually akin to
a reconnaissance in force or perhaps an infiltration
4-52 Combat Operations
FM 3-19.4
attack. During a reconnaissance in force, the friendly
u n i t s e e k s t o d e t e r m i n e t h e e n e m y ' s l o c a t i o n s ,
dispositions, strength, and intentions. Once the enemy is
located, the friendly force is fully prepared to engage and
destroy it, especially if surprise is achieved. The friendly
force retains the options of not employing preparatory
fire (fragmentation or concussion grenades) if it is not
called for (the enemy is not in the room) or if it is
inappropriate (there are noncombatants present also).
The attacking unit may choose to create a diversion (use
a stun-hand grenade) to momentarily distract the
defender while it enters and achieves domination of the
objective.
4-109. The determination of which techniques to employ
is up to the leader on the scene and is based on his
analysis of the existing set of METT-TC conditions. The
deliberate attack (high-intensity techniques), with its
d e v a s t a t i n g s u p p r e s s i v e a n d p r e p a r a t o r y f i r e
neutralizes everyone in the room and is less dangerous
to the assaulting troops. The reconnaissance in force
(precision techniques) conserves ammunition, speeds up
the clearing process, reduces damage, and minimizes the
chance of noncombatant casualties. Unfortunately, even
when well executed, it is very stressful and hazardous
for friendly troops.
4-110. Certain precision room-clearing techniques, such
as methods of squad and fire team movement, the
various firing stances, weapon positioning, and reflexive
shooting, are useful for all combat in confined areas.
Other techniques, such as entering a room without first
neutralizing the known enemy occupants by fire or
explosives, are appropriate in only some tactical
situations.
4-111. Generally, if an alerted enemy force that is
determined to resist occupies a room or building, and if
m o s t o r a l l n o n c o m b a t a n t s a r e c l e a r , e m p l o y
overwhelming firepower to avoid friendly casualties. In
Combat Operations 4-53
FM 3-19.4
such a situation, use supporting fires, demolitions, and
fragmentation grenades to neutralize a space before
friendly troops enter.
4-112. In some combat situations, the use of heavy
s u p p o r t i n g f i r e a n d d e m o l i t i o n s w o u l d c a u s e
unacceptable collateral damage or unnecessarily slow
the unit's movement. In other situations, often during
stability and support operations, enemy combatants are
so intermixed with noncombatants that US forces can
not in good conscience use all available supporting fire.
At such times, room-by-room clearing may be necessary
and precision room-clearing techniques are most
appropriate.
PRINCIPLES OF PRECISION ROOM-CLEARING
4-113. Battles that occur at close quarters, such as
within a room or hallway, must be planned and executed
with care. Units must train, practice, and rehearse
precision room-clearing techniques until each fire team
and squad operates smoothly. Each unit member must
understand the principles of precision room-clearing,
such as surprise, speed, and controlled violence of action.
Surprise
4-114. This is the key to a successful assault at close
quarters. The fire team or squad clearing the room must
achieve surprise, if only for seconds, by deceiving,
distracting, or startling the enemy. Sometimes stun
grenades are used to achieve surprise. These are more
effective against a nonalert, poorly trained enemy than
against alert, well-trained soldiers.
Speed
4-115. This provides a measure of security to the
clearing unit. Speed allows soldiers to use the first few
vital seconds provided by surprise to their maximum
advantage. In precision room clearing, speed does not
4-54 Combat Operations
FM 3-19.4
mean incautious haste. It can best be described as a
careful hurry.
Controlled Violence of Action
4-116. This eliminates or neutralizes the enemy while
giving him the least chance of inflicting friendly
casualties. Controlled violence of action is not limited to
the application of firepower only. It involves a soldier’s
mind-set of complete domination. Each of the principles
of precision room-clearing has a synergistic relationship
to the others. Controlled violence coupled with speed
increases surprise. Hence, successful surprise allows
increased speed.
FUNDAMENTALS OF PRECISION ROOM-CLEARING
4-117. The ten fundamentals of precision room-clearing
address actions soldiers take while moving along
confined corridors to the room to be cleared, while
preparing to enter the room, during room entry and
target engagement, and after contact. Team members
should—
•
Move tactically and silently while securing the
corridors to the room to be cleared. Carry only
the minimum amount of equipment.
NOTE: Rucksacks and loose items carried by
soldiers tire them, slow their pace, and cause
noise.
•
Arrive undetected at the entry to the room in the
correct order of entrance and be prepared to
enter on a single command.
•
Enter quickly and dominate the room. Move
immediately to positions that allow complete
control of the room and provide unobstructed
fields of fire.
•
Eliminate the entire enemy in the room by fast,
accurate, and discriminating fires.
Combat Operations 4-55
FM 3-19.4
•
Gain and maintain immediate control of the
situation and all personnel in the room.
•
Confirm whether enemy casualties are wounded
or dead. Disarm and segregate the wounded.
Search all enemy casualties.
•
Perform a cursory search of the room. Determine
if a detailed search is required.
•
Evacuate all wounded and any friendly dead.
•
Mark the room as cleared using a simple, clearly
identifiable marking according to the unit SOP.
•
Maintain security and be prepared to react to
more enemy contact at any moment. Do not
neglect rear security.
COMPOSITION OF THE CLEARING TEAM
4-118. Execute precision room-clearing techniques by
the standard four-man fire team. Because of the
confined spaces typical of building- and room-clearing
operations, units larger than squads quickly become
unwieldy. When shortages of personnel demand it,
conduct room-clearing with two- or three-man teams;
four-man teams are preferred. Using fewer personnel
greatly increases the combat strain and risks.
BREACHING
4-119. An integral part of precision room-clearing is the
ability to gain access quickly to the rooms to be cleared.
Br each ing tec hn iqu es var y based on the typ e of
construction encountered and the types of munitions
available to the breaching element. Techniques range
f r o m s i m p l e m e c h a n i c a l b r e a c h i n g t o c o m p l e x ,
specialized demolitions.
Shotgun Ballistic
4-120. A useful method of breaching is the shotgun
ballistic breach for forced entry of standard doors. Use a
4-56 Combat Operations
FM 3-19.4
12-gauge shotgun loaded with buckshot or slugs to
breach most standard doors q uickly. When done
properly, the shotgun breach requires only a few
seconds. The two standard techniques of shotgun
breaching are the doorknob breach and the hinge
breach. When attempting either technique, the gunner
approaches the door from an angle, avoiding standing in
the area directly in front of the door. While holding the
stock of the shotgun in the pocket of his shoulder, the
gunner places the muzzle tightly against the door, and
aims down at a 45-degree angle.
4-121. Doorknob Breach. For the doorknob breach,
(Figure 4-8, page 4-58) the aim point is a spot halfway
between th e doorknob and the frame, not at the
doorknob itself. The gunner fires two quick shots in the
same location, ensuring that the second shot is aimed as
carefully as the first. Weak locks may fly apart with the
first shot, but the gunner should always fire twice. Some
locks that appear to be blown apart have parts still
connected that will delay entry. If the lock is not
defeated by the second shot, the gunner repeats the
procedure.
4-122. Hinge Breach. The hinge breach technique is
performed much the same as the doorknob breach,
except the gunner aims at the hinges. He fires three
shots per hinge—the first at the middle, then at the top
and bottom (Figure 4-8). He fires all shots from less than
an inch away from the hinge. Because the hinges are
often hidden from view, the hinge breach is more
difficult. Regardless of which technique the gunner uses,
immediately after he fires, he kicks the door in or pulls it
out. He then pulls the shotgun barrel sharply upward
and quickly turns away from the doorway to signal that
the breach point has been cleared. This rapid clearing of
the doorway allows the following man in the fire team a
Combat Operations 4-57
FM 3-19.4
2
1
3
2
1
3
2
1
3
Doorknob target
Hinge targets
Figure 4-8. Aim Points for a Shotgun Breach of a Standard Door
clear shot at any enemy who may be blocking the
immediate breach site.
WARNING
Do not use small arms (5.56 or 7.62 millimeters) as a
ballistic breach on doorknobs and hinges except as a last
resort. It is unsafe and could result in death.
4-123. Demolitions are often needed to defeat more
elaborate barriers or to produce a desired effect to aid
the initial entry.
Mechanical Breaching
4-124. Mechanical breaching is planned as a backup to a
ballistic or explosive breach. Mechanical breaching is an
assumed capability within all units. Taking the time to
defeat weak barriers such as doors or windows by means
4-58 Combat Operations
FM 3-19.4
of crowbars, saws, sledgehammers, battering rams, or
axes is a decision that must be made based on the
conditions of METT-TC.
Order of Movement
4-125. Clearing-team members must approach the
breach point quickly, quietly, and in standard order.
This approach preserves the element of surprise and
allows for quick entry and domination of the room. The
order of movement to the breach point is determined by
the method of breach and intended actions at the breach
point. The members of the fire team are assigned
numbers 1 through 4, with the team leader normally
designated number 3. If one member of the clearing
team is armed with the squad automatic weapon (SAW)
rather than an M16 rifle or carbine, he should be
designated as number 4.
4-126. Ballistic (Shot Gun) Breach. The order of
movement for a shotgun breach has the gunner up front,
followed by the number 1 man, number 2 man, and then
the number 3 man (team leader). After the door is
breached, the gunner moves to the rear of the lineup and
assumes the position of the number 4 man.
4-127. Explosive (Demolition) Breach. The order of
movement for an explosive breach without engineer
support is number 1, number 3 (team leader), number 2,
and then number 4. The number 1 man provides
security at the doorway. The number 3 man (team
leader) carries the demolition charge and places it. The
number 2 man provides security overhead, and the
num b er 4 ma n prov ide s rea r sec ur ity. Af ter the
demolition charge is placed, the team moves to covered
positions and prepares to enter in the standard 1, 2, 3, 4
order.
4-128. Mechanical Breach. A suggested order of
movement for a mechanical breach is the initial assault
team in order, followed by the breach man/element. At
the breach point the assault team leader will bring the
Combat Operations 4-59
FM 3-19.4
breach team forward while the assault team provides
local security. After the breach is conducted, the breach
team moves aside and provides local security as the
assault team enters the breach.
ENTRY CONSIDERATIONS
4-129. The entire team enters the room as quickly and
s m o o t h l y a s p o s s i b l e a n d c l e a r s t h e d o o r w a y
immediately. If possible the team moves from a covered
or concealed position already in their entry order.
Ideally, the team arrives and passes through the entry
point without having to stop.
4-130. The door is the focal point of anyone in the room.
It is known as the fatal funnel, because it focuses
attention at the precise point where the individual team
members are the most vulnerable. Moving into the room
quickly reduces the chance anyone will be hit by enemy
fire directed at the doorway.
4-131. On the signal to go, the clearing team moves from
covered or concealed positions through the door quickly
and takes up positions inside the room that allow it to
completely dominate the room and eliminate the threat.
Team members stop movement only after they have
cleared the door and reached their designated point of
domination. The first man's position is deep into the far
corner of the room. The depth of his movement is
determined by the size of the room, any obstacles in the
room such as furniture, and by the number and location
of enemy and noncombatants in the room.
4-132. To make precision room-clearing techniques
work, each member of the team must know his sector of
fire and how his sector overlaps and links with the
sectors of the other team members. Team members do
not move to the point of domination and then engage
their targets. They engage targets as they move to their
designated point. However, engagements must not slow
movement to their points of domination. Team members
4-60 Combat Operations
FM 3-19.4
may shoot from as short a range as 1 to 2 inches. They
engage the most immediate enemy threats first.
Examples of immediate threats are enemy personnel
who are—
•
Armed and prepared to return fire immediately.
•
Blocking
movement
to
the
position
of
domination.
•
Within arm's reach of a clearing team member.
•
Within 3 to 5 feet of the breach point.
CLEAR A SINGLE ROOM
4-133. Precision military operations on urbanized
terrain (MOUT) room clearing is generally accomplished
using a four-person team, consisting of three riflemen
and one SAW gunner or breacher. Entry does not always
require four personnel. If a specific room is to small or
there are less than four clearing members due to
attrition, the room may be cleared with less. However,
never clear a room with less than two soldiers. If the
leadership determines that the use of four-soldier teams
is impractical for the situation, use the standard three-
soldier team filling the numbers 1, 2, and 3 entry
positions. The term point of domination refers to the two
corners of the room assigned to the numbers 1 and 2
soldiers. These points allow the team to gain complete
control of the objective. Each team member is assigned a
different, but interlocking field of fire. This ensures
mutual supporting fires. This type of entry is dynamic in
nature. When completed with precision, this technique
overwhelms the enemy and allows the team to move on
to the next objective very quickly. When a room is
cleared, the exiting procedure for leaving the room
Combat Operations 4-61
FM 3-19.4
varies depending on the location of the entry point
(either in the middle or at the corner of the room).
WARNING
The muzzle of the clearing team's weapons should always
be pointing wherever that soldier is looking. The clearing
team should remain one foot away from all the walls to
avoid injury due to bullets traveling down the wall (the
path of least resistance).
Stack Position
4-134. Once the approach to the room or building is
completed, the team stacks (Figure 4-9) parallel to the
outside wall. The number 1 soldier provides security on
the entry point. This point is normally a door in a
precision MOUT environment. The number 2 soldier
provides security to the front of the team. The number 3
soldier (normally the team leader) is in the high-ready
position. The high-ready position consists of the soldier
placing the buttstock of the weapon in his shoulder
pocket and raising the muzzle of the weapon from a 90-
degree angle to a 45-degree angle. The number 4 soldier
is in the low-ready position. The low-ready position
consists of the soldier placing the buttstock of the
weapon in his shoulder pocket and lowering the muzzle
of the weapon to a 45-degree angle. The high- and low-
ready positions aid in ensuring that the soldiers do not
flag their fellow team members with their weapons
during entry or clearing. A support element covers the
teams from a distance, concentrating on the team's blind
spots.
Initial Entry
4-135. When the situation allows (time, concealment,
and so forth), it is important to ensure that each team
member is prepared to enter the initial-entry point to
the building before the assault. This is achieved while in
4-62 Combat Operations
FM 3-19.4
Fatal funnel
4
3
2 1
Figure 4-9. Stack
the stack position. When ready, the number 1 soldier
nods his head while maintaining security on the door.
When soldier number 4 is ready, he squeezes the
shoulder of soldier number 3 with the nonfiring hand.
This action continues up the line. When the signal
reaches soldier number 1, he silently counts to three and
then enters the building with the rest of the team
following. If someone inside opens the door before this
sequence is completed, the team will immediately enter
the structure.
Initial-Entry Breach
4-136. Figure 4-10, page 4-64, depicts the process of a
nonexplosive breach from the standard stack. Soldier
number 4 moves up to the side of the door that contains
the locking mechanisms. When soldier number 3 gives
the signal, soldier number 4 breaches the door (by
shotgun, battering-ram, and so forth) and kicks it open.
Soldier number 4 then moves back from the door to
allow the rest of the team to enter. Soldier number 4
follows them into the room. Refer to FM 90-10-1 for
shotgun breaching techniques.
Combat Operations 4-63
FM 3-19.4
4
3
2 1
4
Figure 4-10. Nonexplosive Breach
Room Entry
4-137. Clear a room in the following manner when the
entry point is located in the middle of the room:
•
Soldier number 1 (Figure 4-11) enters the room
using the path of least resistance, (moves across
the doorway, into the room, and does not make a
turn around the doorframe) clearing the fatal
funnel as fast as possible. The term fatal funnel
is derived from the natural reaction of the enemy
soldiers inside a room (the large end of the
funnel) to focus on and fire at the doorway (the
spout of the funnel). The rounds are funneled
into the doorway from almost any position in the
room. An attacker should never move slowly
through (or stop in) the fatal funnel. Besides
providing a silhouetted target to the enemy,
these actions will slow the entry of the rest of the
team (reducing supportive fires). The number 1
soldier's first responsibility (in this scenario) is
to clear the bottom right corner. This soldier will
not be concerned with the middle of the room
unless a threat is located to his direct front as he
4-64 Combat Operations
FM 3-19.4
1
1
1
1
1
1
Figure 4-11. Number 1 Man, Middle-Door Entry
enters the room. If the number 1 soldier assesses
this threat as being capable of hindering his
movement to the top right corner of the room
(his point of domination), he may engage that
t h r e a t i n a m a n n e r t h a t a v o i d s l o s i n g
momentum. If the door obstructs or partially
obstructs the route, soldier number 1 pushes
hard through it. This helps to dissipate any loss
of momentum and knocks an enemy soldier off
balance if he is hiding behind the door. Once the
number 1 soldier visually clears the corner, he
moves up the wall to his front, clearing it as he
goes. The number 1 soldier stops at his point of
domination. He then turns and begins a scan
from the top left corner to 1 meter off the
number 2 soldier's weapon, located in the bottom
left corner in this scenario (number 1 has farther
to go, soldier number 2 should be in position once
number 1 arrives).
•
Soldier number 2 (Figure 4-12, page 4-66) enters
the room immediately after the number 1 soldier
enters. Soldier number 2, in this case, executes a
Combat Operations 4-65
FM 3-19.4
h a r d l e ft t ur n a n d m o ve s i n t he o p p os i t e
direction of soldier number 1. Soldier number 2's
first concern is to clear the bottom left corner.
Once this corner is visually cleared, he continues
to clear up the left wall. Once soldier number 2
reaches this corner, he has reached the second
point of domination. Soldier number 2 stops and
scans from the top left corner to 1 meter off
soldier number 1's weapon.
1
2
2
2
2 2
Figure 4-12. Number 2 Man, Middle-Door Entry
•
Soldier number 3 enters the room at the same
time as the number 1 and number 2 soldiers
(Figure 4-13). He moves his weapon down from
the high-ready position, between soldiers
number 1 a nd number 2 (using his height
advantage, if it exists). Soldier number 3's first
and primary concern is the middle of the room. If
soldier number 3 enters the room quickly,
effective supporting fires will be provided for the
number 1 and number 2 soldiers as they clear
t h e c o r n e r s a n d m o v e t o t h e i r p o i n t s o f
domination. Soldier number 3 begins with a
4-66 Combat Operations
FM 3-19.4
11:00
12:00
1:00
2
1
3
3
3
3
Figure 4-13. Number 3 Man, Middle-Door Entry
point of aim (in this scenario) at the 11 o'clock
position. He indexes his weapon down the
opposite wall, while moving laterally (cross step)
out of the fatal funnel, in the opposite direction
of soldier number 2 (Figure 4-14). Soldier
1
2
3
3
3
3
3
Figure 4-14. Number 3 Man, Middle-Door Entry
Combat Operations 4-67
FM 3-19.4
number 3 stops when out of the fatal funnel and
begins to scan from 1 meter off soldier number
1's weapon to 1 meter off soldier number 2's
weapon. Once one full scan is completed, soldier
number 3 clears behind the door and then
returns to scanning the room.
•
Soldier number 4 clears in the manner depicted
in Figure 4-15 if the room is large enough for the
SAW gunner or breacher to enter. He enters the
room directly behind soldier number 3 and clears
the fatal funnel as quickly as possible, moving in
the opposite direction of soldier number 3.
Soldier number 4's primary concern is the
m i d d l e o f t h e r o o m . H e b e g i n s w i t h a n
overlapping point of aim at the 1 o'clock position
and indexes his weapon down the far wall as he
moves laterally towards the number 2 soldier.
Soldier number 4 stops, once clear of the fatal
funnel, and continues to scan from 1 meter off
the number 2 soldier to 1 meter off the number 1
soldier.
1
4
3
2
4
4
4
4
4
Figure 4-15. Initial Coverage
4-68 Combat Operations
FM 3-19.4
NOTE: The M249 or shotgun are not precision
weapons. The number 4 soldier only engages when
a clear shot at a confirmed combatant presents
itself. The M249 is also very useful when the
situation has degraded and heavier support is
required. Leaders should train SAW gunners or
bre ach ers to be pru den t in th e u se o f th ei r
weapons in a precision MOUT environment.
•
Figure 4-16, page 4-70, shows the coverage area
of each team member once they have reached
their positions. The room can be visually cleared
very quickly because it has been dominated in
depth. This is especially important considering
the fact that most rooms contain furniture
(hiding positions) and many are irregular
shaped. A majority of the room is covered at all
times, should an undiscovered or wounded
enemy soldier attempt to engage the clearing
team. The bottom right corner is the only area
not effectively covered by fire at this time. Both
the number 1 and number 3 soldiers cleared this
area during the initial entry. If the number 1
soldier or number 3 soldier determines that a
threat might exist in this corner, it is soldier
number 3's responsibility to provide security in
this area.
Communication
4 - 1 3 8 . W h e n t h e r o o m h a s b e e n d o m i n a t e d ,
communication is required between the team members
in order to clear the room quickly and move on to the
next objective. Whether scanning the room or providing
security on possible threats (open doors, unidentified
persons, or dead or wounded enemy), the team members
cannot shift their gaze around the room to ascertain the
current situation. To solve this problem, the team leader
calls for a status when he determines that no immediate
threat exists. This status or situation report (SITREP)
Combat Operations 4-69
FM 3-19.4
1
3
2
4
Figure 4-16. Number 1 Man, Center-Door Entry
consists of each clearing team member's current
condition and any possible threat in his sector. The
number 1 soldier states his situation to the rest of the
team. The number 2 soldier follows with his report and
so on down the line. The team leader absorbs all this
information and then gives directions based on the
information. The conversation should be at a level that
each team member may hear, but no louder. If soldier
number 1 fails to sound off, soldier number 2 states his
status. If soldier number 1 is down, the team will know
it. If soldier number 1 fails to sound off due to a mental
lapse, he may give a SITREP once the other team
members have given theirs. An example of this type of
communication is as follows:
•
Team leader (TL) (soldier number 3 in this
scenario): "Status."
•
Soldier number 1: "One up!"
•
Soldier number 2: "Two, one down to my front!"
•
Soldier number 3: "Three up!"
•
Soldier number 4: "Four up!"
•
TL: "Soldier number 1 secure the subject."
4-70 Combat Operations
FM 3-19.4
4-139. This scenario is based on a one-room dwelling
objective for simplicity. Once the subjects are secured,
they are extracted them from the dwelling by a support
team and taken to a secure area where their status can
be determined and first aid may be rendered, if needed.
Meanwhile, the clearing team continues its mission.
T h i s w o u l d i n c l u d e ( d e p e n d a n t o n t h e m i s s i o n )
searching the room for any hidden threats, contraband,
or enemy information or equipment. If there are
multiple rooms to clear, the TL either directs one of the
clearing team members to remain in the room as
security (such as "soldier number 1 security") or (if
available) calls for a reserve, who is positioned outside of
the room, to enter the room and secure the subjects
inside it until the building is cleared. The team would
then be free to move on to the next room.
Corner-Door Position
4-140. When an entry point is located in the corner of
the room, slight modifications are made to the middle-
door entry method. The number 1 soldier (Figure 4-17,
page 4-72) enters through the path of least resistance
and clears the path to the corner to his front and stops.
This is soldier number 1's point of domination. Soldier
number 1 does not continue on to the next corner, as in
the middle-door method, because it would take to long
for him to reach this location. The number 2 soldier
makes a hard turn around the doorframe and clears the
path to the corner diagonally opposite of soldier number
1. This is soldier number 2's point of domination. The
number 3 and number 4 soldiers use the far corner of the
room as the 12 o'clock reference point (Figure 4-18, page
4-72). All other actions in the room are the same as the
middle-door method.
Rules
4-141. No matter what the room configuration, there
are a few rules that should always be adhered to. These
rules include the following:
Combat Operations 4-71
FM 3-19.4
2
2
1
2
1
1
Figure 4-17. Number 1 and 2 Man, Corner-Door Entry
12
11:00
:00
2
1:00
4
3
4
3
1
Figure 4-18. Number 3 and 4 Man, Corner-Door Entry
•
Know that it does not matter if the person in
front of you goes the wrong way when entering
4-72 Combat Operations
FM 3-19.4
the room. Just go the opposite way as the soldier
in front of you and it will work out.
•
Enter the room as quickly and smoothly as
p o s s i b l e a n d d o n o t w a s t e m o v e m e n t s .
Remember smooth is fast. The faster each team
member picks up its initial point of aim, the
more difficult it becomes for the defender. Even
a prepared defender can be caught off guard.
•
Clear (do not stop) the fatal funnel. The number
3 and number 4 soldiers are especially prone to
stopping in the funnel.
NOTE: Ensure that the doorway is completely
cleared before assuming a final position in the
room.
•
Stay focused. Never stop scanning your sector
for targets unless—
в–
You identify a threat in your sector. This
threat could be an open door leading to an
uncleared room, a person in the room other
than one of the team members, an obstacle
that cannot be cleared visually from your
position, or anything else that you may
determine as a threat. If such a threat
exists, provide security for the team by
covering it with your weapon.
в–
You are ordered by the team leader to
perform another task.
•
Ensure that if you fall down while entering the
room, you stay down and do not move. Do not get
up until a team member places his hands on you
and lifts you up. If a team member arbitrarily
gets up, he may become an impediment to the
r e s t o f t h e t e a m ' s m o v e m e n t s . A n o t h e r
possibility is that he would rise into the path of a
team member's bullet.
•
Rehearse communication. As stated above, speed
and momentum will make or break this type of
Combat Operations 4-73
FM 3-19.4
action. Poor communication techniques will slow
your building clearing to a crawl.
•
Ensure that each team member knows the
procedures for each position. After the first room
is cleared in a multiroom objective, a team
member may find that he is in a different
position in the stack than when the assault
started. The team leader should always attempt
to avoid being the number 1 soldier when
e n t e r i n g a r o o m . T h i s c a n n o r m a l l y b e
accomplished, but in some situations it will be
unavoidable.
•
Ensure that you never enter a room alone. Two
personnel are the minimum room-clearing team.
If two soldiers are entering a room (either due to
the size of the room or attrition), they should
assume the number 1 and number 2 soldiers'
positions.
•
Ensure that you never flag a fellow team
member. Flagging is defined as pointing your
weapon at or sweeping your weapon across
another team member. Muzzle awareness, at all
times, is imperative.
CLEAR A CONNECTED ROOM
4-142. Clearing multiple rooms using connecting doors
is preferable to using hallways. This action reduces
exposure and compliments speed and momentum.
4-143. Figure 4-19 shows a team that has just cleared a
room using the corner-door technique. The door to the
adjacent room is open, providing the number 2 and
number 4 soldiers the opportunity to partially clear the
second room. If a threat is identified in the adjoining
room, it may be engaged from the cleared room. Once
this firing has stopped, the SITREP will be restarted if
necessary.
4-74 Combat Operations
FM 3-19.4
2
4
3
1
Figure 4-19. Partial Clearing of a Connected Room
4-144. Figure 4-20, page 4-76, shows how the team
stacks in preparation for entry into the next room. When
the team leader declares the first room clear, the team
will automatically stack on the entrance to the next
room. In this example, crossing the doorway would not
only place a soldier in the fatal funnel unnecessarily, it
would also mask the cover fire of the number 4 soldier.
Therefore, soldiers number 1 and 3 stack to the left of
the door and soldier number 2 stacks to the right.
Soldier number 4 remains in a position to cover a portion
of the adjacent room. In this example, soldier number 1
remains the first soldier to enter the room. He awaits a
squeeze from soldier number 3. This squeeze acts as a
signal to soldier number 1 that at least one other team
member is behind him and is ready to enter the room.
This form of communication reduces the time spent
discussing the order of entry and eliminates the need for
a verbal queue (an early warning for enemy soldiers
inside the room) to enter the room. If the door had been
positioned elsewhere in the room, it could have just as
easily been the number 2 or number 3 soldier entering
the adjacent room first.
Combat Operations 4-75
FM 3-19.4
2
1
4
3
Figure 4-20. Team Stack
4-145. Figure 4-21 depicts the position of the team
members while clearing the second room. The soldiers'
original numbers are left in place to demonstrate the
difference in the positions from the first room. As the
team enters the room, soldier number 4 lowers his
weapon and moves quickly to the entry point to prevent
flagging any team member. He then moves up to the
entrance and follows the rest of the team into the next
room.
4-146. Figure 4-22 depicts a closed door to the adjacent
room. A closed door is considered locked in all cases
when a breacher is present (this is assuming the
breacher has the means available to defeat the lock).
Once the other team members are stacked, the breacher
moves to the door and breaches it on the hand signal of
soldier number 3. Soldier number 4 then steps back in
order to clear the path for soldier number 2 (the third
soldier to enter the room). If no breaching equipment is
available, a quick attempt to open the door, from the
side may be made. If the door is locked, kick it open.
However, this should be the last choice for defeating a
locked door. Kicking generally requires more than one
4-76 Combat Operations
FM 3-19.4
1
3
4
2
Figure 4-21. Team Members' Positions
2
4
4
1
3
Figure 4-22. Team Positions When the Door
to the Adjacent Room is Closed
attempt to defeat the lock. After the first attempt, the
breacher's chances of drawing fire through the door are
significantly increased.
NOTE: Do not attempt to open the door by hand. If
the door is locked, this action will alert any enemy
soldiers inside of the room of your intentions and
Combat Operations 4-77
FM 3-19.4
possibly expose the breacher to fire through the
doorway.
4-147. Figure 4-23 depicts the team preparing to enter
the next room or a hallway. Soldier number 1 moves to a
position just inside the doorway. He would have had
security on the doorway from his original point of
domination. The other team members stack to the left,
remaining just inside the doorway. Soldier number 1 is
now in the position to partially clear the next room or
hallway. The team enters the room the same way as
described in the initial coverage.
1
1
3
2
4
Figure 4-23. Stack Variation
CLEAR A FLOOR
4-148. When clearing a single-floor complex, the
principles discussed in single- and connecting-room
clearing are used. The only added features are the
hallways and an additional squad, when available, to
combat attrition. Figures 4-24 through 4-28 depict the
sequence of events in a floor-clearing mission.
4-149. Figure 4-24 gives an example of a two-squad
(four teams, plus HQ element) assault force, preparing
4-78 Combat Operations
FM 3-19.4
Room 4
Room 3
Room 2
Room 1
1st squad
2nd squad
Room 3
Room 2
Room 1
LEGEND
= A team
= Combatants
= B team
= SAW
= Noncombat
Figure 4-24. Clearing a Floor
to clear a floor. The first and second squads are stacked
on adjacent opposite walls in the hallway. The first
squad prepares to enter or clear the first room on their
side. Soldier number 1 (first squad) is continually
providing security on the door to his direct front. The
second squad halts before exposing itself to the open
door in front of the first squad. The second squad's
number 1 soldier provides security on the first doorway
to his direct front. If no entry point to his direct front
exists, soldier number 1 provides security down the
hallway. Soldier number 2 (second squad) provides
security on the second doorway to the front of the first
squad. Soldier number 3 (second squad) provides
Combat Operations 4-79
FM 3-19.4
security on the door to the direct front of the first squad.
He lifts that security when the first squad begins to
enter that room. The SAW gunners in both teams
provide security down the hallway. The HQ RTO (not
depicted) provides rear security.
4-150. In Figure 4-25, the first squad clears the first
room and moves into the second adjoining room. As the
second room is cleared, soldier number 3 calls shot and
engages an enemy threat in the next room. The B team
of the first squad moves into the first room after the A
LEGEND
= A team
= Combatants
= B team
= PL
= SAW
= RTO
= Noncombat
Figure 4-25. Clearing Adjoining Rooms with Hallway Security
4-80 Combat Operations
FM 3-19.4
team begins to clear the second room. The B team awaits
permission from the A team leader to enter the second
room. The HQ SAW gunner picks up the hallway
security. The second squad has not moved from their
original position. A team should never move past an
uncleared room. In this case, the second squad will not
receive a room clear signal from the first squad until the
first squad reaches and clears the third room. This is
because entry points interconnect the rooms on this side
of the hallway. These entry points should be used in lieu
of the hallway, whenever possible.
4-151. In Figure 4-26, page 4-82, the first squad has
cleared the first three rooms. In this example, one
soldier from the B team has been detached to secure the
first room, a second has been left in the second room to
secure the noncombatant, and a third is securing a
noncombatant and a downed enemy soldier in the third
room. Soldier number 1 (first squad) remains inside the
doorway and provides security on the entry point of the
second room to the second squad's front. Soldier number
2 provides security on the third room to second squad's
front. The second squad receives the all-clear sign from
the first squad (radio, thumbs-up, or hand and arm
signals) and moves to their first-room entry point.
NOTE: If there are not enough personnel available
to leave security in cleared rooms (especially in
m u lt il e ve l c le a r i n g ), d i sa r m a n d se c u r e a l l
combatants and noncombatants using handcuffs
or flex cuffs.
4-152. If more than one floor is involved, leave a two-
person security team on each floor while the building is
c l e a r e d . I n t h i s i n s t a n c e , e a c h r o o m m u s t b e
systematically recleared once the building is secured. A
marking system (such as chalk or chemical lights) must
be implemented in order to identify the rooms that have
been cleared.
Combat Operations 4-81
FM 3-19.4
LEGEND
= A team
= Combatants
= B team
= PL
= SAW
= RTO
= Noncombat
= Combatant
Figure 4-26. First Squad Clearing a Room with Hallway Security
4-153. In Figure 4-27 the second squad clears all three
rooms on their side of the hallway. The second squad
was forced to clear each room by using the hallway as an
access. In this example, the second squad's B team
would not follow A team into the room. When the room is
cleared, the first member in the B team stacks and
(when instructed) enters in order to relieve the A team of
security responsibilities. Once this takes place, A team
is free to exit the room and move down the hallway to
the next room.
4-82 Combat Operations
FM 3-19.4
NOTE: Before the team exits the room into the
hallway, the lead team member announces that
the team is about to exit the room. They should
wait for permission to come out into the hallway.
4-154. Once the second squad has finished clearing
their side, the number 1 soldier provides security on the
next uncleared room on the right (first squad) side. The
first squad receives the all clear signal and then moves
up to the next room. Both B team SAW gunners continue
to provide security down the hallway.
LEGEND
= A team
= Combatants
= B team
= PL
= SAW
= RTO
= Noncombat
= Combatant
Figure 4-27. Second Squad Clearing Rooms
Combat Operations 4-83
FM 3-19.4
4-155. Figure 4-28 depicts the events that take place
once the building has been cleared. Two SAW gunners
are dispatched to each end of the hallway for security.
T h e r o o m s c o n t a i n i n g n o n c o m b a t a n t s o r e n e m y
personnel are searched first (mark them to indicate that
they have been searched). Once this is completed, it is
usually best to remove all of the combatants and
noncomb atan ts encountered du ring the cl ear ing
o p e r a t i o n ( u s i n g a s m a l l d e ta c h m e n t) a l o n g a n
extraction route that is covered by a support element.
The support team escorts the noncombatants to a
designated holding area to determine their status, and
then searches the remaining rooms.
CLEAR A STAIRWAY
4-156. When multilevel structures are encountered,
stairs become an added obstacle that will require
maneuver (Figure 4-29, page 4-86). One of the more
dangerous stair situations that a team is likely to
encounter is a stairway with a turn between floors.
Besides the blind spot at the turn, these stairways often
have a loft that overlooks the bottom portion of the
stairway. If the team is ascending, the number 1 soldier
(as always) provides security to his direct front. Soldier
number 2 secures the top row of stairs. Soldier number 3
secures the loft area. If a loft area does not exist, soldier
number 3 secures the top of the second row of stairs. If
the team is descending, each soldier has the same area
of responsibility, except that the bottom of the stairway
is secured, as opposed to the top.
CLEAR BLIND SPOTS
4-157. When a blind spot is encountered (such as stairs
or a sharp corner), it can be cleared with a technique
known as cutting the pie (Figure 4-30, page 4-87). The
soldier clears the dead space by slicing it up into pieces
and then clearing one piece at a time. By doing this, the
soldier exposes only a very small portion of his frame to
4-84 Combat Operations
FM 3-19.4
LEGEND
= A team
= Combatants
= B team
= PL
= SAW
= RTO
= Noncombat
= Combatant
Figure 4-28. Events After Building is Closed
any enemy combatants, while placing himself in a
position to methodically clear the dead space.
SECURE PERSONNEL
4-158. The clearing team secures and identifies all
personnel found in a room or building that is being
cleared or searched. Until identified, (which will not
normally occur during the clearance of the building) they
approach noncombata nts in the same manner as
combatants. They do not assume that the frail old man
in civilian clothes, cowering in the corner, presents no
Combat Operations 4-85
FM 3-19.4
Figure 4-29. Clearing Stairs
threat. On contact, the soldier that first indexes his
weapon onto the individual orders the individual to his
knees, with his hands on his head, and his fingers
interlocked. This soldier stays out of arms reach at all
times. Do not allow the unidentified individual near any
exits. The individuals will remain in that position, with
security present, until the building or room has been
cleared. When it is time to secure the individual, the
soldier that has been providing security does all the
talking. In a slow, loud (but calm) voice, the soldier gives
short, easy to understand, instructions to the individual,
such as "look at me," "sit up straight," and so forth. This
talk has a dual purpose. It—
•
Gives directions that helps in securing the
individual and calms him down.
•
Keeps the individuals attention oriented on him
and not on the second securing soldier.
4-159. As the first soldier talks to the individual, a
second team member unholsters his pistol for close-in
work. The second soldier approaches the individual from
4-86 Combat Operations
FM 3-19.4
Figure 4-30. Cutting the Pie
a blind spot, grasps the middle three interlocked fingers,
and places a knee in the middle of the individual's back.
Once the individual is under control, the second soldier
holsters th e pi stol an d secu res the ha nds of the
individual behind his back. If there are numerous
individuals to secure and there will be several minutes
before they can be exfiltrated from the building, these
individuals can be placed on their knees and tilted
forward so that their foreheads are against a wall. Their
bodies should be at such an angle that their heads
support most of the weight. If the prisoner attempts to
get up, he will fall to the floor. This position enables a
few soldiers to watch several prisoners. If an enemy
soldier becomes engaged and the combatant does not
appear to be conscious, it must be determined whether
the individual is deceased or not. The body should be
approached in the same manner as described above. If a
Combat Operations 4-87
FM 3-19.4
kick does not gain a response, a simple eye gouge or
sternal rub should identify whether the combatant is
indeed dead. It is always best to secure the hands of the
individual before applying an eye gouge or sternal rub.
Beware of the enemy soldiers playing opossum.
TRAINING FOR MASTERY
4-160. It is obvious that the techniques described above
will work best in an environment that has quick-
thinking and intelligent soldiers. If the above techniques
are practiced using the crawl, walk, and then run
method, squads will find themselves catching on very
quickly. When the one-room technique is mastered,
everything else will fall into place. As teams work
together, they will come up with their own systems of
signaling, security, and change up in positions. The
clearing of a building will be one smooth flow. The
platoon leader starts training with single rooms outlined
in engineer tape. This system allows for ea se in
critiquing, and all personnel will be able to observe and
learn from the positive and negative performances of
each team. The only building layout that cannot be
reproduced by tape is a multilevel building (due to the
presence of stairwells). Once the platoon is proficient in
the one-room technique, the platoon leader moves to
co nn ec ting ro om s ou tlined in eng i nee r tape. H e
continues this process until a complete floor in a real
building can be cleared smoothly. Once multilevels are
covered, he adds simulated breaching, furniture, and
combatant or noncombatant scenarios. Once this type of
training is completed, an assault team should have the
base knowledge required to overcome specific situations
that are not covered in this chapter. The platoon leader
remembers that this is a perishable skill. As time
passes, new platoon members must be integrated into
thistrainingandoldermembersmustberetrained.
4-88 Combat Operations
Chapter 5
Maneuver and Mobility Support
MMS, formerly known as battlefield circulation
control, consists of those measures necessary to
enhance combat movement and the ability to
conduct movement of friendly resources in all
environments. These measures ensure that
commanders receive personnel, equipment, and
supplies as needed. MMS is conducted across
the full spectrum of military operations. The
primary focus of MP during MMS is to ensure
swift and uninterrupted movement of combat
power and logistical support.
