COMBAT+USA(part3)

• Fill sandbags approximately 75 percent.



• Build above ground unless absolutely necessary.





• Construct to standard.



• Forget lateral bracing on stringers.





• Use common sense.





The commander’s responsibilities during construction of survivability positions are to:

• Protect troops.



• Continuously improve and maintain unit survivability.



• Provide materials.



• Periodically inspect.



• Plan and select fighting position sites.



• Get technical advice from engineers, as required.



In a combat situation, it may be necessary to improvise construction of a survivability position by using materials not normally associated with the construction. Some examples of field-expedient materiel are:



Wall Revetment



Wall Construction (Building up)





• Sheet metal.



• Sand-grid material.





• Corrugated sheet metal.



• 55-gallon drums filled with sand.





• Plastic sheeting.



• Expended artillery shells filled with sand.





• Plywood.



• Shipping boxes/packing material.





• Air mat panels.



• Prefabricated concrete panels.





• Air Force air-load pallets.



• Prefabricated concrete traffic barriers.





Overhead Cover Stringers



Stand-Alone Positions





• Single pickets.



• Prefab concrete catch basins, valve pits, and utility boxes.





• Double pickets.



• Military vans.





• Railroad rails.





• “T” beams.



• Connexes or shipping containers.





• Two-inch diameter pipe or larger.



• Large diameter pipe/culvert.





• Timbers 2” × 4”, 4” × 4”, and larger.



• Steel water tanks.





• Reinforced concrete beams.



• Other storage tanks (cleaned and ventilated).





• 55-gallon drums cut in half longitudinally



• Vehicle hulks.





• Large diameter pipe/culvert, cut in half.





• Precast concrete panels, 6–8 inches thick.





• Airfield panels.





• Air Force air-load pallets.





• Shipping pallets.





The following is a suggested inspection checklist to follow when preparing survivability positions:

• Location is sited tactically sound.



• Low profile is maintained.



• Materials are of structural quality (standard construction material).



• Excavation-walls are sloped.



• The setback for overhead is a minimum of 1 foot or ½ the depth of cut.



• Stringers—



– Are firmly on a structural support.



– Have lateral bracing emplaced along supports.



• 2” × 4” or 2” × 6” stringers are used on the edge; the strength is on the depth of the lumber.



• Supports—



– Stringers are firmly on supports.



– Supports extend past the excavation by ¼ the depth of cut.



• Revetments—



– Quality of construction is checked.



– Sheeting is supported by pickets.



– Pickets are tied back.



• Overhead cover—



– Quality of structural layer is inspected.



– Quality of dust layer—plywood or panels—is inspected.



– Layer is cushioned at least 18 inches deep.



The one-man fighting position is the individual’s basic defensive position. The one-man fighting position with overhead cover (see Figure 3-1) provides protection from airburst weapon fragments. A good position has overhead cover that allows the soldier/marine to fire from beneath it. Stringers extend at least 1 foot on each side of the position to provide a good load-bearing surface for overhead cover.





Figure 3-1: One-man fighting position with overhead cover.





Generally, the two-man fighting position is preferred over a one-man position since one soldier/marine can provide security while the other is digging or resting. The position can be effectively manned for longer periods of time; if one soldier/marine becomes a casualty, the position is still occupied. Further, the psychological effect of two men working together permits occupation of the position for longer periods. Overhead cover also improves the position’s effectiveness; it is made as described for the one-man position (see Figure 3-2).





Figure 3-2: Two-man fighting position with overhead cover.





Fighting positions for machine guns are constructed so the fires are to the front or oblique; the primary sector of fire is usually oblique so the gun can fire across the unit’s front. The position is shaped so the gunner and assistant gunner can get to the gun and fire it to either side of the frontal direction. Overhead cover is built over the middle of the position (see Figure 3-3). It is constructed as described for the one-man position.

Protective shelters and fighting bunkers are usually constructed using a combination of the components of positions mentioned thus far. Protective shelters are primarily used as command posts, observation posts, medical aid stations, supply and ammunition shelters, and sleeping or resting shelters. Figure 3-4 shows an example of a command bunker.





Figure 3-3: Machine-gun position with overhead cover.





The Dragon position requires some unique considerations. The soldier/marine must consider the Dragon’s extensive backblast and muzzle blast, as well as cleared fields of fire. When a Dragon is fired, the muzzle extends 6 inches beyond the front of the position, and the rear of the launcher extends out over the rear of the position. As the missile leaves the launcher, stabilizing fins unfold. Therefore, the soldier keeps the weapon at least 6 inches above the ground when firing to leave room for the fins. A waist-deep position will allow the gunner to move while tracking a target. Because of the Dragon’s above ground height, soldiers/marines should construct frontal cover high enough to hide the soldier’s/marine’s head and, if possible, the Dragon’s backblast. The soldier/marine must dig a hole in the front of the position for the biped legs. If cover is built on the flanks of a Dragon position, it must cover the tracker, missiles, and the gunner. Overhead cover that would allow firing from beneath it is usually built if the backblast area is clear (see Figure 3-5).





Figure 3-4: Command bunker.





Figure 3-5: Dragon position.





A fighting position for the dismounted TOW must not interfere with the launch or tracking operations of the weapon. As with Dragon and LAW positions allowances for backblast effects are necessary. Backblast and deflection requirements restrict the size of overhead cover for the weapon. See Figure 3-6.





Figure 3-6: Dismounted TOW position.





Designers of fighting positions and protective positions in desert areas must consider the lack of available cover and concealment. Fighting positions should have the lowest profile possible, but mountain and plateau deserts have rocky soil or “surface chalk” soil which makes digging difficult. In these areas, rocks and boulders are used for cover. Because target acquisition and observation are relatively easy in desert terrain, camouflage and concealment, as well as light and noise discipline, are important considerations during position construction.

Indigenous materials are usually used in desert position construction. However, prefabricated structures and revetments, if available, are ideal for excavations. Metal culvert revetments can be quickly emplaced in easily excavated sand. Sandbags and sand-filled ammunition boxes are also used to prevent side walk of positions from collapsing.

FM 5-103 discusses vehicle fighting positions in detail and should be consulted for more information. Figure 3-7 provides specifications for vehicle survivability defilade positions that can be dug by the D-7 dozer.





Figure 3-7: Survivability defilade positions.





Logistics areas (BSA/DSA) require additional survivability support. Desert operations require that logistics concentrations such as BSAs and DSAs be given additional considerations for survivability support. These sites are large, datively static, and difficult to camouflage. As a result, these support areas are vulnerable to enemy interdiction. Military vans or connexes should be covered with sandbags to improve protection. Additionally, if they are covered with heavy plastic, with plastic drapes over the entrances, protection against NBC effects can be improved.

Engineer digging assets, such as bulldozers, should be tasked to provide survivability support to these sites with particular emphasis placed on hardening ammunition and fuel storage locations. Caution should be used when digging foxholes and tank hide positions since some areas have a tendency to cave in.

Water Supply

Water supply is the most important mission of engineers in the desert. The search for water sources requires continuous, intensive reconnaissance. Water may be obtained by drilling beds of dry water courses, or by deepening dry wells. Once found, water must be made potable and stored or transported. Since water purification trucks may be high-priority targets and barely sufficient for the task, any force operating in the desert must be augmented with water supply units (including well drilling), water purification and water distillation teams, and transportation teams. Another possible water source is the reverse osmosis water purification unit (ROWPU). This unit is an ISO frame-mounted, portable water purification system capable of purifying water from almost any shallow well, deep well, and surface water or raw water source. The ROWPU is capable of removing NBC contaminants, minerals, and biological impurities. The single greatest benefit of the reverse osmosis process is the ability to desalinate sea water. The ROWPU is capable of producing potable water at a rate of 600 gph. The ROWPU is powered by a 30-kilowatt generator set.



SECTION II. OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS



This section discusses offensive operations as they are modified by desert terrain.


GENERAL



The main purpose of offensive operations in desert terrain is to destroy the enemy. Operations may be undertaken to secure key or decisive terrain, to deprive the enemy of resources or decisive terrain, to deceive and divert the enemy, to develop intelligence, and to hold the enemy in position. Destruction of the enemy can be accomplished by concentrating friendly forces at a weak point in the enemy’s defense and destroying enemy combat units, or by driving deep into the enemy’s rear to destroy his combat service support and cut his lines of communication. No force can survive in the desert for long without combat service support.

An imaginative commander is not bound by terrain constraints in seeking and destroying the enemy. Due to the scarcity of key terrain in the desert, normally the only constraints placed upon a maneuvering force is its ability to maintain responsive combat service support and to protect its combat service support from enemy attack. The longer the lines of communication become, the more susceptible they are to being cut.

In most deserts, the scarcity of large areas of defensible terrain means that an enemy force has at least one flank open to attack. The attacking force must seek this flank and attempt to maneuver around it into the enemy’s rear before the enemy can react and block the envelopment with mobile reserves.

Successful offensive operations depend on rapid, responsive, and violent maneuver, seeking a vulnerable enemy flank while exposing none to the enemy. The enemy, realizing the danger of remaining stationary in this terrain, may choose to conduct spoiling attacks or to counterattack. The resulting meeting engagement between the two attacking forces will often be a series of flanking actions and reactions with success going to the one who can find the other’s unguarded flank first.

Attacking forces may conduct or participate in movement to contacts or hasty or deliberate attacks. Within a division, lead elements of forward units may be conducting a deliberate attack on the enemy’s weak point or flank to open a gap for following units to move through and exploit success. Lead units of the exploiting force will be conducting a movement to contact and hasty attacks to overcome pockets of enemy resistance.


FUNDAMENTALS OF THE OFFENSE



The attacker must conduct active and aggressive reconnaissance to the front, flanks, and rear, not only to locate and identify enemy obstacles, units, weak points, and flanks, but also to give early warning of threats to his flanks and combat service support elements. A moving force is at a disadvantage in the desert due to a lack of concealment.

Therefore, it is necessary to push reconnaissance units as far out from the main body as possible to allow early warning and to deny the enemy close-in observation.

Information gathered by this reconnaissance must be passed promptly to all units. In the desert, a negative report may be as important as an enemy sighting. Commanders and staffs must avoid the two extremes of either passing too little information or overwhelming their subordinates with useless trivia. Similarly, reconnaissance units must also avoid extremes. There is a very real possibility that extensive reconnaissance in one area will alert the enemy of intended operations in that area. Therefore, the need for reconnaissance must be tempered with the need for deception. In fact, reconnaissance may even serve as a deceptive measure to draw the enemy’s attention away from the real objective or area of operations.

Concentrate on overwhelming combat power. Mass is achieved in both time and space. Units must be able to rapidly concentrate at a given time and place, and then disperse just as rapidly to avoid offering a lucrative target to the enemy. Concentration does not necessarily mean that vehicles and men are massed in a small area, but that units have the ability to place an overwhelming concentration of fires on the enemy.

Mutual support is as important in the desert as in temperate climates. Due to the large distances covered by maneuver in the desert, mutual support does not mean that any one unit is always in position to fire against an enemy threatening another unit. However, units must be capable of maneuvering in support of one another without disrupting the scheme of maneuver.

Concentration requires movement, and possibly weakening of forces facing the enemy in another part of the zone. Due to the enemy’s observation capabilities, movement should take place at night or in conditions of limited visibility whenever possible. Deception measures play an important part in concentration, either to mislead the enemy as to the strength or true intentions of the opposing forces, or their avenues of approach. In this environment of negligible concealment, deception cannot be overemphasized.

The enemy’s objective is to stop and destroy the attacking force by direct and indirect fires, obstacles, and counterattacks. The attacker must in turn suppress enemy weapon and surveillance systems to degrade their effects and their intelligence-gathering capability.

Attack helicopters and high-performance aircraft are extremely useful due to their ability to maneuver and apply firepower over a large battlefield in a short time. So, suppression of enemy air defense has a high priority during offensive operations. The destruction of enemy antitank capabilities must also have a high priority due to the shock potential of armor in the desert. No target that has a long-range antitank capability should be disregarded. Good gunnery and well-planned fire distribution are preeminent.

In featureless desert terrain, the requirement to shock, overwhelm, and destroy the enemy demands accurate reconnaissance to identify actual positions from false positions, and excellent navigation so that a commander may be certain of the deployment of his forces. Reconnoiter to find a gap or assailable flank (without alerting the enemy that the area is being reconnoitered) and concentrate the main body to go through or around it with suppressive fires on the flank(s). A gap must be wide enough to allow one unit to bypass another unit that could be stalled. Obstacles are likely to be placed so that attempts to go around them will often lead the attacker into a tire sack. Equipment capable of breaching obstacles must be located well forward.


ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS



As a general rule, a force attacking in daylight should try to wait until the sun is comparatively low and position behind it. This enables enemy targets to be plainly seen without their shadows, while the defenders are handicapped by glare, mirages, and haze. It is not always possible (nor essential) for the sun to be directly behind the attackers. To rely on this leads to a stereotyped method of attack which could become evident to the defenders. The commander of a maneuver force should attempt to keep the sun somewhere on a 3,200-mil arc to his flanks or rear, giving a wide choice of angle of attack.

Dust is an observational hazard to a maneuvering force, especially where there is little or no wind. Teams should move in echelon with overmatching elements on the upwind side, and observers and attack helicopters should operate well to the flank. Since it is impossible to disguise movement during daylight, the assault should be as rapid as possible to minimize enemy reaction time.

The decision to move through a sandstorm will depend on the unit’s distance from the enemy, trafficability, the presence of minefield, and the direction and density of the storm. If the advancing unit is caught in a storm blowing from the enemy’s direction, the safest alternative is to halt until it abates, although this may not always be possible. In some situations it may be possible for platoons to form close column, using taillights only, and continue movement. When the storm is blowing toward the enemy it is possible (and extremely effective) to conduct an attack immediately behind the storm.

In certain circumstances equipment or positions that are camouflaged and are less than 1 meter from the ground are invisible to an observer at the same height out to approximately 2,000 meters. At the same time, mirages allow observation of objects below the horizon, although these may be distorted, enlarged, or fuzzy to the point of being unrecognizable. These effects often depend entirely on the angle of the sun to the observer and are best combated by—

• Maintaining observers as high above the desert floor as possible, even if only in hull-down positions behind sand dunes.



• Allowing a vehicle’s crew on one side of a position to warn a crew on the other side of a possible threat to his front by crews observing over wide areas.



Many offensive operations take place at night. Observation in these conditions varies according to the amount of ambient light. During nights when the moon is full or almost full, the clear desert sky and ample ambient light allow good observation, both with the naked eye and with night observation devices. Maneuvering units using night-vision devices must continually scan the surrounding terrain to pick up enemy activity that normally would be acquired by peripheral vision in the daylight.

The desert night is extremely dark when there is little or no moon. Under these conditions passive-vision devices, with the exception of thermal imagery, are of little value unless artificial light is used. Active light sources will have to be relied upon. Employment of artificial light must be strictly controlled by the headquarters directing the operation to maintain surprise. As a general rule, direct-fire weapons should not illuminate their target themselves, as their vision will be obscured by debris kicked up due to muzzle blast. Following contact, when some targets should be on fire, passive devices can be used.


MANEUVER



If the terrain permits masking of maneuvering units, and trafficability is good, normal fundamentals of fire and maneuver are used. Trafficability may be restricted by rocky terrain as in the Golan Heights, or the ground may be so flat that the defender has total observation of the area. Movement in these circumstances requires speed of maneuver, deception, and considerable suppression to degrade enemy observation and fires. Frontal attacks should be avoided, especially in conditions of restricted trafficability. It is preferable to maintain pressure on enemy units in unfavorable terrain, while other forces find enemy weaknesses in terrain that is more favorable for an attack.

Lack of clearly defined terrain features complicates navigation and phased operations. Units conducting an enveloping maneuver are apt to lose direction unless routes have been carefully reconnoitered by the maximum number of leaders.



SECTION III. DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS



This section discusses defensive operations as they are modified by desert terrain.


GENERAL



It is unlikely that a U.S. force will be fully deployed in a desert country before an enemy attack. The more probable situation, assuming a secure lodgement area, will be that part of the force will be in position supporting an allied force, while the remainder is moving in by air and sea. Tactically, the allied force will be outnumbered, so the initial mission will be to gain time until the entire force is present in the operational area. This will require a defensive posture initially, but a defense undertaken so aggressively as to convince the enemy that his offensive action will be too costly in personnel and equipment to be worth maintaining. The enemy will be well aware that U.S. forces are arriving in the area, and will make every effort to conclude his operation successfully before the force is fully prepared for combat operations.

The force may conduct defensive operations during subsequent stages of the operation for several reasons. Portions of the force may be required to defend the important types of terrain described below:

• Man-made features such as ports, key logistic installations, roads, railroads, water pumping stations, airfields, and wells.



• Natural features, such as mountain passes, or dominating ground, such as Mount Hermon on the border of Syria and Israel, or the Sollum escarpment near the sea between Libya and Egypt.



• Key or decisive terrain that need not necessarily be a major feature, but one whose loss will inhibit the force in some manner. For example, the loss of terrain relatively close to a lodgement area may hinder the planned rate of buildup.



With the exception of the above cases, the retention of desert terrain normally makes little difference to the final outcome of battle. This does not mean that a commander has complete discretion to move his force wherever and whenever he wishes, as this movement will affect the dispositions of other U.S. forces or allies. It means that possession of terrain is less important than the destruction of enemy forces. Although it will be necessary to dominate certain terrain or retain freedom to maneuver in large areas of the desert, there is no more sense in permanently occupying such areas than occupying a patch of sea. Assuming equal equipment capabilities for both opposing forces, the critical factor in defense will be the force ratios involved and the state of morale and training of the opposing forces.

A defense using aggressive maneuver at all levels is the best way to destroy large numbers of enemy without being destroyed in the process. If the defending force fails to remain mobile and active, the enemy will easily outflank it and strike directly at vital targets, such as the lodgement area. It is almost certain that one flank or the other will be open as were the south flanks of the British and German forces in Egypt and Libya in 1940–43. Since it will not be possible to maintain an unbroken line between strategic obstacles, air and ground security forces must be positioned in width and depth to guard against an enemy trying to outflank the defender.

Obstacles, both natural and artificial, are used to slow, contain, or isolate enemy units in order to defeat and destroy his units one at a time. Forward units block the enemy and canalize him into one or two avenues where he can be engaged from the flank. A reserve can then counterattack to destroy any remaining enemy.

Mutual support is normally a factor of time rather than weapon range due to the large areas to be covered. Gaps in initial positions may have to be accepted between and within task forces; although the ideal is to site units in such a manner that forces in at least two positions can engage an enemy maneuvering on any one of them. This greatly reduces any possibility of defeat in detail. When gaps exist they must be kept under surveillance. The defensive plan must include provisions for maneuvering to fire on any part of a gap before the enemy can move through it. A unit’s area of responsibility must be defined by higher headquarters and should be clearly identifiable on the ground, which, due to the absence of significant terrain features, may require marking by artificial means.


FUNDAMENTALS OF THE DEFENSE



The following paragraphs discuss some points to remember in desert operations as they apply to the fundamentals of defense.

Reconnaissance and security units and force surveillance systems must focus on:

• What is the enemy’s short-term objective?



• What are the enemy’s avenues of approach, and what force is employed on each of them?



• Are the apparent movements real or feints?



As soon as these questions have been answered the commander will be able to maneuver to destroy the enemy. Until they are confirmed he can do nothing more than react to enemy initiatives. This is dangerous in any circumstance and doubly so in the desert as the side with the greatest potential for maneuver is more likely to win.

Direct-fire weapons must be used to their maximum effective range both by day and night. Limitations in night-vision equipment cannot be allowed to reduce depth or frontages; so plans for field artillery or mortar illumination are made for defense during limited visibility.

It is essential that all elements of a force retain their tactical mobility and efficient communications so that they can immediately react to changes in the commander’s plans. Each individual weapon must be sited in a number of firing positions, even though vehicular movement may be exposed to air attack. Infantry fighting vehicles must remain in positions where they are concealed, capable of giving fire support to the dismounted squad, and available for immediate remounting.

Combined arms teams are essential to give the commander the capability he requires to fight the defensive battle. Defending forces orient on primary enemy approaches but units must also be prepared for attack from any other direction. It is neither possible nor necessary to have maximum firepower in all directions, provided weapons can be moved to threatened areas before the enemy reaches them. Air cover or an air defense umbrella is necessary for a successful defense.

It is rare to find positions where any substantial part of the unit area of operations can be protected by natural obstacles. This require extensive use of artificial obstacles, depending on time, personnel, and combat service support available. Obstacles are used to divide the enemy force to improve local force ratios, and to slow the enemy’s advance, thus permitting a flank attack. Conventional minefield must be clearly marked on the friendly side and recorded to avoid unnecessary losses if friendly forces later maneuver over the area.


STRONG POINTS



Strongpoints are rare in desert warfare; however, they may be necessary to defend an oasis, mountain pass, or other key terrain essential to the defender’s scheme of maneuver. When it is necessary to deny terrain to an enemy force, it is far better to initiate the defense well forward of the terrain feature, conduct the defense in depth, and destroy the enemy or force him to break off his attack before he reaches the critical feature.

In some cases the level of fortification and the deployment of the enemy maybe a function of time, or the enemy’s intention and his understanding of what our forces are intending to do, The effectiveness of these strongpoints depends on the range of fires, the level of fortifications, and the decision of the opponent to attack them.

Deeply dug and well-prepared strongpoints surrounded by a minefield and having underground accommodations are usually used in the desert. Although these strongpoints may be neutralized by air or artillery fire and bypassed, eventually they will have to be assaulted. If they have been carefully sited and are well defended they can be quite effective. Variations of the strongpoint defense are used in rear operations. Combat service support units will use this method in perimeter defenses or base-cluster defenses. See Figure 3-8 for an example of a strongpoint and Figure 3-9 for an example of a strongpoint holding key terrain.





Figure 3-8: Strongpoint.





Figure 3-9: Strongpoint holding key terrain.





REVERSE SLOPE DEFENSE



The use of the reverse slope defense takes on added importance in the desert. Concealment is hard to achieve in the open desert. Detection of a unit’s location invites both direct and indirect fires in abundance. The use of reverse slope positions will deny the enemy direct observation of positions until he is within the range of direct-fire weapons. Reverse slopes can even be found on seemingly flat desert floors; an intervisibility line will provide the reference for the establishment of engagement areas to support a reverse slope defense. A common misconception is that the desert is flat, when in fact, deserts are normally very uneven, with large breaks in the terrain.

Desert environments give special significance to the terrain aspect of METT-T. Commanders at all levels should place emphasis on the impact of desert terrain as it relates to the other factors of METT-T. The reverse slope defense in desert terrain warrants special considerations.

Direct-fire positions should be placed at the maximum effective ranges from the intervisibility line. This is where the enemy cannot see or engage a force with direct fire until he is within its engagement area. He can only deploy limited forces at a time. This allows the defender to mass fires on one portion of the enemy force at a time. The attacking force will have difficulty in observing and adjusting indirect fires. Obstacles may not be seen by the enemy until he is upon them and force him to breach under massed frees. Observation posts (OPs) positioned forward to see the advance of the enemy can influence the fight through indirect fires. The OPs can direct indirect fires on enemy forces that are slowed or stopped outside direct-fire ranges.

This defensive technique may be used in all defensive missions. Light infantry units use the reverse slope for protection against enemy long-range fires and to reduce the effects of massive indirect fires (artillery and close air support). The reverse slope defense brings the battle into the defender’s weapons’ ranges. Use of the reverse slope provides an opportunity to gain surprise.

The goal is to cause the enemy to commit his forces against the forward slope of the defense, resulting in his force attacking in an uncoordinated fashion across the crest. A reverse slope defense is organized on the portion of a terrain feature or slope that is masked from enemy direct fires and observation by the topographical crest, and extends rearward from the crest to maximize the range of the defender’s weapon systems. See Figure 3-10 for an example of a reverse slope defense and Figure 3-11 for the organization of the reverse slope defense.





Figure 3-10: Reverse slope defense.





Figure 3-11: Organization of the reverse slope defense.





A disadvantage maybe that the maximum ranges of weapon systems may not be employed due to the terrain available. The desert may be the best environment for the reverse slope defense. It may allow the use of weapons at maximum ranges as well as facilitating advantages. The following are advantages of a reverse slope defense:

• It hinders or prevents enemy observation of the defensive position.



• Attacking forces will not be able to receive direct-fire support from following forces.



• Enemy long-range antitank fires will be degraded.



• Attacking enemy forces will be silhouetted on the crest of the hill.



• Engineer work can be conducted away from direct-fire and observation from the enemy.



Reverse slope defense is not one concept, but a series of concepts that produce the potential for success. The concepts are:

• Pursue offensive opportunities through surprise and deceptive actions, with the intent of stealing the initiative, imposing the commander’s will on the enemy, and breaking the enemy’s morale.



• Afford the defender a variety of options in positioning his troops, with each option designed to draw the enemy into unfamiliar terrain.



• Enhance light infantry effectiveness and survivability.



A hasty or deliberate reverse slope defense may be considered when any of the following conditions exist:

• When the forward slope lacks cover and concealment, and effective enemy fire makes that position untenable.



• When the terrain on the reverse slope affords appreciably better fields of fire than those available on the forward slope.



• When it is desirable to avoid creating a distortion or dangerous salient in friendly lines by relying on forward slope positions.



• When it is essential to surprise and deceive the enemy as to the unit’s true defensive positions or main effort.



• When seeking to gain protection from the enemy as he is massing fires.




DELAY OR WITHDRAWAL



When it is necessary to delay or withdraw, a desert offers many advantages to the defender. Long-range fields of fire allow engagements at maximum effective range of direct-fire weapon systems, and disengagement before the defender’s position. However, dust clouds created by a moving force make it necessary to disengage under cover of smoke or darkness. Even a sandstorm can be used to the advantage. Field artillery, U.S. Air Force fighter bombers, and attack helicopters can also be used to allow a ground maneuver unit to disengage and move rapidly to the next position.

When it is necessary to trade space for time, often a counterattack to destroy enemy advance units will do more good than trying to defend longer from an intermediate position.

Commanders at all levels should clearly understand the scheme of maneuver concept of the operation, and what it is they are expected to do, especially if communications should fail. Plans must include provisions for alternate means of communication. Routes should be clearly marked and reconnoitered to the maximum extent practical.

Due to the distances involved and constantly changing task organization, passage of lines is more difficult to coordinate and control. Pay extra attention to the identification of vehicles, routes of passage, signals, and coordination of movements.

Deception should be a part of all desert retrograde operations. The object of deception is to conceal the fact that a retrograde operation is taking place and that units are thinning out. Smoke and dummy positions can be used, false radio messages transmitted, and even dust clouds used to deceive the enemy.


ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS



In the desert it is necessary to modify the techniques of defense as described in doctrinal manuals applicable to each level of command and according to the mission, the fundamentals described in the preceding paragraph, and to the environmental considerations that are described in the following paragraphs.

Observation

The enemy will try to attack when the sun is low and behind him so as to dazzle the defender. The defender’s observers must be as high as possible above the desert floor to see the advancing enemy as soon as possible.

Active light sources can be detected from great distances, especially during nights with low ambient light. Positive control of active light sources must be maintained until the battle is joined. Even then, the force equipped with passive devices will have the advantage over the force that is not equipped with these devices.

Heat from combat vehicles can give an enemy using thermal imagery devices a complete picture of the defensive scheme. So, combat vehicles should not prematurely occupy battle positions at night.

Sandstorms

Sandstorms may be used by the enemy to hide an offensive operation especially if the storm is blowing from the enemy’s direction. When this is the case, units should immediately occupy their battle positions before the storm arrives. The unit should remain there until it ends, ready to fire and maneuver against the attacker after the storm abates. If vehicle patrolling is possible, a scout platoon or similar unit should cover all gaps, preferably moving in pairs, and on straight lines in view of navigational difficulties.