MANEUVER SUPPORT
5-1. Maneuver is the employment of forces on the
battlefield in combination with fire (direct or indirect) or
fire potential. It is the movement of combat forces to
gain a positional advantage, usually to deliver or
threaten delivery of direct and indirect fires. MP tasks
that support maneuver include—
•
MP support to river crossings.
•
MP support to breaching operations.
•
MP support to a passage of lines.
•
Straggler control.
•
DC control (refer to Chapter 7 for more information
about DC operations).
SUPPORT FOR RIVER CROSSINGS
5-2. A river is a significant obstacle that may slow, stop,
or impede a unit’s ability to maneuver. Units are
Maneuver and Mobility Support 5-1
FM 3-19.4
restricted to moving in column formations along limited
routes that come together at crossing sites. Friendly
forces are vulnerable while crossing water obstacles. The
challenge is to minimize the river’s impact on the
commander’s ability to maneuver. The three types of
river crossings include—
•
Hasty.
•
Deliberate.
•
Retrograde.
5-3. MP traffic control is essential to help reduce
exposure time and speed units across any obstacle. In
addition, effective traffic control contributes to the
flexibility of the crossing plan by enabling commanders
to change the sequence, the timing, or the site of the
crossing units. MP can switch units over different routes
or hold them in waiting areas as directed by the tactical
commander. This support is vital in reducing congestion,
speeding the crossing of any obstacle (not just water),
a n d e n a b l i n g t h e m a n e u v e r f o r c e s t o m a i n t a i n
momentum.
Hasty River Crossing
5-4. A hasty river crossing is a decentralized operation
using organic, existing, or expedient crossing means. It
is the preferred river crossing method. Conduct a hasty
river crossing as a continuation of an attack to ensure
little or no loss of momentum by the attacking force. The
MP platoon in direct support of a crossing maneuver
brigade, may be required to support the crossing without
additional support.
Deliberate River Crossing
5-5. A deliberate river crossing requires planned and
augmented MP support. Conduct a deliberate river
c ro ss i ng w he n a h a st y c r os si n g ca nn ot b e ma de
successfully, normally when offensive operations must
be renewed at the river, and when enemy forces must be
5-2 Maneuver and Mobility Support
FM 3-19.4
cleared from the area. A buildup of firepower and
equipment is needed on both entry and exit banks.
Normally, MP support from corps is required to augment
the division MP company.
Retrograde Crossing
5-6. Closely plan and control a retrograde crossing.
Massed crossing forces could slow momentum or exceed
bridge classification limits. Forces moving to the rear
may retrograde to defensive positions beyond the water
obstacle and may be slowed as they set up to defend the
exit bank. MP support retrograde crossings the same as
they do deliberate crossings.
River Crossing Planning
5-7. The crossing force commander plans the river
cr ossi ng op eration. He prepares an OPOR D a nd
specifies what support is required. The PM, based on the
OPORD, plans MP support for the river crossing. The
plan includes how MP assets will be used and what
additional resources are needed. The MP commander
supporting the operation plans and supervises the
mission based on the OPORD and guidance from the
PM. The OPORD normally gives OPCON of all units
entering the crossing area to the crossing commander.
5-8. The MP leader supporting the crossi ng si te
develops a traffic control plan to support the circulation
control plan. He must plan for—
•
Traffic control posts (TCPs) and temporary route
signs at—
в–
Major crossroads on the MSR and near
crossing sites and lateral boundaries to
control traffic from adjacent unit areas that
c o u l d i n t e r f e r e w i t h d i v i s i o n s u r f a c e
movements.
в–
Staging
areas
and
engineer
regulating
points (ERPs) to provide directions and
Maneuver and Mobility Support 5-3
FM 3-19.4
information, control movement to and from
staging areas according to planned times,
and relay messages between traffic HQ and
the moving unit.
в–
Holding areas on the entrance bank to direct
traffic to crossing sites; on the exit bank,
inside the traffic regulating line (TRL), to
control movement; and on the exit bank,
o u t s i d e t h e T R L , t o t e m p o r a r i l y h o l d
sections of a convoy or a unit until it can
reassemble and continue its movement.
•
Mobile patrols to operate along primary routes
to control traffic, spot problems, guide and escort
vehicles, and reroute traffic when necessary.
•
Temporary EPW collecting points. Set up the
collecting points outside the TRL. Evacuate
EPWs through the crossing areas as quickly as
possible so their transit does not impede the
movement of friendly forces.
5-9. For brigade crossings, the MP leader may collocate
with the brigade staff to form a small, temporary traffic
control cell located at the brigade main CP or the
br igade TOC. The brigade main CP controls the
maneuver support force that consists of corps engineers,
bridge companies, MP, and chemical units.
Control Measures
5-10. To ease control of large, fast-moving forces, the
river crossing plan usually allots one crossing area for
each maneuver brigade. The commander uses control
measures to delineate areas of responsibility for
subordinates and to ease traffic control. Figure 5-1
shows the following control measures.
5-11. Release Line (RL). As used in river crossing
operations, RLs are used to delineate the crossing area.
RLs are located on both the far shore and nearshore and
5-4 Maneuver and Mobility Support
FM 3-19.4
PL Pear
PL Pear
RP
2
PL Apple
PL Apple
Figure 5-1. River Crossing Control Measures
indicate a change in the HQ that is controlling the
movement. RLs are normally located within 3 to 4
kilometers of the river and on easily identifiable terrain
features, if possible.
Maneuver and Mobility Support 5-5
FM 3-19.4
5-12. Crossing Areas. Crossing areas are controlled-
access areas that decrease congestion at the river. This
permits swift movement of the forces. Each lead brigade
has a crossing area on both sides of the river that is
defined by brigade boundaries and the RL. Crossing
areas normally extend 3 to 4 kilometers on each side of
the river, depending on the terrain and the anticipated
battle.
5-13. Waiting Areas. Waiting areas are located
adjacent to the routes or axes of advance. Commanders
use the following waiting areas to conceal vehicles,
tr oo ps , a n d equ i p m en t w h ile w aiti ng to r es um e
movement or make final crossing preparations:
•
Staging areas. These are battalion-size waiting
areas outside the crossing area where forces wait
to enter the crossing area. The brigade traffic
control cell handles the units' movement into the
staging areas. The crossing area commander
(CAC) controls movement from the staging areas
into the crossing areas. MP operate TCPs at the
staging areas according to the crossing and
t r a f f i c c i r c u l a t i o n p l a n s . T h e y e m p l a c e
temporary signs along the route from the staging
area through the crossing area to guide the
convoys. Units make crossing preparations and
receive briefings on vehicle speed and spacing in
the staging areas. Staging areas—
в–
Are located to support the crossing concept.
в–
Are far enough back to permit the rerouting
of the battalion along other roads or to
alternate crossing sites.
в–
Are easily accessible from major routes.
в–
Have enough area for dispersing a battalion-
size unit.
в–
Provide concealment.
•
Call-forward areas. These areas are company-
size waiting areas located within the crossing
5-6 Maneuver and Mobility Support
FM 3-19.4
area. Engineers use them to organize units into
raft loads; crews use them to make final vehicle
c r o ss i n g p r e pa r a t i o n s . T h e C A C c o n t r o l s
movement from the staging area to the call-
forward area. The crossing site commander
(CSC) directs movement from the call-forward
area to the crossing site and on to the far-shore
attack position. As a minimum, each CSC
operates his own call-forward area. Call-forward
are—
в–
Located to support the crossing plan.
в–
Company size within the crossing area.
в–
Easily accessible from routes.
в–
Planned with a minimum of one per crossing
site.
в–
Collocated with ERPs.
в–
Used to organize units into raft loads.
в–
The final preparation areas before going to
the crossing site.
в–
Normally operated by engineers.
•
Holding areas. These areas are waiting areas
that forces use during traffic interruptions.
Units move into these areas when directed by
TCP personnel and disperse rather than stay on
the roads. Holding areas are battalion size
outside of the crossing area and company size
within it. Far-shore holding areas are used to
organize return traffic. MP operate holding
areas according to the crossing and traffic
circulation plans and—
в–
Are used as call-forward areas for return
traffic from the far shore.
в–
Are located to support the crossing plan.
в–
Are easily accessible from routes.
в–
Have enough area for dispersion.
в–
Provide cover and concealment.
Maneuver and Mobility Support 5-7
FM 3-19.4
в–
Are defensible.
в–
Maximize traffic flow with minimum control.
•
Attack positions. The attack positions are the
last positions occupied or passed through by the
assault echelon or the attacking force before
crossing the line of departure. Within the
bridgehead, the attack position is the last
position before leaving the crossing area or
bridgehead line.
в–
Assembly areas. These are the areas where
forces prepare or regroup for further action.
5-14. Engineer Equipment Parks (EEPs). These are
areas located a convenient distance from bridging and
rafting sites for assembling, preparing, and storing
bridge equipment and material. They are at least 1
kilometer from the river and hold spare equipment and
empty bridge trucks that are not required at the
crossing sites. EEPs should be located where they do not
interfere with the traffic to the crossing sites and where
equipment can be concealed and dispersed. Ideally,
routes leading from the EEPs to the crossing sites are
not the same routes used by units crossing the river.
5-15. Traffic Control Posts. In river crossings, TCP
personnel assist the crossing-area HQ in traffic control
by reporting and regulating the movement of units and
convoys. TCP personnel relay messages between the
crossing-area HQ and the moving units. The PM
identifies locations that need or require TCPs. MP
operate TCPs on both banks of the river to control traffic
moving toward or away from it. TCPs are operated at
major or critical crossroads and road junctions, staging
areas, holding areas, and ERP.
5-16. Engineer Regulating Point. ERPs are technical
checkpoints used to ensure that vehicles do not exceed
the capacity of the crossing means. They help maintain
traffic flow. Vehicles not allowed to cross are removed so
that they do not cause a traffic backup at the actual
5-8 Maneuver and Mobility Support
FM 3-19.4
crossing site. Engineers man the ERPs and report to the
CSC. TCPs are collocated with the ERP to ensure that
all vehicles clear the call-forward areas. An additional
duty of ERP personnel is to give the drivers final
instructions on site-specific procedures and other
information, such as speed and vehicle intervals. As a
minimum, each crossing site requires an ERP at its own
call-forward area . If enough engineer a ssets are
available, an ERP may be established at far-shore
holding areas to regulate rearward traffic.
Route Execution
5-17. MP must be prepared to establish holding areas
along movement routes on order. If the road network
sustains damage, vehicles will need to be routed into the
holding areas until traffic can be restored or rerouted.
Refer to paragraph 5-104 for more information about
holding areas.
5-18. MP mobile patrols operate along primary routes,
monitoring traffic, spotting problems, and rerouting
traffic as necessary and conducting AS around the
crossing area. They make frequent checks of temporary
signs to prevent the enemy from tampering with them.
5-19. MP may be directed to screen the crossing unit's
fl a n k s a n d r e a r . T h e si z e o f su c h a n el e m e nt i s
determined by METT-TC. In most environments this
mission requires at least a squad. MP conduct screening
missions to provide early warning of enemy approach
and to provide real-time information, reaction time, and
maneuver space for the crossing unit. The squad fights
o n l y f o r s e l f - p r o t e c t i o n a n d r e m a i n s w i t h i n i t s
capabilities. Refer to Chapter 6 for more information
about screening missions.
5-20. Include at each crossing site a temporary EPW
collection point. Initially the collection point will be on
the entry bank. Once MP cross as part of the support
force, a temporary collection point is established on the
Maneuver and Mobility Support 5-9
FM 3-19.4
e x i t b a n k . A di v i s i o n c e n t r a l c o l l e c t i o n po i n t i s
established outside of the crossing area. Refer to
Chapter 7 for more information about division forward
collection points.
5-21. Rigid control of civilian movement is necessary to
preclude congestion on movement routes. The PM
coordinates for HN police support to ensure that the
civilians who live in the crossing area are kept in place
or, if necessary, quickly moved to designated areas away
from the river. Normally, civilians are not allowed to
cross the river or move along the edge of the river during
the river crossing operation. Refer to Chapter 7 for more
information about DC resettlement.
MILITARY POLICE SUPPORT TO BREACHING
OPERATIONS
5-22. Breaching operations are conducted to allow
maneuver despite the presence of obstacles. Obstacle
breaching is the employment of a combination of tactics
and techniques to advance an attacking force to the far
side of an obstacle that is covered by fire. Breaching
operations begin when friendly forces detect an obstacle
and b egi n to apply the b rea ching fundamenta ls.
Breaching operations end when the battle handover has
occurred between the follow-on forces and a unit
conducting the breaching operation.
Support Planning
5-23. MP support to breaching operations is similar to
M P s u p p o r t t o r i v e r c r o s s i n g o p e r a t i o n s . T h e
employment of MP is based on METT-TC, available
resources, and the commander’s priorities. MP support
to breaching operations includes—
•
Operating TCPs at the breaching site and along
r o u t e s l e a d i n g t o o r d e p a r t i n g f r o m t h e
breaching site.
•
Operating holding areas.
5-10 Maneuver and Mobility Support
FM 3-19.4
•
Providing mobile guides to escort the units.
5-24. The platoon leader coordinates with higher HQ
and the engineer forces conducting the breach for
essential information that includes the—
•
Azimuth and distance to the final-approach
marker or the 8-digit grid coordinate of the final-
approach marker that is entered into the teams
Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver.
•
Lane marking pattern currently emplaced.
•
Type of final-approach marker used.
•
Traffic control plan and march order.
5-25. A combined-arms breach is a complex operation
and requires precise synchronization. Breaching
operations normally require the maximum use of TCPs
to assist support, breach, and assault forces to move
along various lanes. Refer to paragraph 5-88 for more
information about TCPs. Lanes are marked to safely
pass units through the obstacle. The three levels of lane
marking are—
•
Initial.
•
Intermediate.
•
Full.
5-26. MP may provide TCPs and guide support to lanes
at any level of marking. However, the main effort of MP
support may come in later phases of the operation, when
la rger uni ts (b atta lion and ab ove) are passed to
subsequent objectives, and time permits marking
improvements to be made. The increase in traffic and
the more diverse forces with different levels of driver
experience will increase the need for MP traffic control
operations. MP guides are simply mobile MP teams that
escort units from one control measure or point to
another. Guides and TCPs are essential when there are
multiple la nes. Figu re 5 -2, page 5 -1 2 shows the
flexibility that the combinations of multiple lanes and
guides or TCPs provide the commander.
Maneuver and Mobility Support 5-11
FM 3-19.4
Guide or TCP
Lane 1
Lane 2
Distance deter-
mined through the
situation analysis
kca
Guide or TCP
tt Direction
A
of attack
Figure 5-2. Multiple Lanes (Two-Way Traffic)
Movement Execution
5-27. The commander sets the priority of movement
based on the situation. MP may concentrate their efforts
on assisting the immediate passage of larger combat
forces. Or their priority may quickly shift to ground
evacuation of casualties or vehicle recovery operations.
MP traffic control operations give the commander the
ability to make last-minute changes in the traffic flow or
lane usage
5-12 Maneuver and Mobility Support
FM 3-19.4
5-28. MP may be required to establish unit holding
areas (battalion and company size) in the event that
traffic is disrupted on the lanes due to enemy activity or
the need to do maintenance or upgrade a lane. Refer to
paragraph 5-104 for more information about holding
areas.
5-29. The commander collocates guides or TCPs at the
far recognition marker when he feels the situation
requires more positive control.
5-30. Guides and TCPs are briefed on this information
and are kept up to date on changes to the traffic control
plan and enemy activity in the AO.
5-31. The platoon leader plans for the possible need to
establish a forward EPW collection point near the
breaching operation. Refer to Chapter 7 for more
information about division forward collection point. He
must also plan for an increase in the number of TCPs
needed during limited visibility or in restrictive terrain.
Refer to FM 3-34.2 for more information about breaching
operations.
PASSAGE OF LINES SUPPORT
5-32. This area describes how an MP leader is to plan
and conduct MP support to the passage of lines. The MP
elements described in the following paragraphs are
supporting the passing and stationary units. MP
conducting a battle handover or passage of lines to a
TCF is discussed in Chapter 6.
5-33. A passage of lines is a tactical event normally
associated with a battle handover. A passage may be
designated as a forward or rearward passage of lines.
Moving a maneuver unit through the positions of an
emplaced unit that is in contact with the enemy is a
critical action. It requires detailed coordination;
planning; and close, continuous supervision of the
movement.
Maneuver and Mobility Support 5-13
FM 3-19.4
5-34. The main focus of MP support to a passage of lines
is normally employing special traffic control measures
that include—
•
TCPs.
•
Temporary route signing.
•
Checkpoints and roadblocks.
•
Defiles.
5-35. MP may also provide guides to escort the passing
unit en route to a release point or AA. Similar to MP
support to breaching operations, guides provide the
commander a means to change the sequence, timing, or
lanes of the passing units.
Passage of Lines Planning
5-36. MP support the passage of lines operation to assist
a maneuver unit in contact with the enemy to maintain
movement. Depending on the scope of the operation, a
division MP company may not be enough to support a
passage of lines operation. METT-TC may necessitate
the need for additional corps MP support.
Control Measures
5-37. When planning control measures for a passage of
lines, MP leaders must consider the placement of the
following:
•
AAs where units prepare for further action.
•
The battle handover line (BHL) where the
stationary force assumes responsibility for the
sector from the covering force.
•
The forward edge of the battle area.
•
Passage lanes along which the passing units
move to avoid stationary units and obstacles.
•
Passage points where units will pass through
o n e a n o th er . T h ey a r e l o c a t e d w h e r e t h e
commanders want the units to execute the
5-14 Maneuver and Mobility Support
FM 3-19.4
passage of lines. Designate multiple passage
points to help eliminate congestion.
•
Contact points (designate an easily identifiable
terrain feature) where the units will physically
meet.
•
SPs where unit elements come under the control
of the commander responsible for the movement.
•
Phase lines, used in controlling the timing of the
operation, are usually recognizable terrain
features extending across the zone of action.
•
RPs
where
unit
elements
revert
to
their
respective commanders and continue moving to
their destinations.
•
Travel routes from the point of origin to the
destination.
•
Checkpoints
used
to
coordinate
friendly
m o v e m e n t . ( C h ec kp o i n t s a r e n o t u s e d a s
reference points for reporting enemy locations.)
Passage of Lines Execution
5-38. MP support for a passage of lines is conducted at
the platoon level. The company monitors the platoon and
coordinates with higher HQ. The company operations
section is required to conduct detailed coordination with
the passing and stationary units that includes—
•
Communication requirements.
•
Recognition signals.
•
Route SP.
•
Time of passage.
•
Passing lanes.
•
Control measures to include TCPs, escort and
guide vehicles, temporary route signs, or a
combination of these.
•
EPW and DC evacuation.
5-39. The platoon leader continuously coordinates with
the company operations section to confirm the following:
Maneuver and Mobility Support 5-15
FM 3-19.4
•
The size of the passing unit.
•
Locations of AAs.
•
Recognition signals.
•
The actual time that the passage of lines will
commence.
5-40. MP support for a passage of lines begins at the
route SP, which serves as a contact point. Recognition
signals are displayed at the SP. MP monitor the passing
unit’s command net during the entire passage. Radio
silence is maintained during this time.
5-41. Depending on the situation, MP can support the
passing unit with the following:
•
TCPs.
•
Escort and guide vehicles.
•
Temporary route signs.
•
A mix of these measures.
5-42. The platoon leader selects the method that best
supports the movi ng u nit’s passa ge through the
stationary unit. Temporary route signing will decrease
the number of TCPs needed, but if routes are not well
defined or they cross congested areas, expect to provide
TCPs or escort vehicles.
5-43. MP must be prepared to initiate vehicle holding
areas at designated locations along movement routes. If
the road network sustains damage, vehicles will be
routed into a holding area until traffic can be restored or
r e r o u t e d . ( R e f e r t o p a r a g r a p h 5 - 1 0 4 f o r m o r e information about holding areas.)
5-44. The platoon leader plans for the need to establish
a temporary EPW collection point, and establishes it
near the passa ge area but out of the view of the
operation.
5-45. Strict control of the movement of civilians is
necessary to preclude congestion on routes used for the
operation. When necessary, MP establish evacuation
5-16 Maneuver and Mobility Support
FM 3-19.4
routes to move DCs to a designated area rear of the
staging areas. Local nationals who live in the immediate
area will remain in place or be evacuated primarily by
HN police from the area.
STRAGGLER CONTROL
5-46. MP conduct straggler control operations to assist
commanders in maintaining combat strength by locating
and returning stragglers to their units. MP identify
stragglers at the TCPs, checkpoints, roadblocks, defiles,
or while patrolling the MSR. For large numbers of
stragglers, special collecting points are set up along the
MSR.
Operate Straggler Posts
5-47. When operating a straggler CP, MP teams need to
know what units are located or operating in their AO.
M o s t s t r a g g l e r s a r e s o l d i e r s w h o h a v e b e c o m e
accidentally separated from their command. Stragglers
are identified by checking the following:
•
Uniforms.
•
Unit insignia.
•
Bumper markings on the vehicles.
•
Identification cards or tags.
•
Passes or other authorization documents.
5-48. For each straggler identified, as a minimum, MP
record—
•
The straggler’s name, rank, social security
number (SSN), and nationality.
•
The straggler’s unit.
•
The
straggler’s
category
(“injured”
or
“uninjured”).
•
Whether the straggler is armed or not.
•
Where the straggler was coming from and his
destination.
•
Why and when the straggler left the unit.
Maneuver and Mobility Support 5-17
FM 3-19.4
•
The location where the straggler was sent.
5-49. MP administer first aid to the injured, wounded,
or ill stragglers. Seriously ill or injured soldiers are
e v a c u a t e d . S t r a g g l e r s w h o h a v e i n f o r m a t i o n o f
immediate tactical value are reported to higher HQ.
Soldiers fit for duty who mistakenly became separated
are returned to their units or a HQ within their chain of
command. The soldiers unit is responsible for any
transportation requirements.
5-50. MP treat deliberate stragglers, those who have
deserted or are attempting to desert or are absent
without leave (AWOL), with caution. These stragglers
may resort to violence to avoid military control. MP
search, disarm, and detain them. They hold these
stragglers until transport and escort can be arranged to
take them to their unit, the straggler collecting point, or
another facility set by the SOP or the straggler control
plan. MP safeguard confiscated property and documents,
and dispose of them according to the straggler control
plan.
5-51. MP handle stragglers from the HN or other allied
forces the sa me a s US stragglers. If the PM has
coordinated with other national forces to set up joint
straggler posts, allow MP from other national units to
handle stragglers from their own forces.
Operate Straggler Collecting Points
5-52. When large numbers of stragglers exist and TCPs,
mounted patrols, and straggler control posts are not able
to handle the straggler flow, MP may be tasked to
operate a straggler collecting point. MP temporarily hold
stragglers at collecting points while they process them
for return to their units, placement in medical channels,
or placement in other military channels.
5-53. The PM operations section plans the location of a
straggler collecting point, placed along a key MSR or at
5-18 Maneuver and Mobility Support
FM 3-19.4
an intersection of the MSR. This allows quicker access to
the straggler collecting point to aid in moving stragglers
to their appropriate destination.
5-54. Often it is collocated where elements of medical,
transportation, and MP units can share efforts to ease
the disposition of stragglers. At a straggler collecting
point, MP may need food, water, clothing, and shelter for
stragglers. If a medical facility is not close by, request
extra medical supplies and be prepared to administer
first aid.
5-55. Guards separate the injured stragglers from the
uninjured. They process each soldier at the collecting
point. Guards record the key information on each soldier
for a straggler report. They search, segregate, and guard
stragglers who refuse to return to their unit. Guards
assemble and forward the report to wherever the
straggler control plan directs. They hold stragglers at
the collecting point until transport arrives.
5-56. Detain stragglers who refuse to return to their
unit until their unit provides an escort or until they are
transported to a detainment facility.
MOBILITY SUPPORT
5-57. Mobility is the capability of military forces to move
from place to place while retaining the ability to fulfill
their primary mission. It includes those activities that
enable a force to move personnel and equipment on the
battlefield without delays due to terrain or obstacles.
MP activ i ties that supp ort m obility i nc lud e the
following:
•
Route reconnaissance and surveillance.
•
MSR regulation enforcement.
•
Special circulation control measures.
Maneuver and Mobility Support 5-19
FM 3-19.4
ROUTE RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE
5-58. MP conduct route reconnaissance and surveillance
operations to gain detailed information on specific routes
to be used as deployment routes, MSRs, or movement
corridors. Mobile MP teams record and report the
condition of the MSR and other critical roadways,
identifying effects of weather on road surfaces, damage
to routes, NBC contamination, and the presence of
enemy activity. Platoon leaders use this information to
develop a road reconnaissance report and a route
reconnaissance overlay.
5 - 5 9 . T h e
p l a t o o n
l e a d e r
p r o v i d e s
t h e
M P
reconnaissance reports and overlays are used to assist
the division PM with the development of the division
traffic control plan. Movement planners use information
gathered from the MP route reconnaissance to update
the highway traffic section’s (HTS’s) traffic circulation
control plan and to formulate the highway traffic
regulation plan. Refer to FM 55-10 for more information
about traffic circulation control plans and highway
traffic regulation plans.
Plan
5-60. MP leaders plan route reconnaissance operations
by examining intelligence reports and maps of the area
surrounding the route to be reconnoitered. When time is
critical, MP conduct a hasty route reconnaissance to
obtain specific information only. The MP leader must
clearly understand the following critical tasks to be
accomplished:
•
Find and report all enemy forces that can
influence movement along the route.
•
Determine the trafficability of the route.
•
Reconnoiter
any
special
areas
that
could
influence movement on the route. These areas
may consist of highly populated areas or key
5-20 Maneuver and Mobility Support
FM 3-19.4
terrain features. Additional teams may be
needed to cover these areas based on METT-TC.
•
Inspect all bridges on the route.
•
Locate fords or crossing sites near all bridges on
the route.
•
Inspect
all
overpasses,
underpasses,
and
culverts.
•
Locate areas suitable for short halts and holding
areas.
•
Locate mines, obstacles, and barriers along the
route.
•
Locate
a
bypass
around
built-up
areas,
obstacles, and contaminated areas.
•
Report route information.
5-61. A more detailed route reconnaissance would
include additional information concerning the terrain,
potential hazards, or obstacles and would include key
terrain and built-up areas 2 to 3 kilometers on either
side of all MSRs. A route reconnaissance this detailed
requires considerably more time and personnel.
Execute
5 - 6 2 . O n e M P sq u a d c a n c o n d u c t a h a st y r o u te
reconnaissance of only one route, (about 30 kilometers).
MP platoons reconnoiter three routes within the
boundaries of the platoon AO, if route reconnaissance is
their primary focus.
5 - 6 3 . T h e s i z e o f t h e r e c o n n a i s s a n c e p a t r o l i s
de termined by using M ET T-T C f a ctors. In most
environments route reconnaissance operations are not
conducted with less than a squad. The squad leader
o r g a n i z e s t h e s q u a d i n t o s e c u r i t y t e a m s a n d a
reconnaissance team. The reconnaissance team records
the information, completes a DA Form 1248, and
prepares a reconnaissance overlay. The other teams
provide security.
Maneuver and Mobility Support 5-21
FM 3-19.4
5-64. MP do not engage the enemy when conducting
route reconnaissance except in self-defense or when
ordered to do so. They report any visual contact with the
enemy and maintain surveillance while gathering as
much information as possible. They break visual contact
only on order from proper authority.
5-65. Often the main purpose of a reconnaissance is to
confirm information already known about a route.
Additional information can be obtained from the division
PM, the division transportation officer, and from HN
police. MP teams talk to convoy commanders, vehicle
drivers, local nationals, and highway control regulating
teams to gain or verify information about well-traveled
roads. Although this information is not as reliable as
information gathered from driving a route, its reliability
increases when several road users report the same
condition.
5-66. Mounted MP patrols continuously collect data at
the level of detail required by the PM or commander and
report it by the fastest secure means available. The
patrols travel the routes within the AO to—
•
Identify and locate the recommended route.
•
Check the driving time and distances between
easily recognized points.
•
Look for obstructions and restrictions (bridges,
tunnels, steep grades, sharp curves, ferries,
snow blockage, defiles, flooding, rock falls, and
slides).
•
Note the location and type of possible ambush
sites on the route.
•
Look for terrain where direct fire from the
enemy could stop movement on the route.
•
Identify natural defense, counterambush, and
assembly locations.
5-22 Maneuver and Mobility Support
FM 3-19.4
•
Identify
areas
where
terrain
restricts
communications.
•
Watch for enemy situations that could affect
route security or conditions, such as—
в–
Enemy elements positioned on key terrain.
в–
The enemy emplacing mines and other
obstacles.
в–
Frequency changes or type of enemy fire in
the area.
в–
Enemy aerial interdiction.
5-67. To keep from overlooking critical terrain data, the
squad leader prepares a checklist of items that may be
included on the reconnaissance overlay, such as—
•
The route classification formula.
•
The
identification
and
location
of
the
reconnoitered route.
•
The road distances between the points that are
easily recognized both on the ground and on the
map.
•
The presence and lengths of steep grades
(having a slope of 7 percent or greater).
•
Curves having radii of less than 45 meters.
•
Military load classifications (MLC) and limiting
d i m e n s i o n s o f b r i d g e s . I n c l u d e s u i t a b l e
bypasses, classifying them as easy, difficult, or
impassable.
•
Locations and limiting data of fords, ferries, and
tunnels. Include suita ble classification of
bypasses.
•
Route restrictions (like underpasses) below
minimum standards and, if appropriate, the
distances such restrictions extend.
•
Areas suitable for short halts, holding areas, or
bivouacs that offer easy access to the roadway
a n d
a d e q u a t e
d i s p e r s i o n ,
c o v e r ,
a n d
Maneuver and Mobility Support 5-23
FM 3-19.4
c o n c e a l m en t. I n c l u d e i n f o r m a ti o n o n th e
shoulders.
•
Rock fall and slide areas that may present a
traffic hazard.
•
Overhead clearance of less than 4.3 meters.
•
Civil
or
military
road
numbers
or
other
designations.
•
Obstructions to traffic.
5-68. Roads that bisect heavily wooded areas are likely
obstacle and ambush sites. Heavily loaded vehicles are
vulnerable to ambushes and unable to circumvent
obstacles easily. Steep grades and numerous S-turns,
where logistical vehicles that are heavily loaded with
supplies slow to a crawl, make good ambush points. For
more information on route classification, refer to FM 5-170
and Appendix I of this manual.
5-69. If enemy activity is suspected along a route, the
squad should—
•
Use caution when approaching critical locations.
•
Deploy using traveling overwatch or bounding
ov e r wa tc h . C ho o se m o v em e n t te c hn i q u es
according to the latest information on suspected
enemy activity.
•
Avoid danger areas.
5-70. Use caution when approaching a sharp bend or a
defile in the road. Such areas are often mined and are
ideal sites for an ambush. When necessary, the squad
leader has the reconnaissance element conduct a
dismounted reconnaissance of these areas while the
security element provides overwatch.
5-71. MP check bridges for mines and booby traps.
Before crossing a bridge, MP have the security element
m o v e t o a n o v e r w a t c h p o s i t i o n . T h e y h a v e t h e
reconnaissance element dismount and check the bridge
a n d i t s a p p r oa c h es f o r m i n e s, b o o b y t r a p s, a n d
demolition charges. If any are found, MP move to a
5-24 Maneuver and Mobility Support
FM 3-19.4
covered and concealed area, report the information, and
request engineer support to clear the mines. MP
maintain surveillance of the bridge until the mines are
cleared. They stop friendly forces and civilians from
using the bridge until the engineers have cleared it.
When the bridge is cleared, MP have the reconnaissance
e l e m e n t g a t h e r c r i t i c a l d a t a o n t h e b r i d g e ' s
characteristics and continue the reconnaissance.
5-72. MP reconnoiter key terrain and built-up areas
near the route. They move on and off the road to identify
enemy activity. The type of terrain dictates whether a
reconnaissance is conducted mounted or dismounted.
Reconnoitering terrain can be time-consuming. The
m i s s i o n o r d e r a n d t h e t i m e a v a i l a b l e f o r t h e
reconnaissance determine how many and which terrain
features are reconnoitered.
MAIN SUPPLY ROUTE REGULATION ENFORCEMENT
5-73. MP traffic control activities support movement
control by enforcing highway regulation plans. Traffic
enforcement measures, such as speed control and safety
inspection checkpoints, help protect the force and ensure
that only authorized traffic uses controlled routes. MP
employ special circulation control measures, such as
temporary route signing, TCPs, holding areas, defiles,
and checkpoint and roadblock operations, to support
combat and sustainment operations. Refer to Chapter 6
for more information about checkpoints and roadblocks.
5-74. Highway regulations are set by the agency having
jurisdiction over the road network. MSR regulation
m ea su re s a r e sta ted i n th e c om m a nd ’ s h i gh wa y
regulation plan. They also may be in the unit SOPs and
c o m m a n d d i r e c t i v e s . T h e H T S s e t s t h e r o u t e
classification.
5-75. Mounted MP teams patrol MSRs to monitor traffic
and road conditions. They gather information on
friendly and enemy activity and assist stranded vehicles
Maneuver and Mobility Support 5-25
FM 3-19.4
and crews. Road condition changes and enemy activity
are reported immediately through MP channels.
SPECIAL CIRCULATION CONTROL MEASURES
5-76. MP limit, control, block, or direct mounted or
dismounted forces traveling on the MSR, by employing
special circulation control measures. Special circulation
control measures include the following:
•
Temporary route signing.
•
TCPs.
•
Holding areas.
•
Defiles.
5-77. Many of these measures are used in MP support to
breaching operations, river crossings, and passage of
lines.
Temporary Route Signing
5-78. A signed military route system, like the signed US
highway system, can enable road users to reach their
destinations by following route signs and road markings
displayed along the roadside. MP patrols monitor signs
on a routine basis, checking specific signs before critical
moves. Engineers erect permanent signs, but signs can
be damaged, destroyed, or moved by weather, saboteurs,
and battle.
NOTE: For more information about temporary
route signing refer to Appendix I.
Traffic Control Post
5-79. TCPs are used to support MMS only when needed.
They are used to preclude the interruption of traffic or
unit movement along designated routes. TCPs are
communication links to units using the MSR. Show on
the traffic control plan and the traffic circulation plan
the placement of TCPs. MP activities at a TCP include
the following:
5-26 Maneuver and Mobility Support
FM 3-19.4
•
Monitoring and assisting traffic authorized to
use the MSR.
•
Redirecting unauthorized vehicles to the road
network they need.
•
Providing route security for the MSR at critical
locations or intersections.
•
Monitoring for NBC contamination.
•
Rerouting traffic as needed.
•
Gathering information and reporting it.
•
Providing information to passing units.
•
Assisting stragglers and DCs.
5-80. Plan. An MP squad can operate one TCP for an
extended period or three TCPs for a short duration. The
platoon leader uses METT-TC to analyze the mission
and estimate the situation. He decides the appropriate
weap ons, ma te rials, a nd equip me nt n eed ed and
considers such factors as the movement of traffic and the
degree of control required. If HN police support is
needed, the company operations section or the PM
arranges for it. The platoon leader uses overlays and the
traffic control plan to determine the location for the
TCP. The squad leader plans for emergency destruction
of doc um ents a nd e qu ip men t i n c a se the TC P is
attacked. The squad leader plans for continuous
operations by—
•
Developing an adequate sleep plan.
•
Arranging for maintenance and refueling.
•
Arranging for additional rations.
•
Constructing fighting positions.
•
Camouflaging all vehicles and equipment.
5-81. Execute. TCPs are manned at points where two
or more MSRs converge or where confusion could affect
vehicle movement. They are used to help protect the
force at critical locations where civilian or military
traffic can cause an accident. Operations in which TCP
will be maximized include the following:
Maneuver and Mobility Support 5-27
FM 3-19.4
•
Deliberate river crossings.
•
Deliberate breach operations.
•
Defile operations.
5-82. When METT-TC requires a TCP to be manned by
one MP squad, the squad leader—
•
Analyze the terrain location.
•
Positions the teams.
•
Directs the squad’s vehicles to a covered and
concealed position near the squad’s fighting
position. Use camouflage nets, if needed.
•
Selects a fighting position from which the squad
can cover and secure the TCP.
•
Maintains communication.
5-83. Once the squad has occupied the actual TCP site,
the squad leader establishes security and provides a grid
coordinate to higher HQ. One team in the overwatch
covers the TCP while another team watches the flow of
traffic from a covered and concealed position near the
road. When needed, a member of this team moves to the
center of the road to direct the flow of traffic while the
other members provide security. If necessary, the squad
leader has the third team resting in a covered and
concealed position. The squad leader ensures that all
three teams communicate by wire (the preferred
method) or radio. If neither is available, they use arm
and hand signals.
5-84. At a TCP, the main purpose is to ensure smooth
and efficient use of the road network according to the
traffic circulation plan. The plan contains—
•
Military route numbers and directions of travel.
•
Light lines and blackout areas.
•
Highway regulation points and MP TCP.
•
Route control classification.
5-85. Vehicles too wide or heavy for a road will be
denied access. MP reroute them to alternate MSRs. No
5-28 Maneuver and Mobility Support
FM 3-19.4
authorization is needed for travel on an open route, but
use of a classified route may be restricted to certain
units, operations, or types of vehicles.
5-86. All vehicles on the dispatch route will have a
current movement credit issued by the HTS. On a
supervised route, normally a column of 10 or more
vehicles or an individual vehicle of exceptional size or
weight will have movement credit from HTS.
5-87. MP stop vehicles or convoys that are not following
MSR regulations. They tell the convoy commander why
the vehicles are halted. The convoy commander makes
immediate corrections. When immediate corrections
cannot be made, MP record the key information about
the incident and report it through MP channels.
5-88. TCP is used to disseminate information about the
AO. MP provide information to authorized personnel
only. They support the commander’s force protection
program by providing friendly forces with current
information on route conditions and enemy activity. At
the TCP, MP disseminate information on the locations of
contaminated areas, supply points, medical facilities,
and other units on a need-to-know basis and should not
volunteer more information than is needed to avoid
creating security and/or intelligence issues.
5-89. MP actively seek information from road users by
asking drivers what they have seen of suspected or
actual enemy activity along the MSR. When language is
not a barrier, MP talk to local civilians and to the HN
civilian and military police to gain information about the
road network in an AO. MP pass this information up the
chain of command so that it can be verified as reliable.
5-90. MP are constantly on watch for enemy aircraft
and suspicious activity by the local populace. When such
activity is observed they relay SPOTREPs through MP
channels. MP use the SALUTE format to report this
information.
Maneuver and Mobility Support 5-29
FM 3-19.4
5-91. When the movement control agency requests it,
MP keep track of military movements that pass through
a TCP. This helps movement planners keep track of the
progress of convoys. This information is compiled into a
passing report that includes the—
•
TCP location.
•
Date.
•
Convoy identification (unit or serial number).
•
Time the first vehicle passed the TCP.
•
Time the last vehicle passed the TCP.
•
Number of vehicles in the convoy.
5-92. Usually, TCP passing reports are picked up at the
TCP or transmitted by secure radio. The platoon leader
compiles the TCP passing reports into one report. He
forwards the report through MP channels or as directed
by the commander. The report may be written or
tr ansmitted. If transm itted, a report i s encoded
according to the unit SOP. In some instances, the
platoon leader may permit a squad leader to bypass the
usual report channels and submit a passing report
directly to the movement control agency.
Holding Areas
5-93. MP operate vehicle-holding areas to help regulate
t h e t r a f f i c f l o w . H o l d i n g a r e a s c a n b e u s e d a s
independent measures or with other measures like
defiles or checkpoints to support large operations like
river crossings or passage of lines. When MP operate
holding areas, they direct vehicles, convoys, and troops
into and out of the holding areas.
5-94. Plan. METT-TC and the size of the holding area
determine the number of teams needed to operate it.
When one MP squad operates a holding area, the squad
leader designates one team to control the entrance to the
holding area, another team to control the exit from the
5-30 Maneuver and Mobility Support
FM 3-19.4
holding area, and one team to provide security. He also
assigns each squad member a fighting position.
•
The general location for a holding area may be
designated by the echelon movement control
unit, PM, or MP company commander. The exact
location is selected by the MP leader with the
mission. The holding area's location is noted on
the traffic control plan and passed to the echelon
movement control unit to keep the traffic
circulation plan current. Select a site where—
•
Parked vehicles can face the exit so that they can
be driven from the area quickly.
•
Vehicles can be dispersed.
•
There is easy access to and from the roadway.
•
The surface of the area is firm enough to hold
the weight of the vehicles.
•
The area is large enough to allow vehicles to be
covered and concealed from air and ground
observation.
•
The area can be defended.
5-95. Execute. MP teams at the entrance and exit to
the holding area are positioned in concealed locations.
When vehicles approach the holding area, one MP moves
to the center of the road and directs the vehicles in. He
tells the vehicle driver or convoy commander where to
park. He moves back to the concealed location when all
vehicles have entered. Vehicles moving in the holding
area should be ground-guided by members of the convoy.
5-96. The MP team at the exit operates in a similar
manner. MP move from their cover and concealment
only when necessary. Depen ding on the tactical
situation, MP teams may use red lens flashlights to
direct traffic at night. Colored chemical light sticks are
posted to help drivers identify their locations within a
holding area if the situation permits.
Maneuver and Mobility Support 5-31
FM 3-19.4
5-97. Ideally, the MP leader controls the holding area
from a position overlooking the entrance and exit. The
MP leader receives instructions on when to allow
vehicles to pass from higher HQ. When the holding area
is to support a river crossing site, the MP leader has a
movement schedule to follow. He receives his movement
information from the echelon movement control office or
the crossing area commander.
5-98. When operating a large holding area, the MP
leader may need additional personnel inside the holding
area to direct traffic and parking and ensure that the
units comply with the flow plan. Large holding areas
will have a simple control plan, such as a subdivision
system.
5-99. Take the following steps when using a subdivision
system:
•
Make a map or a sketch of the area showing the
road net, trails, and major obstacles.
•
Outline the holding area on the map or sketch.
•
Divide the area into equal subdivisions and
assign a letter or a name to each subdivision.
This helps direct units to their section of the
holding area.
•
Erect signs showing the outline of each area.
•
Develop a traffic flow plan and erect directional
signs to help users.
5-100. Keep a count of vehicles in the subdivisions by
number, size, and unit designation for each vehicle. At
night, use chemical light sticks to identify the sections
within the holding area and the exit.
5-101. Vehicle holding areas are controlled sites. MP
instruct convoy commanders to keep drivers with their
vehicles or assign them fighting positions. They do not
allow convoy personnel to openly move around within
the holding area. They use signs to help control traffic
5-32 Maneuver and Mobility Support
FM 3-19.4
and maintain communications between positions by
wire or hand and arm signals.
Defiles
5-102. Defiles keep traffic moving smoothly despite
narrowed passageways. Controls at defiles ensure that
traffic moves through the passage, one direction at a
time, first from one end and then the other. A defile may
be considered a critical site and its security a priority.
5-103. Plan. METT-TC and the estimated length of the
operation are used to determine the actual size of the
e l e m e n t n e e d e d t o o p e r a t e a d e f i l e . I n m o s t
environments, a defile will not be operated with less
than a squad. An MP platoon may be needed to conduct
a large defile operation for extended periods. At a defile
(Figure 5-3), MP do the following:
Fighting
position
Squad leader
Fighting
position
Holding
Lead
area
vehicle
Holding
area
Figure 5-3. Defile
•
Secure and defend the site.
•
Brief drivers about obstructions.
Maneuver and Mobility Support 5-33
FM 3-19.4
•
Control access so vehicles move through quickly.
•
Ensure that vehicles enter one at a time.
•
Reroute traffic when necessary.
5-104. Terrain or traffic needs may dictate a need for
vehicle holding areas and signs or a TCP. Larger defiles
require a holding area at each end. The placement of
holding areas depends on the site available and the ease
of communicating between the sites and the defile.
5-105. Execute. Because defiles involve restricted
movement, they are an ideal target for the enemy.
Security of a defile is a priority. Before a defile is put
into operation, an area reconnaissance is conducted to
detect the presence of enemy activity in and around the
l o c a t i o n o f t h e d e f i l e . O n c e t h e a r e a h a s b e e n
reconnoitered, the squad leader establishes security and
reports the exact location of the defile, if not previously
known, to higher HQ. He selects the crew-served
weapons fighting position, picking key terrain that
overlooks the defile. He ensures that the squad’s
v e h i c l e s a r e c ov e r e d a n d c o n c e a l e d . A s i n m o st
stationary MP operations, communications within the
squad is primarily wire and arm and hand signals.
5-106. MP use control measures to keep traffic flowing
smoothly. They use the simplest method of control. Plan
for the use of two different control measures. This
provides a back-up method, if needed. Control measures
can include the following:
•
Visual signals to tell traffic when to move, such
as hand and arm signals, flashlights, or a
handheld flags. Use any technique that shows
vehicles when to move. Visual signals work best
for small defiles where holding areas are not
needed.
•
Wireless or wire communications to tell teams in
holding areas to hold or start traffic through the
defile. Link communications directly between
holding areas, or route them through the leader
5-34 Maneuver and Mobility Support
FM 3-19.4
at the defile site. Use wire communications as
the main means of communication. Use wireless
communications as a backup or when no other
means are available.
•
A flag to identify the last vehicle moving through
a defile. Give the flag to the last driver or attach
it to the last vehicle entering the defile. Another
MP removes the flag when the vehicle reaches
the end of the defile. This serves as a signal for
traffic to start in the opposite direction. This is
repeated as often as needed.
•
An MP rider to indicate the last vehicle of a
column. The rider stays in the last vehicle until
the c olumn reac hes th e opp osite s id e. He
dismounts and rides back in the last vehicle
returning. This technique ensures that all the
vehicles clear the defile.
•
MP lead and trail vehicles in the front and rear
of a column to guide it through the defile. After
the column clears the defile, the vehicles guide a
column moving in the opposite direction. MP use
this method when movement through a defile is
complex and requires an escort. The trail vehicle
ensures that all the vehicles clear the defile. A
single lead or a single trail vehicle can also be
used, depending on the number of vehicles and
the complexity of the defile.
5-107. To ensure traffic flow is not interrupted by a
disabled vehicle, MP plan for a recovery vehicle to stand
by at the defile. If a recovery vehicle is not available,
they use field expedient measures.
5-108. Regardless of what special control measure is
employed, MP leaders coordinate with the PM for the
location, duration and special criteria for the execution
of the control measure. Once operational, MP monitor its
effectiveness and ensure that force protection and
security measures are followed and maintained.
Maneuver and Mobility Support 5-35
Chapter 6
Area Security
MP conduct AS operations to protect critical
f u n c t i o n s , f a c i l i t i e s , a n d f o r c e s . T h e y
synchronize efforts with base and base cluster
defense planners within a specific AO to ensure
that support and sustainment operations are
not interrupted. The HN, when capable, retains
responsibility for security of all areas outside
US bases. H owever, U S com man ders are
always responsible for the defense and security
of US forces a nd ba se s regardle ss of HN
support. AS is conducted by MP across the full
spectrum of army operations to protect the
force, impose order, and ensure freedom of
movement. MP activities that support AS
include reconnaissance operations, ADC, base
and air base defense (ABD), response force
operations, and critical site asset and high-risk
personnel security.
RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS
6 - 1 . M P
p l a n
a n d
c o n d u c t
a r e a
a n d
z o n e
reconnaissance, screening and surveillance missions,
and counterreconnaissance.
6-2. MP conduct reconnaissance and screening missions
to obtain information about the activities and resources
of an enemy or potential enemy or to secure data
concerning the characteristics of a particular area. MP
reconnaissance, screening, and surveillance efforts
Area Security 6-1
FM 3-19.4
include area, zone, and route reconnaissance and
c o u n t e r r e c o n n a i s sa n c e . T h e s e m i ss i o n s m a y b e
conducted primarily in the rear area, but may occur
anywhere sustaining operations are conducted. Refer to
C h a p t e r 5 f o r m o r e i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t r o u t e
reconnaissance. MP employ NBC detection equipment to
determine the absence or presence and extent of NBC
c o n t a m i n a t i o n . R e f e r t o A p p e n d i x J f o r m o r e
information about NBC reconnaissance.
AREA RECONNAISSANCE
6-3.
Area reconnaissance is performed to obtain
detailed information concerning the terrain or enemy
activity within a prescribed area, such as a town,
r i d g e l i n e , w o o d s , o r a n y t e r r a i n c r i t i c a l t o t h e
operations. MP conduct area reconnaissance to help
guard against unexpected enemy attack in the rear area.
Area reconnaissance and surveillance are vital to
maintaining AS and contribute to the commander’s
intelligence collection plan. MP area reconnaissance is a
composite of actions. It is initiated from observations
and reports gathered over time by MP patrols and
information gained through coordination with HN police
and other friendly forces. Refer to FM 7-8.
6-4.
Reconnaissance patrols may differ slightly,
d e p e n d i n g o n t h e t y p e o f r e c o n n a i s s a n c e t o b e
performed. However, all reconnaissance patrols have a
reconnaissance and security team. The size of the patrol
is determined by METT-TC. Other considerations to
determine the size of the patrol include—
•
Size and number of reconnaissance objectives.
•
Requirement to secure the objective rally point
(ORP) and other points.
•
Time allowed for conducting the mission.
6-5. MP leaders plan area reconnaissance based on the
I P B a n d t h e c o m m a n d e r ’ s c r i t i c a l i n f o r m a t i o n
6-2 Area Security
FM 3-19.4
requirements. Information on enemy activity and likely
avenues of approach is coordinated with military
intelligence (MI). MP monitor likely enemy avenues of
approach and LZ and DZ in critical areas to give early
warning of rear-area enemy activity.
6-6. MP area reconnaissance plans include areas near
f a c i l i t i e s t h a t a r e d e s i g n a t e d a s c r i t i c a l b y th e
commander, such as—
•
NAIs.
•
Air bases.
•
Bases and base clusters.
•
Communications centers.
•
Logistic support clusters.
•
Key terminals, depots, and bridges.
•
Critical terrain features.
•
High-value assets.
6-7. When leading an area reconnaissance patrol, in
addition to using troop-leading steps and following the
general principles for making a reconnaissance, the
patrol leader—
•
Uses a scheme of maneuver.
•
Secures and occupies an ORP.
•
Conducts
a
leader’s
reconnaissance
of
the
objective area to confirm or change the plan.
•
Returns to the ORP, completes the plan, and
briefs the soldiers.
6-8. The security elements leave the ORP before the
reconnaissance element. The security element leader
places security teams at the ORP and on enemy avenues
of approach into the objective area. The reconnaissance
element conducts the reconnaissance by moving to
several vantage points around the objective.
6-9. The reconnaissance element leader may have a
small reconnaissance team move to each vantage point
Area Security 6-3
FM 3-19.4
instead of having the entire element move as a unit from
point to point. This reduces the chances of being spotted.
6-10. After the objective has been reconnoitered for the
details outlined in the order, all elements return to the
ORP. Teams share their information, consolidate it, and
report it, then return to the patrol HQ or continue to the
next mission.
ZONE RECONNAISSANCE
6-11. A zone reconnaissance is a directed effort to obtain
detailed information concerning all routes, obstacles (to
include chemical or radiological contamination), terrain,
and enemy forces within a zone defined by boundaries. A
zone reconnaissance is normally assigned when the
enemy situation is vague or information concerning
c r o s s - c o u n t r y t r a f f i c a b i l i t y i s d e s i r e d . Z o n e
reconnaissance techniques include the use of moving
e l e m e n t s, s t a t i o n a r y t e a m s , o r a s e r i e s o f a r ea
reconnaissance actions. Refer to FM 7-8 and FM 17-98.
6 - 1 2 . T h e f o u r m e t h o d s u s e d to c o n d u c t a z o n e
reconnaissance are—
•
Box method.
•
Fan method.
•
Converging routes method.
•
Successive sector method.
Box Method
6-13. To use the box method (Figure 6-1), the leader
sends his reconnaissance and security teams from the
ORP along the routes that form a boxed-in area. He
sends other teams along routes through the area within
the box. All teams meet at a linkup point at the far side
of the box from the ORP.
6-4 Area Security
FM 3-19.4
ORP
(Next)
ORP
Team 2
Team 1
Team 3
ORP
Figure 6-1. Box Method of Zone Reconnaissance
Fan Method
6-14. To use the fan method (Figure 6-2, page 6-6), the
platoon leaders selects a series of ORPs throughout the
zone. At the first ORP halt and set up security. After
confirmation of the patrol’s location, the platoon leaders
selects reconnaissance routes out from and back to the
ORP.
NOTE: These routes form a fan-shaped pattern
around the ORP. They must overlap to ensure that
the entire area has been reconnoitered.
6-15. Once the routes have been selected, send out
reconnaissance elements along the routes. Do not send
out all the elements at once. The platoon leader keeps a
reserve at the ORP. He sends elements out on adjacent
Area Security 6-5
FM 3-19.4
ORP
(Next)
ORP
ORP
(Previous)
Figure 6-2. Fan Method of Zone Reconnaissance
routes to keep from making contact in two different
directions.
6-16. After the entire area (fan) has been reconnoitered,
report the information then move the patrol to the next
ORP. Repeat this action at each successive ORP.
Converging-Routes Method
6-17. To use the converging-routes method (Figure 6-3)
(which incorporates the fan method), select an ORP and
reconna issa nce routes through the zone and the
rendezvous point.
NOTE: The rendezvous point is a place where
patrol members link up after the reconnaissance.
6-18. Halt the patrol at the ORP and set up security.
Confirm the patrol’s location. Designate a route for each
6-6 Area Security
FM 3-19.4
Team 3
Team 2
Team 1
ORP
Figure 6-3. Converging Routes Method of Zone Reconnaissance
reconnaissance element, a location for the rendezvous,
and a linkup time at the rendezvous point. Send a
reconnaissance element to reconnoiter each route
(usually using the fan method). The leader moves with
the center element.
6-19. At linkup, the patrol secures the rendezvous point
as it did the ORP. While at the rendezvous point,
information gained by each member is exchanged with
all the other members. This provides backup to ensure
that all information is passed onto higher HQ. The
patrol then returns to friendly lines or continues on to
another mission.
Successive-Sector Method
6-20. To use the successive-sector method (Figure 6-4,
page 6-8), build on the converging-routes method. Select
Area Security 6-7
FM 3-19.4
an ORP and a series of reconnaissance routes and
rendezvous points. Use the converging-routes method
from each ORP to each rendezvous point.
ORP
ORP
ORP
Team 2
Team 3
Team 1
ORP
ORP
Figure 6-4. Successive Sector Method of Zone Reconnaissance
6-21. Each rendezvous point becomes the ORP for the
next phase. Designate reconnaissance routes, a linkup
time, and the next rendezvous point when the patrol
links up at the rendezvous point. Continue this action
until the entire zone has been reconnoitered.
6-22. Regardless of the type of method used, report the
information through proper MP channels as soon as pos-
sible. Commanders rely on fast, accurate reconnaissance
information to plan successful operations.
6-8 Area Security
FM 3-19.4
SCREENING MISSIONS
6-23. Screening missions are defensive in nature and
largely accomplished by establishing a series of OPs and
conducting patrols to ensure adequate surveillance of
the assigned sector. Division cavalry units normally
conduct security missions that include a screen for
maneuver units during offensive operations.
6-24. MP conduct screening missions for friendly forces
in the rear area to provide early warning of enemy
approach and to provide real-time information and
reaction time for stationary units. In the event of a Level
III threat, MP may come under the OPCON of a TCF,
which is also referred to as a combined-arms maneuver
unit. In this role MP may provide limited security
missions, such as a screen to the flank or rear of the
main body, with the primary mission of providing early
w a r n i n g a n d d i s r u p t i n g o r d e s t r o y i n g e n e m y
reconnaissance vehicles.
6-25. Generally, MP are tasked to observe specific
avenues of approach or, more precisely, NAI. The area to
observe should be identified in either the reconnaissance
and security plan that the platoon leader receives or in
the OPORD from higher HQ. If the platoon does not
receive an IPB product, the higher OPORD must
specifically state where it must focus the screening
o p e r a t i o n . I f t h e p l a t o o n i s a s s i g n e d m u l t i p l e
requirements, the higher HQ must prioritize them.
SURVEILLANCE
6-26. On order, MP maintain continuous surveillance of
all the assigned NAIs or enemy reconnaissance avenues
o f a p p r o a c h i n t o a p a r t i c u l a r s e c t o r . T h i s i s
accomplished by setting up a series of OPs. MP may
c o n d u c t a c t i v e m ou n te d p a tr o l s to ex t e n d t h e i r
observation limits or to cover dead space and the area
between OPs. Refer to Chapter 4 for more information
about setting up OPs/LPs.
Area Security 6-9
FM 3-19.4
6-27. Once the platoon leader understands what his
surveillance requirements are, he task organizes the
platoon and any assigned assets to achieve the most
effective surveillance of the avenue or NAI.
6-28. Unlike a scout platoon, MP focus on providing
early warning of enemy reconnaissance elements rather
than gaining and maintaining contact with the enemy’s
main body or destroying it. During screen missions, it is
important to understand that an MP platoon by itself
does not have enough assets to both acquire and kill an
enemy rec onnaissance larger than the en gaging
element. Generally, other assets will be given the
specific mission of killing these forces. If MP are ordered
to engage enemy forces, they do so by engaging at the
maximum effective range of their organic weapons. If
available, the platoon leader also plans for and uses CAS
and indirect fire.
6-29. During surveillance the platoon’s ability to report
is critical. Effective early warning requires detailed
planning for uninterrupted communications. The
platoon leader considers communication distances and
significant terrain features to identify potential wireless
communication problems. If problems exist, he requests
support from the higher HQ.
COUNTERRECONNAISSANCE
6-30. MP contribute to the commander’s concept of
operations by conducting security and reconnaissance
missions designed to detect, disrupt, and impede enemy
reconnaissance elements. Counterreconnaissance is not
a distinct mission; rather, it is a combination of
measures taken by friendly forces to reduce the threat’s
ability to gather information. It contains both active and
passive elements and includes combat action to destroy
or repel enemy reconnaissance units.
6 - 3 1 . C o u n t e r r e c o n n a i s s a n c e p r e v e n t s e n e m y
reconnaissance forces from observing the main body of
6-10 Area Security
FM 3-19.4
friendly forces by defeating or blocking the enemy forces.
In the execution of counterreconnaissance, MP operate
either offensively or defensively using whatever tactics
best accomplish the mission. The principal techniques
used are—
•
A hasty attack.
•
An ambush.
•
Indirect fire support.
6 - 3 2 . M P m u s t t a s k o r g a n i z e t o d e f e a t e n e m y
r e c o n n a i s s a n c e f o r c e s . E n e m y r e c o n n a i s s a n c e
capabilities in any given situation must be compared to
the MP unit’s capabilities to determine if additional
maneuver or CS assets are required.
6-33. Conventional reconnaissance elements are usually
squad-size or small er. H owever, specia l-purpose
reconnaissance forces can consist of mechanized forces
up to company size. In all counterreconnaissance
operations, the goal is to acquire, identify, and kill the
enemy reconnaissance force after it has penetrated the
initial screen line. Defeating such forces usually
requires combined-arms forces, but this is dependent on
the type, size, and capabilities of the reconnaissance
element.
6-34. MP platoons are not organized or equipped to fight
for extended periods or to destroy enemy armor vehicles.
MP employ AT weapons, such as AT-4s, for defensive
purposes (self-protecti on a nd b reaking contact).
However, MP teams are highly skilled at reconnaissance
and surveillance and providing early warning of enemy
activity.
6-35. A scout platoon acquires and identifies enemy
reconnaissance forces along a screen line, which is a
control measure usually named as a phase line, and is
an established forward of the main body. MP conduct
their counterreconnaissance efforts in a similar manner
Area Security 6-11
FM 3-19.4
in the rear area or anywhere sustainment operations are
taking place.
6-36. In most cases, the scout platoon cannot be
exp ecte d to a c q uir e, id en tif y, and defe a t ene my
reconnaissance elements. As a CS asset, MP can assist a
scout platoon by locating the enemy reconnaissance
element, freeing the scouts or TCF to perform the killing
function of counterreconnaissance on larger mechanized
enemy reconnaissance elements. MP activities that
contribute to counterreconnaissance include—
•
Area reconnaissance.
•
Zone reconnaissance.
•
Route reconnaissance.
•
OP operations.
•
Physical
security
and
vulnerability
risk
assessment.
•
Critical asset security.
•
OPSEC.
•
Deception operations.
6-37. Conventional threat reconnaissance elements
push far out in front of their combat unit to gain
intelligence on their rear area objective. Unconventional
threats such as terrorists, criminals, or gangs may try to
observe installations, deep-water ports, or other
facilities to obtain information. Conventional threat
reconnaissance efforts are concentrated on gaining
in telligence on the capability of friendly forc es.
Unconventional threats try to obtain information to plan
sabotage or criminal activity, or to simply disrupt the
efforts of friendly forces.
6-38. MP leaders plan measures to counter enemy
reconnaissance by coordinating with various staff
sections and agencies that include—
•
MI for information on enemy capabilities, likely
rear area targets and objectives, likely enemy
reconnaissance avenues of approach, and the
6-12 Area Security
FM 3-19.4
commander's critical information requirements
(CCIR).
•
The PM and criminal investigation division
(CID) for HN police information on local gangs,
known criminals, and criminal activity.
6 - 3 9 . T o
a s s i s t
c o m m a n d e r s
w i t h
t h e i r
counterreconnaissance efforts, friendly forces such as
MP, CID, engineers, and MI conduct physical security
surveys and vulnerability and risk assessments of bases
and base clusters, deep-water ports, and air bases. They
advise commanders of these facilities on security
measures designed to prevent the threat from gaining
access to friendly forces and facilities.
6 -4 0 . D ur in g A S mi s s i o n s , M P con duc t se c uri t y
a c t i v i t i e s a r o u n d N A I ; c r i t i c a l a s s e t s , s u c h a s
communications nodes; and air bases. MP perform area
and zone reconnaissance of all terrain that dominates
critical facilities. They concentrate their efforts on
locating enemy reconnaissance forces. MP deny the
enemy the opportunity to observe friendly forces by
reporting their location, maintaining surveillance, and
assisting in their destruction if required.
6-41. Enemy reconnaissance forces are not likely to use
primary reconnaissance avenues of approach to gather
information on friendly forces. MP teams are more likely
to come in contact with enemy reconnaissance forces
operating on trails, rough terrain, and dead space that
allows mounted movement. They use the cover of
darkness for their operations. MP must make maximum
use of NVDs and illumination to help detect their
movement. They put the devices on key terrain and
along avenues of approach to critical bases, and cover
t h e a r e a w i t h c r e w - s e r v e d w e a p o n s . E n e m y
reconnaissance teams are most vulnerable during the
day. MP concentrate daytime mounted or dismounted
operations on locating their base camp or hide positions.
Area Security 6-13
FM 3-19.4
Once they are discovered, if ordered to do so, MP can lay
ambushes on likely routes to destroy them. Refer to
Chapter 4 for more information about ambush patrols.
6-42. Mounted MP patrols use overlapping search
techniques to make it difficult for enemy reconnaissance
teams to reach their objectives without being exposed.
Overlapping searches provide random coverage not
easily predictable by simple observation.
6-43. If contact is made, MP may b e d ir ected to
maintain contact or surveillance until enough force can
be assembled to counter the threat. They disrupt their
movement and delay them until a large enough force is
available to defeat them. If directed to disrupt or delay,
they clearly identify the enemy before engaging them;
there are generally numerous friendly forces operating
in the rear area. MP must consider fratricide preventive
measures. Refer to Appendix F for more information
about fratricide avoidance.
6-44. MP make good use of terrain and maximum use of
weapon systems. They use harassing fire from mounted
crew-served weapons (MK19/M2), but do not become
decisively engaged. They deceive the enemy with heavy
harassing fire from crew-served weapons. If available,
MP destroy the threat with indirect fire. MP make the
threat believe he has encountered a defense. The enemy
must not realize these actions are only delaying tactics.
AREA DAMAGE CONTROL
6-45. ADC is basic to successful rear-area operations.
ADC measures are taken before, during, and after
hostile actions or natural or man-made disasters to
minimize effects and reduce damage. All commanders
try to limit the impact of enemy actions and reestablish
unit operations as quickly as possible. Commanders at
each level plan ADC operations.
6-14 Area Security
FM 3-19.4
6-46. ADC operations integrate the functions of many
specialized units. Engineers plan and coordinate ADC
operations at the site. Medical teams help sort and treat
mass casualties and assist in initial evacuations. Army
aviators help evacuate casualties and provide emergency
resupply, communications relay operations, area
damage assessment, and C2 actions. MP expedite and
control battlefield movement into, around, or through
damaged or contaminated areas. Signal elements
reestablish the signal system. HN civil efforts, like
clearing rubble and providing facilities and services, can
greatly aid ADC.
6-47. The amount of MP support needed for ADC
depends on the extent of the damage, the importance of
the affected area, and the effect of the damage on the
movement of troops and logistical supplies. Enemy
attacks on key military facilities can leave them
unprotected. Heavy damage in urban civilian areas can
disrupt local government services.
NO TE: Protec ting c ivilian fac ilities is a HN
responsibility. However, MP preserve law and
order in such an area if so doing protects friendly
forces and resources.
6-4 8. Route and a rea r ec onna issance are key to
determining the trafficability of the routes into, out of,
a n d a r o u n d a f f e c t e d a r e a s ; o b t a i n i ng a d a m a g e
assessment, and having early warning of the continued
presence of the enemy. MP determine the level and
extent of NBC contamination and identify the location of
critical points affected by damage.
6-49. The enemy's damage to the terrain determines the
degree and kind of MP support needed and where to
place the priority of effort. Downed trees, urban rubble,
damaged or destroyed bridges, cratered roads, and
contaminated road networks affect circulation control. If
the roads can be traveled, MP provide circulation control
operations locally in the affected area. However, damage
Area Security 6-15
FM 3-19.4
to an area may be so great that roads must be closed and
MSR traffic rerouted.
6-50. MP give priority of movement to ambulances
transporting wounded and engineers clearing debris.
They maintain law and order in the affected area by
employing measures to stop looting and unlawful
behavior, according to the ROE and the use of force
requirements. They disseminate key information such
as the location of first aid stations, emergency shelters,
and other emergency facilities.
6-51. Security patrols may be needed around key
facilities. MP may need to set up an OPs/LPs to observe
sectors of the affected area. The OP/LP teams can watch
for enemy agents trying to exploit the effects of a
conventional attack through arson, sniper fire on
firefighters, or other disruptive acts. The OPs/LPs also
watch for theft, pilferage, or arson against military
property.
6-52. MP ADC operations may be either part of an
ongoing operation or a separate requirement. During
ADC, MP—
•
Perform route and area reconnaissance in
affected areas.
•
Evaluate the serviceability of the road network.
•
Note and report the development of critical
points caused by damage to bridges, tunnels,
and the like.
•
Monitor the flow of DCs from the damaged area.
•
Report and block off affected areas.
•
Provide AS for involved critical facilities.
•
Reroute battlefield movement to alternate road
networks.
•
Check
for
and
report
NBC
hazards
and
contamination.
•
Prevent sabotage, looting, and pilferage in the
damaged area.
6-16 Area Security
FM 3-19.4
•
Protect property, contain panic, and enforce
emergency restrictions.
•
Direct persons to first aid stations, emergency
shelters, and other emergency operations.
•
Post temporary signs to prevent entry into
u n s a f e b u i l d i n g s o r r e d i r e c t a c t i v i t y t o
temporary locations.
•
Help establish populace control in affected
areas.
•
Operate
mounted
and
dismounted
mobile
patrols, checkpoints, and roadblocks to—
в–
Enforce emergency restrictions on move-
ment into, within, and out of the affected
area.
в–
Direct DCs.
в–
Collect stragglers.
в–
Enforce curfews, stand-fast orders, and
movement authorizations.
BASE DEFENSE
6-53. Base defense is the local military measures, both
normal and emergency, required to nullify or reduce the
effectiveness of enemy attacks on, or sabotage of, a base
to ensure that the maximum capacity of its facility is
available to friendly forces.
6-54. The base commander organizes and controls the
forces assigned to a base to best capitalize on their
capabilities. These forces may be joint or single-service
forces operating in the joint rear area (JRA). If a base,
base cluster, or air base comes under attack, the base
commander responds within his capability. Defense
fundamentals, as they pertain to the defense of the
bases, include the following:
•
Understand the enemy. Defenders must be
familiar with the capabilities and limitations of
Area Security 6-17
FM 3-19.4
the enemy forces, weapons, equipment, and
tactics.
•
Use situational awareness. Intelligence opera-
tions are key to assembling an accurate picture
of the battle space.
•
Use the defender’s advantages. The defender’s
advantages may permit a numerically inferior
f o r c e t o d e f e a t a m u c h l a r g e r o n e . T h e s e
advantages include—
в–
The ability to fight from cover.
в–
A more detailed knowledge of the local
terrain and environment.
в–
The ability to prepare positions, routes
between them, obstacles, and fields of fire in
advance.
в–
The ability to plan communications, control
measures, indirect fires, and logistic support
for contingency operations.
в–
The ability to deceive enemy forces about
friendly defensive capabilities, dispositions,
and execution of operations.
•
Concentrate
at
critical
times
and
places.
Conduct the defense of a base along interior
l i n e s , p e r m i t t i n g t h e t i m e l y a n d s e c u r e
movement of forces to engage the most critical
threats. The commander must mass combat
power at points of decision by economizing in
s o m e a r e a s , r e t a i n i n g a r e s e r v e , a n d
maneuvering to gain local superiority at critical
points.
•
Conduct counterreconnaissance and counterat-
tacks. Fixed bases have well-established perime-
t e r s t h a t u s u a l l y h a v e l i m i t e d d e p t h .
Counterreconnaissance and counterattack add
depth to the battle, outside the perimeter, allow-
ing the base to continue its primary mission with
minimal interference.
6-18 Area Security
FM 3-19.4
•
Extend counterreconnaissance patrols 3 to 5
kilometers outside the perimeter, based on
terrain. This reduces the risk of fratricide,
especially at night.
•
Coordinate critical defense assets. Synchroniza-
tion of indirect fires, air defense resources, tacti-
cal aircraft, engineers, dismounted troops,
armored vehicles, naval surface fire support, and
helicopters can produce a combined-arms effect.
•
Balance base security with political and legal
constraints. This fundamental is especially
critical in a low-intensity conflict environment.
•
Know
the
law
of
war
and
ROE.
Base
comma nders and their sub ordinates must
comply with ROE. In joint-service operations,
reconcile inconsistencies with ROE.
6-55. A base or base cluster has certain inherent
capabilities which allows it a degree of defense. Each
b a s e h a s a B D O C t h a t p l a n s , c o o r d i n a t e s , a n d
supervises base defense operations. The BDOC initiates
contingency planning that enables the base to—
•
Increase the manning posture of the base as the
threat level increases.
•
Detect
and
defeat
the
threat
within
its
capabilities.
•
Defend against heavier enemy forces until the
response force is committed.
•
Maintain control of the fight within the base.
•
Support the fire and movement of the response
force operating outside the base.
6-56. Each base cluster has a BCOC to monitor base
defense plans and establish the base cluster response
force. The BCOC—
•
Provides C2 of resources for planning, coordinat-
ing, and supervising the defense of the base clus-
ter.
Area Security 6-19
FM 3-19.4
•
Coordinates base defense operations.
•
Maintains communications with the BDOC
within the cluster, MP, and the supporting
RAOC.
6-57. MP leaders plan for the interface of their support
into the base plan. The plan requires—
•
Cover
and
concealment
of
personnel
and
equipment.
•
Secure and redundant communications systems
at all guard locations (a landline, radio links to
the BDOC, and a telephone hookup to the center
switch).
•
Deception.
•
Contingency planning.
•
Improvement of base defense positions.
•
Coordination with BCOC or RAOC as required.
•
OPs/LPs.
•
Noise and light discipline.
•
Immediate reaction to enemy threat or attack.
•
Rehearsals of defense measures.
6-58. All plans and overlays depicting MP support are
forwarded through normal MP channels to the BCOC.
6-59. Any threat to the bases must be dealt with swiftly.
Few sustainment units can continue their mission while
under attack by even a low-level threat.
6-60. Sustaining operations rely on MP to stay apprised
of e nem y a c ti vi ty n ea r b a se s. MP fo rw a rd ea rl y
warnings of enemy activity to the operations cell at the
rear CP. The rear-operations cell immediately notifies
the subordinate RAOC and the base and base clusters. It
may also alert the response force.
6-61. If a base or base cluster comes under attack, the
base commander responds within his capabil ity.
However, interruptions of base sustainment operations
6-20 Area Security
FM 3-19.4
must be kept to an absolute minimum. If a threat
exceeds a base's ability to defeat it, the base commander
requests response force support.
DANGER
Base defense forces must be aware of the disposition of
other friendly forces in front of them. Fire discipline
between the response force, mobile reserve, and TCF is
imperative. Positive control must be maintained at all
times.
AIR BASE DEFENSE
6-62. The Army is responsible for defending air assets
from ground threats outside the boundary of the air base
and its area of responsibility (AOR). ABD forces are
tasked to defend particularly critical air bases. They
may be forces operating in the area specifically on call
for ABD or they may be the rear-area response force.
6-63. Air Force security forces (AFSF) are responsible
for the internal security of US air bases. HN and US
Army forces are primarily responsible for external
defense of US air bases. Given the size of an air base and
the high priority as a threat target, providing ABD as a
dedicated asset requires a force larger than a company.
MP do not have the force structure to be dedicated solely
to ABD operations. However, an echelon commander
could decide to redirect MP mission priorities to ABD
and deploy his limited MP assets to serve as part of a
larger composite force, such as a TCF. Or an MP
response force may be required to respond to threats
beyond the base’s capabilities.
6-64. MP operating as part of a larger ABD force may
provide support that includes —
•
Setting up roadblocks and checkpoints to limit
access to the base.
Area Security 6-21
FM 3-19.4
•
Occupying OPs/LPs and fighting positions on
key terrain and likely avenues of approach to the
air base.
•
Conducting screening missions.
•
Conducting
combat
patrols
(security
and
ambush).
•
Conducting DC operations.
6-65. A typical ABD layout consists of a base perimeter
that surrounds the runway and the facilities that
support air base operations. The tactical perimeter of a
base is the outer most ABD tactical AOR. It is where
defense forces cover, patrol, or occupy likely avenues of
approach to the base and other key terrain. Figure 6-5
shows a typical ABD layout.
USAF tactical perimeter
OP
l
P
ro
USAF AOR
a
a
t
at a
r r
e ol
P
a
are
Army/
foreign
nation
Army/
OP
AOR
OP
foreign
nation
Patrol
AOR
area
Base Perimeter Fence
Patrol
USAF AOR
area
OP
USAF tactical perimeter
Figure 6-5. Typical ABD Layout
6-22 Area Security
FM 3-19.4
6-66. Commanders develop unit SOPs and contingency
plans for ABD. SOPs should address C2 and fire support
issues that are different for ABD. However, AS plans for
ABD provide for increased security patrols and static
security measures around an air base the same as they
would for other critical facilities.
6-67. The depth of the defense area surrounding the air
base depends on METT-TC and other defensive planning
f a c t o r s . M P a c t i v i t i e s t h a t s u p p o r t A B D a r e
concentrated in the tactical perimeter and on key terrain
adjacent to the tactical perimeter.
FIRE SUPPORT
6-68. Organic AFSF fire assets typically available are
the M29 81-millimeter mortar, the MK19, and the M2
.50 caliber machine gun (MG). These fire systems are
incorporated into the base defense plan for both the
security force (SF) and MP. This ensures compatibility
with all ABD measures in the surrounding area and
mutual support to other bases when practical.
6-69. The use of mortars and other indirect-fire weapons
located in the defense area is coordinated through a 5-
man FDC located at the air base BDOC. The AFSF
primarily uses its mortars for illumination, suppression
of enemy indirect-fire weapons, and suppression of
enemy surface-to-air missile (SAM) capability. AFSF
weapons controlled by the FDC vary. The number of
weapons available depends on the size of the air base.
6-70. CAS is obtained from aircraft at the base. Aircraft
may be sent aloft to provide CAS or targets may be
assigned to aircraft already airborne. CAS provides
suppressive fire or increased detection capabilities.
Among the CAS aircraft that may be available, the AC-
130 Spectre gunship and the A-10 Thunderbolt II both
have night-flying capability. Both have compatible
frequency modulated/modulation communications
equipment. Both are especially effective for use against
Area Security 6-23
FM 3-19.4
targets considered danger close to ABD forces. However,
they are very susceptible to SAM.
DANGER
ABD forces must be aware of the disposition of other
friendly forces in front of them. Fire discipline between
AFSFs response forces, mobile reserves, and the TCF is
imperative. Positive control must be maintained at all
times.
COMMUNICATIONS
6-71. Joint communications for all forces supporting
ABD must be compatible. Communications must be
secure, have redundancy, and possess the ability to
integrate all security forces.
6-72. Effective coordination must be an ongoing process.
Call signs, frequencies, and SOI are exchanged between
all joint, combined, and coalition forces supporting ABD.
MILITARY POLICE RESPONSE TO AIR BASE DEFENSE
6-73. Air bases are normally located in the rear area.
Threats that are beyond the capability of the base may
require the deployment of an MP response force. In
general, the response force responds to an air base the
same as any other base or base cluster. However, as a
joint service operation there are C2 and fire support
differences. Company and platoon tactical SOPs for ABD
should be developed to help speed the response time.
6-74. The response force leader coordinates with the Air
Force defense force commander (DFC) for the current
tactical situation and threat. When committed, the MP
response force may transition to the operational control
of the DFC. This ensures that MP actions do not
interfere with air sorties being generated by the air base
commander.
6-75. The DFC is in charge of all aspects of ABD
operations. He provides guidance on where the response
6-24 Area Security
FM 3-19.4
force is needed and informs the response force leader of
the tactical situation. The response force leader directs
the tactical operations of MP elements, keeping the DCF
informed. If a TCF must be called to defeat a Level III
threat, all units, Air Force and Army, are under the
OPCON of the TCF commander until the threat is
defeated.
6-76. For the local ground defense of their base, the Air
Force provides a BDOC which operates similar to an
Army BDOC. It is responsible for combat intelligence,
c o m b a t o p e r a t i o n s , l o g i s t i c s , a n d p e r s o n n e l
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . I t c o l l e c t s t h e g r o u n d c o m b a t
intelligence within the ABD area.
6-77. The AFSF maintains a mobile reserve force. The
mobile reserve’s purpose is to mass enough firepower to
destroy threat forces within the air base boundary or, at
least, delay the threat until a larger force can be
assembled. The mobile reserve is usually a mounted
force. It is under the direct control of the BDOC. The
mobile reserve tries to contain any direct landing by
threat forces on the airfield. It responds to penetrations
of the defense area by forces that have managed to elude
external defense forces.
6-78. If the enemy penetrates deeply into the defense
area, the response force leader can request that the
BDOC commit the mobile reserve to battle. This may
prevent the premature commitment of the TCF. Contact
points and AAs are established around the base to assist
in integrating the mob ile reserve during combat
operations outside the ground defense area.
6-79. The response force must keep the enemy from
destroying resources on the ground and interrupting or
stopping air operations.
Area Security 6-25
FM 3-19.4
Night Operations
6-80. Air bases are most vulnerable when visibility is
limited. In response to the threat, the bulk of both
internal and external ABD operations must be dedicated
to detecting threat forces during periods of limited
visibility. The large gaps between defensive positions
facilitate enemy infiltration through external defenses.
To narrow these gaps during limited visibility, external
defensive efforts may have to be set up closer to the
perimeter. External defensive efforts should integrate
the extensive use of—
•
Night vision equipment.