Terrain

From the point of view of a defending brigade or battalion task force commander, avenues of approach will often seem unlimited. Long-range observation must be maximized and scouts employed well forward to offset this problem. Radars should also be used extensively to provide early warning. It is necessary to identify the enemy’s main effort early in order to move to concentrate.

Lack of concealment, especially from the aerial detection, prohibits units from occupying firing positions until just before engaging the enemy. Combat vehicles must displace immediately after engagement or risk destruction. Because of frequent displacement, mutes between battle positions should be reconnoitered and marked when possible, without revealing the scheme of defense. Smoke must be used frequently to conceal movement.


TACTICAL DECEPTION OPERATIONS



Analysis of desert operations from World War II to the present day indicates that tactical deception and surprise are clearly linked to the ability to move and mass forces during periods of limited visibility.

Operational planning should emphasize night movement of units. To minimize the problems of dust and to enhance deception, movement should be accomplished using multiple routes. Place priority on training to support this requirement. Associated with night movement is the requirement for night passage through lanes in minefield and forward passage through friendly forces.

In every modern desert war, deception has played a major role. The lack of concealment leads commanders to believe that with a reasonable reconnaissance effort they can gain an accurate picture of the enemy’s dispositions. Reconnaissance by German, British, Israeli, Egyptian, and Syrian forces in modern desert warfare has been sufficient to detect the presence of combat forces in the desert. Deception has been successfully used in each of the modem desert conflicts to mislead commanders.

Since the desert environment makes it difficult to hide forces, the alternative is to make them look like something else—trucks and plywood made to look like tanks, and tanks made to look like trucks.

The movement of personnel and equipment and the placement of logistic support installations are normally indicators of a force’s intent. The movement of empty boxes or pallets of ammunition and the establishment of fuel storage areas with real or dummy assets can deceive the enemy as to planned offensive actions. Use minimal actual transportation assets and make numerous, visible trips to simulate a large effort.

There are many examples of successful deception efforts by U.S. forces from World War II. In September 1944, the 43rd Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (Reinforced) occupied a 23-mile fronton the left flank of XX (U.S.) Corps on the Metz Front. This squadron portrayed an armored division for several weeks and was so successful that the German Order of Battle Maps showed the 14th (U.S.) Armored Division (AD) to be in the area. The 14th AD was not even in Europe at the time. Expertise in deception operations is critical to success.

Deception plays a key part in offensive operations and has two objectives: the first objective is to weaken the local defense by drawing reserves to another part of the battlefield. This may be done by making a small force seem larger than it is. The second objective is to conceal the avenue of approach and timing of the main attack. Some deception methods that can be used in offensive operations are:

• Using dummy units and installations.



• Using phony radio traffic.



• Using movement and suppressive fires in other areas timed to coincide with the real attack.



• Using small convoys to generate dust clouds.



• Filling ration boxes with sand and stacking them at landfills.



• Moving trucks into and out of the area giving it the appearance of being a storage facility or logistic base.



• Emulating damage to induce the enemy to leave important targets alone. For example, ragged patterns can be painted on the walls and roof of a building with tar and coal dust, and covers placed over them.



• Stacking debris nearby and wiring any unused portions for demolition. During an attack, covers are removed under cover of smoke generators, debris scattered, and demolitions blown. Subsequent enemy air photography will disclose a building that is too badly damaged to be used. Troops using the building after an attack must guard against heat emissions after dark and care must be taken to control electromagnetic emissions.



• Using phony minefield to simulate live minefields. For example, disturb the ground so that it appears that mines have been emplaced and mark boundaries with appropriate warnings.



• Making a real minefield to appear as phony or camouflaging it. For example, once a real minefield is settled, a wheel or a specially made circular wooden tank track marker can be run through the field, leaving track or tire marks to lure the enemy onto live mines. Antipersonnel mines should not be sown in such a field until the track marks have been laid. Another method is to leave gaps in the mechanically laid field, run vehicles through the gaps, and then close them with hand-laid mines without disturbing the track marks.



• Using decoys to confuse the enemy as to the strength of friendly forces and the unit’s identity, or to conceal unit movement by being sited in a position after the real unit has moved.




LONG-RANGE SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS



Desert characteristics affecting LRS operations are: lack of water (a major problem), scarcity of vegetation, extensive sand areas, extreme temperature ranges, brilliant sunlight, and usually excellent observation. Movement using animals, vehicles, or by foot may be considered and is generally restricted to darkness. More training in land or air navigation and terrain orientation procedures may be necessary.





CHAPTER 4





Operations in Mountains



This chapter describes special conditions associated with operating in mountains such as those in the southern Sinai and on the shores of the Red Sea. It does not address tactics and techniques for mountain operations that are equally applicable to all mountains, except for the purpose of clarity.


TERRAIN



Mountains are high and rugged, with very steep slopes. Valleys running into a range become more and more narrow with the sides becoming gradually steeper. Valleys are usually the only routes that allow ground movement of men and equipment at any speed or in any quantity. Water is nonexistent on hilltops and unusual in valleys except during flash floods after rains. Lateral ground communications are limited unless the force is moving across the spines of mountain ranges. Navigation may be difficult, as maps are likely to be inaccurate.


PERSONNEL



Troops operating in mountainous country must be in peak physical condition. Regardless of their normal physical condition, personnel operating in mountainous areas require additional stamina and energy. They must also possess the ability to conduct sustained physical exertion and recover from it quickly.

Acclimatization to height, which varies much more among individuals than that for heat, must also be considered for operations in mountains. Lack of oxygen at high altitudes can cause unacclimatized troops to lose up to 50 percent of their normal physical efficiency when operating in altitudes over 6,000 feet. Mountain sickness may occur at altitudes over 7,800 feet and is usually characterized by severe headache, loss of appetite, nausea and dizziness, and may last from 5 to 7 days. Troops can acclimatize by appropriate staging techniques. It may take several weeks to become completely acclimatized, depending on altitude and the individual’s personal physical reactions.

The risk of sunburn, particularly to the uncovered face, is greater in mountains than on the desert floor due to thinner atmosphere. Use antisunburn ointment and keep the face in shade around midday, using face nets or sweat rags. An individual camouflage net or scarf is particularly useful for this purpose. Recognition of heat illnesses in higher altitudes may not be as apparent as at lower altitudes because sweat evaporates very quickly. Measures to avoid dehydration and salt loss are extremely important. Daily temperature variations may be considerable making it necessary to ensure troops do not become chilled at night. Layering of clothing is essential. Troops who have been sweating heavily before the temperature starts to drop should take their wet shirts off and place them over relatively dry shirts and sweaters. Soldiers/marines should add layers of clothing as it gets colder and remove them as needed. This may have to be leader supervised and disciplined in the same manner as water consumption.

Requirements for hygiene areas important in mountainous areas as in the desert itself. Normal rocky ground will make it extremely difficult to dig any form of latrine so cover excrement with rocks in a specially marked area.


GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS



Infantry is the basic maneuver force in mountains. Mechanized infantry is confined to valleys and foothills (if these exist), but their ability to dismount and move on foot enables them to reach almost anywhere in the area. Airmobile infantry can also be extensively used. Consideration should be given to modifying the TOE of infantry units operating in barren mountains. A strong antitank platoon may not be necessary. However, the infantry requires extra radars and radios for the number of observation posts and separate positions that they may expect to occupy.

Mountains are not a good environment for tank and armored cavalry operations, because tanks and armored cavalry are unable to maximize their mobility, flexibility, and firepower.

Avenues of approach at ground level are few. Roads or trails are limited and require extensive engineer effort to maintain. Off-road trafficability varies from relatively easy to very difficult. Most movement and maneuver in this type of terrain is either by air or on foot. Unnecessary vertical foot or vehicle movement should be avoided. Rock slides and avalanches, although not as common as in high cold mountains, do exist and can restrict movement.

Air cavalry is the major reconnaissance means but they must guard against being ambushed by ground troops located at their own altitude or even higher. Security of units must include observation, especially at night, of all avenues of approach including those within the capabilities of skilled mountaineers.

It is relatively easier to conceal troops in barren mountains than on the desert floor due to rugged ground, deep shadows (especially at dawn and dusk), and the difficulties an observer encounters when establishing perspective. Carefully placed rocks can be used to hide equipment; however, rocks can chip and splinter under small arms fire. The normal-type camouflage net, which breaks up outline by shadow, may be used rather than the overall cover normally used in the desert.

Helicopter units of all types can be used, although they may be slightly inhibited by altitude and rugged terrain. Payloads and endurance are degraded due to density and attitude. Winds are turbulent with considerable fluctuations in air flow strength and direction, particularly on the lee side of mountains. These winds, combined with the terrain, produce extra strain on crews as they have little margin for error. Flight crews should receive training in these conditions before flying in operations under these conditions.

When using men on foot for navigation, use all available maps, the lensatic compass, and a pocket altimeter. The pocket altimeter is essentially a barometer, measuring height by means of varying air pressure. If a navigator can only establish his location in the horizontal plane by resection on one point, the altimeter tells him his height, and thus his exact position. The instrument must be reset at every known altitude as it is affected by fluctuations of air pressure. Air photographs can also be helpful if they are scaled and contoured.

Supply of water and ammunition and the evacuation of wounded, especially if helicopters cannot land, can complicate operations. Water and ammunition may have to be transported by unit or civilian porters using A-frames or other suitable devices, or even by animal transport such as camel or mule.


OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS



The objective in mountainous areas of operations is normally to dominate terrain from which the enemy can be pinned down and destroyed. Avenues of approach are normally few, with very limited lateral movement except by helicopter. Reconnaissance must be continuous using all available means, as enemy defensive positions will be difficult to find. Observation posts are emplaced on high ground, normally by helicopter.

When contact is made, airmobile infantry can be used to outflank and envelop the enemy while suppressive fires and close air support are placed on all suspected positions, especially on dominating ground. Engineers should be well forward to assist in clearing obstacles. If airmobile infantry is unable to outflank the enemy, it will be necessary to launch a deliberate attack.

Frontal attacks in daylight, even with considerable supporting frees, have a limited chance of success against a well-emplaced enemy. Flank attacks on foot take a lot of time. The best opportunity is at night or in very poor visibility, but progress of men on foot will be slow and objectives should be limited.

The force should make every effort to secure ground higher than enemy positions to allow the attack to be downhill. Mobile forces should select objectives to the enemy’s rear to kill the enemy as they reposition or counterattack. Foot mobile forces must seek adequate terrain (restrictive) to equalize the enemy’s mounted mobility advantage.

Air superiority is required to allow a continuous flow of supplies and combat support by helicopter. Friendly mobile units must concentrate to destroy enemy command and control, artillery, service support, and air defense assets. It may be possible to infiltrate to a position behind the enemy, preferably using the most difficult, and hence, unlikely route. Although this is very slow, it normally has the advantage of surprise.

The importance of dominating terrain, together with the enemy’s knowledge that troops on the objective will be physically tired and dehydrated, makes an immediate counterattack likely. Supporting weapons must be brought forward at once, preferably by helicopter, and casualties removed by the same method.

Airmobile and attack helicopter units are well suited for pursuit operations. They can be used to outflank retreating enemy, and set up positions overlooking likely withdrawal routes. Small engineer parties can be emplaced to block defiles and interdict trails. Close air support and field artillery are used to reinforce airmobile and attack helicopter units and to counter efforts by enemy engineers to create obstacles.


DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS



A defense from a series of strongpoints is normal in hot mountains due to the need to hold dominating terrain and restrictions on ground mobility. Due to the amount of rock in the soil, it takes more time to prepare positions and normally requires engineer support.

It is necessary to hold terrain dominating avenues of approach. Any terrain that dominates a friendly position must either be held, or denied to the enemy by fire. It may be necessary to stock several days’ supplies, especially water, ammunition, and medical equipment in a position in case helicopters or supply vehicles are unable to reach it.

When a covering force is used, it is organized around cavalry reinforced with attack helicopters, supported by field and air defense artillery. Airmobile infantry operates on ridge lines. If the enemy closes on a battle position it is difficult to extract airmobile infantry, so sheltered landing sites nearby should be available. In any event, extractions must be covered by air or ground suppressive fires. Stay-behind observers should be used to call down field artillery fires on targets of opportunity or to report enemy activity. When tanks are a threat and terrain is suitable, the covering force is reinforced with tank-heavy units and antitank weapon systems.

Combat in the main battle area is usually a series of isolated actions fought from strongpoints on ridge lines and in valleys. Patrols are used extensively to harass the enemy and prevent infiltration; all possible routes must be covered. If the enemy attempts to outflank the friendly force, he must be blocked by attack helicopters, if available, or airmobile infantry.

Reserves should be kept centrally located and deployed by air to block or counterattack. If this is not possible, reserves may have to be split up and placed behind key terrain where they are available for immediate counterattack.

If retrograde operations are necessary, mountainous terrain is as good a place to conduct them as anywhere. More time is required to reconnoiter and prepare rearward positions, and they should be prestocked as much as possible. Unlike the desert floor where movement between positions is likely to cover relatively great distances, movement in these conditions is usually from ridge to ridge. Routes must be covered by flank guards, especially at defiles or other critical points, as the enemy will attempt to block them or cut off rear guards.


COMBAT SUPPORT



It may be difficult to find good gun positions at lower altitudes due to crest clearance problems—so high-angle fire is often used. The best weapons are light field artillery and mortars that are airmobile and can be manhandled so they can be positioned as high as possible.

Field artillery observation posts are emplaced on the highest ground available, although in low-cloud conditions it will be necessary to ensure that they are staggered in height. Predicted fire may be inaccurate due to rapidly changing weather conditions making observed fire a more sure method for achieving the desired results.

Like field artillery, there is limited use for self-propelled weapons in this environment, although some may be used in valleys. Airmobile towed weapons allow employment throughout the mountainous area of operations.

Major tasks for engineer, even in an airmobile force, are: construction, improvement, and route repair, and their denial to the enemy. Mining is important due to the limited number of routes. Lines of communication require constant drainage and possibly bridging to overcome the problem of flash flooding.