•
Reconnaissance and surveillance.
•
Electronic detection devices.
•
Tactical deception.
•
OPs/LPs.
Water Obstacles
6-81. Many air bases border water obstacles. Air bases
located next to rivers, lakes, or oceans provide unique
ABD problems. Threat efforts directed against an air
base from the water include infiltration, reconnaissance,
and standoff-weapons attacks. As a result, water
obstacles that penetrate the defense area may require
ABD forces to set up continuous battle positions between
the water and any critical air base facility near the
water. ABD obstacle plans should include fences, mines,
and sensor em ployment along the porti on of the
perimeter tha t borders water . Pl anned fires are
coordinated to defeat watercraft. Floating expedient
barricades may have to be assembled. Warning buoys
s h o u l d a l s o b e a n c h o r e d o f f s h o r e . U n d e r w a t e r
approaches provide excellent avenues to air bases. They
must be considered during ABD planning. Joint support
from the Navy and the Coast Guard may also be needed.
6-26 Area Security
FM 3-19.4
Urban Terrain
6-82. Air bases bordered by urban areas pose a special
challenge for ABD operations. Increased security is a
n e c e s s i t y . M P m u s t b e a w a r e o f u n d e r g r o u n d
approaches, such as sewers, that could bypass defensive
positions. Threat forces, saboteurs, and special-purpose
forces will use these avenues of approach to gain access
to the air base.
6-83. Infiltrating groups will be very difficult to detect
because they avoid direct confrontation and usually
move at night. These teams have the greatest potential
for disrupting air operations throughout the rear area.
CHECKPOINTS AND ROADBLOCKS
6-84. Checkpoints and roadblocks are set up to control
the movement of vehicles, personnel, and material and
prevent illegal actions or actions that aid the enemy.
They are used to prevent trafficking in contraband and
stop the movement of known or suspected belligerents.
Checkpoint and roadblock operations contribute to the
commander’s information and intelligence collection
process. Additionally, they assist friendly forces in
detecting and establishing the behavioral patterns of the
local populace.
6-85. When conducted improperly, checkpoints and
roadblocks can foster resentment toward US forces. MP
minimize the negative impact that checkpoints and
roadblocks may have by treating local nationals with
dignity and respect. Whenever possible, checkpoints and
roadblocks should be conducted with interpreters, HN
police, or other HN authorities.
6-86. In most stability and support operations there
exists the potential for threat forces to attempt to
e x e r c i s e s o m e l e v e l o f f o r c e a g a i n s t U S f o r c e s .
Checkpoints and roadblocks may become prime targets
for threat forces (both traditional and nontraditional).
Area Security 6-27
FM 3-19.4
METT-TC determines the level of self-protection needed
at a checkpoint or roadblock. However, MP leaders must
always plan force protection measures that allow their
forces to quickly implement adequate self-defense when
threatened.
6-87. Checkpoints and roadblocks must be designed so
that potential threat forces are discouraged from
attempting to disrupt its operation or try to inflict
casualties. MP use armored vehicles whenever possible
to su pp or t the d i sm oun ted tro ops o per ating the
checkpoint or roadblock. The MP security element
assigned to protect the site should have an antiarmor
capability. The vehicle search area should be located in
an area that provides blast protection.
Checkpoints
6-88. Checkpoints are part of a police action. As such,
the ROE and the use of deadly force must be clearly
understood by all soldiers participating in the operation.
M P u s e t h e m i n i m u m i n t r u s i o n a n d i m p o s i ti o n
necessary to accomplish the mission and protect the
force. They allow for a vehicle escape route and plan to
destroy a hostile element who uses it. If the checkpoint
is completely sealed off, an enemy will have to penetrate
it by attempting to run over the barricades. This puts
the search team in a position to have to defend itself and
fight back.
6 - 8 9 . M P e s t a b l i s h a n d o p e r a t e t w o t y p e s o f
checkpoints—deliberate and hasty.
6-90. Deliberate Checkpoint. A deliberate checkpoint
is a fixed position set up on a main road in a rural or
built-up area. It can be classified as either a heavy- or
light-traffic checkpoint, depending on how much traffic
is expected to pass through it. A heavy-traffic deliberate
checkpoint normally requires a platoon. An MP squad
6-28 Area Security
FM 3-19.4
can only operate a light-traffic checkpoint for a short
duration (12 hours or less).
6-91. To operate a heavy-traffic checkpoint, task
organize the platoon into—
•
A HQ element. The HQ element is responsible
for C2 and maintaining communications with
subordinate elements and higher HQ.
•
A security element. The security element is an
MP squad that provides early warning to the
search and assault element, watches for and
reports suspicious activity, and monitors traffic
flow up to and through the checkpoint. The
security element should have an antiarmor
capability to protect the site from an enemy
armor threat.
•
A search element. The search element is an MP
squad that halts vehicles at the checkpoint,
guides them to the designated search point,
conducts personnel and vehicle searches, and
d i r e c t s c l e a r e d v e h i c l e s o n t h r o u g h t h e
checkpoint.
•
An assault element. The assault element is an
MP squad responsible for destroying (consistent
with the ROE) any hostile element that forces its
way past the search team. The squad leader
places his soldiers beyond the search point and
emplaced zigzag obstacles and barriers. The
soldiers prepare and occupy fortified fighting
positions. When confronted by a threatening
vehicle, the search element gets out of the way
and allows the vehicle to pass. The vehicle
passes through the escape lane, and the assault
element makes the decision whether to engage
or not. If the assault element has to engage, the
battle will occur away from the checkpoint. This
reduces the possibility of fratricide to friendly
forces or injury to innocent civilians.
Area Security 6-29
FM 3-19.4
6-92. In smaller checkpoint operations, a squad can be
organized in a similar fashion. MP elements use
h a n d h e l d p o r t a b l e r a d i o s , i f a v a i l a b l e , o r w i r e
communications. However, much of the needed signals
at a checkpoint or roadblock can be easily accomplished
using arm and hand signals.
6-93. A deliberate checkpoint is organized into sections
( F i g u r e 6 - 6 ) . T h e p h y s i c a l l a y o u t a n d d e t a i l o f preparation depend on the amount of traffic that will
pass through it and the duration of its operation.
Normally, a deliberate checkpoint will require engineer
support to construct obstacles, barriers, escape lanes,
and possibly fighting positions. All checkpoints consists
of—
•
Obstacles or barriers.
•
Search areas (personnel and vehicle).
•
Security overwatch and fighting positions.
•
Holding areas.
E
D
A
F
B
C
C
A. Vehicle search area
B. Female search area
C. Obstacle barrier
D. Overwatch positions
D
E. Reaction force
F. Detention area
Figure 6-6. Deliberate Checkpoint
6-30 Area Security
FM 3-19.4
6-94. Hasty Checkpoint. MP set up hasty checkpoints
to achieve surprise. They are temporary and should be
moved often. The materials used to construct these
checkpoints are carried by the platoon. The platoon or
squad uses its vehicles, reinforced with concertina wire,
as the obstacle. MP may employ tire deflation devices or
road spike stripes. These devices are more effective than
concertina wire and may be less intrusive in peace
operations. They are commercially available or can be
locally fabricated.
6-95. MP position the vehicles to partially block the
route (Figure 6-7). MP conduct the search in the area
MP teams
overwatch
checkpoint
Search team
Sentry
Sentry
Search
Search team
area
MP teams
overwatch
checkpoint
Figure 6-7. Hasty Checkpoint
Area Security 6-31
FM 3-19.4
between the vehicles. MP are positioned at each end of
the chec kpoint. Th ey c over them by mou nted or
dismounted automatic weapon positions. MP conceal a
reaction force (at least one team) nearby to react in case
the site is attacked.
6-96. MP establish hasty checkpoints where they cannot
be seen by approaching traffic until it is too late to
withdraw. Good locations to set up hasty checkpoints
include—
•
Bridges.
•
Defiles.
•
Highway intersections.
•
The reverse slope of a hill.
•
Just beyond a sharp curve
6-97. Vehicle Searches. Two members of the search
team position themselves at both rear flanks of the
vehicle undergoing a search, putting the occupants at a
disadvantage. These soldiers maintain eye contact with
the occupants once they exit the vehicle and react to any
threat attempts by the occupants during the vehicle
search.
6-98. The actual search is conducted by two MP armed
with pistols only. One MP conducts interior searches
and the other performs exterior searches. They instruct
the occupants to exit the vehicle during the interior
search and instruct the driver to watch the vehicle
search. Once the interior search is complete, they escort
the driver to the hood of the vehicle and instruct him to
open it. On ce the en gin e com par tmen t h as been
examined, they instruct the driver to open the other
outside compartments (tool boxes, gas caps, trunks, and
so forth). The driver removes any loose items that are
not attached to the vehicle for inspection. Members of
the search team rotate positions to allow for mental
breaks.
6-32 Area Security
FM 3-19.4
6-99. MP use MWD teams, mirrors, and metal detectors
to t h o r o u g h l y s e a r c h ea c h v e h i c l e f o r w e a p o n s ,
ex p l o s i v es , a m m u n i t i o n, a n d ot h er c o n tr a b a n d .
Depending on the threat level, the vehicle search area
provides blast protection for the surrounding area.
6-100. Personnel Searches. MP may be required to
conduct personnel searches at the checkpoints. Every
attempt should be made for HN authorities to conduct,
o r a t l ea s t o b s e r v e, s e a r ch e s of l o c a l n a t i o n a l s .
Additionally, MP leaders must plan for same-gender
searches. Personnel searches are conducted only when
proper authorization has been obtained, usually from
higher HQ, according to the ROE, Status of Forces
Agreement (SOFA), or HN agreements. This does not
preclude MP from searching individuals that pose a
threat to US or other friendly forces.
6-101. MP may have to detain local nationals who
become belligerent or uncooperative at the checkpoints.
The OPORD and the ROE must address the handling of
such personnel. In any case, self-protection measures
should be planned and implemented according to the
orders from higher HQ.
6-102. Searches of local nationals should be performed
in a manner that preserves the respect and dignity of
the individual. Special consideration must be given to
local customs and national cultural differences. In many
cultures it is offensive for men to touch or even talk to
women in public. Searchers must be polite, considerate,
patient, and tactful. MP leaders must make every effort
not to unnecessarily offend the local population. Such
situations can have a very negative impact on peace
operations and can quickly change popular opinion
toward US and other friendly forces.
6-103. Each captive is searched for weapons and
ammunition, items of intelligence value, and other
inappropriate items.
Area Security 6-33
FM 3-19.4
NOTE: When possible, conduct same gender
s e a r c h e s ; h o w e v e r , t h i s m a y n o t a lw a y s b e
possible due to speed and security considerations.
Therefore, perform mixed gender searches in a
respectful manner using all possible measures to
prevent any action that could be interpreted as
s e x u a l m o l e s t a t i o n o r a s s a u l t . T h e o n - s i t e
supervisor carefully controls soldiers doing
mixed-gender searches to prevent allegations of
sexual misconduct.
6-104. MP conduct individual searches in search teams
that consist of the following:
•
A searcher. A searcher is the MP that actually
conducts the search. He is in the highest-risk
position.
•
Security. Security includes at least one MP to
provide security. He maintains eye contact with
the individual being searched.
•
An observer. The observer is a MP leader that
has supervisory control of the search operation.
He also provides early warning for the other
members of the team.
6-105. The two most common methods that are used to
conduct individual searches are the frisk search and the
wall search.
•
Frisk
search.
This
method
is
quick
and
ade q uate to d etec t w eap ons , evid en ce , or
contraband. However, it is more dangerous
because the searcher has less control of the
individual being searched.
•
Wall search. This method affords more safety for
the searcher because the individual is searched
in a strained, awkward position. Any upright
surface, such as a wall, vehicle, tree, or fence
may be used.
6-34 Area Security
FM 3-19.4
6 - 1 0 6 . I f m o r e c o n t r o l i s n e e d e d t o s e a r c h a n
uncooperative individual, the search team places the
subject in the kneeling or prone position.
6-107. Strip searches should only be considered when
the individual is suspected of carrying documents or
other contraband on his person. This extreme search
method should be conducted in an enclosed area and by
qualified medical personnel when available.
Additional Checkpoint Considerations
6-108. The effective use of all task organization
elements is vital to the success of checkpoint operations
is. Roles and responsibilities must be well defined and
rehearsed. Additional considerations when conducting
checkpoint operations include—
•
Preparing and emplacing signs in the local
language instructing drivers what to expect and
do at the checkpoint (for example, "You are
entering a military checkpoint. Prepare to stop
your vehicle, and have your identification papers
ready for inspection.").
•
Determining if it is necessary to apprehend or
detain those who see the checkpoint ahead and
turn around to avoid it. If it is, HN police are
r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h i s m i s s i o n , i f t h e y a r e
available. If they are not available, it may be
necessary to position a respond force close to the
approach route to block or detain vehicles that
try to avoid the operation.
•
Clearing and maintaining control of all buildings
and terrain that dominate the checkpoint.
•
Staying alert for any change of scenery around
the checkpoint. A parked car that was not there
before, crowds gathering for no apparent reason,
or th e m edia waitin g fo r an e vent a re all
indicators that something may happen.
Area Security 6-35
FM 3-19.4
•
Using artificial illumination for night opera-
tions, arrange the lighting to keep those passing
through the checkpoint in the light and our
forces in the shadows as much as possible.
6-109. If HN personnel are used to assist, commanders
ensure that they do not represent a national, ethnic, or
religious group of faction feared and hated by the
majority of the local population.
6-110. Leaders avoid setting patterns by moving the
checkpoint location and changing the method of
operation at random.
6-111. MP can gain valuable police, criminal, and
combat information while operating checkpoints. They
use a checklist to standardize the information collection
effort. The following information is included in the
checklist:
•
The number and type of vehicles stopped. Report
identifying markings, license plate number, and
any signs displayed on the vehicle.
•
The number of passengers in the vehicle. Report
the nationality, the ages, and the sex mixes of
passengers.
•
The type and quantity of cargo.
•
The point of origination and destination of the
vehicle.
•
The stated reason for travel by passengers.
•
A description of arms, ammunition, explosives,
and sensitive items found and confiscated from
the vehicle.
•
Possible
or
actual
sightings
of
weapons,
explosives, or threat forces by the passengers.
•
The condition of passengers (general health,
dress, attitude).
•
Anything unusual reported by the passengers.
6-112. When conducting checkpoint operations, MP will
need the support of the following:
6-36 Area Security
FM 3-19.4
•
Engineers to build obstacles and barriers to
channel traffic.
•
Linguists familiar with the local language.
•
A civil affairs officer or HN police.
•
Trained interrogators.
6 - 1 1 3 . S o m e t i m e s M P a r e t a s k e d t o o p e r a t e a
checkpoint to assist convoys of friendly forces. These
checkpoints are set up at the entrance to the controlled
r o u t e a n d w i l l h a v e a v e h i c l e h o l d i n g a r e a t o
accommodate large convoys. Refer to Chapter 5 for more
information about holding areas.
6-114. At the convoy checkpoints, MP check convoy
vehicle movement credits issued by the local movement
control unit to ensure that the convoy is moving on the
correct route at the correct time. When convoys are
ahead of schedule, MP hold them near the checkpoint in
a vehicle holding area until it is their scheduled time to
pass. They allow convoys that are behind schedule to
proceed if route traffic permits and assist drivers who
have taken the wrong route.
Roadblocks
6-115. Roadblocks are set up to stop, slow, or limit
movement of vehicles along a route. They are used to
limit access to certain areas or roads. A roadblock can be
established separate from a checkpoint or used to
channel vehicles and personnel to a checkpoint.
6-116. MP use their vehicles with concertina wire,
barbed wire, and warning signs as a roadblock (Figure 6-8,
page 6-38). If available, armored vehicles make excellent
roadblocks. Place a roadblock where unauthorized
vehicles or enemy personnel cannot bypass it. If
possible, position it so that obstacles like cliffs, swamps,
or rivers restrict movement to its flanks or around it.
Build man-made obstacles to tie in with and reinforce
natural obstacles.
Area Security 6-37
FM 3-19.4
Barrier
Concertina
roadblock
Barrier
Figure 6-8. Roadblock
6-117. When using a roadblock to channel traffic to a
checkpoint, place it where drivers cannot see the
roadblock until after they have passed all possible
turnoffs. When using a roadblock to close off a road,
place it at an intersection to let drivers change to
another route with little delay.
6-118. Select a defendable site for the roadblock. Cover
the roadblock with automatic weapons. Ensure that
defensive positions—
•
Include a fighting position for the crew-served
weapon to provide overwatch for the roadblock.
•
Have fields of fire that cover the approaches to
the roadblock to keep it from being breached.
•
Are not accessible to an attacker and provide
cover and concealment.
•
Are placed at an intersection to let drivers
change to another route with little delay.
6-38 Area Security
FM 3-19.4
•
Are placed near an area where drivers can turn
their vehicles around easily.
RESPONSE FORCE OPERATIONS
6-119. MP response forces may respond to threats to a
base, a base cluster, or an air base and possibly respond
to downed aircraft. MP are normally the commander’s
designated force to respond to attacks beyond the
capabilities of a base or base cluster. The objective of
response force operations is to eliminate the threat or
make the enemy disengage without requiring the
premature commitment of the TCF. MP are organized
and equipped to defeat Level II threats. These threats
exceed base and base cluster self-defense capabilities
but do not require the commitment of a TCF.
6-120. With pr ior c oordi nation and a p prop riate
supporting fires, MP can defeat the following:
•
Small combat units conducting raids, ambushes,
and reconnaissance operations.
•
Unconventional forces conducting diversionary
and sabotage operations.
•
Special
warfare
intelligence
collection
and
operational missions.
6-121. MP response forces are prepared to delay and
disrupt Level III threats, protect the flank of a TCF, or
allow a base time to establish defenses in greater depth.
Plan
6-122. METT-TC, the number of MP available, and the
commander’s intent determine the size of a response
force. Normally, an MP response force requires at least a
f u l l - s t r e n g t h p l a t o o n . H o w e v e r , r e s p o n s e f o r c e
operations conducted in built-up areas or in support of
ABD may require a much larger force. MP platoons are
not organized and equipped to fight for extended
periods. The commander task organizes a platoon for
Area Security 6-39
FM 3-19.4
response force operations. A response force should have
increased antiarmor capability, integrate available fire
support, and have CAS available. The result is a force
capable of causing an enemy to break off its attack. The
response force can then fix and destroy the threat using
close combat techniques and the application of artillery,
Army aviation, and CAS.
6-123. MP must know the terrain and be able to use it
against the enemy. They mass combat power quickly to
destroy the enemy or delay them until a TCF can arrive.
The rear CP fire support element, along with the main
CP fire support cell, establishes procedures by which MP
can call for fire support.
6-124. The response force identifies the location of the
bases within their AO, and must know which bases are
the most critical and which are the most vulnerable.
They include this information in the local IPB. In
coordination with the rear CP operations cell and the
affected RAOC, they position the response force where
they can best—
•
Detect enemy incursions (near the DZ, the LZ,
and the like).
•
Interdict enemy forces enroute to their targets.
•
Consolidate quickly in response to threatened
key assets in the rear area.
6-125. The resp onse fo rce leade r mu st ha ve the
following readily available:
•
The base defense status of each base.
•
Locations of any obstacles or mines near the
base.
•
Locations and direction of fire of the crew-served
weapons.
•
The signal for FPF.
•
Locations of TRPs and preplanned fires.
•
Methods for contacting the BDOC or the BCOC,
to include call signs and frequencies.
6-40 Area Security
FM 3-19.4
•
Locations of the OPs/LPs and friendly patrols if
employed.
•
Call
signs
and
frequencies
for
supporting
artillery and Army aviation units tasked to
respond.
•
Call signs and frequencies for the TCF, RAOC,
and the rear CP.
•
Fire support targets that are on the approved
list.
•
Locations of the nearest medical treatment
facility (MTF), NBC decontamination site, and
ammunition supply point (ASP).
6-126. Continuous communication with the base and
base clusters is the key to knowing how and when an MP
response force is needed. Bases and base clusters
establish 24-hour communications with the RAOC, if
they are located in the corps rear area, or the rear CP, if
they are located in the division. This liaison and
interface allows timely response and information
dissemination.
6-127. The response force will be effective only if it can
react swiftly and is thoroughly familiar with the base
defense plan. They coordinate all response force actions
for a base through its BDOC. (Go through the BCOC for
base clusters.) They coordinate the following with
BDOC:
•
Call signs and frequencies.
•
Base defense plans and layouts.
•
Positions of critical internal assets, external
coordination points, and no-fire areas.
•
Indirect-fire support.
•
Engineer support, if needed, to help prepare
defensive positions or for ADC.
6-128. In coordination with the main CP fire support
cell, the operations cell sets procedures by which MP can
call for fire support.
Area Security 6-41
FM 3-19.4
Execute
6-129. Base response force operations rely heavily on
MP tactical skills. The choice of action is based on
M E T T - T C a n d t h e b a s e c o m m a n d e r ' s t a c t i c a l
assessment. Once a situation develops that requires a
response force, there are several options available to
disrupt or eliminate the threat. Response force options
include the following:
•
Call for fire support to make the enemy break
contact.
•
Attack into the enemy’s flank using the base for
fire support.
•
Use ambushes along likely escape avenues if it is
obvious that the attacking force is not strong
enough to overrun the base.
•
Augment the base's defense forces and provide
support from within a base.
6-130. Once the MP company commander receives the
mi ssion to d ir ect respon se f orce ope ra ti ons, the
company’s main efforts shift to supporting the response
force. The commander conducts a mission analysis and
begins the TLPs, culminating in issuance of an OPORD
and a FRAGO. Refer to Chapter 2 for more information
about TLPs.
6-131. The company HQ coordinates for support that
includes communications, air evacuation, and logistical
support (Class I, III, V, and IX). The company operations
section coordinates with follow-on forces and other
support that includes the following:
•
Fire support to include CAS.
•
The location of adjacent units.
•
The location of threatened friendly forces.
•
The location of noncombatants.
•
Coordination with the TCF.
6-42 Area Security
FM 3-19.4
6-132. Once the platoon leader receives the mission to
conduct response force operations he initiates TLPs.
Normally, the PSG assembles the response force at a
prearranged AA near the base under attack.
6-133. The base commander gives the response force an
objective and a tactical AO. He may designate a small
force to assist the response force. This force would be
under the OPCON of the response force leader.
6-134. Normally, the response force acts as a maneuver
element against the enemy. Once the platoon leader
develops a COA he designates the ORP and selects a
scheme of maneuver. The response force moves to the
ORP, establishes security, and reports its status to
higher HQ. Once the response force has established
communications with the friendly forces under attack,
the platoon leader reconnoiters the area and assesses
the situation. Based on the situation and guidance from
higher HQ the platoon leader may decide to—
•
Request fire support to destroy the enemy.
•
Continue to observe for weaknesses in the
enemy’s flanks.
•
Engage and further develop the situation.
•
Attack and destroy the enemy.
6-135. If the decision is made to call for fire to destroy or
make the enemy break off the attack, the platoon leader
follows the procedures set by the main CP fire support
cell. When available, MP can call for and adjust indirect
fire provided by artillery. Another option is CAS, if there
is a tactical air control party or army aviator trained in
joint air attack team operations. Refer to Chapter 3 for
more information about call for fire and fire support.
Also refer to FM 6-20.
6-136. If the response force is ordered to attack and
destroy the enemy, the platoon leader immediately
prepares the response force for a hasty attack.
Area Security 6-43
FM 3-19.4
6-137. Plan a Hasty Attack. A hasty attack is an
immediate action taken without extensive preparations,
with the resources at hand and, if by so doing, the
attacking element can maintain momentum or take
advantage of the enemy situation.
6 - 1 3 8 . T h e p l a t o o n l e a d e r u s e s f i r e s u p p o r t t o
complement the scheme of maneuver. The goal is to kill
as many enemies as possible and suppress the rest to
keep them from seeing or shooting the maneuver
element as it closes on the objective. The attack plan
includes the use of all available direct and indirect fire.
The response force leader mainly plans and directs the
fire of his organic weapons (MG, M203, AT-4, and
MK19). The fire element's makeup depends on how
much direct-fire support is needed and what support is
to be provided. The initial employment of the fire
element includes the following:
•
Positioning crew-served and M249 weapons on
or near the line of departure (LD), when the
objective and route to it can be seen and covered
by fire.
•
Positioning
some
crew-served
and
M249
weapons on or near the LD and some with the
moving element, when the objective can be seen
and covered by fire from the LD, but only a part
of the route is visible, or when the entire route is
visible from the LD, but the objective is not
visible or is out of range from the LD.
6-139. Plan control measures at the objective and initial
employment of the fire element. If time is available
before moving to the assault position, make a second
reconnaissance to see if the plan needs changing.
6-140. Conduct the Attack. The platoon leader moves
to where he can lead the force and influence the fight.
He moves a fire element into the over watch position and
has the attacking element move from the LD to the
6-44 Area Security
FM 3-19.4
assault position, using covered and concealed positions.
If en route to the objective, the patrol should—
•
Receive indirect fire. Move quickly out of the
impact area to a preset point.
•
Meet obstacles, breach, or bypass them. Report
their location if the obstacles might affect follow-
on units. Take special care when crossing a
danger area like a field, roadway, or creek. Refer
to Chapter 3 for more information about moving
in contact.
•
Meet direct enemy resistance before reaching
the objective and return fire. Call for and adjust
fire on the enemy.
6-141. The platoon leader coordinates action so that the
response force hits the enemy with its full combat power.
He maneuvers the force to strike the enemy’s flank or
rear. The response force engages the hostile element
w i t h t h e a p p r o p r i a t e l e v e l o f f o r c e . H e u s e s
overpowering force on armed combat forces. While in
contact—
•
Immediately assume the best available covered
positions, when moving, and at the same time,
return fire in the direction of the enemy.
•
Locate actual or suspected enemy positions and
engage them with well-aimed fire.
•
Distribute fires evenly over the objective when
no individual positions have been identified.
•
Report
and
monitor
the
situation
and
recommend COAs.
•
Make visual or verbal contact with soldiers on
the left or the right. (Platoon members and team
leaders make frequent visual contact with the
squad leaders. Squad leaders make frequent
visual contact with the platoon leader. Relay all
arm and hand signals from the platoon chain of
command.)
Area Security 6-45
FM 3-19.4
6-142. When resistance is destroyed, the attacking force
continues quickly onward to the assault position. They
deploy on line just before reaching the assault position.
To maintain the momentum, the attacking force passes
through the assault position and attack the objective.
They halt at the assault position only to allow all the
soldiers to come on line to attack at once. The assault
position should be as close to the objective as possible to
prevent needless exposure to enemy fire.
6-143. As the moving element attacks, the fire element
in its overwatch position will cover the attacking
element by shooting at the enemy. Before the attacking
element moves beyond support range, the fire element
moves up to a position from which it can continue its
support and shoot at the enemy.
6-144. With the fire element in overwatch, the platoon
leader (commander) gives the command or signal to open
fire. The fire leader will control the method and the rate
of fire. He and the gunners watch the progress of the
attacking element and engage targets that threaten it.
When crew-served weapons are close together, the fire
leader anticipates the masking of their fire and moves
the weapons one at a time. When those weapons are
separated, each gunner displaces when its fire is masked
or when it can no longer support the attacking element.
The platoon leader (commander) times the displacement
of weapons in a fire element so that the attacking
element has continuous fire support.
6-145. Maneuvering begins when the attacking element
makes contact with the enemy. As the attacking element
maneuvers near the objective, the fire element in
overwatch suppresses the enemy with a high rate of fire.
6 - 14 6 . W h e n t he a t t a c k i ng el e m e n t re a ch e s th e
objective and closes with the enemy, the fire element
walks its fire across the objective in front of the
m a n e u v e r i n g e l e m en t. T h e n i t s h i f ts i t s f i r e t o
6-46 Area Security
FM 3-19.4
supplementary targets (rear of the objective, escape
routes) or lifts its fire to keep from endangering the
attack element. Soldiers in the element closing with the
enemy move singly, by pairs, by teams, by squads, or by
a combination of these, using as much cover as possible.
As they close, they fire on selected targets to suppress
the enemy. Automatic rifles are fired in short bursts
across the forces' front. Rifles, M203s, hand grenades,
bayonets, and MG are used to overcome pockets of
resistance. The advance continues past the objective far
enough to shoot at any withdrawing enemy. Firing
continues until the enemy is killed or captured or
withdraws.
6-147. Once the threat is eliminated, the platoon leader
reconsolidates the response force and assembles it at a
se c u r e r a l l y p oi n t . R e f e r t o C h a p te r 3 f o r m o r e
information about consolidating and reorganizing.
6-148. Conduct an Attack on Urban Terrain. In
military operations in built-up areas, a response force
must be able to find, isolate, and evict the enemy
concealed in hardened structures. Normally, responding
to a threat in a built-up area will call for a larger
response force and should be supported by armored
fighting vehicles. When attacking and clearing a
building in an urban area, try to—
•
Determine and isolate the area around the
objective. In urban terrain it is often hard to
pinpoint the enemy's position.
•
Number the area's buildings and use those
n u m b e r s a s r e f e r e n c e p o i n t s t o c o n t r o l
movement and for clearing operations.
•
Clear buildings from the top down if possible.
•
Retain a reserve force to have the flexibility
essential for urban combat.
Area Security 6-47
FM 3-19.4
6-149. Refer to FM 90-10-1 for information about
attacking on urban terrain.
Respond to Downed Aircraft
6-150. MP are often required to respond to downed
ai rcraft. This specia li zed mi ssi on requ ires cl ose
coordination with aviation assets. In the event of a
downed aircraft, the primary mission is to safeguard the
aircraft, render first aid to the crew, evacuate the
wounded, and secure the crash site. Normally, this
requires MP to be airlifted to the crash site.
6-151. MP leaders plan for downed-aircraft rescue
operations as a contingency mission. The primary
concern is the safety of personnel onboard the aircraft.
The MP leader establishes preplanned lift packages for a
mounted or dismounted platoon-size downed-aircraft
response force. When organized for downed-aircraft
o p e r a t i o n s , t h e f o r c e m u s t m e e t t h e f o l l o w i n g
requirements:
•
Possess cross-country capability.
•
Be prepared to defend the site against Levels I
and II threats.
•
Have internal medical support to treat and
evacuate injured personnel.
6-152. Engineer support may be necessary to clear lanes
t o t h e d o w n e d a i r c r a f t a n d m e d i c a l e v a c u a t i o n
(MEDEVAC) LZs.
6-153. Once the response force arrives at the crash site,
the platoon leader immediately establishes security and
notifies higher HQ of the exact location, the type of
aircraft, and the number of wounded or killed personnel.
Medical personnel treat the injured and prepare them
for evacuation. The platoon leader selects and secures a
MEDEVAC LZ. Once all the injured personnel have
6-48 Area Security
FM 3-19.4
been evacuated, the response force continues to secure
the crash site until relieved.
6-154. Security at the crash site involves MP preventing
the handling or disturbance of the wreckage, theft of any
parts, or compromising evidence such as gouges or
marks on the ground made by the aircraft. Other
security measures include—
•
Preventing all unauthorized access to the site.
This includes media and local authorities.
•
Protecting all civil and military property at the
site.
•
Prohibiting removal of deceased persons until
properly identified by military authorities.
•
Prohibiting the removal of wreckage.
•
Keeping
spectators
and
the
media
at
a
reasonable distance from the site for safety.
6-155. All requests for information will be referred to
the Public Affairs Office (PAO). MP at the scene will not
release information about the crash to the media.
ENEMY DELAY
6-156. A delay is an operation in which a force under
pressure trades space for time by slowing down the
enemy’s momentum and inflicting maximum damage on
the enemy without, in principle, becoming decisively
engaged. Normally a delay operation is unlikely to be
conducted in a sustainment area. However, bypassed
enemy forces could create a situation where a MP
response force may be required to delay a threat to buy
time for a base to establish defenses in greater depth or
to delay an enemy until the arrival of the TCF. MP
deliberately conduct a delay only when directed to do so
by higher HQ. In that case, higher HQ determines the
size of the MP force. In the delay, the destruction of the
enemy force is secondary to slowing his advance to gain
time.
Area Security 6-49
FM 3-19.4
PLAN
6-157. The platoon delays either from successive
positions or from alternate positions. When delaying
from successive positions, the delaying force will fight
rearward from one position to another, holding each
position for a given time or until it becomes decisively
engaged.
6-158. When delaying from alternate positions, the
delaying force will fight rearward with the force
deployed so elements can provide overwatch and
subsequent maneuver. While the forward element is
fighting, the rear element prepares to assume the action.
The forward element disengages. It passes through or
around the rear element to prepare to assume the action
from a position in greater depth. Use the following
methods to delay the enemy (Figure 6-9):
•
Delay forward of a specified line or terrain
feature if you have—
в–
A narrow sector.
в–
Cross-compartment terrain.
в–
An area restrictive to armor and the enemy
can be canalized into a selected area.
в–
Terrain dominating mounted avenues of
approach.
•
Delay from successive positions when you—
в–
Have wide sectors or limited observation,
fields of fire, and visibility.
в–
Have a mobility advantage simultaneously
moving one or two elements at a time.
в–
Are in dangerous sectors.
в–
Lack good defensible terrain in depth.
•
Delay in a sector if you have—
в–
An area of responsibility that cannot be
adequately covered from one battle position.
в–
Multiple enemy avenues of approach.
6-50 Area Security
FM 3-19.4
в–
Limited fields of fire and observation.
•
Delay from alternate positions when —
в–
The sector is narrow or there is long-range
observation and fields of fire.
в–
The enemy is superior in combat power.
в–
There is good defensible terrain in depth,
and the terrain facilitates movement by
bounds.
Delay by successive
Delay by alternate
withdrawal positions
withdrawal positions
Direction of
Direction of
PL
enemy advance
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enemy advance
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o
fo la
te
w
u
ra
MP
MP
MP
MP
route
ro
d
d
h
1st
withdrawal
n
it
2
w
Figure 6-9. Methods of Delaying the Enemy
6-159. The platoon leader develops a plan of action
using the factors of METT-TC and the commander's
concept and intent. He gives priority to—
Area Security 6-51
FM 3-19.4
•
Obtaining a detailed knowledge of the terrain.
•
Gearing the terrain analysis to the enemy's
intent, avenues of approach, and likely positions
and targets.
•
Gaining information from aggressive area patrol
and reconnaissance.
•
Having alternate communications, both sound
a n d si g h t , re a d y t o b e u s e d i n ca s e ra di o
communications are disrupted.
•
Forecasting time. The response force must
consider how fast the enemy will close, how long
will it take to move off a position, and how long
to get to a nd occupy the next position. In
delaying actions, timing can be critical.
•
Requesting fire support along the route.
6-160. In the OPORD to subordinate leaders, includes
the—
•
Concept of conducting the action.
•
Initial delay positions.
•
Trigger
points
identifiable
on
the
ground.
("Squad leader, I plan to initiate fires when the
enemy reaches the railroad track.")
•
PLs and delay lines. Include the length of time to
delay on or forward of the given position or PL.
•
Coordination and contact points.
•
Indirect-fire plan (smoke, high explosives [HEs]
munitions, artillery-delivered sca tterable
mines).
•
Responsibility for adjacent-unit coordination
(passage and the like).
•
Fire
control
measures,
engagement
areas,
targets, and rate of fire.
•
Disengagement criteria. ("Squad leaders, I plan
to start disengagement when the enemy has
three armor vehicles across the railroad tracks.")
6-52 Area Security
FM 3-19.4
•
Plan for moving after disengagement (signals,
breakpoint, use of smoke, and the like).
•
Subsequent delay positions and routes and the
sequence of disengagement.
6-161. Most of the firepower will be oriented toward the
enemy. However, flank and rear security must be
provided. The platoon leader plans fire support in front
of and on both flanks of the positions. He plans fire to
cover the disengagement and movement to subsequent
positions. He has fire concentrate on breaking up the
enemy's advance at long range.
6-162. Higher HQ will resupply, rearm, and refuel the
delaying element. On a platoon action, the platoon
sergeant is crucial in ensuring that the platoon has the
required support to continue a delaying action. The
OPORD provides for a central point where the teams or
squads can recover.
EXECUTE
6-163. If directed to delay the enemy, the platoon leader
moves to a position where he can best control the action.
The platoon leader makes good use of the terrain to
mask all movements and provide vantage points for
observation and harassing fire.
6-164. The enemy will try to bypass a delaying force.
The platoon leader tries to keep the enemy in front of or
on an oblique angle to the delaying force’s position. He
prepares positions as thoroughly as time permits, and
reconnoiter routes to subsequent positions.
6-165. When selecting delay positions, look for the
following:
•
Clear observation and fields of fire onto the
avenues of approach.
•
Positions
offering
mutual
support
and
interlocking and flanking fires where possible.
•
Restrictions to canalize the enemy.
Area Security 6-53
FM 3-19.4
•
Short, covered, concealed, and trafficable routes
to rearward positions.
•
Positions hidden from enemy observation and
fires.
•
Defilade positions for HMMWV and ASV.
6-166. If the delaying force has time they—
•
Emplace obstacles to slow the enemy while they
move to rearward positions.
•
Block obvious routes rearward and direct the
force to use more hidden routes.
•
Continue preparing positions.
•
Consider preparing ambush sites along the
routes to slow enemy pursuit.
•
Select primary and alternate firing positions.
•
Have soldiers familiarize themselves with the
routes to these positions.
•
Place the OPs/LPs, and other security means far
enough forward to warn the platoon, particularly
if the enemy is using a secondary avenue of
approach.
Control Fire
6-167. Fire control is extremely important. The platoon
engages the enemy at maximum range with all weapons
systems. They fire on a prearranged signal or event
(trigger point). They aim for leaders and C2 vehicles and
avoid premature firing. The platoon leader considers not
firing until the enemy reaches a preset point on the
ground. Then he uses ambush-type fires to quickly
destroy lead enemy elements. This also keeps the enemy
from learning the friendly force’s size and location.
6-168. If the enemy force cannot evade, it will make
every effort to envelop and destroy the delaying force.
Avoid presenting an exposed flank to the enemy. Use
contact points to help ensure flank coordination.
6-54 Area Security
FM 3-19.4
6-169. Each time the delaying force moves back, it will
have less time to plan and prepare. Speed, firepower,
and maneuver become more important. The platoon
leader calls for added fire support or assistance from
higher HQ if decisive engagement or envelopment seems
likely.
6-170. If additional elements arrive, the platoon leader
uses them to augment the element in contact, employing
them on the left and right of the element in contact. The
platoon leader ensures that as the element in contact
moves back, the left and right elements know to also
move, but not at the same time. As the element in
contact m ov es back, the f lank scree ns c an op en
harassing fire. Drawing enemy attention to flank
elements will allow the element in contact to disengage
more easily.
6-171. The platoon leader keeps higher HQ informed of
the situation. Forward elements must not become so
heavil y engaged that they cannot be wi th drawn
effectively. If contact with higher HQ is lost, the platoon
leader uses initiative. He bases each move on METT-TC,
t h e e v e n t s o n t h e b a t t l e f i e l d , a n d t h e t a c t i c a l
commander's intent.
Disengage
6-172. Deciding when to disengage is difficult. If the
delaying forces remain too long, they risk decisive
engagement or envelopment. If they move too soon, they
may give up ground unnecessarily and risk pursuit. The
decision of which element to move is based on METT-TC.
Move the least heavily engaged element first. To
disengage—
•
Direct supporting elements to engage enemy
forces forward of the disengaging element.
•
Concentrate
all
available
fire
and
mutual
support.
Area Security 6-55
FM 3-19.4
•
Give priority fire, if available, to the disengaging
element to rapidly increase its firepower.
•
Begin an orderly movement to successive or
alternate positions.
•
Use all available fire.
•
Place the fire far enough forward to avoid
impeding personnel leaving the protected
positions.
•
Place smoke between the delaying force and the
enemy.
•
Move into subsequent positions from the rear
and send a SITREP to higher HQ.
•
Report the delaying force’s arrival to higher HQ.
•
Tell the elements left in contact to disengage and
take their next positions.
6-173. If it becomes necessary, replace key leaders, give
crew-served weapons a priority of manning, evacuate
casualties, and redistribute ammunition. Refer to FM
17-95 for more information on defensive tactics used for
delays.
BATTLE HANDOVER TO A TACTICAL COMBAT
FORCE
6-174. When the combined efforts of the base and base
cluster defense force and the MP response force are
unable to jointly defeat an enemy threat, the operation
becomes the responsibility of the TCF. Coordination is
essential to determine when, where, and how the
response force gives up responsibility for the fight and
the TCF takes over. The MP response force and the
base-defense force will then hand over the fight to the
TCF by conducting a battle handover.
6-175. A battle handover (Figure 6-10) is a coordinated
o p e r a t i o n b e t w e e n t w o u n i t s t h a t t r a n s f e r s
responsibility for fighting an enemy force from one unit
6-56 Area Security
FM 3-19.4
ORGANIZATION
Maintain unit integrity for C2.
ORDER OF MOVEMENT
Base the order of movement on the—
• Number of passage points.
• Degree of security required.
• Enemy situation.
• Terrain.
• Prevention of confusion and congestion. Give priorities indicating which
units move and when they move.
COMMUNICATIONS
Ensure that the following actions occur:
• Both units have SOI compatibility.
• Both units monitor the rear operations net (critical for recognition signals
and fire support).
• Both outgoing and incoming unit elements operate on the outgoing unit’s
command net.
• The outgoing unit maintains routine radio traffic volume while the
incoming monitors it.
• When the responsibility of the battle has changed over, the
incoming unit operates on its own net only.
COMMAND AND CONTROL
Ensure that the—
• Number of passage points can determine the method of C2 used.
• Multiple passage points are set up, dictating decentralized control.
• TCF commander decides how he can best influence the action and
positions himself accordingly.
• Response force commander collocates with the command group of the
TCF during the passage of lines.
• Time or circumstances when responsibility for the battle is transferred
are mutually agreed on before hand by the response force and the TCF
commanders.
• Responsibility can be passed by radio communications if need be.
Figure 6-10. Planning Considerations for a Battle Handover
Area Security 6-57
FM 3-19.4
COMMAND AND CONTROL POINTS
Ensure that the following occurs:
• All units follow the control measures.
• For a response to force passing through a stationary TCF, control
measures include the following:
в–
AAs. Used by a unit to prepare for an upcoming mission.
в–
BHLs. The single, most important control measure in delineating
response force and TCF responsibilities. A PL is placed where the
TCF assumes responsibility for the battle from the response force.
в–
Attack position. The last position occupied or passed through by the
TCF before crossing the LD.
в–
Passage lanes. Areas on which the response force moves to avoid
the stationary TCF.
в–
Passage point. A place where the response force will pass through
TCF units. It is located where the commander desires subordinate
units to physically execute the passage of lines.
в–
Time of passage. The time at which the passage is executed by the
leading element of the response force to facilitate control through the
passage point.
в–
Recognition signals. Established signals to prevent the response
force from directing fire on the TCF and vice versa.
в–
Contact points. Designated, easily identifiable points on the terrain
where two friendly forces are required to meet.
в–
RPs. Points on the ground where subordinate units are under the
control of their respective commanders while en route to their
appropriate destinations.
в–
Routes. Routes are the prescribed course to be traveled from a
specified point of origin to a specific destination.
• For a TCF passing through a delaying response force, control measures
include the following:
в–
Battle position. A defensive location established by the response
force oriented on the most likely enemy avenues of approach.
в–
LD and LC. This control measures places the BHL in that control of
the battle is assumed by the TCF once its units cross the PL.
Figure 6-10. Planning Considerations
for a Battle Handover (Continued)
to another in close-in battle. It is designed to sustain
continuity of the combined-arms fight and protect the
com bat potential of both for ces involved. Battle
6-58 Area Security
FM 3-19.4
handover is usually associated with conducting a
passage of lines. MP leaders must establish clear
tactical SOPs that allow their forces to quickly establish
the n ecessar y coor dination to pr eclud e a l oss of
momentum in the attack. In a battle handover, the MP
response force will pass rearward through the TCF lines
while handing over the fight or the TCF will move
forward through the MP response force lines to engage
the enemy.
6-176. However the fight is handed off, coordination
between the MP response force commander and TCF
commander is critical. Use a BHL (refer to FM 17-95 and
FM 17-98) and contact points as control measures to set
both forces’ responsibilities. Both the TCF commander
and the response force leader coordinate the BHL
location. The BHL is shown on the operations overlay
and in the OPORD as a PL or a boundary. It identifies
ground as “owned” by the TCF or by the response force.
It sets the location where control of the battle passes
from one commander to the other. It is where the TCF
can use direct fire and observe indirect fire.
6-177. The handover occurs at the time or event
c o o r d i n a t e d b y t h e T C F c o m m a n d e r . T h e T C F
commander decides the method of handover based on
METT-TC. Generally, one of the following methods will
be used:
•
The response force passes rearward through a
stationary TCF.
•
The TCF passes forward through a delaying
response force.
•
The response force sets up a final blocking
position, with elements of the TCF conducting
an attack to destroy the enemy.
Area Security 6-59
FM 3-19.4
6-178. Coordination for battle handover normally flows
from the TCF commander to the response force leader.
Coordination normally includes—
•
Establishing communications.
•
Providing updates on both friendly and enemy
situations.
•
Coordinating passage.
•
Collocating C2.
•
Dispatching representatives to contact points.
•
Ensuring that there are visual recognition
signals for vehicles.
•
Ensuring the status of obstacles and routes.
•
Coordination of fire support and CSS requirements.
6-179. The most important task for the response force is
to maintain contact and continue to engage the enemy.
The enemy must continue to see the level of activity that
has been established. If the enemy perceives that the
handover is occurring, he will attempt to seize the
opportunity to destroy the response force.
PASS A RESPONSE FORCE THROUGH A STATIONARY
TACTICAL COMBAT FORCE
6-180. The TCF commander coordinates with the
response force leader at a designated contact point. The
rear CP operations cell dictates the contact point
location and notifies both units.
6-181. The contact point should be located forward (50
to 200 meters) of the BHL. It should be near or on easily
identifiable terrain features. At a prescribed time,
liaison parties from both forces will meet. Normally, a
response force representative is sent to the contact
point. At the contact point, the TCF commander or his
representative briefs the response force representative.
Response force teams may remain in the vicinity of the
BHL if passage is imminent. TCF security forces screen
6-60 Area Security
FM 3-19.4
along the BHL and monitor the response force command
net.
6-182. The actions of the elements on the BHL are
critical. At the BHL, the TCF scouts, or others assigned
the BHL action, pick up the fight from the passing
response force elements. If the response force is in
contact, its maneuver elements are bound behind the
BHL, preferably to a covered and concealed location. At
the same time, the TCF elements on the line relieve the
pressure on the response force elements.
6-183. At the passage point, where the response force
passes through TCF units, response force teams identify
passing response force units. They ensure that the
passing vehicles are displaying the correct visual
recognition signal. TCF scouts on the BHL notify the
forward TCF teams by a prearranged signal that contact
has been made and friendly forces are at the BHL.
Response force elements continue to delay forward of the
BHL. Once behind the BHL and covered from enemy
direct fire, the response force should—
•
Confirm that the proper visual recognition
signal is still displayed on all vehicles.
•
Orient weapons systems toward the enemy.
•
Move quickly, in the directed formation, through
the passage points and along designated routes
to the RP.
6 -1 84 . Sta t i o na r y T CF ele men ts o v e rw a tc h th is
movement. The only time the TCF fires is when positive
enemy identification is made. At the completion of the
handover, response forces may either be released by the
operations cell to resume other priority missions or
tasked to remain in OPCON to the TCF and continue
the fight.
Area Security 6-61
FM 3-19.4
PASS A TACTICAL COMBAT FORCE THROUGH A
DELAYING FORCE
6-185. This technique is similar to the response force
passing through the stationary TCF. The response force
will have more information on the terrain and enemy
situation than the TCF.
6-186. The response force leader sets up contact points,
passage points, and routes. At the least, he provides
guides. The guides meet the TCF at the contact points
and lead them along routes to the passage points and/or
RPs near the LD and LC.
6-187. The response force maintains normal radio
traffic. The TCF and response force operations elements
temporarily collocate. The TCF commander assumes
control of the battle handover at this time. TCF company
teams may maintain listening silence on their TCF
command net. The response force guides notify their
commander when the TCF begins moving forward from
the contact points. As the TCF company teams deploy
across the BHL, the response force leader and the TCF
commander transfer responsibility for the battle.
6-188. The TCF fire support officer (FSO) may collocate
with the response force forward observer (or the
individual appointed to act as forward observer for the
artillery unit in the AO). Fire missions are approved by
the RAOC supporting the response force until the battle
handover has occurred. After that, any fire missions for
the response force are cleared through the TCF FSO.
Response force units provide direct-fire overwatch
according to the TCF commander's scheme of maneuver.
It is coordinated directly by the TCF commander and the
response force leader at collocated command groups.
6-189. Response force direct-fire support depends on the
TCF commander's attack plan and the battle handover.
6-62 Area Security
FM 3-19.4
However, the stationary unit lifts and shifts its direct
fire as coordinated by the collocated command groups.
BLOCK FOR A TACTICAL COMBAT FORCE
6-190. When defending from a battle position, the
response force positions its elements to achieve the TCF
commander's intent. The response force sets up blocking
positions to keep the enemy from escaping. It selects
battle positions where it can control, maneuver, and
concentrate direct fire on the enemy. As blocking
positions are set up, the TCF maneuvers to attack the
enemy's flank. The TCF commander and the response
force commander set up a contact point for coordination
and conduct a reconnaissance of this point, time
permitting. The TCF commander and response force
leader coordinate C2 and exchange the following
information:
•
When to lift or shift fire.
•
What targets must be destroyed to allow the
TCF to close on the enemy.
•
The time, location, or activity to pass control of
the battle.
•
The location of the engagement areas.
6-191. The TCF and blocking force coordinate so that
t h e T C F f l a n k s t h e e n e m y . T h e r e s p o n s e f o r c e
suppresses the enemy from the front allowing time for
the TCF to maneuver into position.
6-192. The TCF commander specifies tasks for the
response force to achieve the TCF scheme of maneuver.
The response force normally will have to orient its
weapon systems on the enemy avenue of approach using
TRPs or engagement areas (EAs). The response force
may be tasked to—
•
Destroy a certain enemy force from the battle
position.
Area Security 6-63
FM 3-19.4
•
Control the terrain or block an avenue of
approach by holding the battle position against
the enemy assault.
•
Reorient weapons systems on a secondary
avenue of approach from supplemental positions
or avenues of escape for the threat.
•
Assist in any other task needed to achieve the
TCF mission.
6-193. Refer to FM 17-95 for more information about
battle handover.
CRITICAL SITE, ASSET, AND HIGH-RISK
PERSONNEL SECURITY
6- 194. MP are of te n task ed to p erf orm s ecurity
operations that require integration and prioritization
f r o m o t h e r M P C S o p e r a t i o n s . D u r i n g s e c u r i t y
operations, MP focus their efforts on measures designed
to safeguard resources by conducting special security
a c t i v i t i e s t h a t p r e v e n t u n a u t h o r i z e d a c c e s s t o
installations, equipment, materiel, and documents; and
safeguard against espionage, sabotage, damage, and
theft. An MP security operation includes protection of
CPs, convoys, ASPs, deep-water ports, rail, pipelines,
and high-risk personnel.
COMMAND POST SECURITY
6-195. CPs are priority targets for enemy attack, and
their security can be crucial to the success of military
operations. CPs at division, corp s, and E AC a re
designated critical sites and assets. When CPs relocate,
MP provide in-transit security. The amount and type of
security provided to an established CP depends on
whether the CP is dispersed or massed, large or small.
In all cases, the focus of MP security efforts is on
providing early warning of threat activity. MP possess
mobility and communications assets that make them
6-64 Area Security
FM 3-19.4
most valuable in operating AS patrols around the CP.
Elements do not share a common defensive perimeter in
a dispersed CP. Each cell provides its own local security
and access control. MP conduct screening operations to
provide early warning of enemy activity. In a massed CP
where elements share a common perimeter, MP may
contribute to perimeter defense with other elements that
are collocated at a base.
Division Main CP Security
6-196. All Army of Excellence (AOE) divisions have a
main, rear, and tactical CP. Division XXI currently has a
division main and tactical CP and a security operations
center (SOC). The best use of MP assets to secure any
division CP is to employ MP teams to conduct AS around
the location of the CP. MP provide early warning of
enemy activity by conducting area reconnaissance and
surveillance (R&S) of likely enemy avenues of approach
to the CP. This security measure also provides the CP
with standoff protection from direct enemy fire.
Division Band
6-197. When assigned to augment security operations,
the division band should be employed intact, facilitating
the commander’s ability to quickly return it to its
primary mission. The MP commander ensures that the
bandmaster and his soldiers know the tactical situation
and the defensive plan for the CP when they are
assisting in CP security. The band may—
•
Assist in perimeter defense of the CP.
•
Provide access control on the road to the CP.
•
Operate the dismount point for the CP.
•
Provide access control to the main CP.
Corps Command Post Security
6-198. Normally, the corps CPs are echeloned into a
tactical CP, a main CP, and a rear CP. The corps main
Area Security 6-65
FM 3-19.4
CP is generally located in the general vicinity of the
division rear boundary. Traditionally, the corps main CP
is massed and is a large organization with attendant
mobility and signature problems. The corps tactical CP
is small, mobile, survivable, and normally located well
forward in the vicinity of a division main CP.
6-199. MP security is provided to both the corps main
and tactical CPs. How MP elements deploy depends on
the CP dispersion, the particular situation, and the
METT-TC. The MP company provides corps CP security.
If the CP is massed, one platoon secures the tactical CP
and the remainder of the company secures the main CP.
Or, depending on the METT-TC,—
•
One squad provides access control within the
corps tactical operations center (CTOC).
•
Two squads serve as a response force.
•
Two squads secure the tactical CP.
•
Two squads man dismount points or augment
other squads.
•
The remaining squads operate the OPs/LPs and
the security patrols.
6-200. The main security efforts and emphasis of MP
are on early warning and screening. Both internal access
and screening force measures provide CP security.
These measures are enhanced by—
•
Internal guard posts.
•
Perimeter access control points.
•
LPs/OPs
and
a
security
post
outside
the
perimeter.
6-201. When a corps main CP is dispersed in cells, focus
MP efforts on screening force measures. Allocate MP
based on the location of the function and the METT-TC.
6-66 Area Security
FM 3-19.4
CONVOY SECURITY
6-202. MP leaders plan and conduct convoy security
(specifically convoy escort) using several different
methods to secure them as they move through their AO.
Primarily, MP secure vehicle movement by maintaining
security in the area that a convoy will pass through. MP
also conduct route security on a specific route for a
designated period during which multiple convoys move
unimpeded.
6-203. The main threats to convoys are mines and
ambushes. Convoys are vulnerable to sniper fire, long-
range fire from artillery, mortar, threat aircraft, and AT-
guided missiles. They are also vulnerable to remotely
controlled mines and demolitions. Armored vehicles are
better suited to provide convoy escort protection.
Leaders carefully evaluate the threat before assigning a
convoy escort mission to HMMWV-equipped units.
6- 20 4. When MP condu ct c onvoy escort secur ity
missions, platoons normally escort the convoy through
their AO and pass responsibility for escort to adjacent
platoons as the convoy moves from one platoon’s AO to
another. However, some situations may require a
platoon to escort a convoy from its SP to its final
destination.
6-205. Whatever method is used to secure the convoy,
MP platoons executing the escort mission operate under
the control of the convoy commander. The relationship
between the MP platoon and the convoy commander
provides for unity of command and effort, if combat
operations are required during the course of the mission.
Plan
6-206. The platoon leader plans for security of the
convoy in all directions and throughout the length of the
convoy. This requir es MP teams to be dispersed
throughout the convoy formation. When available, locate
Area Security 6-67
FM 3-19.4
engineer assets toward the front to respond to obstacles.
If a fire-support team (FIST) is attached, locate it near
the platoon leader.
6-207. The platoon uses the column formation (Figure
6-11) due to its inherent speed and ease of movement.
Platoon leader
Engineer
Scout
3 to 5
minutes
Trail
FIST
Lead
Figure 6-11. MP Platoon Escorting a Convoy
6-208. The platoon leader develops a convoy security
plan that includes the following:
•
HN support.
•
The escorted unit’s frequencies and call signs.
•
The vehicle number and type and the order of
the march.
•
Checkpoint identification along the route.
•
Security for halts and rest stops.
•
Enhanced security at critical points such as,
bridges, tunnels, key intersections, and other
danger areas.
•
An alternate route determination.
•
Emergency
actions
to
be
taken
during
ambushes, a sniper attack, an air attack, or an
artillery attack.
•
Ambush reactions.
•
Coordination with the response force responsible
for the AO.
6-68 Area Security
FM 3-19.4
6-209. The platoon leader assigns selected teams to
remain with the convoy to provide close-in security, if
attacked, and other teams to maneuver toward the
enemy to deliver a high volume of fire. Use a scout
vehicle to travel ahead of the convoy (3 to 5 minutes) to
alert the convoy commander of enemy activity, obstacles,
or anything that might disrupt the convoys movement.
6-210. If a tracked armored vehicle is not available to
lead the escort, the platoon leader assigns one team as
the lead security element. Hardening of all vehicles used
for convoy escort missions must be SOPs.
6-211. The platoon leader coordinates with the convoy
commander to ensure that all convoy personnel are
briefed and fully understand the convoy security plan. If
time permits, the platoon leader conducts a joint
rehearsal with the convoy commander and all security
elements. At a minimum, the rehearsal should cover
reactions to an ambush and air and artillery attacks.
React to Ambush
6-212. A well-planned ambush can have a devastating
effect on a convoy. The reaction to an ambush must be
quick, overwhelming, and decisive. The platoon executes
its reaction to an ambush as a drill, taking special care
to prevent fratricide. Actions to be taken include the
following:
•
When the ambush is initiated, security vehicles
direct their action toward the enemy (Figure
6-12, page 6-70). Selected teams move to covered
positions between the convoy and the enemy to
suppress the enemy with the highest possible
volume of fire and obscure the enemy’s view with
smoke. At least one team should remain with the
convoy and continue close-in security. The
platoon leader sends the appropriate reports to
higher HQ.
Area Security 6-69
FM 3-19.4
Kill zone
B
B
Convoy
Convoy
Smoke
A
A
A
A. MP direct their action toward
the ambush and suppress the
enemy.
B. The convoy continues to move
Ambush
at an increased speed.
Figure 6-12. Security Vehicles’ Actions During an Ambush
•
The convoy commander continues to control the
convoy and maintains radio contact with the
security force (MP platoon leader). Vehicles not
yet in the kill zone are stopped before they enter.
Vehicles in the kill zone are moved out of the
zone at the highest possible speed.
•
The scout vehicle immediately selects a safe area
for the convoy commander to move vehicles. The
vehicles use a Light Vehicle Obscuration Smoke
Sy s te m ( LV O S S) o r o th e r s m o ke to m a sk
movement if possible. This safe area will be the
linkup location when the convoy resumes.
•
The convoy vehicles, if armed, return fire only
until the security force positions itself between
the convoy and the enemy.
6-70 Area Security
FM 3-19.4
•
The damaged or disabled vehicles are abandoned
and pushed off the route if they are not mission
essential.
•
The MP platoon leader submits SPOTREPs.
Based on his assessment of the situation he can
call for fire or CAS, or request the response force.
•
Once the convoy is clear of the kill zone, the MP
platoon leader chooses one of the following COAs
based on the composition of the escort and the
strength of the enemy:
в–
Continue to suppress the enemy, while
response forces move to support.
в–
Assault the enemy.
в–
Break contact, move out of the kill zone, and
calls for indirect fire.
6-213. Normally, MP equipped with HMMWVs move
out of the kill zone as soon as the convoy is clear. ASV-
equipped security forces may continue to suppress the
enemy or execute an assault. The platoon leader decides
when to break contact.
6-214. Mines. Command-denoted mines are usually to
signal the start of an ambush. When ambush fire comes
from one side of the road, the enemy will most likely
deploy a second, smaller force on the opposite side. They
will deploy mines and obstacles between themselves and
the convoy to contain US forces. The ambush force often
uses mines to protect its flanks. To avoid damage from
mines, drivers must—
•
Drive on the track of the vehicle in front.
•
Avoid driving on the shoulder of the road.
•
Avoid running over foreign objects, brush, or
grass in the road.
•
Watch local traffic and the reactions of people on
foot, which may give away locations of mines and
booby traps.
Area Security 6-71
FM 3-19.4
6-215. Artillery Attack. If a convoy comes under
artillery fire, vehicles must not stop. The convoy
continues forward as quickly as possible to clear the
area.
6-216. Air Attack. If the convoy comes under air
attack, vehicles are dispersed, and soldiers attempt to
find cover for the vehicles. Personnel begin firing all
available weapons in an antiaircraft effort.
6-217. Obstacles. Obstacles are a major threat to
convoys. Obstacles can be used to harass the convoy by
delaying it. If the terrain is favorable, it may stop the
convoy altogether. In addition, an obstacle or series of
obstacles can be used to channel or stop a convoy to set
up an ambush. The purpose of a route reconnaissance
ahead of a convoy, is to identify obstacles and either
breach or find bypasses. The convoy takes actions to
reduce or bypass the obstacle. A convoy becomes more
vulnerable when it is stopped and its escort force is
occupied with tasks required to overcome or bypass the
obstacle. For these reasons, security becomes critical,
and actions at the obstacle must be accomplished
quickly. Security personnel take the following actions at
an obstacle:
•
Direct (convoy commander) a halt when the lead
security vehicle identifies an obstacle.
•
Establish
dismounted
security
and
provide
security throughout all activities directed by the
co nvo y c om ma n der (su ch a s c ond uc ti ng a
reconnaissance and breaching the obstacle).
•
Establish an obstacle overwatch.
•
Ensure that convoy vehicles remain on the road.
•
Move escort elements to the flanks to provide
security.
•
Ensure that all convoy vehicles are aware that
the enemy may have buried mines in the area,
especially on the road flanks.
6-72 Area Security
FM 3-19.4
6-218. Halts. When a convoy has to halt for short
breaks it assumes a herringbone formation (Figure
6-13). Security forces take up protective positions 360-
degrees around the convoy and orient their weapons
outward. They remain alert and establish dismounted
local security. The convoy pulls into the protected area
in the center of the perimeter. Stagger the convoy
vehicles off the road, if there is no threat of enemy
mines, but position them so they can easily pull back
onto the road.
Route
100 meters
Figure 6-13. Herringbone Formation
6-219. When the convoy is ready to resume, the convoy
vehicles reestablish the column formation, leaving space
for the security vehicles. Once the convoy is in column,
the security vehicles join the column, leaving local
security dismounted.
Area Security 6-73
FM 3-19.4
6-220. Once all elements are in column, local security
personnel mount and the convoy continues.
CONVENTIONAL AMMUNITION SUPPLY POINT
SECURITY
6-221. When an MP platoon has been tasked to provide
security for an ASP, the platoon establishes internal and
external security. The platoon secures the ASP against
enemy or criminal activity so that the ASP is able to
maintain normal operations. MP leaders coordinate with
ASP personnel to verify communications, distress and
duress signals, defense plans, and fratricide prevention.
Internal Security
6-222. When MP conduct internal security, they
establish a dismount point and allow only authorized
personnel access to the ASP. Access is granted according
to the local SOP and access and entry control rosters.
MP conduct perimeter patrols ensuring that they do not
set a pattern and maintain communications with
platoon HQ.
External Security
6-223. When tasked to provide external security for an
ASP, MP establish an OP/LP for early warning. They
establish a TCP at the intersection of the MSR and the
ASP access road. The TCP maintains free traffic flow,
screens the traffic entering the access road, and controls
stragglers and refugees. To further enhance external
security, MP employ movement sensors, establish
defensive positions, maintain communications with the
platoon HQ, and emplace obstacles and physical security
measures.
DEEP-WATER PORT SECURITY
6- 224. The ve r y n at ur e of a te rm inal op erat ion
g e n e r a t e s s o m e d i f f e r e n t , a n d f r e q u e n t l y m o r e
6-74 Area Security
FM 3-19.4
demanding, aspects of physical security. Ports and
harbors are prime targets for enemy and criminal
activities. The perimeter areas of these facilities are
more vulnerable because of the extensive distance and
the exposed beach or pier areas. Terminal areas may
include fully developed piers and warehouses or may be
an unimproved beach where logistics over the shore
(LOTS) or roll-on/roll-off (RORO) operations are
conducted.
Security Measures
6-225. When MP provide security for cargo in a port, the
main effort is to provide security from the perimeter of
the port outward. Security measures focus on aggressive
patrolling and reconnaissance designed to detect, report,
or destroy enemy threats before they disrupt port
operations. Measures may also include—
•
Developing police information and intelligence
designed to identify criminal threats operating
near the port.
•
Controlling traffic in the area surrounding the
port.
•
Conducting mounted or dismounted patrols,
w i t h M W D i f a v a i l a b l e , a r o u n d t h e p o r t
perimeter.
•
Establishing an access control and identification
section.
•
Providing a response force to react to incidents
inside the port's perimeter.
•
Providing observation and early warning of
threat ground and air attacks.
6 - 2 2 6 . W h e n p r o v i d i n g s e c u r i t y f o r c a r g o , M P
concentrate their efforts on providing AS in the area
used to move cargo from the port to its final destination.
6-227. Inside a port's perimeter, MP security forces
limit access to cargoes by—
Area Security 6-75
FM 3-19.4
•
Operating
random
mounted
or
dismounted
patrols (with MWD if available).
•
Using the combined patrols as a response force
for incidents inside the perimeter.
•
Controlling access to the most restricted areas.
6-228. The priority is safeguarding the most critical
cargoes waiting to be transferred to land transport. To
safeguard stored cargo MP—
•
Establish access control procedures.
•
Search bundles and packages being taken from
the area.
•
Examine trip tickets and documentation of cargo
vehicles.
•
Inspect seals on locked containers.
Waterside Security
6-229. If the restricted area is a pier or other maritime
environment, access from the water must be controlled
as well as from the land. Entry on the landward side of a
pier can be limited with fencing, pass control, and
aggressive patrolling, but the part of the pier that
protrudes over the water is accessible from the sides and
below. Methods for securing the pier along its water
boundaries include—
•
Patrols (both walking on the pier and in small
boats).
•
Protective lighting.
•
Log booms.
•
Nets.
•
Buoys or floats.
•
Anchored or pile-mounted navigational aids and
signaling devices.
6-76 Area Security
FM 3-19.4
•
Barges.
DANGER
Ports pose special dangers for MP foot patrols. MP
leaders must ensure that soldiers are thoroughly briefed
on the hazards of patrolling too close to the water’s edge.
6-230. While most of the barriers described above will
stop or impede ac cess to fa cil iti es from boa ts or
swimmers, nets are among the most effective. Well-
marked, partially submerged objects are also effective;
however, there may be legal prohibitions against the
emplacement of barriers that may constitute a hazard to
navigation. The barriers should be emplaced only after
coordination with and approval by the appropriate legal
and HN authorities. Sometimes it is best to just close off
the waterside of a pier. A floating boom will keep small
boats out. Suspending a cable or chain link net from the
bottom of the boom will deny access underwater.
6-231. MP establish at least two security zones on a
facility’s waterside: the reaction zone and the keep-out
or exclusion zone. MP in these zones notify vessels, craft,
and swimmers that they are entering restricted waters
and should alter their course. MP may stop and search
intruders if necessary. Security zones should be
extended at lea st 1,000 meters from the nea rest
protected asset; however, in some port areas, a security
zone this large is not possible. In such cases, other
measures, such as boat patrols, must be increased to
mitigate the possibility of attack. The two zones are
defined as the—
•
Reaction zone. The reaction zone extends from
the high water mark to a distance beyond the
maximum range of anticipated waterborne
threats is the reaction zone. Inside the reaction
zone, MP will stop and challenge intruders.
Area Security 6-77
FM 3-19.4
•
Keep-out zone. This is the zone closest to the
protected assets. The keep-out zone extends
from the cargo asset to the maximum range of
anticipated threat weapons. MP prevent the
entry of all unauthorized craft or vessels into
this zone. The tactical response force boat, in
this case, may be employed if necessary.
Cargo Security During the Transfer
6-232. To keep cargo secure during transfer from one
transport method to another, MP control the traffic
moving in and out of cargo handling areas by—
•
Setting up a single access control point.
•
Erecting field-expedient barriers and using
truck trailers or other large vehicles to constrict
the traffic flow if permanent barriers are not in
place.
•
Limiting entry to mission-essential personnel,
vehicles, and equipment, as designated by the
port authority.
6-233. If gates are used by other than cargo vehicles, a
turnout should be available. Cargo vehicles can pull into
it while they are being checked. The turnout must be
large enough to handle the volume and size of traffic
being inspected. A wooden deck or platform at, or
slightly higher than, the level of the truck bed hastens
checking; it makes it easier to see the cargo. The
pla tform should be a s long as the vehicles being
inspected. An empty flatbed trailer could be used.
6-234. Cargo is less likely to be diverted when close
observation of cargo documentation and container safety
is enforced. Containerized cargo is less likely to be stolen
or sabotaged if closely watched as they are filled and
sealed. Cargo can be pilfered before the seal is applied.
An unsealed container can be moved to a stacking area
or someone may apply a false seal, break the seal later,
6-78 Area Security
FM 3-19.4
remove cargo, and then apply a legitimate seal. At
access control points security personnel—
•
Inspect inbound and outbound containers. Look
for signs of damage or unserviceability.
•
Inspect containers for the presence of seals and/
or locks and hinges. Check their serviceability.
•
Verify that the document's transport number,
container number, and seal number match those
numbers on the transportation control and
movement document (TCMD).
NOTE: Check seals by handling them, not simply
by visually checking them.
•
Allow only containers with valid documents to
pass inbound or outbound through the control
point.
TRAIN SECURITY FOR CARGO MOVED BY RAIL
6-235. Military resources moving by rail are often
vulnerable to theft, pilferage, and sabotage. Depending
on the threat, the cargo’s sensitivity, vulnerability, and
MP availability, the echelon commander may require
MP to protect cargo moving by rail.
6-236. Most train operating crews consist of four or five
people–the engineer, a conductor, a fireman, a senior
brakeman, and a brakeman or flagman. This crew
controls the train. The conductor is the train commander
unless a transportation railway service officer is
a s s i g n e d t o t h e t r a i n . T h e t r a i n c o m m a n d e r i s
responsible for the train's operation and security. He
makes all decisions affecting the train. MP integrate
their security efforts with the security efforts of the
train's crew. MP watch for and report any discrepancies
or interruption to normal procedures at any time during
the movement. Information about the movement is
usually sent along the movement route by the chief
dispatcher through a telephone circuit.
Area Security 6-79
FM 3-19.4
Safety Considerations
6-237. Many regions use electric trains. These trains
use aboveground, high-voltage lines and travel at
greater speeds. When these high-speed trains pass
parallel to a stopped cargo train and MP security forces
are dismounted, the train can create a vacuum strong
enough to pull a security force member under the wheels
of the passing train. Some of the slower-moving trains
are referred to as floaters. They travel at much slower
speeds than the express trains, cause less vibration, and
are much quieter. These trains may not be heard until
they are too close to react. All trains pose a risk to MP
working in and around them.
6-238. Track switches are another danger to MP while
they are dismounted. Track switches are used to alter
the course of a moving train or car onto another rail line.
Track switches are remotely controlled and operated. A
member of the rail crew activates some switches
manu ally at som e sites. The in her ent danger to
dismounted MP is getting a foot caught or crushed as
the track is being switched.
Security Force
6-239. Normally, an MP squad is an adequate force to
secure railway shipments of sensitive freight, but
additional MP may be needed for movement of critical
cargo. When required, MP conduct railway security to
prevent pilferage, detect enemy activity directed against
the train and, within their capabilities, defend the train
against enemy attack. In addition to MP, the shipper
may send specially trained personnel with highly
sensitive cargo. The number of MP in a train security
force depends on the—
•
Sensitivity of the freight.
•
Priority of need for the freight.
•
Terrain over which the train will pass.
•
Length of the train.
6-80 Area Security
FM 3-19.4
•
Duration of the trip.
•
Degree of enemy threat.
6-240. When planning rail cargo security, MP—
•
Review the unit SOP to determine guard force
security clearance and weapons qualifications
requirements and the use of force and rail
security operations training.
•
Obtain the time schedule for the rail movement.
•
Make a map reconnaissance of the route. If time
permits, they conduct an aerial reconnaissance.
Bridges and tunnels are especially vulnerable.
•
Coordinate with the HN and other agencies,
s u c h a s t h e m i l i ta r y t r a ff i c m a n a g em en t
command (MTMC) and movement control team
(MCT).
•
Plan actions at scheduled stops or relief points,
deploying MP according to these plans.
•
Plot the locations of MP units and other friendly
forces along the route and note their radio
frequencies and call signs.
•
Obtain an intelligence report covering the route
to indicate sites where sabotage may occur, or
attacks may be expected, and if thefts and
pilferage are likely.
•
Determine
weapons
and
special-equipment
requirements.
•
Assess border crossing requirements.
•
Develop a security cargo checklist.
•
Make a guard force serial-numbered weapons
list.
6-241. MP prepare and maintain a record, by car
number, of guarded cars in the train. MP may be
required to ride in—
•
A specific car that requires protection.
•
The caboose.
Area Security 6-81
FM 3-19.4
•
A special train car provided for the MP to travel
in.
NOTE: If only one security car is used, it should be
near the center of the train; if more than one is
used, space the cars to provide the best protection
for the train.
Security Measures
6-242. The shipper is responsible for the security of all
c a r l o a d f r e i g h t u n t i l i t i s t u r n e d o v e r t o t h e
transportation railway service (TRS).
6-243. Railway cars are sealed after loading. A seal
shows that a car has been inventoried and inspected.
The standard method of sealing a railway boxcar door
(in addition to padlocks or wires) is by a soft metal strap
or cable seal that contains a serial number.
6-244. Maintaining rigid accountability of all the seals
is necessary to prevent the undetected replacement of an
original seal with another. While sealing does not
prevent pilferage, a broken seal is a good indicator that
the car and its contents have been tampered with.
6-245. When military vehicles are shipped by railcar,
sensitive and high-value items must not be secured in
the vehicles. Container express (CONEX) and military-
owned demountable containers (MILVANs) are ideal for
shipping these and other small items on flatcars since
they greatly reduce the chance of pilferage. These
containers must be locked and sealed and, if possible,
placed door-to-door for additional security.
6-246. Cars containing freight that is likely to be
pilfered, high-priority cargo, or special shipments are
grouped in the train to permit the most economical use
of MP security forces. When flatcars or gondolas are
used to transport sensitive or easily pilfered freight, the
MP leader positions a security element where it can
continuously observe and protect these cars.
6-82 Area Security
FM 3-19.4
6-247. The security force commander conducts a joint
inventory and inspection of the seals and locks with the
MCT or transportation officer on DD Form 1911. The
security force commander maintains possession of this
document and uses it when transferring custody.
6-248. The MP leader ensures that each seal is checked
at every scheduled stop (time permitting) and—
•
Reports
broken
seals
immediately
to
help
pinpoint the time and place of possible thefts.
•
Dismounts and conducts 360-degree security
when the train is stopped.
•
Checks for damage to the cars.
•
Notes and reports irregularities in procedures,
the presence and/or actions of unauthorized
personnel, and deficiencies and incidents that
occur.
•
Conducts a joint inspection of the cars when
relieved by another security force while en route.
The relief force signs for the train ( DD Form
1911). The record is kept on the guarded cars.
6-249. Security personnel obtain a receipt for the
secured cars when they arrive at their destination. The
receipt is attached to the trip report that includes the
following:
•
The date and time of the SP and the RP.
•
Any additional information required by local
SOP or command directive.
•
Any recommendations for correcting deficiencies
or for improving future security on the trains.
6-250. Dock workers unload the cars as soon as possible
when arriving at unloa ding points to reduce the
opportunity for loss through pilferage and sabotage. MP
assets are normally not available for security of freight
in railway yards; however, MP must be prepared to
conduct stabling and staging operations.
Area Security 6-83
FM 3-19.4
6 - 2 5 1 . S t a b l i n g o p er a t i o n s a r e c o n d u c t ed wh e n
numerous train shipments are held in a rail yard or
other locations, such as a marshalling area, for extended
periods pending arrival at the final destination. Stabling
operations require continuous security that may include
establishing perimeter patrols, access control, and a
quick-reaction force to respond to internal and external
threats.
6-252. Staging operations are not extended like stabling
operations. They occur when parts of a shipment enter a
secured or unsecured off-load site. The site may be large
enough to accommodate the entire shipment or only
several rail cars at a time. Security forces may be split
and required to maintain security at two locations.
Additional security forces may be required based on the
METT-TC. Refer to FM 55-20 for more information
about security of rail cargo.
PIPELINE SECURITY
6-253. Pipeline systems are widely used in a theater of
operations to transport bulk petroleum products or other
liquids. Such systems are open to a number of security
threats from the point of entry to the point of final
delivery. Pipeline systems are composed of storage and
dispersing facilities, pump stations, terminals, and
extended pipelines. They also include discharging
facilities for tankers at ports or other water terminals.
6-254. The type and extent of risk to a pipeline varies
with the level of conflict in the AO. In a communications
zone (COMMZ), the chief hazard is likely to be pilferage.
Pipelines can be tapped by loosening the flange bolts
that join sections of pipe or cutting holes in the hose line.
The risk rises if gasoline is scarce and expensive on the
civilian market. Sabotage is a security hazard during all
levels of conflict. It is committed by any method such as
simply opening pipe flanges, cutting hose line, or setting
6-84 Area Security
FM 3-19.4
fires and causing explosions to destroy portions of the
line.
6-255. In areas of greater conflict, the likelihood of
sabotage and interdiction increase. Pipeline systems are
vulnerable to air attacks, especially at—
•
Aboveground sections of the pipeline.
•
Pump stations.
•
Storage facilities.
6-256. Deploy MP in the best manner to provide
coverage to the most vulnerable portions of the pipeline
which are at the greatest risk to enemy, terrorist,
partisan, and ground attack. MP are best able to provide
p i p e l i n e s e c u r i t y b y c o n d u c t i n g m o u n t e d a n d
dismounted patrols; establishing a LP/OP for early
warning; and establishing defensive positions around
terminals, pump stations, and aboveground pipeline
sections. They patrol isolated areas and remote pumping
stations and—
•
Detect, report, and respond to attacks on or
sabotage of the pipeline.
•
Monitor critical parts of the pipeline on a routine
but random basis.
•
Monitor ground sensors and other intrusion
detection devices. These are often used at pump
stations and elsewhere along the pipeline to
detect and identify threats to the system.
•
Check line pressure devices in the pipeline and
pumping facilities. These devices monitor the
flow and detect breaks in the line, which may
indicate pilferage of gasoline or other petroleum
products.
6-257. Dedicated MP are rarely enough in number for
surveillance of an entire pipeline system. Available
supporting forces, in the course of their normal duties,
assist in observing and reporting items of intelligence for
further investigation. Examples of suspicious activities
Area Security 6-85
FM 3-19.4
in the pipeline area might include the unusual presence
of commercial tank trucks, the appearance of gasoline
drums or cans, or the increased use of motor vehicles in
fuel-scarce areas.
HIGH-RISK PERSONNEL SECURITY
6 - 2 5 8 . S e c u r i t y o f h i g h - r i s k p e r s o n n e l i s t h e
responsibility of the US Army Criminal Investigation
Division Command (USACIDC). However, due to a
limited number of CID special agents, in any theater of
operation, MP are often tasked to provide close-in
security of protected persons.