Because of the frequent interdictions of mountainous roadways, military police will experience multiple defile operations. Use temporary traffic signs to expedite traffic movement to the front. The number of stragglers may be expected to increase in this environment. Because of difficulty in resupply, the supply points for water, POL, food, and ammunition will become especially lucrative targets for enemy attack. Military police rear area security elements must develop plans for relief and for augmenting base defense forces.





Combat in Jungle Environments





CHAPTER 1





The Jungle





SECTION I. GENERAL



This chapter introduces jungle environments—where they are found and what they are like. Later chapters build on this information, providing guidance on fighting and living in the jungle.

Field Marshal Slim’s words reflect the image of the jungle most armies carry into jungle warfare. At first, the jungle seems to be very hostile, but the hostility wanes as troops learn more about the jungle environment.

Jungles, in their various forms, are common in tropical areas of the world—mainly Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

“To our men…the jungle was a strange, fearsome place; moving and fighting in it were a nightmare. We were too ready to classify jungle as вЂ˜impenetratable’…To us it appeared only as an obstacle to movement; to the Japanese it was a welcome means of concealed maneuver and suprise…The Japanese reaped the deserved reward…we paid the penalty.”



—Field Marshall Slim, Victor in Burma, World War II





(Concerning the dark, early days of the Burma Campaign)





SECTION II. CLIMATE AND WEATHER



The climate in jungles varies with location. Close to the equator, all seasons are nearly alike, with rains throughout the year; farther from the equator, especially in India and Southeast Asia, jungles have distinct wet (monsoon) and dry seasons. Both zones have high temperatures (averaging 78 to 95+ degrees Fahrenheit), heavy rainfall (as much as 1,000 centimeters [400+ inches] annually), and high humidity (90 percent) throughout the year.

Severe weather also has an impact on tactical operations in the jungle. The specific effects of weather on operations are discussed throughout this manual.





SECTION III. TERRAIN AND VEGETATION




TYPES OF JUNGLES



The jungle environment includes densely forested areas, grasslands, cultivated areas, and swamps. Jungles are classified as primary or secondary jungles based on the terrain and vegetation.


PRIMARY JUNGLES



These are tropical forests. Depending on the type of trees growing in these forests, primary jungles are classified either as tropical rain forests or as deciduous forests.

Tropical Rain Forests. These consist mostly of large trees whose branches spread and lock together to form canopies. These canopies, which can exist at two or three different levels, may form as low as 10 meters from the ground. The canopies prevent sunlight from reaching the ground, causing a lack of undergrowth on the jungle floor. Extensive above-ground root systems and hanging vines are common. These conditions, combined with a wet and soggy surface, make vehicular traffic difficult. Foot movement is easier in tropical rain forests than in other types of jungle. Except where felled trees or construction make a gap in the canopy of the rain forest, observation from the air is nearly impossible. Ground observation is generally limited to about 50 meters (55 yards).





Deciduous Forests. These are found in semitropical zones where there are both wet and dry seasons. In the wet season, trees are fully leaved; in the dry season, much of the foliage dies. Trees are generally less dense in deciduous forests than in rain forests. This allows more rain and sunlight to filter to the ground, producing thick undergrowth. In the wet season, with the trees in full leaf, observation both from the air and on the ground is limited. Movement is more difficult than in the rain forest. In the dry season, however, both observation and trafficability improve.





SECONDARY JUNGLES



These are found at the edge of the rain forest and the deciduous forest, and in areas where jungles have been cleared and abandoned. Secondary jungles appear when the ground has been repeatedly exposed to sunlight. These areas are typically overgrown with weeds, grasses, thorns, ferns, canes, and shrubs. Foot movement is extremely slow and difficult. Vegetation may reach to a height of 2 meters. This will limit observation to the front to only a few meters.





COMMON JUNGLE FEATURES




SWAMPS



These are common to all low jungle areas where there is water and poor drainage. There are two basic types of swamps—mangrove and palm.

Mangrove Swamps. These are found in coastal areas wherever tides influence water flow. The mangrove is a shrub-like tree which grows 1 to 5 meters high. These trees have tangled root systems, both above and below the water level, which restrict movement to foot or small boats. Observation in mangrove swamps, both on the ground and from the air, is poor. Concealment is excellent.





Palm Swamps. These exist in both salt and fresh water areas. Like movement in the mangrove swamps, movement through palm swamps is mostly restricted to foot (sometimes small boats). Vehicular traffic is nearly impossible except after extensive road construction by engineers. Observation and fields-of-fire are very limited. Concealment from both air and ground observation is excellent.





SAVANNA



This is a broad, open jungle grassland in which trees are scarce. The thick grass is broad-bladed and grows 1 to 5 meters high. Movement in the savanna is generally easier than in other types of jungle areas, especially for vehicles. The sharp-edged, dense grass and extreme heat make foot movement a slow and tiring process. Depending on the height of the grass, ground observation may vary from poor to good. Concealment from air observation is poor for both troops and vehicles.





BAMBOO



This grows in clumps of varying size in jungles throughout the tropics. Large stands of bamboo are excellent obstacles for wheeled or tracked vehicles. Troop movement through bamboo is slow, exhausting, and noisy. Troops should bypass bamboo stands if possible.





CULTIVATED AREAS



These exist in jungles throughout the tropics and range from large, well-planned, and well-managed farms and plantations to small tracts cultivated by individual farmers. There are three general types of cultivated areas—rice paddies, plantations, and small farms.

Rice Paddies. These are flat, flooded fields in which rice is grown. Flooding of the fields is controlled by a network of dikes and irrigation ditches which make movement by vehicles difficult even when the fields are dry. Concealment is poor in rice paddies. Cover is limited to the dikes, and then only from ground fire. Observation and fields of fire are excellent. Foot movement is poor when the fields are wet because soldiers must wade through water about ? meter (2 feet) deep and soft mud. When the fields are dry, foot movement becomes easier. The dikes, about 2 to 3 meters tall, are the only obstacles.





Plantations. These are large farms or estates where tree crops, such as rubber and coconut, are grown. They are usually carefully planned and free of undergrowth (like a well-tended park). Movement through plantations is generally easy. Observation along the rows of trees is generally good. Concealment and cover can be found behind the trees, but soldiers moving down the cultivated rows are exposed.





Small Farms. These exist throughout the tropics. These small cultivated areas are usually hastily planned. After 1 or 2 years’ use, they usually are abandoned, leaving behind a small open area which turns into secondary jungle. Movement through these areas may be difficult due to fallen trees and scrub brush.

Generally, observation and fields-of-fire are less restricted in cultivated areas than in uncultivated jungles. However, much of the natural cover and concealment are removed by cultivation, and troops will be more exposed in these areas.





CHAPTER 2





Life in the Jungle





SECTION I. GENERAL



Soldiers must understand that the environment affects everyone. The degree to which soldiers are trained to live and fight in harsh environments will determine their unit’s success or failure.

“Jungle fighting is not new to U.S. soldiers, nor does the enemy have a monopoly on jungle know-how. U.S. units adapted well to jungle fighting, and when we operated against the North Vietnamese Army along the Cambodian border we found that they had as much difficulty operating in the area as we did. The prisoners we captured were, as a rule, undernourished, emaciated, and sick with malaria. They stated that almost everyone in their unit had malaria, and many had died from it.”



Report, 25th Infantry Division, Republic of Vietnam





There is very little to fear from the jungle environment. Fear itself can be an enemy. Soldiers must be taught to control their fear of the jungle. A man overcome with fear is of little value in any situation. Soldiers in a jungle must learn that the most important thing is to keep their heads and calmly think out any situation.

Many of the stories written about out-of-the-way jungle places were written by writers who went there in search of adventure rather than facts. Practically without exception, these authors exaggerated or invented many of the thrilling experiences they relate. These thrillers are often a product of the author’s imagination and are not facts.

Most Americans, especially those raised in cities, are far removed from their pioneer ancestors, and have lost the knack of taking care of themselves under all conditions. It would be foolish to say that, without proper training, they would be in no danger if lost in the jungles of Southeast Asia, South America, or some Pacific island. On the other hand, they would be in just as much danger if lost in the mountains of western Pennsylvania or in other undeveloped regions of our own country. The only difference would be that a man is less likely to panic when he is lost in his homeland than when he is lost abroad.



SECTION II. JUNGLE HAZARDS




EFFECT OF CLIMATE



The discomforts of tropical climates are often exaggerated, but it is true that the heat is more persistent. In regions where the air contains a lot of moisture, the effect of the heat may seem worse than the same temperature in a dry climate. Many people experienced in jungle operations feel that the heat and discomfort in some U.S. cities in the summertime are worse than the climate in the jungle.

Strange as it may seem, there may be more suffering from cold in the tropics than from the heat. Of course, very low temperatures do not occur, but chilly days and nights are common. In some jungles, in winter months, the nights are cold enough to require a wool blanket or poncho liner for sleeping.

Rainfall in many parts of the tropics is much greater than that in most areas of the temperate zones. Tropical downpours usually are followed by clear skies, and in most places the rains are predictable at certain times of the day. Except in those areas where rainfall may be continuous during the rainy season, there are not many days when the sun does not shine part of the time.

People who live in the tropics usually plan their activities so that they are able to stay under shelter during the rainy and hotter portions of the day. After becoming used to it, most tropical dwellers prefer the constant climate of the torrid zones to the frequent weather changes in colder climates.


INSECTS



Malaria-carrying mosquitoes are probably the most harmful of the tropical insects. Soldiers can contract malaria if proper precautions are not taken.





Mosquitoes are most prevalent early at night and just before dawn. Soldiers must be especially cautious at these times. Malaria is more common in populated areas than in uninhabited jungle, so soldiers must also be especially cautious when operating around villages. Mud packs applied to mosquito bites offer some relief from itching.

Wasps and bees may be common in some places, but they will rarely attack unless their nests are disturbed. When a nest is disturbed, the troops must leave the area and reassemble at the last rally point. In case of stings, mud packs are helpful. In some areas, there are tiny bees, called sweatbees, which may collect on exposed parts of the body during dry weather, especially if the body is sweating freely. They are annoying but stingless and will leave when sweating has completely stopped, or they may be scraped off with the hand.

The larger centipedes and scorpions can inflict stings which are painful but not fatal. They like dark places, so it is always advisable to shake out blankets before sleeping at night, and to make sure before dressing that they are not hidden in clothing or shoes. Spiders are commonly found in the jungle. Their bites may be painful, but are rarely serious. Ants can be dangerous to injured men lying on the ground and unable to move. Wounded soldiers should be placed in an area free of ants.

In Southeast Asian jungles, the rice-borer moth of the lowlands collects around lights in great numbers during certain seasons. It is a small, plain-colored moth with a pair of tiny black spots on the wings. It should never be brushed off roughly, as the small barbed hairs of its body may be ground into the skin. This causes a sore, much like a burn, that often takes weeks to heal.


LEECHES



Leeches are common in many jungle areas, particularly throughout most of the Southwest Pacific, Southeast Asia, and the Malay Peninsula. They are found in swampy areas, streams, and moist jungle country. They are not poisonous, but their bites may become infected if not cared for properly. The small wound that they cause may provide a point of entry for the germs which cause tropical ulcers or “jungle sores.” Soldiers operating in the jungle should watch for leeches on the body and brush them off before they have had time to bite. When they have taken hold, they should not be pulled off forcibly because part of the leech may remain in the skin. Leeches will release themselves if touched with insect repellent, a moist piece of tobacco, the burning end of a cigarette, a coal from a fire, or a few drops of alcohol.

Straps wrapped around the lower part of the legs (“leech straps”) will prevent leeches from crawling up the legs and into the crotch area. Trousers should be securely tucked into the boots.





SNAKES



A soldier in the jungle probably will see very few snakes. When he does see one, the snake most likely will be making every effort to escape.

If a soldier should accidently step on a snake or otherwise disturb a snake, it will probably attempt to bite. The chances of this happening to soldiers traveling along trails or waterways are remote if soldiers are alert and careful. Most jungle areas pose less of a snakebite danger than do the uninhabited areas of New Mexico, Florida, or Texas. This does not mean that soldiers should be careless about the possibility of snakebites, but ordinary precautions against them are enough. Soldiers should be particularly watchful when clearing ground.

Treat all snakebites as poisonous.





CROCODILES AND CAYMANS



Crocodiles and caymans are meat-eating reptiles which live in tropical areas. “Crocodile-infested rivers and swamps” is a catch-phrase often found in stories about the tropics. Asian jungles certainly have their share of crocodiles, but there are few authenticated cases of crocodiles actually attacking humans. Caymans, found in South and Central America, are not likely to attack unless provoked.





WILD ANIMAL



In Africa, where lions, leopards, and other flesh-eating animals abound, they are protected from hunters by local laws and live on large preserves. In areas where the beasts are not protected, they are shy and seldom seen. When encountered, they will attempt to escape. All large animals can be dangerous if cornered or suddenly startled at close quarters. This is especially true of females with young. In the jungles of Sumatra, Bali, Borneo, Southeast Asia, and Burma there are tigers, leopards, elephants, and buffalo. Latin America’s jungles have the jaguar. Ordinarily, these will not attack a man unless they are cornered or wounded.

Certain jungle animals, such as water buffalo and elephants, have been domesticated by the local people. Soldiers should also avoid these animals. They may appear tame, but this tameness extends only to people the animals are familar with.


POISONOUS VEGETATION



Another area of danger is that of poisonous plants and trees. For example, nettles, particularly tree nettles, are one of the dangerous items of vegetation. These nettles have a severe stinging that will quickly educate the victim to recognize the plant. There are ringas trees in Malaysia which affect some people in much the same way as poison oak. The poison ivy and poison sumac of the continental U.S. can cause many of the same type troubles that may be experienced in the jungle. The danger from poisonous plants in the woods of the U.S. eastern seaboard is similar to that of the tropics. Thorny thickets, such as rattan, should be avoided as one would avoid a blackberry patch.

Some of the dangers associated with poisonous vegetation can be avoided by keeping sleeves down and wearing gloves when practical.