Security Considerations
6 - 2 5 9 . N o r m a l l y , t h e M P c o m p a n y c o m m a n d e r
designates a platoon leader as the officer in charge (OIC)
of the security detail. The platoon leader is given full
responsibility for all phases of the security mission, to
include the coordination. This allows for a single point of
contact for the conduct of the mission. The platoon
leader prepares a comprehensive plan to ensure the
safety of the designated person. Once the platoon leader
receives the designated person’s itinerary, he selects an
advance team and conducts a reconnaissance of the
route and locations the designated person is scheduled
to visit.
6-260. Normally, the platoon leader uses organic
vehicles and equipment to conduct the mission. If special
eq u i pm e n t i s r eq u i r ed , he m a ke s th e n ec e ss a r y
coordination through his higher HQ. Personnel selected
for the mission are thoroughly briefed on the security
plan and their conduct and demeanor during the
mission. The security plan should include the following:
•
Restrictions on individuals approaching the
protected person.
6-86 Area Security
FM 3-19.4
•
Evacuation procedures if the protected person is
attacked and the threat cannot be immediately
reduced.
•
Control measures such as designated check-
points.
•
Crowd control measures.
•
Alternate routes.
•
Emergency MEDEVAC procedures.
•
Emergency actions to be taken in the event of an
ambush or indirect fire.
6-261. Depending on the threat level, selected members
of the security team are armed with a M4, a M16, or a
M203. When dismounted with the protected person, they
provide standoff security out to the maximum effective
range of their weapons. Shotguns should be considered
shotguns if there is a threat of attack in a congested area
where there is danger of injuring innocent persons if
long-range weapons were used. Members of the team
that are selected to physically escort the protected
person should be armed with sidearms only. This allows
them to have both hands free to react to close-in threats.
6-262. The security plan must be flexible to allow for
itinerary and weather changes and mechanical failures.
Once the platoon leader has finalized the security plan,
he assembles the security team and conducts detailed
rehearsals.
Security During the Visit
6-263. Protection may be accomplished by establishing a
series of protective cordons around the protected person.
The protective measures used must allow the person
freedom of movement and must not interfere with the
conduct of his duties. Irritating conduct must be avoided
at all times.
Area Security 6-87
FM 3-19.4
6-264. MP must remain alert at all times and provide
constant security to the protected person. MP provide
security by—
•
Restricting
the
circulation
of
unauthorized
personnel around the protected person.
•
Remaining a short distance from the protected
person.
•
Taking
positions
where
they
can
observe
everything and everyone near the protected
person.
•
Securing the facility of the protected person, but
not entering if the protected person does.
•
Maintaining
constant
communications
with
higher HQ.
6-265. When required to secure a designated person
while moving, the mode of transportation must be
guarded at all times. Vehicle security normally requires
a protected vehicle to transport the designated person,
security vehicles to react to threats, and an advance
team to travel ahead of the motorcade to provide early
warning of threats or hazards before the main body is
affected.
6-266. Regardless of the method of transportation, each
situation must be evaluated to determine the degree of
security that is practical and necessary. Good judgment
on the part of the OIC will be necessary in solving the
various situations that may exist. Refer to FM 3-19.30
for more information about the security of designated
personnel.
6-88 Area Security
Chapter 7
Internment and Resettlement
I/R consist of those measures necessary to
guard, protect, and account for people that are
captured, detained, confined or evacuated by
US forces. In any military operation involving
US forces, accountability and the safe and
humane treatment of detainees are essential.
US policy demands that all persons who are
captured, interned, evacuated, or held by US
forces are treated humanely. This policy applies
f r o m t h e m o m e n t d e t a i n e e s b e c o m e t h e
responsibility of US forces and continues until
the time they are released or repatriated. (Refer
to the Geneva Conventions and AR 190-8, AR
190-14, AR 190-47, FM 3-19.40, and FM 27-10.)
OVERVIEW
7-1. The task areas that support the I/R function are
EPW and CI handling, US military prisoner handling,
and populace and resource control.
7-2. Captured, detained, and protected persons fall into
several different categories that include the following:
•
Enemy prisoners of war. EPWs are members of
an enemy armed force or militia who must be
guarded to prevent escape.
•
Civilian internees.
CIs are persons who have
committed an offense against or poses a threat to
friendly forces and must be guarded to prevent
escape, but are kept separate from the EPWs.
Internment and Resettlement 7-1
FM 3-19.4
•
Dislocated civilian. DCs are persons that have
been removed from their home because of war,
disaster, or other reasons. They may be refugees,
evacuee, stateless persons, or war victims. DCs
a r e p r o v i d e d s u s t e n a n c e , s a f e t y , a n d
h u m a n i t a r i a n a s s i s t a n c e . T h e y a r e k e p t
separate from EPWs and CIs. DCs are controlled
to prevent interference with military operations
and to protect them from combat or to relocate
them to safety. DC operations are discussed
later in this chapter.
•
US military prisoner. US military prisoners are
members of the US armed forces being confined,
awaiting trial, or waiting transportation to a
confinement facility outside the AO. They must
be guarded to prevent escape and cannot be
confined in immediate association with EPWs
and CIs, detainees, or other foreign nationals
who are not members of the US armed forces.
Refer to FM 3-19.40 for more information about
field confinement of US military prisoners.
7-3. EPWs are more specifically defined in FM 3-19-40
and the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, August 1949.
ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR AND CIVILIAN
INTERNEE
7-4. MP receive EPWs and CIs as far forward as
possible to prevent maneuvering units from being
burdened with large numbers of prisoners. Prisoners are
evacuated from the battle area as quickly as possible.
The capturing unit is responsible for guarding prisoners
until relieved. They field process captives using the Five
Ss-and-T method (Table 7-1).
7-5. The capturing unit is usually responsible for
delivering the detainees to the collecting point and the
7-2 Internment and Resettlement
FM 3-19.4
Table 7-1. Five Ss-and-T Methods
Procedure
Description
Search
Search each captive for weapons and ammunition, items of
intelligence value, and other inappropriate items.
NOTE: When possible, conduct same gender searches;
however, this may not always be possible due to speed
and security considerations. Therefore, perform mixed
gender searches in a respectful manner using all
possible measures to prevent any action that could be
interpreted as sexual molestation or assault. The on-
site supervisor must carefully control soldiers doing
mixed gender searches to prevent allegations of sexual
misconduct.
Silence
Do not allow the captives to speak or let anyone speak to
them. Speak only to captives to give orders.
Segregate
Segregate captives by rank, gender, nationally, and status.
Speed
Remove the captives from the battlefield as quickly as
possible.
Safeguard
Safeguard the captives according to the Geneva Conven-
tion and US policy. Provide medical care as needed.
Tag
Use DD Form 2745 and include at a minimum the following
information:
•
Date of the capture.
•
Location of the capture (grid coordinates).
•
Capturing unit.
•
Special circumstances of capture (how the EPW
was captured, for example, did he resist, did he give
up, and so forth).
nonwalking sick or wounded detainees to the nearest
medical-aid station for evacuation through medical
channels. Medically evacuated EPWs and CIs must be
physically segregated from friendly forces. Detainees are
normally turned over to MP at the nea rest EPW
collecting point or holding area. However, MP must be
prepared to go forward to accept EPW from capturing
units.
Internment and Resettlement 7-3
FM 3-19.4
7-6. Traditionally, MP operate collecting points in a
division AO and holding areas in a corps or EAC AO.
However, collecting points and holding areas should be
established wherever they are needed. The evacuation
chain normally moves from the division forward or the
central collecting point to corps holding area, then to
internment facilities. When circumstances permit, such
as taking advantage of available transportation, EPW
evacuation may bypass one or more stations and deliver
the detainees directly to a corps holding area or an
internment facility.
7-7. At collecting points and holding areas, MP work
c l o s e l y w i t h M I d e t e r m i n i n g i f c a p t i v e s , t h e i r
equipment, or their weapons have intelligence value. MI
interrogation teams conduct interrogations during field
processing. Other MI interrogations teams conduct
interrogations once EPW have been evacuated to more
permanent facilities.
OPERATE A DIVISION FORWARD COLLECTING POINT
7-8. The number of MP needed to operate a division
forward collecting point is based on the number and rate
of captives expected and the METT-TC. A division
forward collecting point must be mobile and modular
and able to set up, expand, and move quickly with little
or no notice. The general location of a forward collecting
point is given in the brigade OPLAN or OPORD. It often
is located near or in the brigade support area (BSA), but
should not allow detainees to observe activities in the
BSA. The collecting point should be situated close to an
MSR. This makes it easier to get supplies, such as
water, food, and barrier material from the BSA. Even a
moderate number of detainees will put a strain on the
equipment and supplies of an MP company. Minor
medical treatment may come from the MP company’s
combat medical section. However, the company’s
medical resources are very limited and are primarily
used to support medical needs within the company.
7-4 Internment and Resettlement
FM 3-19.4
Units needed to support the division forward collecting
point should be specifically tasked in the brigade
OPORD. MP leaders operating the division forward
collecting point will—
•
Conduct a reconnaissance before selecting an
exact location for the collecting point.
•
Locate the collecting point far enough from the
fighting to avoid minor shifts in the main battle
area (MBA) (normally 5 to 10 kilometers from
the MBA).
•
Notify the BSA TOC and the PM operations
section of the selected location. The BSA TOC
reports the exact location of the collecting point
to the brigade TOC. The brigade TOC notifies
subordinate units where the collecting point is
located so capturing units with detainees can
take them there.
•
Coordinate with the MI interrogation team if
they are to colocate their interrogation site with
the division forward collecting point.
•
Request
transportation,
additional
medical
supplies, and other support through the forward
support battalion.
•
Ensure that captives do not remain at the
division forward collecting point more than 12
hours before being escorted to the division
central collecting point.
7-9. A forward collecting point (Figure 7-1, page 7-6)
should not be set up near local inhabitants. Existing
s t r u c t u r e s l i k e v a c a n t s c h o o l s , a p a r t m e n t s , o r
warehouses should be used when possible. This reduces
construction requirements and minimizes logistical
requirements. If existing structures are not used,
detai nees, exc ept officers, can be ta sked to help
construct the collecting point. Prisoners may dig or build
cover to protect themselves from artillery, mortar, or air
attack. There is no set design for a forward collecting
Internment and Resettlement 7-5
FM 3-19.4
The size of the division forward collecting point and the placement of the
internal facilities (the water point, the latrine, and trenches or covers) will
vary based on the situation.
Construction supplies
Concertina
Barbed wire
Long and short pickets
Staples and anchors
Water cans
re
Fighting
L
position
cov
orhc
renT
W
LEGEND
Triple concertina
Trench or cover
Water cans or
W
lyster bag
Not to scale
L
Latrine
Figure 7-1. Division Forward Collecting Point
point. It can be anything from a guarded, roped off area
to a secured, existing structure. The collecting point is
built to suit the climate, the weather, and the situation.
When selecting a collecting point, consider the following:
•
The security of the detainees. The perimeters of
the enclosure must be clearly defined and
understood by the detainees.
7-6 Internment and Resettlement
FM 3-19.4
•
First aid. Injured or ill detainees require the
same treatment that would be given to US
casualties.
•
Food and water. Detainees may have been
without food or water for a long time before
capture.
•
Latrine facilities.
•
Field sanitation. If possible, have detainees
w a s h w i t h s o a p a n d w a t e r t o r e d u c e t h e
likelihood of disease.
•
Shelter and cover.
•
Language barriers. Provide interpreters and/or
instructional graphic training aids (GTAs) in the
EPW native language to compensate for the
language differences.
7-10. MP at collecting points normally receive detainees
directly from the capturing troops. MP then process the
detainees using the stress method. The six principles of
stress are search, tag, report, evacuate, segregate, and
safeguard.
7-11. Search. Search and inspect every EPW and CI
and their possessions. Use males to search male
prisoners and females to search female prisoners
wherever possible unless, in exceptional situations, an
individual of the opposite gender must conduct the
search. If this is the case, the search of the opposite sex
must be performed in a respectful manner using all
possible measures to prevent any action that could be
interpreted as sexual molestation or assault. Captives
may keep the following items found in a search:
•
Protective clothing and equipment (such as
helmets, protective masks and clothing) for use
during evacuation from the combat zone.
•
Retained property, such as identification cards
or tags, personal property having no intelligence
value, clothing, mess equipment (except knives
Internment and Resettlement 7-7
FM 3-19.4
and forks), badges of rank and nationality,
decorations, religious literature, jewelry, and
articles that have sentimental value.
•
Private rations of the EPW or the CI (in the
early stages of captivity).
7-12. Certain items are confiscated from the EPW or the
CI and never returned even if the EPW or the CI is
released or repatriated. MP confiscate the following
items when searching a captive:
•
Weapons and ammunition.
•
Items of intelligence value (maps, orders, and so
forth).
•
Other inappropriate items.
7-13. MP will coordinate with the MI interrogation
team s to determ i ne wh ic h i tems that have been
confiscated are of intelligence value. Personal items,
such as diaries, letters from home, and family pictures
may be taken by the MI teams for review, but are later
returned to the MP for return to the proper owner.
7-14. Currency will only be confiscated on the order of a
commissioned officer ( AR 190-8) and will be receipted
for using DA Form 4137.
7-15. Impounded articles are items taken from the EPW
or the CI during his internment because the articles
make escape easier or compromise US security interests.
Items normally impounded are cameras, radios, and all
currency and negotiable instruments found on the
captives. Refer to AR 190-8 and Defense Finance and
Accounting Service-Indianapolis (DFAS IN) 37-1 for
more information about confiscated and impounded
property.
7-16. MP prepare a receipt when taking property from a
detainee. The MP leader ensures that both the EPW or
the CI and the receiving MP sign the receipt (such as DA
Form 4137). MP consider bundling a detainee's property
or placing it in bags to keep each detainee's property
7-8 Internment and Resettlement
FM 3-19.4
intact and separate. They turn in cleared, confiscated
property as far forward as possible. MP maintain a strict
chain of custody for all items taken from the EPW or the
CI. They ensure that a receipt is obtained for any items
you release to any other MP or agency. The escorting MP
signs for and transports any remaining property that
was taken from the EPW or the CI.
7-17. Tag. Each EPW or CI is tagged by the capturing
troops using DA Form 2745 as a way of accounting for
them. MP check each tag at collecting points and holding
areas for—
•
The date and time of the capture.
•
The capturing unit.
•
The place of the capture (grid coordinates).
•
The circumstances of the capture (how the EPW
was captured).
7-18. The remaining information on the tag will be
included as it becomes available. DD Form 2745 is a
perforated, three-part form which has an individual
serial number. It is constructed of durable waterproof,
tear-resistant material with reinforced eyeholes at the
top of Parts A and C. The capturing unit attaches Part A
to the captive with wire, string, or another type of
durable material. They maintain Part B in their records
and attach Part C to the confiscated property so that the
owner may be identified later.
7-19. MP at division collecting points will ensure that
DD Form 2745 has been placed on any captive arriving
at the collecting point without it. MP may have to direct
the capturing units to complete the capture tag before
accepting prisoners into the CP. They ensure that the
following is done:
•
The tag is
filled out with the minimum
information listed above (also listed on the back
of Part C of the form).
Internment and Resettlement 7-9
FM 3-19.4
•
A statement is on the tag if the captive arrived
without a tag.
•
The captive is instructed not to remove or alter
the tag.
•
The
capture
tag's
serial number and
the
captive’s name are a nnotated on a locally
developed manifest.
7-20. MP receive detainees from capturing troops using
DD Form 2708 or a similar document. They ensure that
the receipt includes the following:
•
The capturing unit.
•
The time and date the detainee was received.
•
The identification of the detainee. (Use the
number on the capture tag when the detainee's
name, service number, grade, or date of birth is
unknown.)
•
The name, service number, grade, unit, and
signature of the MP who accepts custody of the
detainee.
•
A statement in the remarks section about the
general physical condition of the detainee. For
example, received without wounds, illness, or
injury or wounded in upper left arm.
7-21. Report. The number of captives at each collecting
point is immediately reported through MP channels.
This aids in the transportation and security planning
process.
7-22. Evacuate. Captives are humanely evacuated
from the combat zone through appropriate channels as
quickly as possible. MP do not delay evacuation to obtain
name, rank, service number, or date of birth. When MP
e v a c u a t e c a p t i v e s , t h e y g i v e t h e m c l e a r , b r i e f
instructions in their own language when possible.
Military necessity may require a delay in evacuation
beyond a reasonable period. When this occurs, MP
leaders ensure that there is an adequate supply of food;
7-10 Internment and Resettlement
FM 3-19.4
potable water; and appropriate clothing, shelter, and
medical attention available.
7-23. MP ensure that EPWs or CIs are not be exposed to
unnecessary danger and are protected while awaiting
evacuation.
7-24. Medical personnel determine if captives with
serious wounds or sickness should be kept in the combat
zone. Sometimes prompt evacuation would be more
dangerous to their survival than retention in the combat
zone.
7-25. Segregate. The senior officer or noncommissioned
officer in charge (NCOIC) having responsibility for
custody of the EPWs or CIs will designate how and at
what level to segregate them to ensure their security,
health, and welfare. EPWs and CIs are segregated into
the following categories:
•
Officers,
noncommissioned
officers
(NCOs),
enlisted, male, and female.
в–
Deserters and those that gave up without a
fight may be further segregated for their
protection.
в–
Nationality,
ideologies,
and
recognized
e t h n i c g r o u p s a r e u s e d f o r f u r t h e r
segregation.
•
CIs and/or refugees are physically separated
from the EPWs and CIs.
•
US military prisoners are physically separated
from EPWs, CIs, retained persons (RP), other
detainees (OD), and refugees.
7-26. MP do not use coercion of any kind to obtain any
information from the captives. This includes basic
information, such as name, rank, service number, and
date of birth, which they are required to provide under
the G enev a C on vention s. C oer cion or in hum ane
treatment of any EPW, CI, RP is prohibited and is not
j u s t i f i e d b y t h e s t r e s s o f c o m b a t o r w i t h d e e p
Internment and Resettlement 7-11
FM 3-19.4
provocation. Inhumane treatment is a serious violation
of international law and the Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ).
7-27. MP must not speak to captives except to give
orders or directions. Captives must not be allowed to
talk to or signal each other. This prevents them from
plotting ways to counter security and plan escapes.
Uncooperative captives may require a gag in certain
tactical situations. However, gags should be used for
onl y a s long as needed a nd shoul d not harm the
individual.
7-28. Safeguard. In order to safeguard captives
according to the Geneva Convention and US policy, MP
must—
•
Provide first aid and medical treatment for any
wounded or sick captive. The wounded and sick
will be evacuated separately through medical
channels using the same assets as those used to
medically evacuate US and allied forces.
•
Ensure that the detaining power provides their
captives with food and water. These supplies
must be the same as to that of US and allied
forces.
•
Provide firm and humane treatment.
7-29. Protecting detainees from attack, preventing their
escape, and quickly removing them from the battle area
further safeguards them. Detainees should not remain
at the division forward collecting point more than 12
hours, if possible. MP from the division central collecting
point move forward to escort detainees back to the
central collecting points. When detainees are field
processed and ready for evacuation, the MP at the
division forward collecting point will—
•
Report detainee status to the BSA TOC and
through MP channels to the PM.
7-12 Internment and Resettlement
FM 3-19.4
•
Request transport, rations, and water for the
detainees from the forward support battalion
supply officer (US Army) (S4).
•
Ensure that the receipts for the detainees are
ready for signing by the escort guards.
•
Ensure that items taken from detainees for
security or intelligence reasons are signed over
to the guards taking the detainees to the rear.
Ensure that each item is tagged to identify the
owner.
ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN A DIVISION CENTRAL
COLLECTING POINT
7-30. MP in GS are responsible for establishing and
maintaining the division central collecting point. They
collect detainees from the forward collecting points, then
process and secure them until corps MP come forward to
eva c u a te th em to th e r ea r . De ta i nee s sh ou l d b e
transferred to the corps holding area or directly to an
internment facility within 24 hours, if possible. One or
more GS MP platoons operate the division central
collecting point. The MP platoons are augmented by the
division band and/or by the corps MP. Augmentation is
based on the number and rate of captives expected.
Band Augmentation
7-31. When necessary, members of the division, corps,
or EAC band augment MP for EPW operations. They
guard detainees, operate dismount points, and provide
perimeter security. When band members are tasked to
augment MP for EPW operations they are OPCON to
the MP company for the duration of the mission and
released at the earliest opportunity to return to their
primary mission.
Internment and Resettlement 7-13
FM 3-19.4
Division Central Collecting Point
7-32. A central collecting point (Figure 7-2) is larger
than a forward collecting point, but the considerations
for setting up and operating the collecting points are
MP use existing structures when possible to reduce construction
requirements. The size and configuration of the compounds and the
placement of internal facilities field processing sites, and the MIs
screening site will vary based on the situation.
Not to scale
Tent, water,
latrine, and
trench or cover
W
W
in each
L
L
compound.
Construction
supplies
- General-pur-
pose medium
L
L
tent*
- Concertina
W
W
- Barbed wire
- Long and short
pickets
- Staples and
anchors
- Water cans
To the receiving and
LEGEND
processing area
NOTE:
Triple concertina
*20 EPWs per
general-purpose
Fighting position
medium tent
W
Waterpoint
authorized
L
Latrine
Figure 7-2. Division Central Collecting Point
7-14 Internment and Resettlement
FM 3-19.4
generally the same. The general location of the central
collecting point is given in the division OPORD or
OPLAN. It is located near the division support area
(DSA), preferably close to an MSR. This makes it easier
to obtain supplies, transportation, and additional
medical support from the DSA. Non-MP units should be
specifically tasked in the coordinating instructions of the
division OPORD to provide the support needed for the
division central collecting point. MP establishing the
collecting point should—
•
Coordinate with the unit responsible for the
area.
•
Conduct a reconnaissance before picking the
exact location for the collecting point.
•
Notify the PM and the operations cell of the
division rear CP (through MP channels) of the
collecting point location.
•
Coordinate with MI for the location of their
screening site.
•
Use existing structures when possible.
•
Request supplies through the division MP
company.
EVACUATE DETAINEES FROM A DIVISION FORWARD
COLLECTING POINT TO A DIVISION CENTRAL
COLLECTING POINT
7-33. The MP platoon charged with operating the
division central collecting point sends MP forward to the
division forward collecting point to escort detainees back
to the central collecting point. EPWs or CIs must be
evacuated from the division forward collecting point as
soon as possible, preferably within 12 hours. Before
e v a c u a t i n g t h e d e t a i n e e s , M P c h e c k s w i t h M I
interrogation teams for any property to be returned to,
or evacuated with, the detainees before they are moved.
Internment and Resettlement 7-15
FM 3-19.4
PROCESS ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR AND CIVILIAN
INTERNEES FOR EVACUATION
7-34. MP consider the physical status of detainees
before evacuating them. Categories for consideration are
the sick and wounded EPWs and CIs and the able-
bodied EPWs and CIs.
Sick and Wounded Enemy Prisoners of War and Civilian
Internees
7-35. The MP unit’s combat medical section will screen
detainees and decide if they will be escorted within MP
channels or medically evacuated. Generally, the walking
wounded go with the other detainees. Litter patients go
through medical channels. US forces provide the same
medical care for sick or wounded detainees as that given to
US and allied soldiers. Sick and wounded EPWs in the
combat zone are either treated and returned to the MP for
evacuation or stabilized and moved through medical
channels to the rear as far and as quickly as possible. If
medically evacuated, MP release the detainees to the
medical authorities using DD Form 2708 or other receipt.
The corps medical regulating officer (MRO) and the
receiving hospital commander coordinate with the
Internment Resettlement Information Center (IRIC) to
account for detainees in medical channels.
7-36. MP determine when security is required for sick or
w ou n de d d et a i n e es . N o r m a l l y , s i c k o r w ou n d e d
detainees requiring MEDEVAC are not likely to be a
security risk. Detainees well enough to present a
security risk can be treated by the combat medical
section and evacuated through MP channels as soon as
possible.
Able-Bodied Enemy Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees
7-37. Ab le-bodied detainees a re escorted during
movement to keep them from escaping. MP planning the
movement of detainees consider the following:
7-16 Internment and Resettlement
FM 3-19.4
•
The factors of METT-TC.
•
The number of detainees being escorted.
•
The condition and morale of the detainees.
Fatigued and cooperative detainees may not
require as many guards as those who are fresher
and more motivated.
•
The type of transport to be used. The type of
transport may influence the number of guards. A
planning consideration is one guard per 5 to 10
detainees. Aircraft is loaded according to the
airplane crew’s instructions.
•
The
terrain
conditions
along
the
route.
Detainees are more likely to attempt escape in
close terrain, like dense woods or jungle, and
may require more guards than open terrain.
•
The level of enemy activity along the route. The
more enemy activity in the area, the greater the
need for increased security precautions.
•
The
likelihood
or
presence
of
suspected
sympathizers and hostile local nationals along
the route.
•
The scheduled arrival of the transport. Use
backhaul transport whenever possible.
•
Transportation considerations. Transportation
depends on the availability of vehicles delivering
cargo in the nearby area.
•
The location of MP units or bases and base
clusters along the route that could provide
assistance during the movement.
•
The number and locations of rest stops (based on
the type of transportation, distance, and the type
of terrain).
7-38. Detainees are evacuated on foot only as a last
resort when transport is not available. Transportation
for detainees is arranged through the company HQ. At
division, the company HQ contacts the local movement
control officer.
Internment and Resettlement 7-17
FM 3-19.4
7-39. Before leaving for the collecting point, the MP in
charge of the escort must—
•
Conduct
a
route
reconnaissance
of
the
evacuation route.
•
Verify the location of the collecting point shortly
before departing, since BSAs move often.
•
Plan to stop only during daylight and outside
towns or installations if possible.
•
Designate guards to dismount at halts and
supervise the loading of the detainees.
•
Segregate detainees by category, if possible.
•
Secure the rations and the water. Use captured
enemy rations for the detainees, if available. Do
not allow the use of utensils or can openers.
•
Search detainees and baggage before loading in
any transport.
•
Use hand irons, leg irons, or special restraining
jackets on detainees, if necessary. If hand irons
are used, restrain the detainees with their arms
in front.
•
If
prescription
drugs are
needed,
disperse
according to the medical officer’s instructions.
EVACUATE ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR AND CIVILIAN
INTERNEES FROM A DIVISION CENTRAL COLLECTING
POINT
7-40. In order for MP to conduct successful evacuation of
EPWs and CIs, MP brief the escorts and the detainees.
Brief the Escorts
7-41. MP or other military personnel may perform as
guards in evacuating EPWs and CIs. Escort personnel
are briefed on evacuation considerations and escape
attempts. Considerations include the following:
7-18 Internment and Resettlement
FM 3-19.4
•
Procedures to ensure that the detainees follow
instructions and orders. Escorts must be firm,
but will not punish detainees who fail to obey.
•
Requirements
to
inspect
passenger
areas,
l a t r i n e s , a n d o t h e r p l a c e s t h a t m i g h t b e
accessible to detainees during transport. Escorts
should look for the means of escape or items that
could be used as weapons and remove the
latches from the latrine doors on transports, if
possible.
•
The necessity to talk to detainees only to give
orders and maintain control.
•
Emergency actions to secure and safeguard the
detainees in case of enemy contact. Members of
the escort element must know in advance which
of them will control the detainees and which
ones will react to the enemy.
Receive and Brief the Detainees
7-42. The senior MP in the escort element accepts
custody of the detainees. Each detainee is tagged and
field-processed before being accepted for evacuation.
Each detainee is accounted for using DD Form 2708 or a
similar receipt. The senior MP escort ensures that all
the detainees (and any equipment) are listed on the
custody receipt when custody is accepted. The escort
retains a copy of the custody receipt.
7-43. Before moving, the senior MP ensures that the
detainees have been briefed on movement discipline in a
language understood by them. MP use locally produced
GTAs to conduct the briefing. If available, an interpreter
should give the instructions to the detainees. They are
told—
•
The meaning of the word halt.
•
That the "silence rule" applies at all times (no
talking to the guards, no talking to each other).
•
The actions to take during an emergency.
Internment and Resettlement 7-19
FM 3-19.4
COLLECT ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR IN OTHER
OPERATIONS
7-44. Some offensive operations are executed so rapidly
that combat forces completely overwhelm the enemy
forces. These operations create special considerations
when planning EPW operations.
River Crossing Operations
7-45 . During ri ver crossing operations, a n EPW
collecting point is established on the nearside of the
river far enough to the rear to prevent interference with
tactical operations and to afford reasonable protection
against hostile fire. The EPWs are evacuated from the
b r i d g e h e a d a r e a a s s o o n a s p o s s i b l e t o p r e v e n t
congestion. The movement of EPWs from the farside of
the river must be coordinated with traffic control
personnel at the crossing sites. Secondary crossing sites
must be used if available.
Amphibious Operations
7-46. During amphibious operations, initially, the shore
pa r t y or he l ic op t er su pp or t t e a ms op er a t e E PW
collecting points in the beach support areas or LZs.
EPWs are evacuated from the collecting points to
designated ships by landing craft, a helicopter, or
amphibious vehicles. MP must coordinate with the
support force for the handling of EPWs once they have
been evacuated from the beachhead. EPWs are retained
in the objective area when facilities, supplies, and
personnel permit, consistent with the reasonable safety
of EPWs from enemy action.
Airborne Operations
7-47. During an airborne operation, the METT-TC
c o n s i d e r a ti o n s f o r c o l l e c t i n g E P W s i n c l u d e t h e
geographical location of the airhead, the tactical plan,
the availability of transportation, and plans for linkup
7-20 Internment and Resettlement
FM 3-19.4
with ground forces. EPWs are evacuated primarily by
air, especially during the early stages of the operation.
The EPW collecting point should be located near a LZ.
Plans should provide for the attachment of MP escort
guard units from the area EAC to the airborne force to
guard EPW during evacuation.
Armored Operations
7-48. Armored units are able to quickly penetrate deep
into hostile territory, possibly bypassing enemy strong
points. They may leave isolated enemy groups, which
would hinder the normal evacuation of EPWs. In this
circumstance, it may be necessary to hold EPWs in the
area of capture until they can be safely evacuated.
Air Assault Operations
7-49. During an air assault operation, organic military
police elements accompany assault elements to the
objective areas so that they can collect and evacuate
captured EPWs. Collecting points are established as
required near heliports or airfields. Arrangements must
be made for nondivisional MP to accompany designated
incoming or resupply aircraft to guard EPWs during
their evacuation from the division.
UNITED STATES MILITARY PRISONER
HANDLING (FIELD DETENTION FACILITIES)
7-50. Use field detention facilities (Figure 7-3, page 7-22)
to hold US soldiers in custody until they can be tried. Use
pretrial confinement only to ensure that an accused
appears at trial or when the seriousness of the offense or
the threat of violence makes confinement essential.
Whenever possible, soldiers awaiting trial remain in their
units. Only when they are a hazard to themselves or
others are they detained in pretrial confinement under
MP control.
Internment and Resettlement 7-21
FM 3-19.4
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7-22 Internment and Resettlement
FM 3-19.4
7-51. Use field detention facilities to hold sentenced
prisoners waiting for transfer to a theater's field
confinement facility (FCF) or the continental US
(CONUS). After trial, move convicted military prisoners,
whenever possible, to confinement facilities outside the
combat zone.
7-52. Each echelon commander sets procedures and
policies for detaining and confining soldiers. Often US
military prisoners in a combat zone are placed under the
control of an MP unit operating an EPW collecting point.
When small numbers of US prisoners are on hand, a
squad operating an EPW collecting point can best take
responsibility for the security of US prisoners. US
military prisoners must be kept physically apart from
EPWs. The policy and procedures for the care and
treatment of prisoners and the safeguarding of their
personal effects remain the same as that set for other
Army confinement facilities.
7-53. When prisoners are retained in-theater, separate
temporary detention facilities maybe set up in the corps
or division areas. US military prisoners should be held
in the division rear area for the shortest possible time.
At a division facility MP must—
•
Safeguard US prisoners.
•
Coordinate for their food and medical care.
•
Sustain them until they can be evacuated to a
corps facility.
•
Transfer them to the corps facility as quickly as
possible.
7-54. When the situation permits, MP from a detention
facility at the corps come forward to pick up the
prisoners at the request of the division's detention
facility commander. From the corps, the prisoners are
evacuated to the theater confinement facility.
7-55. If a temporary detention facility is set up in the
corps, it usually is operated by confinement teams from
Internment and Resettlement 7-23
FM 3-19.4
the confinement battalion in a personnel command
(PERSCOM). These teams are organized and trained to
perform confinement operations. But when corps
detention operations are limited to prisoners being
evacuated to a confinement battalion in the PERSCOM,
elements from a combat support company can operate a
temporary facility.
7-56. A field detention facility usually is located near
the MP company CP for food, transport, and supply
support. MP request construction materials from the
engineers to set up and run a facility. Equipment and
supplies must include the following:
•
Barbed wire (roll and concertina).
•
Fence posts.
•
Gates and doors.
•
Floodlights and spotlights, complete with wiring.
•
An emergency generator.
•
Mess equipment and equipment for cleaning
mess gear.
•
Water cans or lyster bags.
•
Computers.
•
First aid equipment and supplies. Spare clothing
and bedding.
•
Hand restrains or leg irons.
•
Heating equipment (cold climate).
•
Field sanitation supplies.
7-57. MP leaders ensure that the facility is large
enough to separate prisoners by prisoner status, custody
grade, sex, and rank. They locate the facility away from
a base's perimeter or any other area of increased risk.
7-58. The size of the facility is based on the number of
prisoners being detained. It may be a room or a tent, as
long as it provides shelter equal to that offered to other
soldiers in the combat zone. The physical criteria for
permanent and temporary structures are the same. MP
7-24 Internment and Resettlement
FM 3-19.4
use existing structures if you can. Otherwise, they use
tents. Field-expedient facilities must be approved and
periodically inspected by a medical corps officer or a
designated representative.
7-59. A team or a squad can operate a field detention
facility. A team operating a facility may organize so that
the team leader controls the operation and relieves the
guards. The other team members perform guard duty in
alternating 12-hour shifts. When operating a field
detention facility, the team—
•
Accepts sentenced soldiers on the written order
(currently a DD Form 2707) of a court martial
c o n v e n i n g a u t h o r i t y ( o r t h e a u t h o r i z e d
representative).
•
Ensures that the order states the name, grade,
social security number, organization of the
prisoner, offense for which convicted, and the
sentence.
•
Accepts the accused soldiers on the written order
(currently a DD Form 2707) of the accused's
commanding officer.
•
Signs a receipt for each prisoner and his
property on the correct and current form.
POPULACE AND RESOURCE CONTROL (PRC)
7-60. PRC operations are the responsibility of the
Assistant Chief of Staff, (Civil Affairs) (G5), the Civil
A f f a i r s O f f i c e r ( U S A r m y ) ( S 5 ) , a n d / o r t h e H N
authorities. (Refer to FM 41-10 for more information
about PRC.) PRC is often conducted in stability and
support operations where national authority has broken
down and the government cannot control the population.
MP supp or t PRC by condu cting L&O opera ti ons
designed to restore order and protect the people and
property.
Internment and Resettlement 7-25
FM 3-19.4
7-61. Insurgent organizations often emerge in unstable
regions. The aim of such groups is normally to overthrow
the established government. The less control the
government has, the greater the chance for insurgents to
s u c c e e d . T h e s e o r g a n i z a ti o n s t r y t o e x p l o i t t h e
population, often through threat and intimidation.
When insurgent organizations pose a threat to the
population, US forces employ PRC operations that are
designed to deny support and assistance to insurgents
by controlling the movement of people and goods and
restricting access to key facilities. Police activities, such
as roadblocks, cordons, curfews, access control, and
c h e c k p o i n t s
a r e
a n
i m p o r t a n t
m e a s u r e
i n
counterinsurgency, but have a high potential for harm if
used excessively or incorrectly. MP are specially trained
to conduct these operations, as a force focused on
security, protection, and assistance. MP are continually
trained on the prudent use of force, crisis management,
and operations requiring restrictive ROE.
7-62. PRC measures deprive insurgent organizations
support a nd ai d i n identifyin g their supporters.
Appropriate psychological operations (PSYOP) help
make these measures more acceptable to the population
by explaining their necessity. The government informs
the population that, although its actions may cause
inconvenience, the threat posed by the insurgents makes
them necessary.
7-63. PRC is often conducted in urban areas. The best
use of PRC comes before an organized insurgent
movement has the capability for armed conflict. MP
intelligence operations support PRC programs. Criminal
acts, such as robberies, kidnappings, terrorism, and
extortion, may accompany insurgent propaganda or
money-raising activities.
7-64. MP employ special control measures to aid
populace control that include the following:
•
Enforcing curfews.
7-26 Internment and Resettlement
FM 3-19.4
•
Enforcing movement restrictions.
•
Verifying travel permits and registration cards.
•
Assisting with rescue and evacuation operations.
•
Assisting with crowd control.
7-65. MP also employ control measures to aid in
resource control. They include—
•
Operating roadblocks and checkpoints.
•
Inspecting facilities.
•
Enforcing local regulations and guidelines.
•
Controlling rations.
•
Assisting with amnesty programs.
7-66. PRC operations play a vital role in winning
s u p p o r t a w a y f r o m t h e i n s u r g e n t t h r e a t a n d
encouraging support for the goals of the legitimate
government.
7-67. MP leaders responsible for supporting PRC must
plan for the protection of their forces as these types of
operations have a history of turning violent very quickly.
DISLOCATED CIVILIAN RESETTLEMENT
7-68. International law recognizes the humanitarian
practice of providing temporary refuge to anyone,
regardless of nationality, who may be in imminent
physical danger for the duration of the threat. It is US
policy to grant temporary refuge in a foreign country to
nationals of that country, or of a third nation, solely for
humanitarian reasons when extreme or exceptional
circumstances exist.
7-69. Civil affairs (CAs) units are trained to plan,
coordinate resources for, and monitor the handling of
DCs. (Refer to FM 41-10 for more information about DC
operations.) Whenever possible, resources and control
should be arranged with the HN, other governmental
Internment and Resettlement 7-27
FM 3-19.4
a g e n c i e s , a n d n o n g o v e r n m e n t a l a n d p r i v a t e
organizations.
7- 70 . To a ssist in pr operly identifying DCs, the
definition of the five subdivided categories is provided.
These subcategories are defined by legal and political
considerations as the following:
•
Displaced person. A civilian who is involuntarily
outside the national boundary of his country in
time of conflict.
•
Refugee. A civilian who, because of real or
imagined danger, has left home to seek safety.
•
Evacuee. A civilian removed from his place or
residence by military order.
•
Stateless person. A civilian who has been
denationalized, whose country of origin cannot
be determined, or who cannot establish his right
to the nationality claimed.
•
War victim. A classification that describes
civilians suffering injuries, loss of a family
member, or damage to or destruction of his home
resulting from war.
7-71. DC operations are a special category of PRC. The
goal of DC operations is to minimize civilian interference
with military operations, relieve suffering, and protect
civilians from combat operations or other threats. When
the HN cannot or is unwilling to control DCs, MP may
be required to collect, evacuate, and resettle them.
7-72. When directed to conduct DC operations, MP
leaders coordinate with CA and the PM to establish a
traffic control plan. The plan includes the primary and
alternate routes used to move DCs and the location for—
•
The TCP.
•
Holding areas.
•
Roadblocks and checkpoints.
7-28 Internment and Resettlement
FM 3-19.4
7-73. Temporary route signing is not normally an
effective control measure during DC operations. Even
when the signs are posted in the local language, DCs
usually ignore them.
7-74. MP collect and process DCs in the same manner as
EPWs with regard to the difference in their status–they
are detained personnel, not prisoners. As such, security
of the I/R facility should not give the impression that it
is a prison.
7-75. MP collect DCs at assembly points located away
from the MSR and areas where combat operations are
heaviest. They move DCs along selected routes that
have the least military traffic. DCs will normally require
frequent rest stops. When possible, holding areas for
rest stops should be near a source of water and provide
protection from the elements or hostile fire.
7-76. MP provide close-in and standoff security for DCs
while en route to a civilian camp or collection point.