HEALTH AND HYGIENE



The climate in tropical areas and the absence of sanitation facilities increase the chance that soldiers may contract a disease. Disease is fought with good sanitation practices and preventive medicine. In past wars, diseases accounted for a significantly high percentage of casualties.





WATERBORNE DISEASES



Water is vital in the jungle and is usually easy to find. However, water from natural sources should be considered contaminated. Water purification procedures must be taught to all soldiers. Germs of serious diseases, like dysentery, are found in impure water. Other waterborne diseases, such as blood fluke, are caused by exposure of an open sore to impure water.





FUNGUS DISEASES



These diseases are caused by poor personal health practices. The jungle environment promotes fungus and bacterial diseases of the skin and warm water immersion skin diseases. Bacteria and fungi are tiny plants which multiply fast under the hot, moist conditions of the jungle. Sweat-soaked skin invites fungus attack. The following are common skin diseases that are caused by long periods of wetness of the skin:

Warm Water Immersion Foot. This disease occurs usually where there are many creeks, streams, and canals to cross, with dry ground in between. The bottoms of the feet become white, wrinkled, and tender. Walking becomes painful.

Chafing. This disease occurs when soldiers must often wade through water up to their waists, and the trousers stay wet for hours. The crotch area becomes red and painful to even the lightest touch.

Most skin diseases are treated by letting the skin dry.





HEAT INJURIES



These result from high temperatures, high humidity, lack of air circulation, and physical exertion. All soldiers must be trained to prevent heat disorders.





NATIVES



Like all other regions of the world, the jungle also has its native inhabitants. Soldiers should be aware that some of these native tribes can be hostile if not treated properly.

There may be occasions, however, when hostile tribes attack without provacation. If they attack, a small force should be able to disperse them.





SECTION III. JUNGLE SURVIVAL




FOOD



Food of some type is always available in the jungle—in fact, there is hardly a place in the world where food cannot be secured from plants and animals. All animals, birds, reptiles, and many kinds of insects of the jungle are edible. Some animals, such as toads and salamanders, have glands on the skin which should be removed before their meat is eaten. Fruits, flowers, buds, leaves, bark, and often tubers (fleshy plant roots) may be eaten. Fruits eaten by birds and monkeys usually may be eaten by man.





There are various means of preparing and preserving food found in the jungle. Fish, for example, can be cleaned and wrapped in wild banana leaves. This bundle is then tied with string made from bark, placed on a hastily constructed wood griddle, and roasted thoroughly until done. Another method is to roast the bundle of fish underneath a pile of red-hot stones.

Other meats can be roasted in a hollow section of bamboo, about 60 centimeters (2 feet) long. Meat cooked in this manner will not spoil for three or four days if left inside the bamboo stick and sealed.

Yams, taros, yuccas, and wild bananas can be cooked in coals. They taste somewhat like potatoes. Palm hearts can make a refreshing salad, and papaya a delicious dessert.


SHELTER



Jungle shelters are used to protect personnel and equipment from the harsh elements of the jungle. Shelters are necessary while sleeping, planning operations, and protecting sensitive equipment.





NAVIGATION



Navigation in thick jungle areas is difficult even for the most experienced navigators. Soldiers navigating in the jungle must use various aids. The compass is an obvious aid, but a soldier would never be able to move very fast in the jungle if he had to constantly move along a magnetic azimuth. Movement along a terrain feature, such as a ridgeline, is easier but can be extremely dangerous when establishing a pattern of consistency. A soldier must trust the compass, map, and pace count. A soldier should not keep his eyes riveted on the compass; however, it should be used as a check.

The shadows caused by the sun are an easily observed and accurate aid to direction. Allowances must be made for the gradual displacement of the shadows as the sun moves across the sky.

Other aids to maintaining direction include prominent objects, the course of rivers, prevailing winds, the stars, and the moon.


OBSERVATION



All movements of animals and men are marked by tracks and signs. Soldiers must learn to read signs left in soft ground, in streambeds, on roads and trails, and near watering places and salt licks. Animals seldom move without a reason; a few fresh tracks supply information about their maker, his direction, and probable intentions.

Animals avoid man. The animals, their tracks, and their behavior can reveal whether or not men are in the area. Jungle fighters can listen to the cries of animals and learn to recognize their alarm calls.

The ability to track and to recognize signs in the jungle are valuable skills. Throughout the soldier’s time in the jungle, he should practice these skills.


CLOTHING AND EQUIPMENT



Before deploying for jungle operations, troops are issued special uniforms and equipment. Some of these items are:


JUNGLE FATIGUES



These fatigues are lighter and faster drying than standard fatigues. To provide the best ventilation, the uniform should fit loosely. It should never be starched.


JUNGLE BOOTS



These boots are lighter and faster drying than all-leather boots. Their cleated soles will maintain footing on steep, slippery slopes. The ventilating insoles should be washed in warm, soapy water when the situation allows.


INSECT (MOSQUITO) BAR



The insect (mosquito) bar or net should be used any time soldiers sleep in the jungle. Even if conditions do not allow a shelter, the bar can be hung inside the fighting position or from trees or brush. No part of the body should touch the insect net when it is hung, because mosquitoes can bite through the netting. The bar should be tucked or laid loosely, not staked down. Although this piece of equipment is very light, it can be bulky if not folded properly. It should be folded inside the poncho as tightly as possible.





CHAPTER 3





Preparation and Training to Deploy

to Jungle Areas





SECTION I. GENERAL



Chapters 1 and 2 describe the jungle environment. Since many soldiers are unaccustomed to such an environment, they must make preparations before conducting jungle operations.

This chapter lists the factors to be considered when preparing for jungle operations and presents training tips for conducting jungle training.



SECTION II. FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED WHEN PREPARING

FOR JUNGLE OPERATIONS



When a unit is alerted for training or actual combat operations in a jungle environment, the commander must first consider the following:

• Where will the unit be training or operating?



• What are the climatic and terrain conditions of the objective area?



• How much time does the unit have to prepare?



• What available training areas have climate and terrain resembling the objective area?



• What type operations are to be conducted—conventional or counter-guerrilla?



• Will the unit be taking its own equipment?



• Does any of the unit’s equipment require modification (including camouflage painting)?



• What special equipment does the unit require?



• Does the unit have any jungle warfare instructors, soldiers with jungle experience, or linguists?



• What training assistance is available? Outside instructors? Training aids?



• Does higher headquarters have special standing operating procedures (SOP) for jungle war?



• Are all soldiers physically fit?



• What information is available about the enemy?



• What information is available about local civilians and allied forces in the objective area?



Once these questions have been answered, the commander can develop a program to prepare his unit to operate in the jungle.

The idea that a unit is technically and tactically proficient is only a small part of a unit’s preparation. Emphasis should be placed on the mental, physical, and psychological aspects of operating in a jungle environment. The key to overcoming these problems lies with the unit chain of command in their efforts to develop a “will to win” as well as “will to train to win.”



SECTION III. TRAINING TIPS



Units committed to jungle operations may have to fight as soon as they arrive in the operational area. Commanders must make the best use of the preparation time available. Measures which commanders should consider include:

Making use of time in garrison. Certain jungle subjects can be taught using classroom instruction. This training should begin as soon as possible, so that time in jungle training areas can be devoted to more advanced techniques.

Making use of local training areas. Although these training areas may not resemble jungle terrain, some jungle techniques can be introduced in them. This will provide a training base which can be expanded when the unit deploys to its jungle training or operational areas. In addition, physical training should begin in the local training area as early as possible before deployment.

Integrating individual training into unit training exercises. Rather than devote field training time to the individual skills required to live in the jungle, these skills should be introduced early in classes, and then practiced during unit training exercises.





ACCLIMATION



The first priority in preparation for jungle warfare is acclimation (getting accustomed to jungle climate). Troops who are not conditioned properly will not perform jungle warfare tasks reliably. Different people become acclimated to hot weather at different rates, but the following methods can be used in most units.

Exercise is the best method for acclimation, because troops in good physical condition will adapt easily to new climates. A 7to 14-day conditioning period should be sufficient for most soldiers. Exercises should be moderately strenuous at the beginning, and become more demanding each day. Troops from warm climates will adapt faster than troops deploying from colder climates. Physical training in heated gymnasiums prior to deployment will also ease the acclimation process.

Leaders must be alert for symptoms of heat disorders during the acclimation period.


SURVIVAL, EVASION, AND ESCAPE



Convincing a soldier that he will survive alone in the jungle will go a long way in building his self-confidence. The Ultimate Guide to U.S. Army Survival Skills, Tactics, and Techniques contains details on survival, evasion, and escape training.


SWIMMING



Swimming is also a vital skill for the jungle fighter. Falling into a jungle pool or river can be a terrible experience, especially for a nonswimmer. All troops should be “drown proofed.” Units should identify their strong swimmers for lifeguard training and other more difficult swimming tasks.


CAMOUFLAGE AND CONCEALMENT



Training to conceal soldiers and equipment from ground and air observation is equally important to combat, combat support, and combat service support units. Proper use of camouflage will help to make up for an enemy’s superior knowledge of the jungle area.


JUNGLE LIVING



Following a short period of classroom instruction, soldiers should experience jungle living conditions in the field. This training can be incorporated into other unit training.





During this period of training, use of garrison facilities should be kept to a minimum. Supplies should be brought to the field rather than the unit returning to the rear for them. Soldiers should learn to live without unnecessary personal comforts.

Land navigation should be practiced using jungle movement techniques. (See chapter 6).


TARGET AREA ORIENTATION



Classes on the host country should stress those facts which apply to operations.





JUNGLE TACTICS



Chapter 5 describes tactics common to jungle fighting. These tactics should be taught first to leaders down to squad level. The leaders then train their own units. Stress should be placed on small unit tactics and operations with Army aviation. Since night operations, especially ambushes, are common in jungle fighting, units should emphasize night training.


MOVEMENT



Units should train in tactical marches.





WEAPONS TRAINING



Most jungle fighting takes place at close range. Soldiers should be trained in “quick fire,” as outlined in chapter 8, FM 23-9 Advanced training should be conducted on a “jungle range.” On this range, soldiers move down a trail and engage pop-up and moving targets which appear suddenly at close range. Targets are operated by an assistant on signals from a lane grader. Targets should be exposed for 3 to 6 seconds. Only 2 or 3 rounds should be fired at each target. At a later stage, boobytraps and obstacles can be emplaced on the trail.


INTELLIGENCE



Soldiers should be trained in specific intelligence subjects.





This last subject is particularly important in jungle operations, because soldiers will more often hear weapons firing than see them. If captured enemy weapons and equipment are available, they should be used as aids in this training.


MAINTENANCE AND LOGISTICS



Operators need to learn techniques to keep their equipment operational in the jungle environment.





Staff members and leaders should receive familiarization training on these techniques in order to supervise the operators. In addition, staff and leaders should learn those special supply requirements and procedures in the operational area. They should also be familiar with the capabilities of those logistical units supporting the force.





CHAPTER 4





The Threat in Jungle Areas





SECTION I. GENERAL



The jungle is an environment which stretches in a broad belt around the tropical areas of the world. Each of these areas has its own military, political, and economic conditions. As a result, it is impossible to describe one threat which applies to all jungle areas. Potential enemies which U.S. forces might face in the jungle run the spectrum from lightly armed guerrillas all the way to conventional forces.

This chapter describes the main features of guerrilla and conventional forces as they are found in the jungle, and briefly outlines the types of potential threat forces in various jungle regions.



SECTION II. GUERRILLA FORCES




WHAT GUERRILLAS ARE



Guerrillas are irregular forces. They normally constitute the military faction of a political resistance or a subversive movement. These forces engage in unconventional operations in order to undermine the power of an established government or to take political control away from other factions. Their goal is normally to establish a new government, often according to a radical political philosophy.

The basic guerrilla organization is a three to five-man cell. These cells are capable of independent action. They also can be brought together for larger operations and dispersed later. Guerrillas are organized into cells for two reasons. One is for security. The fewer the people who can identify members of a guerrilla force, the better the chances are that it will survive. The second reason is for support. Guerrillas must live off the land to a large degree, and small cells are easier to support in this manner.


HOW GUERRILLAS FIGHT



Guerrillas are usually weaker than conventional forces in terms of total resources. For that reason, guerrillas will not attempt to overwhelm large units of their opponents in combat. They will instead try to inflict as much damage as possible in lightning actions, withdrawing before the opposing forces can react. Guerrillas are most effective when they strike widely separated targets over a long period of time. This type of action will confuse, demoralize, and frustrate their opponents.





These missions are not normally accomplished by the use of conventional attacks and defenses. Instead, guerrillas rely on speed, surprise, and security. Guerrilla operations include raids, ambushes, mining and boobytrapping, and sniping.

Targets are selected by the guerrilla based on an analysis of how much the elimination of the target will disrupt the government, what the effect on the populace will be, the risk of being killed or captured, and the amount of weapons or supplies which can be seized. This analysis calls for timely intelligence, which is gained by active patrolling.

The retention of the initiative is the key to success in guerrilla operations. Guerrillas rely on their ability to strike where they are least expected, at points where the government forces are least prepared. If the guerrillas lose the initiative, and are forced to react to the operations of conventional forces, their effectiveness is greatly reduced.

Guerrillas are not normally organized or equipped for stand-and-fight type defensive operations. They prefer to defend themselves by moving, by dispersing into small groups, or by diverting the opponent’s attention while they withdraw. Whenever possible, these operations are accomplished by offensive operations against the opponent’s flank or rear. If the government forces persist in their attack, the guerrillas are prepared to disengage to keep their freedom of action. If forced to disperse into small groups, the guerrilla forces become less effective until they regroup to resume offensive operations.

One of the most important needs of guerrilla forces is support. This support can come from a number of sources. Food, for example, can be stolen or supplied by political sympathizers. Weapons can be gathered from raids on government installations. A foreign power may provide secret training, and shipments of food, weapons, ammunition, and equipment. If the guerrillas can be cut off from these sources of support, they will be much less effective.