When required, MP provide external and internal
security at a DC camp. Within limits, DCs are allowed
freedom of movement once they have been resettled. MP
and CA must continue to closely monitor DCs at
collection points and camps. Recent operations that
involve large numbers of DCs have been known to turn
violent very quickly. Such a situation can be avoided
when DCs are treated with respect and dignity.
EVACUATION OPERATIONS
7-77. In addition to EPWs, CIs, and DCs, MP are often
required to evacuate other selected individuals or groups
from collecting points, holding areas, or areas of
hostility. The safe evacuation of noncombatants, US
diplomats, or US military prisoners requires close
coordination and extensive planning. This type of
operation is referred to as noncombatant evacuation
operations (NEO). Such missions require contingency
Internment and Resettlement 7-29
FM 3-19.4
plans and unit SOPs that are specifically designed for
these special operations. Unit SOPs should cover the
evacuation of designated personnel by ground, air, rail,
and water. When directed to conduct evacuation
operations, MP leaders task organize based on METT-TC
and the availability of MP. They perform extensive
r e h e a r s a l s t o s u c c e s s f u l l y c o n d u c t e v a c u a t i o n
operations.
7-78. When a HN can no longer ensure the safety of US
civilians in a foreign nation, US military forces may
evacuate them. MP are often required to provide
security and escort for evacuees from their point of
origin to their destination. A NEO is usually a joint
operation conducted with other US and HN government
agencies and CA.
7-79. An MP platoon is most likely employed for these
o p e r a t i o n s . T h e p l a t o o n l e a d e r c o n d u c t s d i r e c t
coordination with CA and the higher HQ. The platoon
leader begins TLP, issues a WO to the platoon, and
requests information that includes the—
•
Screening and identification system being used.
•
Number of evacuees, their point of origin, and
their anticipated direction of movement and
destination.
•
Location of marshalling areas, collection points,
and AAs.
7-80. If time permits, the platoon and squad leaders
conduct a reconnaissance of the evacuation route. The
purpose of the reconnaissance is to prepare an overlay
which is then used to plan control and special security
measures at critical areas along the route. If helicopter
support is available, platoon and squad leaders conduct
an aerial reconnaissance of the evacuation route. An
aerial reconnaissance will normally take less time and
the observation of the terrain around the route is much
better by air than from the ground. At a minimum, a
map reconnaissance must be conducted.
7-30 Internment and Resettlement
FM 3-19.4
7-81. During the reconnaissance, the platoon leader
selects possible rest areas and identifies friendly units
along the route. He identifies critical areas, such as
defiles, bridges, and areas where enemy activity is
likely. He marks these areas on the overlay and plans
for special security measures at these locations.
7-82. The platoon leader coordinates with the movement
control center to ensure that the evacuation route does
not interfere with the movement of friendly forces. If
available, he coordinates for fire support along the route,
normally at critical sites that were identified during the
reconnaissance.
7-83. The platoon leader coordinates for MEDEVAC and
vehicle recovery. His plan includes emergency reaction
to the following:
•
An air attack.
•
An artillery attack.
•
An ambush.
•
A riot.
7-84. NEO are normally carried out according to the
guidelines established by CA and US policy. MP may be
required to screen for authorized personnel to determine
who may actually be evacuated. There are generally
three groups of personnel. They are—
•
Group I. Group I includes US citizens, officials,
dependents, tourist, business persons, and non-
US family members when the father, mother or
wife is a US citizen.
•
Group II. Group II includes foreign nationals
holding diplomatic papers, visas, or passports
who receive Department of state approval.
•
Group III. Group III includes all others, to
include HN citizens, who do not fit into the first
two categories.
7-85. Persons who fall into any of these groups and
require immedi ate medica l attention a re a lwa ys
Internment and Resettlement 7-31
FM 3-19.4
evacuated first. MP should give special consideration to
the elderly and children.
7-86. MP brief the evacuees on discipline and the
actions to take during emergencies. The briefing must be
in a language that all the evacuees understand. The CA
unit or HN agency should provide an interpreter. The
briefing should cover all aspects of the evacuation. This
will help calm the evacuees and instill confidence and
cooperation.
7-87. The platoon provides security of the evacuees at
the marshalling, evacuation, and holding areas and the
reception station. The level of protection depends on the
level of the threat. Methods of security depend on the
type and location of the facilities used. At a minimum,
MP must be prepared to provide interior guards for
group areas, establish perimeter security, and operate a
dismount point to restrict access to the evacuees.
7-88. During movem ent, the platoon escorts the
evacuees by providing close-in security at the lead,
middle, and end of the convoy or in front of and behind a
single transportation vehicle. MP use a scout vehicle
that travels 3 to 5 minutes ahead of the convoy to alert
the main body to danger or delays. If a threat tries to
disru pt the evacu ation oper a tion or destr oy the
evacuation vehicle, selected MP teams protect the
evacuees as other teams counter the threat within the
ROE. Thr ou gh out the evac uation operation, MP
maintain all-around security, protection, and evacuee
accountability.
7-32 Internment and Resettlement
Chapter 8
Law and Order
This chapter addresses the L&O function across
the full spectrum of military operations. Refer to
Append ix K for m ore inf or mati on about civil
disturbance control measures.
OVERVIEW
8 -1 .
L&O op er a tio ns con si st o f th ose me a sur es
necessary to enforce laws, directives, and punitive
regulations; conduct criminal investigations; and
c o n t r o l p o p u l a t i o n s a n d r e s o u r c e s t h a t e n s u r e
commanders the existence of a lawful and orderly
e n vi r on m en t . MP en f o r c e l a w s a n d a p p r o p r i a te
commander directives. They maintain liaison and
coordinate joint L&O operations with other DOD police
organizations; HN military and civilian authorities;
multinational police organizations; and US federal,
state, and local police agencies. A coordinated law
e n f o r c e m e n t e f f o r t r e m o v e s t h e c o n d i t i o n s a n d
opportunities that promote crime, thereby preventing
diversion of military resources and maintaining military
discipline.
8-2. The evolving criminal threat affects military
operations and requires commanders to minimize that
threat to preclude negative impacts on forces, resources,
and operations. The importance of the criminal threat to
military operations is a current, as well as future reality.
Nationalist ideologies, the instability of a government to
effectively govern and control its population, and the
breakdown of government infrastructures will foster the
Law and Order 8-1
FM 3-19.4
li nkage between c rim inal organiz ations a nd the
government and its armed forces.
8-3. MP provide the capability to train foreign MP or
assist in the reorganize of indigenous constabulary
forces as part of stability and support post conflict
operations. Under the provisions of and exceptions to
Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act, MP provide
initial assistance and training to foreign military and
civilian police forces or assist in the creation of these
forces where national authority has broken down.
Additionally, MP forces provides short-term emergency
L&O capabilities until the foreign military and civilian
forces are functional.
8-4. MP and the USACIDC are the primary collectors of
police information and criminal intelligence. They
gather information through contacts made with the local
populace and from conducting combined and joint
patrols with HN military and civilian police agencies.
MP and CID conduct field interviews and gather police
i nf or m a t i o n fr o m s u rv ei l l a n c e o p e r a t i o n s . Th e y
investigate serious offenses and maintain a close liaison
with the HN or allied civilian and military police
a g e n c i e s . T h i s p o l i c e i n f o r m a t i o n a n d c r i m i n a l
intelligence is collected, analyzed, and shared with the
intelligence community and contributes to the police
information assessment process (PIAP).
8-5. The police activities that support L&O operations
include the following:
•
Criminal investigations.
•
Police information collection and dissemination
of the information.
•
Traffic accident investigations.
•
Antiterrorism force protection support.
•
Crowd control.
•
US customs operations.
•
Use of MWDs.
8-2 Law and Order
FM 3-19.4
8-6. The enforcement of military laws, orders, and
regulations is a command responsibility, as well as an
MP responsibility. Each commander is responsible for
maintaining order and discipline in the unit. To support
commanders, the PM plans the use of MP assets to help
enforce military laws, orders, and regulations.
8-7. MP performing L&O operations enhance and
extend the tactical commander’s C2 by—
•
Aiding commanders in maintaining combat
strength.
•
Helping prevent diversion of military resources.
•
Suppressing opportunities for criminal behavior
by US and non-US personnel or elements.
•
Assisting and protecting military forces.
•
Helping ensure the discipline of US forces.
•
Assisting intelligence organizations in obtaining
a true tactical intelligence picture by providing
criminal and operational data and intelligence.
LAW AND ORDER AUGMENTATION
DETACHMENT
8-8. The technical and supervisory expertise to support
L&O operations in a mature theater is provided by L&O
t e a m s o r g a n i z e d u n d e r a n L & O a u g m e n t a t i o n
detachment. The L&O teams are designed to give the
commander the additional flexibility and capability in
any environment to conduct a wide range of force
protection mission requirements, to include split-based
operations. This enables the supported commander to
perform needed L&O missions while other MP assets
are conducting MMS, AS, or I/R.
8-9. When these teams are not available or have not
arrived in theater, L&O missions are prioritized with
other MP combat support missions and are usually not
full-scale dedicated operations. The theater commander
Law and Order 8-3
FM 3-19.4
determines when he can afford to dedicate MP assets to
L&O operations.
8 - 1 0 . A c o m p l e te 4 5 -p e r s o n L & O a u g m e n t a t i o n
de tac h me nt in clu d es a d etac h m en t C 2 te am , a n
operations team, a desk team, five MP investigation
(MPI) teams, five traffic accident investigation (TAI)
teams, and two force protection teams. Refer to Figure
8-1.
Detachment HQ
1-0-3 = 4 x 1
Operations teams
2-0-9 = 11
Desk team
TAI team
MPI team
FP team
0-0-6 = 6 x 1
0-0-2 = 2 x 5
0-0-2 = 2 x 5
0-0-2 = 2 x 2
Figure 8-1. L&O Augmentation Detachment
8-11. When deployed, detachment and teams are under
the overall operational C2 of the PM deployed for the
o p er a t i o n . Th o s e t e a m s m a y b e a t ta c h e d to MP
battalions and companies, as the situation requires. In
war, the L&O augmentation detachment is assigned to
an MP brigade and further attached to MP battalions
and division MP companies as required. The L&O
augmentation detachment consists of the following
teams:
•
Operations. The operations team provides C2;
s u p e r v i s e s t r a f f i c , f o r c e p r o t e c t i o n , a n d
investigative operations; and provides an
8-4 Law and Order
FM 3-19.4
evidence custodian to ensure that the chain of
custody for evidence is maintained.
•
Desk. A desk team establishes and operates the
MP desk and coordinates law enforcement patrol
activity.
•
MPI. MPI teams provide the technical personnel
to investigate crimes that do not fall within the
investigative purview of the CID and conduct
surveillance operations. Each MPI team consists
of two MP with additional skill identifier (ASI)
V5. These teams have no organic vehicles or
communications capabilities.
•
TAI. TAI teams provide the technical personnel
t o c o n d u c t T A I s . B a s e d o n o p e r a t i o n a l
requirements, TAI teams augment PM and MP
organizations to ensure unimpeded movement
and regulation enforcement on the MSRs. Each
TAI team consists of two MP with ASI Q9.
•
Force protection. Force protection teams provide
technical personnel to assist in the safeguarding
of personnel and equipment according to the
c o m m a n d p o l i c i e s a n d f i e l d o p e r a t i n g
procedures. The role of the force protection team
i s t o a s s i s t , i n s p e c t , a n d e d u c a t e . F o r c e
p r o t e c t i o n t e a m s p r o v i d e e x p e r t i s e f o r
safeguarding personnel and PRC for refugees,
d i s p l a c e d p e r s o n s , a n d c i v i l d i s t u r b a n c e
operations. They enhance the unit’s ability to
ensure that soldiers and units are aware of
appropriate personal security safeguards.
Additionally, force protection teams assist
customs operations teams in the establishment
of sterile areas. Each force protection team
consists of MP NCOs.
8 - 1 2 . M P b r i g a d e c o m m a n d e r s e m p l o y L & O
augmentation teams based on the METT-TC to support
the US forces operating within the brigade AO. While
the number of teams is based on the troop population
Law and Order 8-5
FM 3-19.4
supported, whenever possible the team AO should
coincide with the MP battalion and the division AO. The
detachment HQ, operations, desk, and force protection
teams should be collocated with the supported battalion
HQ or division PM. If transportation requirements for
these teams exceed the capabilities of the operations
team, the supported unit must provide transport.
COMPANY AND PLATOON LEVEL LAW AND
ORDER OPERATIONS
8-13. As previously stated, L&O augmentation teams
may not arrive until a theater matures and L&O
operations become the priority. Corps and division MP
units must be prepared to conduct full-scale L&O
missions. When ordered to establish L&O operations,
t h e c o m p a n y c o m m a n d e r d e t e r m i n e s m i s s i o n
requirements that include the following:
•
Special equipment (vehicles, communications,
and barricades or traffic cones).
•
Specialized personnel support (a linguist, HN
police, and PSYOPS or civil affairs personnel).
•
CCIR.
•
Threat assessments from MI and the CID.
8-14. The commander and platoon leaders conduct a
map reconnaissance of the AO and determine the
platoon areas of responsibility. When the tactical
situation allows and adequate structures are available,
the commander selects a building that is centrally
located within the AO to establish the MP operations
center. The facility should, at a minimum, offer areas for
the following:
•
An MP station desk.
•
Offenders processing.
•
Good radio transmissions.
•
Arms, evidence, and property storage.
•
Suspect detainment.
8-6 Law and Order
FM 3-19.4
•
Latrine facilities.
8-15. The company operations section operates the MP
operations center and organizes it into MP sections that
include—
•
MP operations.
•
Administration.
•
Force protection.
•
An MP desk.
•
MP investigations.
•
TAI.
•
MWDs (if attached or assigned).
•
Customs (if attached or assigned).
8-16. MP that a re school-trained and have been
awarded an ASI should be in charge of the appropriate
section.
MILITARY POLICE OPERATIONS AND ADMINISTRATION
OPERATIONS
8-17. The company operations sergeant is in charge of
the day-to-day activities of the MP operations center. He
instructs platoons regarding patrol patterns and
distribution and coordinates for specialized equipment
and personnel. He reviews all MP reports and the MP
blotter. The center maintains close liaison with HN and
al li ed m il itary a nd c ivi lia n poli ce a genci es. The
o p e r a ti o n s s e r g e a n t d i r e c ts a n d s u p e r v i s e s t h e
administration section and provides guidance to other
sections.
FORCE PROTECTION
8-18. The company physical security NCO (ASI H3)
coordinates and directs the efforts of force protection for
th e c o m m a n d e r . T h e fo r c e p r o t e c ti o n s e c t i o n i s
responsible for reviewing the security measures of all
critical facilities and assets within the AO. The force
Law and Order 8-7
FM 3-19.4
protection NCO reviews points designated as critical by
the senior commander and identifies criminal and
operational threats. He develops a draft mission-
essential or vulnerable area (MEVA) list and submits
the list to higher HQ for approval. Once the list is
approved, he conducts vulnerability assessments of
points on the MEVA list. He applies risk analysis
procedures according to AR 190-51, AR 190-11, and DA
Pamphlet 190-51 and ensures that appropriate army
antiterrorism force protection standards are met
according to AR 525-13. He reassesses assets for
addition to or deletion from the MEVA list or changes in
priority. The role of the physical security NCO is to
assi st, i nspect, and advise comm anders on force
protection measures.
MILITARY POLICE DESK
8-19. The MP desk coordinates MP patrol activity,
documents those activities, and reviews incident reports
to ensure accuracy and completeness. The MP desk is
a l s o r e s p o n s i b l e f o r r e f e r r i n g i n c i d e n t s t o t h e
appropriate investigative agency for further action.
8-20. The MP desk operates continuously during the
conduct of L&O operations. It should be located as near
as possible to the center of the L&O operational area,
and have communications throughout the AO. When
possible, existing facilities should be used for the MP
s t a t i o n , b u t r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r c o m m u n i c a t i o n s ,
transportation, and proximity to troops and facilities
may rule out existing structures. The MP desk should be
located within a reasonable distance of the HN police
desk during stability, support, or other operations
involving interaction with HN authorities. It may be
necessary to establish substations if the area covered or
the volume of activity is large. The MP station should
have, at a minimum, the following:
•
Areas and lighting for preparing reports and
other paperwork.
8-8 Law and Order
FM 3-19.4
•
Communications
with
the
MP
elements
performing L&O and the command and populace
that the L&O operations are supporting.
•
Detention areas where persons can be secured
by a guard and/or physical constraints, such as a
detention cell.
•
Latrine facilities.
8-21. MP establish joint service, multiagency, or
multinational operations when appropriate for the
populace being provided L&O support or as directed.
The PM establishes agreements before initiating joint
o p e r a t i o n s t o p r e v e n t c o n f l i c t s i n j u r i s d i c t i o n ,
documentation, and communication. Those agreements
may be informal at first but should be formalized as soon
as the situation permits. Refer to FM 19-10 for more
information about operating a MP desk.
MILITARY POLICE INVESTIGATIONS
8-22. Crimes occurring within an AO may require an in-
depth investigation, depending on the seriousness of the
offense and the availability of investigative personnel.
Commanders report minor offenses within the unit area
to the MP for statistical purposes, but ma y stil l
investigate the offense themselves.
8-23. MPI investigators handle the most criminal
offenses not investigated by CID or the unit commander.
MPI normally investigate those offenses cited in AR 190-
30. The commander ensures that only school trained
(ASI V5) personnel are assigned to the MPI section to
investigate crimes. Outside continental US (OCONUS)
areas, MPI investigate off-post incidents according to
SOFA and/or the US and HN agreements.
8-24. CID investigates serious offenses. It has elements
in support of all echelons down to division level. CID
operates across the full spectrum of army operations,
Law and Order 8-9
FM 3-19.4
with an emphasis on logistics security (LOGSEC) during
wartime operations.
8-25. When MPI has purview to investigate a crime,
they use the following investigation measures:
•
Take control of the crime scene, ensuring that
the crime scene is protected and secure.
•
Identify the personnel involved, both suspects
and witnesses.
•
Identify the type of offense or offenses that have
been committed.
•
Process the crime scene using notes, sketches,
and photographs.
•
Collect and secure the physical evidence.
8-26. Once the investigator has processed the crime
scene, he pursues leads and conducts investigation
activities that include—
•
Interviewing victims, suspects, subjects, and
witnesses, and obtaining written statements
from them.
•
Preparing case documents and the required
reports.
•
Collecting
related
documents
necessary
to
support the investigation.
•
Coordinating with the Staff Judge Advocate
(SJA).
•
Submitting the final draft report for review by
the MPI supervisor.
8-27. The commander appoints an evidence custodian to
m a i n t a i n e v i d e n c e o b t a i n e d d u r i n g c r i m i n a l
investigations. The evidence custodian coordinates the
needed laboratory examinations and ensures the proper
d i sp o s i t i o n o f e v i d e n c e . I t m a y b e n e c e s sa r y t o
coordinate with the CID for this support.
8-28. Joint investigative activities, such as drug or black
market suppression teams, may involve investigators
8-10 Law and Order
FM 3-19.4
from CID, MPI, or other US services or agencies. Such
operations may require close liaison and cooperation
with HN or allied civil or military agencies.
8-29. Refer to FM 19-20 for more information about
criminal investigation techniques and procedures.
TRAFFIC ACCIDENT AND INVESTIGATION
8-30. MP help reduce nonbattle casualties and the loss
of equipment by ensuring that vehicles are operated
according to regulations and determining the cause of
a c c i d e n t s . T r a f f i c e n f o r c e m e n t s u p p o r t s t h e
commander’s intent in HNs by reducing the likelihood
that military traffic will be seen as a threat to the native
population. Thorough investigations of traffic accidents
can—
•
Identify
the
personal,
environmental,
and
equipment factors that caused or contributed to
the accident.
•
Document the facts of the incident for future
criminal or civil actions.
8-31. Traffic enforcement measures vary according to
the operational and political environment. Those
measures may include the following:
•
Operator license and dispatch checks.
•
Safety inspection checkpoints.
•
Vehicle load and route restrictions enforcement.
•
Speed control measures.
8-32. Traffic accidents are investigated on the scene
whenever the tactical situation permits. MP investigate
traffic accidents involving military personnel or vehicles
within their AO. When the HN or other authorities have
primary responsibility for an accident investigation
involving US forces or equipment, MP conduct a
concurrent investigation.
Law and Order 8-11
FM 3-19.4
8-33. The first MP that responds to a traffic accident is
responsible for securing and protecting the accident
scene. When necessary, they administer medical
attention to the injured persons and implement traffic
control measures. MP safeguard classified materials and
take the appropriate action to identify and contain
hazardous materials at the scene.
8-34. The TAI team takes control of the accident scene
when it arrives. Whenever possible a school-trained (ASI
Q-9) traffic accident investigator processes the accident
scene.
8-35. Once the TAI team receives a briefing from the
senior person present, it takes the following steps to
investigate the accident:
•
Collect physical evidence to include evidence of
drug or alcohol involvement.
•
Photograph the scene.
•
Interview victims and witnesses.
8-36. Once the TAI team has the necessary information,
it clears the scene. To do this it ensures that the vehicles
and debris are removed and reestablishes traffic flow.
The TAI team then prepares a final report and submits
it to the proper authority.
8-37. Accidents involving fatalities or life-threatening
injuries require a serious incident report (SIR) according
to AR 190-40.
8-38. Refer to FM 19-25 for more information about
traffic enforcement techniques and conducting TAIs.
MILITARY WORKING DOGS
8-39. MWD teams further enhance L&O and customs
operations with capabilities to detect explosive devices
and residue and controlled substances, and detect, track,
control, and apprehend personnel.
8-12 Law and Order
FM 3-19.4
8-40. Mission support requirements determine the
number of functional MWD teams that make up a
wartime, mission-oriented MWD team. These mission-
oriented MWD teams are assigned to the PM. MWD
teams conducting explosive or narcotic detection are
unable to provide security for themselves and require
security by the supporting unit.
8-41. Explosive, narcotics, and patrol teams each consist
of three handlers and three working dogs. This allows
each team to provide 24-hour support for a mission that
requires one MWD or up to three short-duration
missions. There is also a kennel master team, which
provides technical supervision and is responsible for
establishing kennel operations.
8-42 . Th e explosive or patr ol team pr ovides the
capability to detect explosive devices or residue in
support of personal protection, MOUT, health and
welfare, crime scene, and customs operations. When not
required for explosive detection, this team functions as a
patrol team.
8-43. The na rcoti c and patrol team provi des the
capability to detect controlled substances in support of
the crime scene, health and welfare, and customs
operations. When not required for narcotics detection,
the team functions as a patrol team. The patrol team
provides the capability to search for, track, detect, and
control personnel and augment security in support of
personal protection, MOUT, criminal apprehension,
force protection, EPW, refugee or displaced person, and
crowd control operations.
8-44. Refer to AR 190-12 for more information about the
MWD program, to include standards for selecting and
r e t e n t i n g h a n d l e r s a n d d o g s , t r a i n i n g t e a m s ,
constructing kennels and training areas, maintaining
and disposing of dogs, using teams, and using force.
Refer to DA Pamphlet 190-12 for more information about
the MWD program.
Law and Order 8-13
FM 3-19.4
UNITED STATES CUSTOMS SUPPORT
8-45. Units (and individuals) returning to the customs
territory of the US (CTUS) have the responsibility to
ensure that their vehicles and equipment meet US
c u s t o m s , o t h e r g o v e r n m e n t a l a g e n c i e s , a n d U S
Department of Agriculture (USDA) standards. Units
request and receive customs support to ensure that they
comply with all the established requirements. Trained
military personnel, normally from the unit deploying to
CTUS, conduct military customs inspections in the
absence of US customs personnel. Senior military
customs inspectors (SMCIs) train and supervise unit
p e r s o n n e l o n c u s t o m ’ s r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s a n d
requirements. SMCIs supervise the customs operations.
The SMCIs supporting the theater deploy as part of the
customs operations team.
CUSTOMS OPERATIONS TEAM
8-46. The customs operations team supports the
commander’s requirement to ensure that personnel,
e q u i p m e n t , a n d m a t e r i e l m e e t U S c u s t o m s ,
i m m i g r a t i o n , U S D A , a n d o t h e r f e d e r a l a g e n c y
requirements for redeployment back to the CONUS. A
complete customs operations team includes an SMCI
supervisor team and two 5-member SMCI inspection
teams.
8-47. The customs operations team, when deployed, is
assigned to the Army service component command
(ASCC) PM. It may be under the OPCON of or attached
to the theater support command (TSC) PM.
8 - 4 8 . T h e S M C I s u p e r v i s o r p r o v i d e s t e c h n i c a l
supervision, staff planning, and coordination for mission
requirements with the Army staffs and agencies,
redeploying units, and US federal agencies.
8-49. Two SMCI teams provide the capability to support
two ports of embarkation (POEs). Before arrival at the
8-14 Law and Order
FM 3-19.4
P O E , t h e s e t e a m s a d v i s e d e p l o y i n g u n i t s o n
requirements and procedures to preclude delays or
rescheduling of unit and strategic lift transportation.
Team members train and supervise selected redeploying
unit personnel as inspectors to augment the SMCI team.
REDEPLOYMENT OPERATIONS
8-50. AR 700-93 provides guidance on processing and
shipping DOD-sponsor retrograde cargo destined for the
CTUS. In order for a unit to redeploy successfully, it
must—
•
Coordinate for site requirements and standards.
•
Establish wash and holding areas.
•
Determine
the
existing
USDA
preclearance
requirements.
•
Use the expertise of assigned SMCI.
Site Requirements
8-51. A site includes those areas necessary to getting
the unit’s vehicles and equipment ready for the customs
inspection and shipment. A suitable site includes the
following areas:
•
Staging.
•
Download.
•
Vehicle or equipment wash area.
•
Inspection.
•
Holding (sterile).
8-52. Staging Area. A staging area is an open area
large enough to handle the number of vehicles and
equipment being processed. Units often underestimate
the amount of space needed for the staging area. An
accurate count of vehicles and personnel redeploying to
the CTUS must be received to accurately determine the
staging area requirement.
Law and Order 8-15
FM 3-19.4
8-53. Download Area. The download area is an area
that must have a base of cement, asphalt, or clean or
coarse gravel at least 6 inches deep. Vehicles arriving
from the staging area download equipment here. The
download area breaks out equipment and vehicles for
wash area activities. Vehicles are taken to the vehicle
wash area and equipment is taken to the equipment
wash area.
8-54. Vehicle and Equipment Wash Area. A vehicle
and equipment wash area or wash site consists of a
hardstand area with adequate drainage, water outlets,
high-pressure steam cleaners, and ramps. Most wash
sites resemble a birdbath using long tubes with holes in
them. A vehicle passes by the tubing while it pressure
sprays the sides and undercarriage of the vehicle. Unit
personnel clean vehicles to free them of dirt, vegetation,
insects, and so forth, and check for and clean up fluid
spillage. Equipment is cleaned meticulously, ensuring
that there is no debris or soil present. When vehicles and
equipment are assumed to be clean, they are reloaded
and moved to the inspection area.
8-55. Inspection Area. The inspection area is where
t h e v e h i c l e s a n d e q u i p m e n t a r e i n s p e c t e d f o r
cleanliness. If vehicles and equipment are clean, they
are moved to sterile holding areas. If they are dirty, they
are moved to a spot-wash area and spot-cleaned.
Vehicles and equipment that were spot-washed are
reinspected, and if clean, go to the sterile holding area.
8-56. Holding Area. Cleaned vehicles and equipment
are placed in the holding area. Unit personnel guard the
holding area to ensure that unit members or other
personnel do not contaminate or place restricted or
contraband items in vehicles or equipment. The holding
area must be free of USDA concerns. Some of these
concerns include the following:
•
Weeds. The download area must be vegetation
free.
8-16 Law and Order
FM 3-19.4
•
Soil. The download area must be completely free
of soil and soil particles.
•
Pests. Insects and their debris or excrement are
a major concern in the download area. Ensure
that insects are kept out of the download area.
NOTE: SMCIs assist units in identifying and
eliminating USDA concerns.
8-57. Vehicles and equipment in the holding area will be
loaded onto rail, ship, or other means of transport for
redeployment.
MULTINATIONAL LAW AND ORDER
OPERATIONS
8-58. Multinational police operations may involve joint
patrols with allied forces, HN military or civilian police,
or a combination of these options. Commanders may also
choose to operate certain patrols or stations with MP
forces of one nationality, with all police operations
answering to a combined, multinational operations cell.
B e c a u s e e a c h n a t i o n a l i t y h a s i t s o w n s t a tu t e s ,
regulations, policies, and traditions, police forces should
enforce laws only on persons normally under their own
jurisdiction. This reduces confusion about authority and
the potential ill feelings that can result when citizens
are controlled by other foreign forces. If a situation
occurs involving HN or third-nation citizens, the MP
should contain or monitor the situation until the
appropriate police agency can respond to control the
situation. MP may be required to control the situation
(consistent with ROE or ROI) if the appropriate agency
is not reasonably available or the situation is so severe
that a delay would endanger lives.
8-59. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 prohibits the
military from training HN civilian police. However, MP
may be directed to provide initial assistance and
training to foreign military or civilian police forces or
Law and Order 8-17
FM 3-19.4
assist in the creation of these forces, where the local
na t i o n a l a u t h o r i t y ha s b r o k e n dow n . Th i s i s a n
exception to Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act.
MP, when directed, conduct training for foreign military
police and assist in reorganizing local constabulary
forces during stability and support operations. MP
provides short-term emergency L&O capabilities until
th e for eign mili tar y or c ivili an polic e for ces are
functional.
8-60. US military training assistance of foreign military
or civilian police normally includes the following:
•
Special forces. These detachments teach basic
skills needed to perform security duties such as
small arms training, unit security tactics, radio
procedures, and human rights observation and
safeguard.
•
Military
police.
MP
teach
investigative
t e c h n i q u e s , l a w e n f o r c e m e n t s k i l l s , a n d
confinement operations.
•
Civil affairs. CAs coordinate with the HN to
e f f e c t i v e l y i n t e g r a t e t r a i n i n g w i t h t h e
established political system. They also provide
language interpreter support.
•
Psychological operations. PSYOPS personnel
work to gain and maintain acceptance of the
training effort by the civilian population and
encourage their accep tance of the new or
reconstituted civilian police force.
8-61. The US ambassador and country team provide
guidance for implementing all US Department of Justice
(USDOJ) training, including police training. US military
forces conduct training under the direction of the civilian
authorities, and only until the International Criminal
Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP)
s t a f f o r a n o t h e r a g e n c y c a n a s s u m e t r a i n i n g .
Contractors working for ICITAP, USDOJ, or another
international agency may also provide instruction and
8-18 Law and Order
FM 3-19.4
assistance, and frequently assume those duties from the
m i l i t a r y a s t h e s i t u a t i o n m a tu r e s . U S m i l i t a r y
involvement in training foreign military or civilian
police should not normally exceed 180 days following the
end of a conflict.
8-62. MP train HN military or police forces to maintain
L&O, using current operational and investigative
techniques. They may also act as the agents to equip
th o se fo r c e s w i th th e m a te r i a l n e e de d i n p o l i c e
operations and train HN personnel on the use and
maintenance of that equipment. The training provided
may be formal or informal instruction, or consist of on-
the-job training with MP working with, and monitoring
the performance of, HN police authorities. Classroom
instruction is based on training packages developed
locally or by higher HQ, or exportable training packages
from a service school.
8-63. Once the basics of law enforcement have been
learned or reinforced, new or reconstituted police may
benefit most from working together with MP in joint
operations. ROE and ROI may vary by situation, but
s o m e b a s i c g u i d e l i n e s f o r w o r k i n g w i t h n e w l y
constituted or reconstituted police agencies are—
•
Allowing the HN authorities to handle situations
involving local nationals. US forces assists HN
police and monitor the situation. US forces
should not appear to be giving orders to the HN
agents.
•
Ensuring that US forces take care that they do
not embarrass or demean HN agents, especially
i n v i e w o f t h e p o p u l a c e . S o l d i e r s m u s t
understand that negative behavior toward their
HN counterparts could seriously damage the
relationship between US forces and the HN
authorities.
•
Ensuring that US forces are aware of and
s e n s i t i v e t o t h e c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n s a n d
Law and Order 8-19
FM 3-19.4
standards of the HN. What may be acceptable in
one culture may be, at best, ill-mannered and
possibly, a serious insult or even criminal
behavior in another culture.
•
Ensuring that US forces appear publicly to be
respectful of its agents and leadership and be
confident in their abilities. This helps the HN
force be effective and respected by the local
populace.
8-64. As HN authorities develop professionally and gain
the confidence of the HN population, the role of US
forces changes. MP shift from being the sole providers of
L&O, to being role models and advisors for local
authorities, to being monitors of HN police activity.
8-65. Combined police operations reinforce training and
provide HN police with the mobility, security, and
communications to operate more effectively while
conserving critical personnel resources. MP provide
support through training and the following, usually
combined, operations:
•
Law
enforcement,
security,
and
criminal
information support to the indigenous police
f o r c e t o i n c l u d e L & O o p e r a t i o n s a n d
administration in a democratic society.
•
Patrol and desk.
•
Traffic control.
•
PRC and civil disturbance.
•
MWD.
•
Physical security.
•
Personnel security.
•
Area and route security.
•
Counterdrug.
•
Antiterrorism.
8-66. In most cases, US forces will continue to exercise
jurisdiction over their own forces, especially for offenses
8-20 Law and Order
FM 3-19.4
of a purely military nature. Local government, once
reestablished, may choose to assume jurisdiction in
serious or high interest offenses involving US personnel
or according to the applicable SOFA or other agreement.
MP, in the absence of competent civil authority,
establish control over the movement of personnel and
supplies and guard critical food supplies and material
during production and storage. As the local police and
paramilitary forces become effective and assume more
security responsibilities, MP elements reduce their
activity. They withdraw their support gradually,
ensuring that the HN has adequate resources to carry
out ongoing programs.
Law and Order 8-21
Chapter 9
Police Intelligence Operations
The PIO support, enhance, and contribute to
t h e c o m m a n d e r ’ s p r o t e c t i o n p r o g r a m ,
s i t u a t i o n a l a w a r e n e s s , a n d b a t t l e f i e l d
visualization by portraying relevant threat
information that may affect the operational and
tactical environment. MP and the CID gather
police, criminal, or combat threat information
during the performance of their functions.
OVERVIEW
9-1. MP collect and share information during the conduct
of their day-to-day operations. This information, which
may be police, criminal, or combat, is provided as input to
the intelligence collection effort and turned into action or
reports. The PIO function ensures that information
collected during the conduct of MMS, AS, I/R, and L&O is
reported up through the proper channels so that it can be
analyzed. MP perform PIO while conducting combat
support tasks, such as—
•
Checkpoints and roadblocks.
•
TCPs.
•
Field interviews.
•
Criminal investigations.
•
Reconnaissance (zone, area, and route).
9-2. Collecting police information during MP activities
under the functions of MMS, AS, and I/R may result
primarily in combat information, but may lend to police
or criminal information. Likewise, the police collection
efforts during full-scale L&O operations may result in
Police Intelligence Operations 9-1
FM 3-19.4
combat information. MP apply lessons learned from
peacetime, conflict, and war environments to the PIO
function to gain the most advantage for performing the
function. The MP platoon is capable of operating in all
functions, day or night, and in various terrain, weather,
and visibility conditions. An MP platoon operates
independently over large, dispersed areas. MP, along
with MI, engineers, and NBC reconnaissance, are key to
the IPB (refer to FM 34-130 for more information about
IPB). They are collectors of information in the rear area
during sustaining operations or anywhere throughout
the battlefield. MP gather police information from
contacts that are often very valuable in substantiating
or verifying other sources of information. These sources
include the following:
•
Daily contact with the local populace.
•
Combined police patrols with HN military and
civilian police agencies.
•
Close liaison with local, HN, and multinational
police agencies.
•
Field interviews.
•
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).
•
Private volunteer organizations (PVOs).
9-3. Refer to FM 3-19.1 for more information about the
processes discussed in this chapter.
POLICE INFORMATION ASSESSMENT
PROCESS
9-4. The PIAP is a tool used to contribute to the PIO
function. Information gained through the PIAP may
contribute independently or simultaneously to the all-
source analysis product (ASAP) and the IPB process.
The PIAP, the ASAP, and the IPB enhance and support
the commander’s force protection program, situational
awareness, and battlefield visualization. However, the
PIAP independently or collectively—
9-2 Police Intelligence Operations
FM 3-19.4
•
Provides
the
commander
with
information
necessary to improve measures to protect the
forces.
•
Provides information that clarifies the threat
and operational situation.
•
Reduces
opportunities
for
threat
forces
to
disrupt military operations and inflict US or
friendly casualties.
9-5. The commander and his staff continually monitor
the environment at the tactical level consistent with the
METT-TC. They apply the military aspects of terrain
(OCOKA) as a means of protecting the force. PIO clarify
the evolving criminal threat picture for commanders
through the PIAP. This helps planners predict threat
courses of action aga inst our forces or protected
populations.
9-6. MP use PIAP to continuously collect, organize,
interpret, and report police and criminal information in
support of the IPB. The PIAP consists of 6 steps. Refer to
Table 9-1, pages 9-4 and 9-5.
POLICE INFORMATION
9-7. MP gather police information actively or passively.
Active collecting efforts result from a direct tasking, and
passive collecting efforts result from normal, daily MP
operations.
ACTIVE MODE
9-8. MP perform the PIO function in the active mode
when directed by the higher HQ. In this mode, the MP
platoon conducts specific missions with the intent to
actively collect information. Specific MP activities (such
as setting up a checkpoint or roadblock) are performed to
specifically fulfill a requirement (such as looking for
individuals who are in possession of or have knowledge
of others in possession of weapons, US military property,
Police Intelligence Operations 9-3
FM 3-19.4
Table 9-1. Police Information Assessment Process
Step
Action
1.
Determine the scope of the PIAP by—
•
Conducting a detailed mission analysis.
•
Reviewing the mission of the higher HQ and the
commander’s intent.
•
Reviewing the CCIR.
•
Reviewing mission priorities.
•
Determining the AO and area of interest (AI).
•
Reviewing the IPB estimates of the higher HQ.
•
Determining the required information products.
2.
Assemble the working aids and—
•
Post the applicable maps.
•
Acquire crime statistics and other related data.
•
Obtain language aids, such as cultural references and
interpreters.
•
Acquire the necessary automation equipment.
3.
Determine information requirements and coordinate access to
data by—
•
Coordinating with the CID for access to available
criminal information developed by CID programs.
•
Determining police and criminal gaps in the designated
geographical area.
•
Determining the requirement for information collectors to
fill police and criminal gaps.
•
Coordinating with the Intelligence Officer, US Army (S2),
the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2 (Intelligence), PSYOP,
and other agencies to determine if the information is
already available.
9-4 Police Intelligence Operations
FM 3-19.4
Table 9-1. Police Information Assessment Process (Continued)
4.
Recommend and supervise police and criminal collection efforts
by—
•
Coordinating with the S2, the G2, the SJA, the CID, and
other applicable police agencies before initiating a
collection effort.
•
Determining which police and criminal information tasks
will be assigned to the MP and the CID.
•
Determining the criteria to satisfy information
requirements.
•
Providing collectors with reporting instructions (such as
the reporting frequency and the report format).
•
Monitoring information collection efforts to prevent
duplication of efforts.
5.
Process police and criminal raw data by—
•
Assembling and assessing the reliability of the data
(according to the assessment criteria established
above).
•
Integrating information from the collectors (the MP and
CID agents in the field).
•
Evaluating the data to determine if it meets the
requirements.
•
Developing criminal trends and indicators.
6.
Report and disseminate police and criminal information
assessment by—
•
Recommending MP and CID actions to improve and
focus future collection efforts.
•
Reporting police and criminal information assessments
to the S2, the G2, and other MP units.
•
Reviewing and ensuring that the release of police and
criminal information assessments do not violate
established guidelines and constraints.