To protect their operations, jungle guerrillas will normally establish bases from which they can operate. These bases will be in remote areas. The bases will be secured by a combination of guerrilla outposts and by a grapevine intelligence network established by political sympathizers. Although they may be difficult to find, there will normally be concealed routes into the bases, from which the guerrillas have access to their targets and sources of support.


GUERRILLA STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES



Guerrillas operate most effectively in countries where the people are discontented with government policies. If the people are apathetic or passively hostile to their government, the guerrillas will seek to develop this feeling into a popular base of support. If no such feeling exists among the people, it will be much harder for guerrillas to set up operations.





SECTION III. CONVENTIONAL FORCES




TYPES OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN THE JUNGLE



Conventional forces committed to jungle operations can perform any one of a number of missions. The lowest level of involvement is the use of conventional forces to advise and assist native guerrilla or paramilitary forces, teaching them either how to fight or how to operate sophisticated equipment. A higher level of involvement is the use of conventional forces as a military cadre in units which are composed of native forces. Finally, the highest level of involvement is the operation of conventional forces in a conventional role, fighting major battles in the jungle.

Conventional jungle enemies may come from a number of places. It is possible that U.S. forces committed to jungle operations will fight native conventional forces. It is also possible that U.S. forces will fight conventional forces brought in from a sponsoring hostile power. In either case, most potential jungle enemies are infantry forces, supported with artillery, mortars, and armored vehicles, organized along the lines of Soviet forces. These forces may also have a capability to conduct tactical air (TACAIR) operations and nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC) warfare. They may be equipped with weapons and equipment that are a generation or two older than those found in more modern armies.


HOW CONVENTIONAL FORCES FIGHT IN THE JUNGLE



The way in which a potential conventional threat army fights in the jungle depends on the terrain, the combat experience of that army, and the degree to which it models itself after the forces of a sponsoring power.





A jungle enemy can be expected to be skilled in the art of camouflage, the chief means he has to evade his opponent’s firepower. Camouflage will be for him a way of life. He will probably use bunkers and tunnels as protective survival measures. To slow opposing forces, he may use obstacles, mines, and boobytraps. He will move on covered and concealed routes, using darkness to conceal most of his operations. He will probably depend heavily on streams and rivers to provide concealed routes of movement and drinking water.

He can be expected to remove all intelligence indicators from the battlefield. He will go to great lengths to remove his dead, wounded, weapons, and even expended cartridges from the battlefield. He will try to leave no information relating to order of battle, strength, dispositions, or intentions.

“We captured numerous enemy documents which either condemned or commended certain units for the police of the battle field.”



—Report, 25th Infantry Division, Kontum Province, Republic of Vietnam





Jungle enemies have also used deception means, such as explosive bullets and firecrackers, to mislead U.S. units as to the size and disposition of the forces opposing them. Communications deception and jamming have also been used by jungle enemies against opponents.

Since the U.S. Army is noted for employing an abundance of firepower, jungle enemies in the past have preferred to engage U.S. units at extremely close range. At times, it is impossible for U.S. commanders to use their supporting indirect fires without taking friendly casualties. The specific effects that this technique has on offensive and defensive operations will be discussed later. In general, however, the U.S. ground commander must operate in such a manner that all his fire support can always be used effectively.

Jungle enemies can be expected to train hard to use the jungle to their advantage. In the offense, for example, they use the thick foliage to infiltrate positions and eliminate command posts (CP), key weapons, and vital facilities. These operations are conducted to take away their opponent’s advantages in command and control, fire support, and logistical means. The intent is to put their forces on a more equal footing with their opponents. This situation can be exploited by a force with superior knowledge of the terrain.

When forced to defend, these forces will quite often prepare elaborate defensive positions, well camouflaged and concealed. In addition, defenders may use snipers, boobytraps, and ambushes to delay, create a sense of confusion and insecurity, and cause the attacker to surrender the initiative.

It is also possible that U.S. forces committed to jungle operations will fight Warsaw Pact forces, probably members of airborne divisions. Although these troops will have newer and more sophisticated weapons than some of the troops native to jungle areas, they probably will not be familiar with the local terrain and may not be well trained in jungle operations.


STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF CONVENTIONAL JUNGLE ENEMIES



Much of a conventional jungle enemy’s effectiveness depends on familiarity with the terrain. In general, this means that armies native to a battlefield area will be more effective than forces from outside. Even if these outside forces have a greater amount of firepower than the native forces, the lack of terrain familiarity may limit their ability to use that firepower.





HOW THE THREAT DEFENDS



The threat defense is a temporary measure, adopted only when necessary. This does not imply, however, that the threat defense consists of half measures or that he is unskilled in defense techniques. Jungle enemies will use every trick possible to survive against massive amounts of firepower. His defense will be cleverly and carefully prepared.

A typical jungle enemy defensive position consists of a complex series of earth and timber bunkers, spider holes, and tunnels. These are positioned to achieve mutual support. Bunkers are built low to make them more difficult to see and engage by fire. They are well camouflaged—even the fields-of-fire may be cut from the waist down, so that they will be unnoticeable to a standing man. Weapons positions are planned to provide interlocking fires—lethal even during limited visibility. Boobytraps and obstacles are integrated into the defense to slow, demoralize, and confuse the attacker.

The jungle threat’s concept of the defense is to trap the attacker by allowing him to move into prepared fields-of-fire. Fire is opened at extremely close range, sometimes at 50 meters or less. This is done for two reasons—first, to bring fires to bear from all sides, and, second, to force the attacker to remove himself before he can call for supporting fires.

While the key part of the jungle threat’s defense is automatic weapons positions in bunkers, the enemy will also put snipers in the trees. In this way, the attacker cannot devote his full attention to the bunkers, because he must also deal with the snipers.

If the attacker is too strong, the jungle threat will attempt to withdraw over routes that have been planned and scouted to make the withdrawal as rapid as possible. Stay-behind ambushes, snipers, mines, and obstacles are used to slow the attacker.


HOW THE CONVENTIONAL ENEMY ATTACKS



Attack is the preferred form of combat for potential jungle enemies. Because most of these forces expect to have a disadvantage in firepower and technology when fighting U.S. forces, most of them have developed special techniques to help make up the difference through surprise. They may, for example, probe a defensive position until the defender reveals the location of his key weapons. These weapons are then eliminated by infiltrators before the main attack. They may use firecrackers to create a diversion, drawing the defender’s fire and deceiving him as to the size of the attacking force. They may infiltrate the defense to eliminate command posts, mortars, or artillery units.

“Decoy the Americans from one direction by smoke, firing, or shouting. Then attack him from an unexpected direction.”



—Captured Japanese Document, World War II





Threat units will avoid attacking prepared defenses when possible. They prefer to attack a weak point, using the jungle, weather, and their own special training as much as possible. Sapper squads are specially trained to infiltrate minefields and obstacles in order to neutralize key positions or create a gap in the defense. The enemy may also isolate a position, so that their opponents will be tied down in trying to relieve it, or they may conduct raids to disrupt operations and lower the defender’s morale. Darkness, poor weather, and rough terrain will be used to conceal these operations.

A commander should never assume that any jungle area is impassable to a well-trained jungle enemy. Experience has shown that such enemies are very adept at using extremely difficult terrain effectively as avenues of approach.

“Use fog and rain to catch the Americans off guard. Make an assault suddenly, from positions which the Americans believe unapproachable, such as cliffs, rivers, and jungles.”





—Captured Japanese Document, World War II





Although the jungle enemy attacks swiftly, his attacks are planned in minute detail. If he is allowed to attack according to plan, the jungle enemy is an effective force. If the defender can interrupt even a minor part of the plan, the enemy will have difficulty in adjusting, and the attack will probably fail. This aspect of enemy operations places a high premium on the struggle for the initiative at all levels.

If the defending force can be pushed out of its positions and forced to retreat, the jungle enemy will probably make every effort to maintain contact through pursuit. He will harass the rear guard, at the same time sending forces to outrun and cut off the retreating force. He will then try to destroy the retreating force by ambush or encirclement.



SECTION IV. POTENTIAL ENEMIES IN THREE JUNGLE REGIONS



It is impossible to describe one jungle threat which applies to all areas of the world. There are, however, certain characteristics of potential threat forces that are peculiar to specific jungle regions.


LATIN AMERICA



The most likely threat the U.S. forces may face in Latin American jungles are insurgent movements. These movements aim at the overthrow of a wealthy ruling class to install a new regime. The U.S. is often viewed by the insurgents as an ally of the government, and U.S. facilities and institutions are often targets for these movements.

The military faction of these insurgent movements consists of guerrilla forces similar to those described earlier. They are organized into small cells, are lightly armed, and are capable of concentrating for acts against major facilities and then dispersing after the operation. Although their ultimate objective will often be the establishment of control over the urban areas, they may use the jungle to provide a concealed and secure base of operations. The support of the local people is very important to their survival.

At the time U.S. forces are committed to fight in Latin American areas, guerrilla forces are likely to be augmented with military aid and personnel from other sponsoring countries in the region. These forces may perform any one of a number of roles: advisors, guerrilla cadre, or limited conventional combat. Logistical and intelligence support may also come from these forces.


SUBSAHARAN AFRICA



The conflicts in this region since World War II have been waged by insurgent groups against perceived vestiges of colonialism or imperialism. Most of these colonialist and imperialist institutions are connected in the minds of the insurgents with the Western European powers. As a result, the instability in some areas of this region has provided a tempting target for provocation. To make matters more complicated, many of the conflicting factions are also struggling among themselves, due to political or ancient tribal differences. This in turn creates even more regional turmoil, and an even greater vulnerability for exploitation.

Conflicting factions in Subsaharan Africa consist primarily of guerrilla groups. These guerrillas, however, are often more heavily armed than Latin American guerrillas for two reasons. First, these groups have mortars, artillery, and recoilless weapons from national army formations which have been defeated or disbanded. Second, external powers have backed their favorite factions by supplying arms, ammunition, and equipment. For the most part, these guerrillas subsist by acquiring food and supplies from the countryside.

Foreign involvement in these guerrilla movements has consisted of advisors and cadre from sponsoring nations. Should U.S. forces ever fight in this region, it is likely that they will encounter troops foreign to the nation. In addition, there is also a possibility that Warsaw Pact troops, primarily airborne or tactical aviation units, would be committed to such a region to fight U.S. troops.


SOUTHEAST ASIA



In many respects, the potential threat array in Southeast Asia is the most complicated of any jungle region. There are active guerrilla movements in most Southeast Asian countries as well as tribal and cultural conflicts. There is a good possibility of foreign support or intervention.

The unique development in this region has been the rise of a regional power. Since the end of U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia, this power has developed a potent conventional force, using equipment captured from the U.S. and its allies or supplied by communist countries. More than any other potential threat native in a jungle region, it possesses the ability for sustained conventional operations against any U.S. forces which might be deployed in the area. Its capabilities span the range from clandestine guerrilla operations to large-scale conventional attacks, supported by tanks, motorized units, artillery, and aviation.

Because there are already strong forces in this region, the probability of involvement of large numbers of world power forces is not great. There is a good possibility, however, that U.S. troops committed in these areas might encounter weapons and equipment supplied by a world power. They might also encounter advisors from world powers that instruct and aid the native forces in the use of sophisticated equipment.

Finally, of all the regions discussed thus far, the chemical warfare threat will probably be greatest for U.S. forces conducting operations in Southeast Asia.



SECTION V. WEAPONS USED BY POTENTIAL JUNGLE ENEMIES



Although potential jungle enemy forces vary widely from region to region, there are certain types of weapons which are commonly found in jungle countries. U.S. forces should become familiar with these basic types of weapons in order to be able to recognize them on the jungle battlefield. They should also have a basic knowledge of the weapons’ characteristics and know where the weapons are found in typical communist forces organizations.

Although guerrilla forces do not have the same type of organizational structure as conventional forces, they too will probably carry many of these weapons.





CHAPTER 5





Tactical Operations





SECTION I. GENERAL



There are special techniques which help to insure success in the jungle. These techniques result from the restricted maneuver, slow tempo, close combat, and limited visibility commonly found in the jungle.

Combat in the jungle is characterized by long periods of developing the situation and looking for the enemy, and by short periods of violent, and sometimes unexpected, combat.





These four points must be emphasized when a unit is engaged in jungle operations. The need for discipline is evident when one considers the extended periods of looking, often fruitlessly, for the enemy. When contact is made, maximum advantage can only be achieved through aggressive and violent action predicated upon solid SOPs. Aggressive leadership at the small-unit (squad and platoon) level is the one element that ties together the discipline and the training.


CHARACTERISTICS OF THE JUNGLE BATTLEFIELD



The thick foliage and rugged terrain of most jungles limit fields of fire and speed of movement.





These terrain characteristics make jungle fighting different from fighting on more open terrain. To be effective jungle fighters, soldiers must learn to use these characteristics to their advantage. Potential jungle enemies train to exploit the jungle; so must the U.S. Army.


CHARACTERISTICS OF JUNGLE OPERATIONS



The aspects of terrain and enemy discussed above result in fewer set-piece battles. Rather than conventional attacks conducted against conventional defenses, jungle battles are more often ambushes, raids, and meeting engagements. Battles are not fought for high ground as frequently as conventional battles. Orientation is on the enemy rather than on the terrain. Hills in the jungle are often too thickly vegetated to permit observation and fire, and therefore do not always qualify as key terrain. In the jungle, roads, rivers and streams, fording sites, and landing zones are more likely to be key terrain features.

The frequency of ambushes, raids, and meeting engagements makes it very important that units in the jungle practice immediate action drills. In the jungle firefight, the side which initiates contact and gains fire superiority in the first few seconds will normally have a decisive advantage.


Control



Command and control are difficult in the jungle. The thick foliage allows leaders to see and control only a portion of their units.





In addition, the thick jungle foliage and heavy monsoon rains often weaken radio signals, making communications difficult. To reduce the effects of the problem, use of the helicopter as a command and control vehicle is recommended. In that the heavy monsoon rains may not allow helicopters to always fly, an alternate means of command and control must be planned for.

Flexibility

While an appreciation of battlefield characteristics, jungle enemies, and characteristics of jungle operations is useful, flexibility is important to any leader involved in jungle operations. Successful operations require an extraordinary command adaptability—sometimes, a departure from orthodox thinking in favor of new and often untried procedures. Soldiers must learn to live with the jungle and adapt to its initially apparent disadvantages. Having done this, the unit can concentrate on the use of concealment, covered movement, and surprise.

Security and intelligence

Commanders must stress effective security measures and aggressive intelligence-gathering techniques to prevent being surprised. The key is to give the front-line soldier an appreciation of the things to look for. Food remnants and feces can indicate how long ago an enemy unit occupied an area. Captured documents, equipment, and weapons may provide order of battle information and an idea of the enemy’s logistical situation. Even an ammunition crate may yield a lot number and packing date. From this an intelligence specialist may be able to trace the enemy unit’s place in the order of battle.

In the past, U.S. forces operating in jungle warfare have generally been augmented by native scouts, attached down to platoon level. These scouts were auxiliaries, paid by the unit they supported from a fund established by higher headquarters for that purpose. Scouts familiar with the terrain and the enemy can be an extremely valuable asset. Local security regulations should provide guidance as to what friendly information can be given to scouts.

Surveillance, target acquisition, and night observation (STANO) devices, especially infrared, starlight scopes, and unattended ground sensors, are quite effective in gathering information about troop movements in the jungle. Radars and photography are not as effective because of the concealment of the foliage.

The local populace is one of the most valuable intelligence sources. Whether hostile, friendly, or indifferent, the people can provide information which, when processed, will help complete the intelligence picture.

Security prevents the enemy from gaining intelligence on U.S. units. Active security measures, such as patrolling and the use of observation posts (OP), helps prevent U.S. units from being ambushed or attacked by surprise. These measures do not lessen the need for passive security. Camouflage and noise and light discipline conceal U.S. forces from enemy observation. To prevent being tracked by the enemy, bivouacs and trails must be policed. Odor discipline is also a security measure. The enemy can follow such odors as heat tabs, cigarette smoke, deodorant, and C rations.





TROOP-LEADING PROCEDURES FOR JUNGLE OPERATIONS



Standing Operating Procedures

A unit’s jungle operations SOP should include actions which the unit does on a routine basis or actions that are earned out essentially the same way each time they are done. Examples of such actions include organizing for combat, resupply, bivouac and shelter preparation, movement techniques, and battle drill. Use of SOPs will save planning time.

Planning use of time

A unit planning for jungle combat follows the same planning sequence as in any other type of combat operation. In planning the use of available time, leaders must consider that many tasks in the jungle take more time than the same tasks in other environments. More time must be allowed for movement and security. This means that units may have to begin movements earlier in order to accomplish their missions within a specified time. This may leave less time for planning and preparation.

Inspection





Control of equipment

Those troops who carry extra equipment should not be allowed to discard it. Captured U.S. equipment has been used by jungle enemies in the past. In Southeast Asia and in the Pacific, recovered equipment was a major source of enemy supply.

Supervision

Supervision must continue throughout the conduct of the operation. As the troops become tired after long periods of marching or digging in, they will tend to get lax and ignore good security habits. This is an especially common trend if they have not been in contact for a few days. Tight supervision is a must to ensure that security patrols and OPs are dispatched and doing their jobs; that troops remain alert; and that fire, noise, and light discipline are not relaxed.


JUNGLE MOVEMENT



Planning and route selection

Before conducting a move in the jungle, leaders should make a map and aerial photograph reconnaissance. This reconnaissance will indicate possible danger areas, obstacles, and roads or clearings suitable for resupply.





Movement techniques

Units moving in the jungle should normally use the jungle movement technique, but may use traveling overwatch and bounding overwatch when necessary. The file formation should be avoided in all but the most thickly vegetated areas.





This movement technique is basically characterized as a formation of multiple columns which are mutually supporting.





In traveling overwatch, the lead element performs the mission of point security, with troops from the rest of the unit performing rear and flank security. When contact is imminent, the unit moves into bounding overwatch. Bounds, as terrain allows, are normally 50 meters or less.

Security

The thick foliage makes ambush a constant danger. Point, flank, and rear security teams will help keep a force from being ambushed. These teams must be far enough away from the main body that if they make contact the whole force will not be engaged. They should not be so far away, however, that they cannot be supported. These security elements must be alert to signs of the enemy, and should carry as light a load as possible so they are able to maneuver. Security duties should be rotated often to avoid fatigue. Scout dogs may also be used with the security element. These dogs often detect the enemy before he is detected by humans. The jungle heat is hard on them, however, and they must be rested frequently.

If contact is broken between elements or individuals, the rear element should remain in position. Those in front should return to establish contact.

Halts

Units should plan halts on terrain which lends itself to all-round defense. During short halts, soldiers drop to one knee and face outward, their weapons at the ready. If the halt occurs at a trail crossing, security elements are sent out along the trail. The security element remains in place until the unit clears the crossing. During longer halts, units establish a perimeter defense. They run security patrols around their positions, and employ Claymore mines and early warning devices. Before an overnight halt, units should stop while there is still enough daylight to establish a secure perimeter defense, prepare ambushes, and dispatch patrols as necessary. If halted units are separated, connecting patrols should be run periodically to detect enemy infiltration.



SECTION II. RECONNAISSANCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND SECURITY OPERATIONS




RECONNAISSANCE



Reconnaissance operations are always important in jungle warfare. Many offensive operations in the jungle take on the aspects of a reconnaissance operation during their early stages. This is because the success of offense in the jungle depends on ability to find the enemy. The excellent concealment found in the jungle enables the enemy to operate unobserved both by day and night. Extensive patrolling is necessary to obtain information on his locations, strength, and disposition.

Reconnaissance is a responsibility of all leaders during jungle operations. Units with the capability to conduct reconnaissance should conduct frequent short patrols during the conduct of normal missions. These patrols should be coordinated with higher and adjacent units. In some situations, reconnaissance may become the primary objective of a major jungle operation.

Planning for a jungle reconnaissance should be thorough and well coordinated. Coordination with higher and adjacent headquarters will help insure maximum results from each patrol and eliminate duplication of effort. Radio is the primary means used to control reconnaissance operations. Each reconnaissance patrol must be prepared to make contact, develop the situation, and report to its controlling headquarters.

Ground reconnaissance

In the jungle, these operations are accomplished by means of OPs and long-or short-range reconnaissance patrols. The value of OPs is somewhat reduced in the jungle because of the limited visibility. OPs are most effective when used along trails, roads, and streams to detect enemy movement. (Although OPs in other areas may not provide much useful information on the enemy, they still are effective in providing early warning.) Reconnaissance patrols in the jungle are normally squad-size. These patrols move in a manner to take advantage of natural concealment, and avoid becoming engaged with the enemy. The use of helicopters increases the depth behind enemy lines that such patrols can be employed. For further details on reconnaissance patrols, see section VI.

Visual reconnaissance

From the air, key terrain features can often be identified and the enemy detected in areas where there are gaps in the jungle canopy. Aerial photographs are important sources of information because photograph interpretation can disclose hidden enemy camps not visible to the air observer. Photographs can also be used to locate helicopter landing zones. Decoy reconnaissance flights can be used to confuse or deceive the enemy about upcoming operations.

Reconnaissance-in-force

This method may be used to gather intelligence which cannot be gained by any other reconnaissance means. Examples of such intelligence include the enemy commander’s plan for committing his reserves, or the trails used by a guerrilla force.

The commander conducting the reconnaissance-in-force will normally organize his unit into a number of reconnoitering forces. These reconnoitering forces conduct movements to contact, hasty or deliberate attacks, raids, reconnaissance, or patrols. Once the unit makes contact with the enemy, the commander must react on the intelligence gained. He must be prepared to exploit success or, if necessary, extricate the forces.

The size of the unit that conducts a reconnaissance-in-force depends on the nature of the intelligence to be gained and the chance that the reconnoitering force will have to fight on unfavorable terms. For example, if a battalion commander wants to find out how an enemy commander will commit his reserve, he may conduct a reconnaissance-in-force with his companies conducting limited objective attacks. If, on the other hand, a commander wants to find the routes used by a number of small guerrilla groups, the reconnaissance-in-force mission may be assigned to a company, which in turn will have its platoons conduct movements to contact.

Reconnaissance-by-fire

When using this method, the force fires on suspected enemy positions to cause the enemy to disclose his position by moving or returning fire. Reconnaissance-by-fire risks the loss of surprise. Its most effective use in the jungle is to find the flanks or gaps in enemy lines. Reconnaissance-by-fire from attack helicopters will often reveal the location of well-concealed enemy troops. Likewise, a reconnaissance-by-fire from armored vehicles firing into a wood line, either while moving crosscountry or along a road, can neutralize an enemy ambush. When using reconnaissance-by-fire, commanders must consider the difficulties of ammunition resupply in the jungle.


SURVEILLANCE



Surveillance operations in the jungle include using all techniques for establishing a continuous, thorough watch of the battlefield. This watch must be established both over large jungle areas and at selected key points such as trails, streams, and clearings. Surveillance operations are usually planned to support other missions.

Ground surveillance radars

These radars are best employed in those jungle areas where vegetation and terrain do not restrict line of sight. Night observation devices are also useful in such areas during periods of darkness. Unattended ground sensors, which are not affected by poor line of sight, are very useful in watching specific key areas. These electronic devices are affected by poor weather and are difficult to move in thickly forested areas. As a result, the use of manned OPs in jungle areas should always be planned.

Air surveillance

Surveillance of jungle areas from the air is most effective when pilots are familiar with ground operations and can recognize changes from normal patterns. Repeated flights by the same crews will attain this level of familiarity. In addition to visual surveillance, photographic coverage of an area can assist the surveillance effort. Side-looking airborne radar (SLAR) is not very effective in thick foliage, but can be used for surveillance along roads, trails, or streams. Likewise, infrared detection devices are limited by fog, clouds, rain, and vegetation. Airborne personnel detector devices (sniffers) were developed during the Vietnam war to detect human odors. These devices are extremely effective in detecting base camps of nonmechanized forces, but are limited by fog, rain, and windy conditions.


SECURITY OPERATIONS



Security must be a primary part of all jungle operations; therefore, specific security measures are covered as they apply to other operations throughout this chapter. Compared with operations in other types of terrain, security measures in the jungle must be intensified because of the poor observation and difficulties of control and movement. Operations must be slower than normal, and security forces must be closer to the units secured in order to provide adequate security in the jungle. Because it provides all-round security, the perimeter defense will be the defensive technique used most often by units operating independently in the jungle.

The “stand-to” is an important security technique in jungle fighting. When a unit stands-to, all of its soldiers don their fighting loads and occupy their fighting positions. The unit is 100 percent alert and ready to fight an attacking enemy. Stand-to procedures differ from unit to unit, but common stand-to times are before first light, before last light, before helicopter resupply, and before movement.



SECTION III. OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS




SPECIAL FACTORS



The purpose and fundamentals of the offense as outlined in field manuals for other environments generally apply as well to offensive operations in the jungle.





FUNDAMENTALS OF THE JUNGLE OFFENSE



When considering the use of special offensive techniques, commanders must remember that some offensive fundamentals acquire a new significance in the jungle.

Probably the most important and most difficult of these fundamentals is the requirement to see the battlefield. Above all else, the attacker must know the battlefield. As a result, he relies heavily on security patrols, information provided by air and ground reconnaissance, and proper movement techniques.

Key to effective operations in jungle warfare is the fundamental of using weapon systems to their best advantage. In addition to organic weapons, the ground commander must closely coordinate the employment of the supporting weapons available to him. The dense foliage found in some jungles may prevent heavy weapons from moving directly with the infantry. In those cases, TACAIR support and helicopter weapons must make up the difference. TOWs and Dragons, on the other hand, are of limited use in most jungle environments. The soldiers that man these weapons may be more effective as security forces or as reinforcements for maneuver elements. The primary jungle weapons are individual infantry small arms, supported by machineguns and mortars.

To concentrate overwhelming combat power against enemy weakness in jungle operations, the attacker must be able to bring up other elements quickly to support an element that is engaged. In determining how far he can separate his subordinate units, the commander must consider the factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, and troops and time available (METT). The separation may be expressed in time or in distance. The ability to provide mutual support must not be overlooked. Gaps between units should be covered by scouts and connecting patrols. Targets should be planned along the unit’s route so that supporting fires can be responsive. The use of helicopters will permit even more rapid concentration of forces and provide additional firepower.

The jungle also increases the difficulty of efforts to provide continuous support. The key is constant planning, coordination, and maximum use of helicopters. Fires must be planned along the attack route so that they can be delivered in the shortest amount of time. Procedures for calling attack helicopters must be standardized and rehearsed. Likewise, combat service support must be timely and responsive. Ammunition and water must be loaded on pallets in the trains so that they can be brought forward as soon as needed.


CONDUCT OF THE JUNGLE OFFENSE



Because it is so hard to gather intelligence, jungle offensive tactics must be characterized by continuous reconnaissance. A unit attacking without timely information on the location of the enemy may subject its elements to enemy ambush without being able to support them. In such a situation, they may be defeated in detail.

“It is a situation that too frequently occurs in the Vietnam fighting. The forward element, losing men and becoming pinned down, compromises the position of all others. What has started out as an attack loses all form and deteriorates into a costly rescue act.”



—S.L.A. Marshall, BIRD





Successful jungle attacks usually combine dispersion and concentration. For example, a rifle company may move out in a dispersed formation so that it can find the enemy. Once contact is made, its platoons close on the enemy from all directions. In this way, they move to support each other and destroy the enemy.

Operations are enemy-oriented, not terrain-oriented. Wherever the enemy is found, that is where he should be destroyed. If he is allowed to escape, he will only have to be found again, with all the risks involved.





MOVEMENT TO CONTACT AND HASTY ATTACK



These two forms of combat are discussed together since they account for the majority of combat actions in the jungle. The successful follow-on action to movement to contact is a violently executed hasty attack. This action capitalizes on the advantage of surprise and the confusion prevalent in the jungle. The decision to employ single or multiple columns may depend solely on terrain and foliage considerations.