NOTE: Refer to Appendix E of FM 3-19-1 for a
further discussion of PIAP.
and so forth). MP gain valuable police, criminal, and
combat information while conducting these operations.
A standardized checklist enhances the information
Police Intelligence Operations 9-5
FM 3-19.4
c o l l e c t i o n e f fo r t a n d a i d s i n t h e a n a l y s i s o f th e
information collected. The checklist indicates a pattern
in the behavior of the local nationals. It shows what the
local nationals are transporting, to where they are
transporting the items, and so forth. The checklist may
include—
•
The number and types of vehicles stopped.
Identifying marks, license plate numbers, and
any signs displayed on the vehicles are recorded
and reported.
•
The number of passengers in the vehicle. The
nationality, age, and sex mix of the passengers
are recorded and reported.
•
The type and quantity of cargo.
•
The vehicle’s point of origin and destination.
•
The stated reason for travel by the passengers.
•
The description of arms, ammunition, explo-
sives, and sensitive items found and confiscated
from the vehicle.
•
The possible or actual sightings of weapons,
explosives, or threat forces by the passengers.
•
The condition of the passengers.
•
The reporting of anything unusual by the
passengers.
PASSIVE MODE
9-9. Every MP conducts the PIO function in the passive
mode during their normal day-to-day operations. In the
passive mode, PIO are not a stand-alone function and, as
suc h , i t c ann ot b e s epar ated fr om the o ther MP
functions. If while performing MMS, AS, I/R, and L&O,
MP receive, observe, or encounter police, criminal, or
combat in form ation, they immediately sub mi t a
SALUTE, SPOTREP, or other appropriate report to
relay information up the chain of command. The
information is then integrated into the on-going PIAP
9-6 Police Intelligence Operations
FM 3-19.4
and forwarded to the higher echelon S2 and G2 for IPB
applications.
RESPONSIBILITIES
9-10. The responsibilities for the PIO function start
with the MP company. The company has the overall
responsibility of supervising the collecting and reporting
of information to the higher HQ. (Refer to FM 34-2 for
more information about the collection management
process). Training scenarios can be developed to enhance
the PIO information collecting process of both the active
and passive mode. Additionally, the scenarios stress
c o l l e c t i v e t r a i n i n g ( s u c h a s p r o c e s s i n g p o l i c e
information) and individual training (such as improving
interpersonal communication and interview skills).
PLATOON LEADER
9-11. When the platoon leader is tasked to conduct PIO
collecting and reporting, he initiates TLPs for the
mission. The platoon leader—
•
Coordinates with the higher HQ for the CCIR,
police and criminal information requirements
(PCIR), and threat estimates. The PCIR allows
additional focus on local threats.
•
Establishes liaison with civil and MP forces and
law enforcement agencies in the AO.
•
Coordinates with the local and HN police to
determine the existence of organized crime in
the AO and the identification of current and
emerging criminal leaders and associates.
•
Coordinates with the local and HN police and
the populace to identify the types of criminal
activity (such as smuggling, counterfeiting,
narcotics, extortion, and so forth) in the AO.
•
Reports information of potential intelligence
value by—
Police Intelligence Operations 9-7
FM 3-19.4
в–
Gathering collected information from squads
and teams.
в–
Consolidating original reports and sketches
o f p o t e n t i a l i n t e l l i g e n c e v a l u e a n d
fo rw a r di n g t he m t h ro ug h i nt e l l i g e nc e
channels for analysis and a determination of
their intelligence value.
PLATOON MEMBERS
9-12. The platoon sergeant, squad, and team leaders,
down to the junior member of the platoon share in
seeking out sources of information by—
•
Collecting R&S information that supports the
commander’s overall PIOR and PCIR collection
e f f o r t s w h i l e o n a r o u t i n e p a t r o l . T h e y
accomplish this by—
в–
Noting terrain information pertaining to
streets, roads, canals, subterranean systems,
built-up areas, cities and villages, and the
impacts of weather on the terrain.
в–
Collecting information on progovernment
and antigovernment individuals and groups
who might disrupt L&O during protests,
strikes, riots, and other spontaneous or
organized efforts.
в–
Identifying private establishments that may
be a target or whose presence or operations
contribute to the disruption of L&O (such as
gun shops, pawnshops, and liquor stores).
в–
Identifying critical infrastructures such as
power stations, water works, radio and
t e l e v i s i o n s t a t i o n s , t e l e p h o n e a n d
c o m m u n i c a t i o n
f a c i l i t i e s ,
p u b l i c
transportation, and other establishments
that may be critical to the sustenance of the
community.
9-8 Police Intelligence Operations
FM 3-19.4
•
Identifying EPWs, stragglers, and DCs who may
have information of potential intelligence value
and reporting it to the chain of command. Use a
SPOTREP, SITREP, or a SALUTE report or a
format directed by the chain of command to
report information. SOPs may also be used.
Refer to Appendix D for report formats
Police Intelligence Operations 9-9
Appendix A
Metric Conversion Chart
A-1. Use Table A-1 to convert from US to metric
measurement and metric to US measurement.
Table A-1. Metric Conversion Chart
US Units
Multiplied By
Equals Metric Units
Length
Feet
0.30480
Meters
Inches
2.54000
Centimeters
Inches
0.02540
Meters
Inches
25.40010
Millimeters
Miles (statute)
1.60930
Kilometers
Miles (nautical)
1.85320
Kilometers
Yards
0.91400
Meters
Area
Square inches
6.45160
Square centimeters
Square feet
0.09290
Square meters
Square yards
0.83610
Square meters
Volume
Cubic inches
16.38720
Cubic centimeters
Cubic feet
0.02830
Cubic meters
Cubic yards
0.76460
Cubic meters
Gallons
3.78540
Liters
Fluid ounces
29.57300
Milliliters
Quarts
0.94600
Liters
Metric Conversion Chart A-1
FM 3-19.4
Table A-1. Metric Conversion Chart (Continued)
US Units
Multiplied By
Equals Metric Units
Weight
Ounces
28.34900
Grams
Pounds
453.59000
Grams
Pounds
0.45359
Kilograms
Short tons
0.90700
Metric tons
Long tons
1.01600
Metric tons
Metric Units
Multiplied By
Equals US Units
Centimeters
0.39370
Inches
Meters per second
2.23700
Miles per hour
Millimeters
0.03937
Inches
Kilometers
0.62137
Miles (statute)
Kilometers
0.53960
Miles (nautical)
Meters
3.28080
Feet
Meters
39.37000
Inches
Meters
1.09360
Yards
Area
Square centimeters
0.15500
Square inches
Square meters
10.76400
Square feet
Square meters
1.19600
Square yards
Volume
Cubic centimeters
0.06100
Cubic inches
Cubic meters
35.31440
Cubic feet
Cubic meters
1.30790
Cubic yards
Milliliters
0.03380
Fluid ounces
Liters
1.05700
Quarts
Liters
0.26420
Gallons
Weight
Grams
0.03527
Ounces
Kilograms
2.20460
Pounds
Metric tons
1.10200
Short tons
A-2 Metric Conversion Chart
Appendix B
Media Relations
Military operations are carried out, especially
in the initial phases, under the full glare of
public scrutiny. The press can distribute reports
and pictures faster than the news can be
released by the command by using satellites
and modern comm unications technology.
Incidents, sometimes embroidered or slanted
towards a partisan viewpoint, are screened on
the television the same day and in the countries
that are parties to the dispute and their allies.
OVERVIEW
B - 1 . J o u r n a l i s ts f a l l b a c k o n s p e c u l a t i o n w h e n
information is withheld. Such speculation, although
usually inaccurate, is often near enough to the truth to
be accepted as such by large sections of the public and
e v e n b y t h e g o v e r n m e n t s . B e l l i g e r e n t s f i n d i t
advantageous to leak part of a story to the press to build
public support for their position. On occasion, such
activities can grow into a fully orchestrated press
campaign.
MEDIA INTERACTION
B-2. Establish procedures for media interaction and
incorporate them into SOPs. Know what (such as a
simple theme which they can tie their responses back to)
to discuss with the media and what to refer to the PAO.
Ensure that deploying units receive a predeployment
briefing from the installation PAO to clarify what may
Media Relations B-1
FM 3-19.4
or may not be discussed with the media. Ensure that
this action occurs before any exposure to the media. Do
not make off-the-record statements in briefings or
discussions with the media. Public or media knowledge
of any classified activity associated with an operation
d oe s n ot i m p l y or m ea n th a t t h e i n f or m a t i o n i s
unclassified or may be released or confirmed.
B-3. Ensure that MP are courteous, respond candidly,
speak effectively, and continue the mission when
interacting with broadcast and print reporters and
photographers. This relationship with the media
prevents any misgivings. The media will report more
accurately and not feel that information is being
withheld. The media provides its audiences with real-
time information of varying accuracy and completeness.
B-4. The media can be a valuable tool or a lost asset
during military operations. It can potentially have a
quick and pervasive impact on the plans and operations
of commanders, and can change the public’s opinions
and perceptions about military operations. It can target
audiences whose support is crucial to the desired end
state of an operation. MP may be the centerpiece for
humanitarian assistance or during operations to relieve
suffering. A reporter or a photographer may show up at
a c h e c k p o i n t o r a T C P w h e r e l o c a l n a t i o n a l s
(belligerents) are refusing to cooperate. Ensure that the
media is not only documenting the activities and
behavior of the belligerents, but is also recording the
military’s response to the incident.
B-2 Media Relations
Appendix C
Training Execution Model
The TEM allows numerous rehearsals and
identification of the TTP required for mission
accom p lishm ent. It causes each soldier,
regardless of position, to understand the unit
leader's plan with contingencies and the TTP
required. It allows junior leaders and soldiers to
see the big picture and understand the tactical
environment. Place the company as the OC for
the subordinate platoons, and place the platoon
leader as the OC for the subordinate squads
during internal evaluations.
OVERVIEW
C-1. The TEM ensures that soldiers are trained to
standard, not to time. It is derived from train-up or
certification exercises (CERTEXs) before deploying to
the National Training Center (NTC).
TASK IDENTIFICATION
C-2. The TEM takes place after the METL is approved.
The approved METL, coupled with an assessment
process (such as external or internal evaluations),
determines the collective and individual tasks to be
covered during training exercises. Once these tasks are
identified, implement the following eight-step TEM:
Step 1. Back brief number 1.
Step 2. Back brief number 2.
Step 3. Rock drill.
Training Execution Model C-1
FM 3-19.4
Step 4. Subunit leaders walk-through.
Step 5. Subunit leaders walk-through with troops.
Step 6. Dry run on the actual lane.
Step 7. Execution.
Step 8. After-action review (AAR).
C-3. The TEM steps complement but do not replace the
TLPs. The following outline explains the eight-step
model applicable to an MP platoon. The TEM assumes
that the platoon's collective task lists are approved at
the appropriate level, the OCs are certified and trained,
and all resources are available.
STEP 1: BACK BRIEF NUMBER 1
C-4. During step 1 (Figure C-1), the OC issues the
mission order to the platoon leader. He briefs the
platoon’s mission using a sand table, which the platoon
built. The platoon leader provides a mission back brief
to the OC. The back brief eliminates any confusion or
misunderstanding at the very beginning of the mission
or plan cycle. The platoon leader’s back brief is only with
the OC. This allows the interaction between the OC and
the platoon leader to take place while leaving the
platoon leader’s credibility intact. With no subordinate
present, the environment to learn and ask questions is
established.
C-5. In a nearby AA, leaders train soldiers on critical
individual soldier tasks that support the platoon’s
collective tasks. Here, the PSG checks on the focus and
progress of those individual tasks that have been
assessed as weak. Additionally, AA actions in step 1
focus on PCIs.
STEP 2: BACK BRIEF NUMBER 2
C-6. During step 2 (Figure C-2, page C-4), the platoon
leader returns to the sand table area where the mission
order is received from the OC. He briefs the tentative
C-2 Training Execution Model
FM 3-19.4
Lane expert or OC
Unit leader
Co cdr, OC plt lane
1. The OC issues the mission
Plt ldr, OC sqd lane
order to the unit leader.
2. The unit leader provides a
mission back brief to the OC.
3. The unit leader begins the
tentative plan.
4. The unit leader issues the
WO.
Standard
• The leader back briefs the
Team leader
PSG or sqd ldr
OC on the mission.
• The leader understands
the TTP.
AA
The team leader
• The OC releases the leader to
conducts the PCIs.
prepare the plan.
Soldiers train on the
critical tasks.
Figure C-1. Back Brief Number 1
p l a n t o t h e O C . O n c e t h e O C v e r i f i es th e M TP
standards and pertinent TTPs, the platoon leader briefs
squad leaders on the same sand table. The OC remains
present to hear the interaction among the platoon's
leadership. After the squad leaders are briefed, the
platoon leader conducts the leader's reconnaissance. If
any modification to the tentative plan is required based
on the reconnaissance, the platoon leader briefs the OC.
He briefs the squad leaders again if changes are
approved. The interaction and planning get more
focused after the leader's reconnaissance.
STEP 3: ROCK DRILL
C-7. During step 3 (Figure C-3, page C-5), the platoon
leader and squad leaders conduct a rock drill on a
Training Execution Model C-3
FM 3-19.4
Lane expert or OC
Unit leader
Is
s
s
Co cdr, OC plt lane
u
u
b
e
Plt ldr, OC sqd lane
le
o
a
r
d
d
e
e
r
r
s
to
PSG supervises
Sqd ldr/tm ldr
Standard
the tm ldr training.
• The leader prepares the
tentative plan.
Tm ldr
• The leader conducts the
conducts:
leader’s reconnaissance.
AA
crew
• The leader issues the order to
Soldiers conduct
drills
critical individual
the OC on the sand table.
and
tasks.
• The OC releases the leader to
COMMEX.
issue the order to the
subleaders.
• The leader describes the
action to the subleaders using
the sand table.
Figure C-2. Back Brief Number 2
terrain model that the platoon constructed of the actual
training lane. The OC is in an overwatch position. He
always assesses the interaction of the leadership and
serves as the OPFOR for the rock drill. The platoon
leader talks or walks through the plan on the terrain
model with all the squad leaders.
C -8 . I n rea c t i o n t o t h e O P F O R, l e ad e r s so l id i fy
contingencies based on the interaction on the terrain
model. The OC's "what if " drills will usually trigger
detailed planning. The credibility of the platoon
leadership is still intact because the interaction and
pertinent questions are not being asked in front of the
C-4 Training Execution Model
FM 3-19.4
soldiers. The soldiers are in the AA continuing their
individual training and preparing equipment based on
the WO received. Locate the PSG in the AA to coach
team leaders in their AA activities. Once the OC is sure
that the platoon leaders understand the plan, he
releases them to conduct a walk-through.
The unit leader conducts a rock drill
The OC in the overwatch
on a sand table with subleaders.
assesses the interaction
and TTPs and acts as
an OPFOR.
AA
Standard
Soldiers conduct
special rehearsals,
• The unit leader talks through the plan on
such as test firing or
the terrain model with the subleaders.
pyro safety brief.
• The OC is the OPFOR who interacts with
the unit leaders throughout the plan.
• The leader plans contingencies based on
the OC's interaction.
• The OC releases the unit leaders after
they understand the plan and the TTPs.
Figure C-3. Rock Drill
STEP 4: SUBUNIT LEADER’S WALK-THROUGH
C-9. During step 4 (Figure C-4, page C-6), the platoon
l e a d e r di s pl a y s a l l t e r ra i n fe a t u re s a nd c o n t r o l
measures. During the walk-through, the platoon
leadership imitates the movement selected, such as
traveling, traveling overwatch, and bounding overwatch.
The platoon leadership uses actual radio procedures and
call signs according to the platoon's plan. The platoon’s
leadership demonstrates its grasp of the plan and the
Training Execution Model C-5
FM 3-19.4
mission without troops, showing that credibility is still
sound.
C-10. Once the OC is satisfied that the platoon's
leadership knows the tasks, he releases them to brief the
soldiers on the sand tables previously mentioned. Squad
leaders ensure that their team leaders and soldiers
understand the mission by showing them on the sand
table what their part of the mission is and how it fits
into the overall scheme of maneuver.
AA
“Football field” walk-through
Soldiers conduct
critical
Standard
individual tasks.
• The subleaders walk through the actions.
• The subleaders imitate the movements.
• The subleaders use actual radio call signs
or procedures.
• The OC observes and releases leaders
for the next step.
• The unit leader briefs the soldiers in the
AA on the sand table or the terrain table.
Figure C-4. Subunit Leader’s Walk-Through
STEP 5: SUBUNIT LEADER'S WALK-THROUGH WITH THE
TROOPS
C-11. During step 5 (Figure C-5), the soldiers are
assembled and briefed on the mission using sand tables.
The MP teams walk and talk through the mission. The
platoon walks through its action of the plan; and the
soldiers react and dress on their team, squad, and
platoon leaders. Shout commands out so that all can
hear. Imitate movement as well as radio procedures, call
C-6 Training Execution Model
FM 3-19.4
signs, fire commands, calls for suppression, and so forth.
The OC who plays the OPFOR and interacts with the
platoon through its leaders observes the platoon. Often,
while conducting the walk-through with the troops it
will be necessary to stop and inform soldiers of any risk
hazards and individual responsibilities. The platoon's
interaction on the field is a critical component of mission
accomplishment. The OC only releases the unit for the
next step if he is satisfied that the unit understands the
leader’s plan and the required TTP.
Issue warning OPORD
Subleaders walk-through
All now in final rehearsal
• The subleader walks through the actions with troops on the
sand table.
• The troops act on the leader's commands.
• The subleader imitates movements.
• The subleader uses actual radio call signs or procedures.
• The OC observes and releases the leaders for the next step.
Figure C-5. Subunit Leader’s Walk-Through with the Troops
STEP 6: DRY RUN ON THE ACTUAL LANE
C-12. During step 6 (Figure C-6, page C-8), the unit
follows the leader’s plan and conducts a dry run of the
mission on the actual training lane. The OC observes to
ensure that the platoon follows its plan and conducts the
mission to MTP standards. The dry run identifies weak
subtasks and allows the platoon to retrain or repeat the
dry run. This is a full dress rehearsal and ensures that
the platoon is meeting the standard. If the platoon
Training Execution Model C-7
FM 3-19.4
performs satisfactorily on the dry run, the OC releases it
to execute at full combat speed.
The unit conducts a dry run of the mission following the leader’s plan on the
actual lane.
Standard
• The unit conducts the mission to the MTP
standard.
• The unit identifies the weak subtasks.
• The unit identifies the terrain-induced
Actual lane
dry run.
weakness to the plan.
• The unit retrains the weaknesses.
• The unit does the lane again.
• The OC releases the unit to execute at the full
combat speed if satisfied with its
performance.
Figure C-6. Dry Run on the Actual Lane
STEP 7: EXECUTION
C-13. During step 7 (Figure C-7), the unit executes the
mission at full combat speed against an unrestricted
OPFOR that is controlled by the OC. This phase
involves force on force, controlled by the OC, with a
complete simulation system (such as multiple-integrated
laser engagement system [MILES]). The OC ensures
that soldiers adhere to MTP standards and TTPs. The
OC calls for an end of exercise (ENDEX) when the
training lane has run to culmination (such as the
mission is accomplished and all the training effects took
place). The OC has enough information to assess the
platoon’s performance and initiate the next step—the
AAR.
C-8 Training Execution Model
FM 3-19.4
The unit executes the mission.
Standard
• The unit conducts the mission to the MTP
standards.
• The unit has full use of OPFOR and MILES.
Actual
• The unit uses force on force or is
lane
unrestrained.
• The OC controls the OPFOR.
• The OC calls for an ENDEX.
Figure C-7. Execution
STEP 8: AFTER-ACTION REVIEW
C-14. During step 8 (Figure C-8, page C-10), the unit
conducts an AAR of the lane. If possible, it conducts the
AAR on the objective site that overlooks the lane. The
OC facilitates the AAR. He or the platoon leader states
the tasks, condition, and standards for the training
objective. The OC ensures that the AAR becomes a
review that is driven from the soldier level up toward
the top. He elicits the soldiers to identify their actions,
both right and wrong, and gets the leaders to do the
same. The OC states what was right and wrong with the
mission according to the MTP and the appropriate TTPs,
always striving to leave the AAR on a positive note to
improve soldier and unit morale and performance.
Training Execution Model C-9
FM 3-19.4
The unit conducts an AAR of the training event.
Standard
• The OC facilitates the AAR.
• The unit members state the training objectives (task, condition,
standards).
• The unit members have a bottom-up discussion.
• The unit members have the soldiers identify their mistakes.
• The unit members have the leaders identify their mistakes.
• The OC assesses the task according to the MTP.
NOTE: The assessment dictates whether to go to the next
training or redo the training.
Figure C-8. AAR
C-10 Training Execution Model
Appendix D
Orders and Reports
Orders are written or oral communications
directing action. They are based on plans or the
r e c e i p t o f a n e w m i s s i o n . U s e r e p o r t s
extensively to provide information to higher,
lower, and adjacent commands. Although there
are many, this appendix is limited to combat
orders and reports. Refer to FM 101-5 for more
information about orders.
ORDERS
D-1. Combat orders pertain to strategic, operational, or
tactical operations and their service support. The
combat orders used by MP are WOs, OPORDs, and
FRAGOs.
WARNING ORDERS
D-2. Refer to FM 101-5 for an example of a WO. WOs
provide advance notice of an action so that MP can use
available time for preparations, and they—
•
Are issued at each level down to the squad.
•
Are issued to subordinates in as much detail as
possible.
•
Are issued as brief, oral, or written messages.
•
Are a part of planning the use of available time.
WOs should be kept simple.
•
Describe the operation and the preparations to
be made before the OPORD is issued.
Orders and Reports D-1
FM 3-19.4
•
Include the situation, the mission, special
instructions, and the time and place for issuing
the OPORD.
OPERATION ORDERS
D-3. OPORDs coordinate actions to carry out the
commander's plan for an operation, and they—
•
Explain how leaders at different levels want the
operation conducted. To ensure that maneuver
and other non-MP units carry out actions or
provide a form of support that MP plans and
operations depend on, state the required actions
or support in the coordinating instructions
paragraph of the division and brigade OPORDs.
•
Have a great impact on how subordinate leaders
e m p l o y u n i t s a n d p e r f o r m m i s s i o n s . F o r
example, the MP platoon leader's latitude to
employ the unit could be restricted, based on
h o w t h e c o m p a n y c o m m a n d e r w a n t s t h e
operation conducted.
•
May be written, oral, graphic (such as traces and
overlays), or a combination of these forms.
•
Are usually written when prepared at company
level and above.
•
Have a standardized system of designating days
and hours in relation to an operation or an
exercise.
•
Follow
a
prescribed
written
format,
that
contains a classification, heading, body, and
ending.
•
Have a prescribed five-paragraph format for the
body of the order, which includes the following:
в–
Situation.
в–
Mission.
в–
Execution.
в–
Service support.
в–
Command and signal.
D-2 Orders and Reports
FM 3-19.4
D-4. The risk management process is greatly enhanced
by incorporating the risk assessment into the OPORD.
The commander integrates risk management into the
order, rather than treating it as an afterthought.
Leaders at all echelons assess the effectiveness of their
units by reviewing how well hazards are identified and
risk controls are specified in oral and written orders.
Refer to Figure D-1, pages D-5 through D-10, for an
example of an OPORD format. (Refer to FM 101-5,
Appendix H, for further discussion of an OPORD.)
D-5. FRAGOs issue supplemental instructions to a
current OPORD or OPLAN while the operation is in
progress, and they–
•
Contain missions of immediate concern to
subordinate units.
•
May be either written or oral.
•
Provide brief, specific, and timely information
without loss of clarity.
•
Have no prescribed format. Prevent confusion
OPORD.
•
May be issued to change an OPORD that has
already been issued. As such, only those items
from the original OPORD that have changed are
included in the FRAGO, as long as clarity is not
sacrificed.
STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES
D-6. SOPs prescribe routine methods to be followed in
operations, and they–
•
Supplement other combat orders.
•
Reduce the number, length, and frequency of
other orders. Because the SOP is a standing
order, do not repeat the information contained
therein in other orders unless emphasis is
desired.
Orders and Reports D-3
FM 3-19.4
•
Have no prescribed format. However, ensure
that the subordinate unit SOPs follows the
format of the next higher HQ SOP if possible.
•
Prescribe actions of a recurring nature that lend
t h e m s e l v e s t o d e f i n i t e o r s t a n d a r d i z e d
procedures. Examples include the following
items:
в–
Troop safety matters
в–
Methods of reporting unit locations.
в–
Measures for handling captured personnel or
equipment
в–
Distribution of supplies.
в–
Standard
communication
procedures
for
exercising C2.
в–
Other
items
that
lend
themselves
to
standardization.
NOTE: These items are generally the constants in
what is otherwise a frequently changing set of
circumstances.
REPORTS
M P c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e c o m m a n d e r ’ s s i t u a t i o n a l
awareness by providing timely information to higher
HQ. They collect and report information in the form of
administrative, operational, or intelligence reports.
These reports ensure that the commander receives
continuous current information. Tables D-1 through D-3,
pages D-11 through D-18, are examples of reports used
by MP when conducting CS operations. Refer to FM
101-5-2 for a complete listing of the standardized
Army report and message formats.
.
D-4 Orders and Reports
FM 3-19.4
_________________
(Classification)
Place the classification at the top and bottom of every page of the OPORD.
(Change from oral orders, if any.)
This statement is applicable only if an oral order is issued by the
commander. The phrases "No change from oral orders" or "No change from
oral orders except paragraph ___ " are necessary here.
Copy ___ of ___ copies
Issuing HQ
Place of issue (coordinates)
DTG of signature
Show the place of issue (location of the issuing HQ) on each copy. Show
the name of the town or the place in capital letters, the coordinates in
parentheses, and the country in capital letters. Both may encode.
The effective time for implementing the plan or order is the same as the
DTG, unless coordinating instructions state otherwise. When orders apply
to units in different time zones, use time zone Zulu (Z). In OPORDs and
service support orders, list the time zone applicable to the operation in the
heading of the order following the references. When an order does not
specify the actual date and hour for beginning an operation, apply the proper
reference designations.
Message Reference Number
Message reference numbers are internal control numbers that the unit
signal officer issues and assigns to all orders. The unit’s SOP normally
describes the number’s allocation and use. Using the number allows an
addressee to acknowledge receiving the message in the clear.
OPORD ________ (code name)
(Number)
Orders normally contain a code name and are numbered consecutively
within a calendar year.
Reference(s): The heading of the order includes a list of maps, charts,
datum, or other related documents the unit will need to understand the plan
or order. The user does not need to reference the SOP but may refer to it in
the body of the order. The user references a map using the map series
Figure D-1. OPORD Format
Orders and Reports D-5
FM 3-19.4
number (and country or geographic area, if required), sheet number, name,
edition, and scale, if required. Datum is the mathematical model of the
earth used to calculate the coordinates on any map. Different nations use
different datums for printing coordinates on their maps. Reference the
datum in the marginal information of each map.
Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: The time zone used throughout
the order (including annexes and appendixes) is the time zone applicable to
the operation. Operations across several time zones use Z time.
Task Organization: Describe the allocation of forces to support the
commander’s concept. Show task organization in one of two places:
preceeding paragraph one or in an annex, if the task organization is long
and complicated.
OPORD ________ - _______________________
(Number)
(Issuing HQ)
(Place this information at the top of the second and any subsequent pages
of the OPORD.)
1. SITUATION.
a. Enemy Forces. Express this information down to two enemy
echelons below yours (for example, battalions address platoons or
companies address squads). Describe the enemy’s most likely and most
dangerous COA. When possible, provide a sketch of the enemy COA in
lieu of verbiage (Appendix ___ [sketch] to Annex ___ [title]). Include an
assessment of terrorist activities directed against US government interests
in the AOs. Reference more sources using the final subparagraph to refer
the reader to the documentation.
b. Friendly Forces. Include the mission, the commander’s intent, and
the concept of operations for HQ one and two levels up. Subparagraphs
state the missions of the flank units (left, right, front, and rear) and other
units whose actions would have a significant bearing on the issuing HQ.
c. Attachments and Detachments. State when, and for how long, units
are attached or detached to the operation. Do not repeat information
already listed under task organization or in a task organization annex. State
"See Annex ___ (title)" here if a task organization annex is necessary.
Figure D-1. OPORD Format (Continued)
D-6 Orders and Reports
FM 3-19.4
2. MISSION. State the mission derived during the planning process. This
statement describes the task and purpose of the operation and clearly indicates
the action to be taken and its reason. There are no subparagraphs in a mission
statement. The mission statement covers on-order missions.
3. EXECUTION.
Intent: State the commander’s intent derived during the planning process.
It is a clear, concise statement of what the force must do to succeed with
respect to the enemy and the terrain. It provides the link between the
mission and the concept of the operation, which provides the basis for
subordinate initiative and decentralized mission execution. Always include
the desired end state.
a. Concept of Operations. The concept of operations may be a single
paragraph or divided into two or more subparagraphs. It is based on the
COA statement from the decision-making process and, at a minimum,
should address close, deep, rear, and security operations as well as
designating the main effort. The commander uses this subparagraph when
he feels he must supply enough detail to ensure appropriate action by
subordinates in the absence of additional communications or further
instructions. When an operation involves two or more clearly distinct and
separate phases, the concept of operations may be prepared in
subparagraphs describing each phase. Ensure that the concept statement
is concise and understandable. The concept describes the following:
•
The employment of maneuver elements in a scheme of maneuver.
•
A plan of fire support or scheme of fires supporting the maneuver
with fires.
•
The integration of other major elements or systems within the
operation, including reconnaissance and security elements,
intelligence assets, engineer assets, and air defense.
NOTE: Depending on what the commander considers appropriate, the
level of command, and the complexity of any given operation, the
following subparagraphs are examples of what may be included within
the concept of operations:
(1) Maneuver. State the scheme of maneuver derived during the
planning process. Ensure that this paragraph is consistent with the
operation overlay. Ensure that this paragraph and the operation overlay is
Figure D-1. OPORD Format (Continued)
Orders and Reports D-7
FM 3-19.4
complementary and adds to the clarity of, rather than duplicating, each
other. Do not duplicate information to be incorporated into the unit
subparagraphs and coordinating instructions.
(2) Fires. State the scheme of fires to support the concept, and
include priorities of and restrictions for fire support.
(3) Reconnaissance and Surveillance. Specify the reconnaissance
and surveillance (R&S) plan and explain how it ties in with the basic concept
of operations.
(4) Engineer. Clarify the scheme of engineer support to the plan,
paying particular attention to the integration of engineer assets and
obstacles, including the priorities of effort.
(5) Air Defense. State the overall concept of air defense in support of
the scheme of maneuver if necessary.
(6) Information Operations. State the overall concept of information
operations in support of the scheme of maneuver. Refer to the appropriate
annexes if necessary.
NOTE: Units required to accomplish specific tasks for information
operations and R&S are specified in the appropriate subparagraphs of
3b (tasks to maneuver [subordinate] units).
b. Tasks to Maneuver (Subordinate) Units. Clearly state the missions
or tasks for each maneuver (or subordinate element) unit that reports
directly to the HQ issuing the order. List the units in the same sequence as
in the task organization, including attachments. Use a separate
subparagraph for each subordinate element. State the tasks that are
necessary for comprehension, clarity, and emphasis. Place tactical tasks
that commonly affect two or more elements in subparagraph 3c
(coordinating instructions).
c. Coordinating Instructions. List only those instructions applicable to
two or more units (subordinate elements) and not routinely covered in unit
SOPs. This is always the last subparagraph in paragraph 3.
NOTE: The following are examples of subparagraphs that are
generally included as coordinating instructions. Subparagraphs 1
through 5 below are mandatory.
Figure D-1. OPORD Format (Continued)
D-8 Orders and Reports
FM 3-19.4
(1) Time or condition when an order becomes effective.
(2) CCIR.
(a) Priority intelligence requirements (PIR).
(b) Essential elements of friendly information (EEFI).
(c) Friendly force information requirements (FFIR).
(3) Risk-reduction control measures may include such items as
MOPP, operational exposure guidance, vehicle recognition signals, and
fratricide prevention.
(4) ROE. When lengthy and complicated, include ROE as a separate
annex.
(5) Environmental considerations.
(6) Force protection.
(7) Any additional coordinating instructions.
4. SERVICE SUPPORT. Address service support in the areas shown
below as needed to clarify the service support concept. Refer to any
annexes, where necessary. Subparagraphs can include the following:
a. Support Concept. State the concept of logistics support necessary
to support the operation. Include the concept for—
•
Support HQ or support area locations, including locations of
logistical bases if not clearly conveyed in the overlay.
•
Commander’s support priorities.
•
HN support.
•
Any significant sustainment risks.
•
Unique support requirements in the functional areas of manning,
arming, fueling, fixing, moving, and sustaining the soldier and the
systems.
b. Materiel and Services.
c. Medical Evacuation and Hospitalization. At a minimum, include
frequencies, call signs, and locations of medical support facilities and units,
as well as the plan for casualty evacuation (CASEVAC).
d. Personnel Support.
e. EPW.
f. Transportation.
Figure D-1. OPORD Format (Continued)
Orders and Reports D-9
FM 3-19.4
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.
a. Command. State the map coordinates for the CP locations and
potential future locations for each echelon CP applicable to the operation.
Identify the chain of command if not clearly addressed in unit SOPs.
b. Signal. List signal instructions not specified in unit SOPs; and identify
the specific SOI addition in effect, required reports and formats, and the
times the reports are submitted. List primary and alternate means of
communications, as well as pyrotechnic signals and their meanings.
Acknowledge: Include instructions for the acknowledgement of the order
by addressees. The word acknowledge may suffice or a message reference
number. Acknowledgement of an order means that it has been received and
understood.
Commander’s last name
Rank
The commander or his authorized representative signs the original copy. If
the representative signs the original, add the phrase “For the Commander."
The signed copy is the historical copy and remains in the HQ files. It is
always designated “Copy 1 of ______ copies.”
OFFICIAL:
(Authentication) Use only when applicable. If the commander signs the
original, no further authentication is required. If the commander does not
sign, authorization is required by the signature of the preparing officer or
individual and only the last name and rank of the commander appear in the
signature block.
Annexes: List annexes by letter and title and in the sequence by which they
were referenced in the order.
Distribution: Furnish distribution copies either for action or for information.
List in detail those who are to receive the order. If extremely lengthy, refer to
an annex containing the distribution list or to a standard distribution list or
SOP.
_________________
(Classification)
Place the classification at the top and bottom of every page of the OPORD.
Figure D-1. OPORD Format (Continued)
D-10 Orders and Reports
FM 3-19.4
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D-18 Orders and Reports
Appendix E
Precombat Inspections
Combat missions start with PCIs. These PCIs
are an essential part of every mission. The
objective of PCIs is to confirm the combat
readiness of the unit. Subordinate leaders
conduct detailed checks, allowing the unit
leader to conduct PCIs in an atmosphere of total
prepa redn ess. Afte r t he P CI , the u nit is
prepared to move on the receipt of orders.
MODIFIED PRECOMBAT INSPECTION
CHECKLIST
E-1. A modified PCI checklist (Figure E-1, page E-2)
ensures that the team has the required equipment to
conduct its mission when the unit is short on time. The
modi fi ed PCI allows the tea m l eader to focus on
preparing the team for the mission, while the platoon
leader issues the mission to the squad leader. Use the
checklist as a recovery checklist when the team returns
from the mission. Immediate, proper recovery ensures
that the team is ready for the next mission. This
checklist is only a guide and can be modified based on
METT-TC and the unit SOP.
Precombat Inspections E-1
FM 3-19.4
Steps
Actions
1
The squad leader and the team leader receive the WO.
2
The team leader prepares the squad for movement, while the squad
leader is receiving the mission from the platoon leader.
3
The team leader follows the same checklist, while the squad leader
debriefs the platoon leader if recovering from a mission.
4
The team leader inspects the communications equipment and
ammunition in HMMWVs. He—
•
Conducts a communications check with the platoon CP.
•
Ensures that proper frequencies are set and that call signs are
available.
•
Ensures that there is a Single-Channel, Ground-to-Air Radio
System (SINCGARS), a manpack, accessories, and a battery
case.
•
Ensures that there are batteries for the radios (automated net
control device [ANCD], precision lightweight global positioning
system receiver [PLGR], OE-254).
•
Ensures that the Class V basic load is accounted for.
5
The driver conducts preoperation checks and services on the vehicle.
He ensures that—
•
The correct paperwork is completed, such as the dispatch,
folder, and signature. Ensures that the correct TM is on hand.
•
He has a valid driver's license.
•
Preventive-maintenance checks and services (PMCS) are
performed to a -10 standard.
•
A current DA Form 2404 is on hand.
•
The fire extinguisher is sealed, tagged, and dated.
•
The engine's coolant, oil, transmission fluid, and washer fluid
are at the correct level.
•
The battery level is correct and that cables are secured.
•
Lights are operational.
•
Fuel and water cans are filled and that there are meals, ready-
to-eat (MREs) available.
•
There are no exhaust leaks.
•
Basic-issue item (BII), on-vehicle material (OVM), pioneer
tools, locks, and chains are present on the vehicle.
•
The load plan is followed and that the vehicle's interior is
clean.
Figure E-1. Modified PCI Checklist
E-2 Precombat Inspections
FM 3-19.4
Steps
Actions
6
The gunner conducts preoperation checks and services on the crew-
served weapon and NBC equipment. He ensures that—
•
A TM for the equipment (-10) is available.
•
The weapon is oiled, cleaned, and functional.
•
There is a spare barrel and BII.
•
There is a T&E mechanism.
•
There is a wrench.
•
There is a tripod mount with an adapter.
•
There are weapon cleaning kits present.
•
There are night vision devices (NVDs) present.
•
All the NBC equipment is present and serviceable.
Figure E-1. Modified PCI Checklist (Continued)
PRECOMBAT INSPECTION CHECKLIST
E - 2 . T h i s P C I c h e c k l i s t i s e x t e n s i v e a n d t i m e -
consuming. Use it when the team has a lot of downtime
and has a secure environment in which to work. Once
combat operations begin, the secure environment and
the downtime will be lost. Figure E-2, page E-4, is a draft
checklist, which may be modified to meet the needs of
the unit.
Precombat Inspections E-3
FM 3-19.4
Steps
Actions
1
Soldiers. Soldiers should ensure that they—
•
Have a seasonal uniform. The uniform should include the
following:
в– Load-carrying equipment (LCE) that is complete.
в– First aid packet.
в– Canteens that are full and have a M17 drinking cap.
в– M40 with a hood, M258A1 kit, M13 kit, and optical inserts (if
required).
в– Kevlar with a camouflage cover and band.
в– Individual weapon with 6 magazines.
в– ID tags around the neck and ID cards.
в– Ear plugs.
•
Have been briefed on the current situation and the mission.
•
Possess a current driver’s license.
•
Have been briefed on hot- and cold- weather injuries.
Leaders. Leaders should conduct a safety briefing, to include—
•
Checking for hazards, such as ticks, chiggers, and spiders,
and taking preventive first aid measures.
•
Checking for snake hazards and ensuring that there is first
aid.
•
Checking for poisonous plants, such as oak, ivy, and sumac.
•
Checking for hot- and cold- weather injuries and preventing
them.
•
Ensuring that correct driving practices are followed, to
include—
в– Speed in relation to the weather.
в– Ground guides.
в– Seat belts.
в– Blackout driving.
в– Gunner positioning (goggles).
•
Ensuring that equipment is set up, such as camouflage nets
or tents.
•
Ensuring that there are fire-prevention vehicles and tents.
•
Taking appropriate actions during severe weather.
•
Using pyrotechnics.
•
Using the buddy system for safety and during the mission.
Figure E-2. Extensive PCI Checklist
E-4 Precombat Inspections
FM 3-19.4
Steps
Actions
Vehicle commander, squad leader, or team leader. The vehicle
commander, squad leader, or team leader ensures that—
•
There is a map with a current overlay.
•
воскресенье, 2 июня 2013 г.
USA(2) - Military Police - part(1)
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