For companies and battalions, multiple columns are a sound movement practice because this formation provides more firepower to the front and because it is easier to deploy troops from two or three columns than from one file. In order to speed up deployment, units should develop and rehearse SOPs and immediate action drills. Troops should try to maintain a distance of five to seven paces between men, but must maintain visual contact. All-round defense and security measures must be maintained throughout movement.

Once contact with the enemy is made, the unit’s first action is to build up a large volume of fire. The commander then assesses the situation and deploys his unit to overrun the enemy’s positions while they are still suppressed. In this way, he seizes the initiative. There should be no delay in the troops’ movement from the march formation into assault formation. Security elements protect the rear and prevent the enemy’s counterattack. These forces may be used later to exploit a success, but should not be committed until the commander understands the situation.

The slowness of jungle maneuver makes a rapid call for supporting indirect fire important. Upon making contact, fires on the enemy should be immediately requested and adjusted from planned targets. To receive effective and timely fire support, accurate and continuous land navigation is necessary. Means for controlling attack helicopters are also important; this includes both radio and visual means. Adjustment techniques should be established by SOP.

Supporting fires and TACAIR or attack helicopters can place fires on suspected withdrawal routes, placing further pressure on the enemy. The success of the hasty attack depends to a large degree on the unit’s vigorous execution of unit SOPs and the leadership of the squad and platoon leaders.

As the situation is developed and an enemy position is located, a violent assault should be made over the enemy’s position. Soldiers stay on the alert for hidden enemy positions, snipers in the trees, and tunnels through which the enemy might move to attack the attacker’s rear. This thorough technique will also provide enough information of the enemy and security to permit the commander to use his reserve force for exploitation, if needed.

The assault should be made using fire and maneuver. Soldiers should cover each other, moving by crawls and short rushes. Fire should be well-aimed shots and short bursts of automatic fire.

In such a fast-moving situation, it might be possible, for example, for a platoon to receive a fragmentary order (FRAGO), move to a pickup zone (PZ), and conduct an air assault to an objective. In this case, the planning might take place on the PZ or even in the vicinity of the objective rally point (ORP).

After the objective is seized, it must be secured immediately with a hasty perimeter, OPs, and early warning devices. This is to detect and repel an enemy counterattack or to allow the attacker to prepare to continue the attack.


THE DELIBERATE ATTACK



Based on information gained from reconnaissance and other sources, the commander may formulate a plan to attack a larger objective using a deliberate attack. Jungle terrain favors reduced distances and intervals between troops and units, and the deployment from movement to attack formation as far forward as possible. In thickly vegetated terrain, the use of some of the same control techniques used in a night attack may be required.

Fire support is as essential in the jungle as in other types of terrain. Unsupported troops are likely to incur heavy casualties when attacking jungle positions, especially considering the difficulties of employing organic weapons. Targets must be pinpointed by reconnaissance, and fires must be adjusted within very close range of attacking troops. During the assault, these supporting fires must continue until shifted by the assaulting commander. They are then adjusted onto targets which will assist the progress of attacking forces by blocking enemy counterattacks or withdrawal. Due to poor observation, indirect fire may have to be adjusted by sound.

Assaulting troops move over the objective using aggressive fire and movement to overcome enemy resistance. Assaulting troops again must be alert to snipers, mines and boobytraps, hidden positions, and tunnels which would permit the enemy to maneuver into the rear of attacking forces. Assaulting platoons and squads move in a single direction, with fires concentrated on enemy positions as they are located. Attacking elements must adjust their progress using base elements and phase lines. Smoke may be used to screen the flanks of the penetration from enemy observation and reduce his ability to deliver effective fires. Once an initial penetration is secured, it is exploited until the objective is taken.

After the objective is overrun, it must be secured immediately with a hasty perimeter, OPs, and early warning devices to detect and repel an enemy counterattack or to allow the attacker to prepare to continue the attack (see IV ).


INFILTRATION



Jungle areas are ideal for infiltration. Dense vegetation and rugged terrain limit the enemy’s ability to detect movement. As a technique to move through the enemy’s positions, infiltration can be used with other offensive maneuvers to gain an advantage in the jungle. Although jungle infiltrations are normally conducted on foot, under certain circumstances helicopters or watercraft may be used.

Infiltrations are normally difficult to control. Chances for success are better if troops are well trained, well briefed, and well rehearsed. Roads, trails, and streams should be avoided because they will normally be under enemy surveillance. Movement by stealth is normally slow and exhausting. Phase lines (PL), infiltration routes, and adequate communications must be used to control the operation and to coordinate fires with movement.





EXPLOITATION AND PURSUIT



Local successes should be exploited as soon as possible to cut off the retreat of isolated enemy forces. Airmobile troops are most effective to block enemy retreat in the jungle. They can also disrupt and harass enemy reserve, logistical, and command operations. Artillery, TACAIR support, and attack helicopters may also be used to block escape routes. Tanks may be used along trails or roads or in less dense areas if properly secured with infantry. During exploitations, rear areas must be secured against the actions of bypassed or infiltrating enemy.

Pursuit operations in the jungle should be conducted to maintain contact with the enemy. The precautions required to secure against ambush can slow pursuit operations considerably. Because attacking troops become more fatigued than defending troops, pursuit operations should be conducted using troops from the reserve. As is the case with most jungle offensive operations, airmobile forces, air cavalry, and attack helicopters can be used very effectively in pursuit operations.


ATTACK AGAINST A FORTIFIED POSITION



As mentioned earlier, jungle enemies have often used strongly fortified defensive positions to protect themselves from the effects of U.S. firepower. If it is necessary to attack such a position, troops will probably encounter bunkers, barbed wire, mines, and boobytraps. The enemy will often have to be burned or blasted out of such positions. These operations will require attacks on a narrow front, great amounts of firepower, and limited objective attacks.

Fortified enemy positions in dense jungle are often so well concealed that troops are not aware of their presence until they have physically encountered them. In these cases, the best course of action is usually to adjust forward dispositions enough to allow use of supporting indirect fires, to deploy additional forces to block possible withdrawal routes, and then to maneuver under the cover of supporting fires to defeat the fortifications in detail.

Maximum use of combat intelligence is required when attacking fortified areas. Aerial photographs, electronic intelligence, interrogation of prisoners of war (PW), and aggressive patrolling are all means of gaining the required information. Patrols also keep the enemy off balance and limit the enemy’s ability to patrol.

In addition, combat engineer, and special weapons (such as flame) and equipment should be attached to the maneuver forces to assist in destroying the fortifications.

Destruction of the enemy in those types of positions takes a lot of time and effort. Other means should be used as much as possible. Here is a technique that proved successful in the past:

“The use of CS riot control gas could not be overlooked… On one occasion, a battalion made a night attack with gas masks following an aerial CS attack. A helicopter made several low passes on the windward side of the area and dispersed about 250 CS grenades. This was followed by 20 minutes of artillery fire, about half of which was VT fuze fired into the enemy positions. Behind a walking barrage of artillery fire, one company assaulted, and, once inside the objective, flareships lit up the area. Eighteen enemy were killed, while no casualties were suffered by the friendly troops.”



—Report, 25th Infantry Division, Duang Nhgai Province, Republic of Vietnam





SECTION IV. DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS




SPECIAL FACTORS



The purpose and fundamentals of the defense as outlined in field manuals for other environments also apply to defensive operations in the jungle.





FUNDAMENTALS OF THE JUNGLE DEFENSE



As in the offense, jungle defensive operations are based on the same fundamentals used in other area operations. Some of these fundamentals acquire a special significance in the jungle.

To succeed in the jungle defense, a commander must understand the enemy and see the battlefield. The enemy will probably be expert in using the environment to his advantage, and the defender must understand enemy techniques. To counter the threat of infiltration, the defender must employ all-round defense and all surveillance means available. No amount of electronic means can eliminate the need for frequent patrolling.

The defender must exploit every advantage that he has, particularly the abundant concealment provided by the foliage and the weather. A force which remains concealed may disrupt an enemy’s attack by using surprise fire from hidden locations. Though not as common as in other types of terrain, features which lend themselves to the defense, such as rivers, gorges, and ridges, should be used if they dominate likely avenues of approach. The defender must appreciate the defensive characteristics of the terrain and environment.

The defender must maximize the effectiveness of key weapons, which in the jungle are infantry small arms, mortars, and artillery. The poor trafficability also increases the importance of attack helicopters and TACAIR.

In planning to concentrate combat power at critical times and places, the defender must first plan the massing of small-arms fire. Since fields-of-fire will be limited, positions must be placed close together for mutual support. To move troops and weapons rapidly to supplementary or alternate positions, it maybe necessary to cut paths through the bush. Units should rehearse these maneuvers.

As in the offense, the problem of providing continuous support is to a large degree solved by effective communications and the use of helicopters.


PLAN OF THE JUNGLE DEFENSE



Planning for the jungle defense should provide for a covering force area, a main battle area, and a rear area. Forces in each area must be provided fire support. Obstacles are planned to improve the natural defensive strength of the terrain. Plans are also formulated for counterattacks. The following factors should be considered when planning for the jungle defense:

Day and night in jungle regions are each roughly 12 hours long. Nights, especially under jungle canopies, are extremely dark. Defensive preparations should begin at least 2 hours before nightfall.

The heat and humidity will fatigue troops rapidly.

Tropical rain will flood positions unless they are adequately drained. During the rainy season, defensive positions should be dug on high ground, if possible.

Because jungle terrain favors infiltration, the use of starlight scopes, OPs, and early warning devices is very important.

After the commander organizes the ground and secures the area to be defended, he then positions his Dragons, if they can be used effectively, and machineguns and clears fields of fire. Leaders must insure that troops do not cut too much vegetation. In order to be mutually supporting, positions will be closer together than on other types of terrain. In addition to attaining mutual support, this helps prevent enemy infiltration. Mines and obstacles should be emplaced where they are covered by friendly fires. These should be located beyond hand grenade throwing range of the defensive positions.





Security

Since enemy tactics, jungle terrain, and bad weather favor attacks conducted by stealth, security should be the leader’s first concern. OPs, early warning devices, ambushes, and patrols are all measures which will prevent a unit from being surprised. Patrols must be planned according to an irregular schedule. A system of recognition signals must be used to prevent the engagement of friendly units.



NOTE



If mechanical ambushes are used, units should stop patrolling in that area, and should provide some means, such as communications wire, to guide OP personnel and prevent them from straying into the mechanical ambush.





Defensive formations

The basic defensive technique in the jungle is the perimeter defense. Two other very effective defensive techniques for jungle operations are the triangle and “Y” formations (see app J). Whether a unit is operating independently or as part of a larger defensive position, it must be prepared to defend itself against an attack from any direction. Initially, these formations will be formed by platoons or by companies. Larger units should position their companies in depth to provide all-round defense. Alert and aggressive patrols and OPs will defeat enemy attempts to infiltrate between positions. Later, if time permits, platoon and company formations can be connected with fighting positions and trenches. Even then, however, companies and platoons must be prepared for all-round defense.

Priority of work

Units in the defense must pay particular attention to their priority of work. Since more security measures must be taken than normal, fewer troops will be available to prepare defensive positions at any one time. Positions should be prepared and camouflaged as in any other situation. Overhead cover should be prepared using strong wood and sandbags. Claymore mines and trip flares should be emplaced in front of the defensive positions. Fields of fire should be cut low, leaving enough foliage so as not to reveal the location of the defensive position.

To counter enemy reconnaissance efforts, units should shift the positions of machineguns after dark. After a few days, the entire unit’s position should be changed. If a unit remains in position for a longer period of time, it is more likely to be reconnoitered by the enemy and subject to attack.

Command and control

Command and control are extremely difficult in the jungle defense. Commanders must place great emphasis on planning, coordination, and small-unit leadership. Decentralized control is important to ensure that subordinate units can react to multiple threats. Aggressive leadership at the small-unit level is necessary in fighting off isolated assaults at close range. Alternate communications means must be established wherever possible. An example might be a communications system using wire as the primary means, radio as the secondary means, and pyrotechnics for certain prearranged signals.

Defensive targets for artillery and mortars should be planned on stream and trail junctions, and any other likely enemy avenues of approach. Artillery and mortar fire should also be used to cover the many areas of dead space found in jungle terrain. It is also a good idea to confirm the location of the defense on the ground by using artillery marking missions integrated into registration missions. Signals for the employment of TACAIR and attack helicopters, both day and night, and for medevac and resupply helicopters must also be planned.


CONDUCT OF THE JUNGLE DEFENSE



There are occasions when a unit will have to establish a defense with minimum planning time. This normally occurs when an attack is stalled, at dusk when the unit is still in contact with the enemy and no night attack is planned, or when an intermediate objective must be secured before continuing the attack. These situations are more dangerous in the jungle than in other areas because of the dense foliage and the closeness of the enemy.

The normal course of action in these cases is to establish a perimeter defense. Dragons, if they can be used effectively, and machineguns are positioned immediately where they have the best fields of fire. As soon as possible, OPs and other local security measures are established. Frontages are smaller than in other types of terrain, especially at night, to guard against enemy infiltration. Indirect fires are registered and fighting positions are dug as soon as possible.

Once these actions have been completed, steps are taken to improve the defense. A primary consideration in improving a defense is to expand the perimeter to gain “working room.“ This may require limited attacks, massed artillery and mortar fire, or close-in machinegun fire to force the enemy to withdraw. If the position will be occupied for a long time, it should be made as strong as possible.





If troops remain in a defensive position for a long time, they must not become complacent. Leaders must inspect weapons, positions, and the cleanliness of troops. They must also develop plans for alerts, feeding, maintenance, and bathing. These activities must be scheduled according to a random pattern so that the enemy cannot take advantage of a set routine.

An alert system must be established, so that a portion of the defensive force is always awake. Although the poor observation in jungles favors the enemy’s attack at any time, the early hours of the morning afford him the greatest chance of surprise unless positive alert measures are taken. All troops should stand-to before dawn.

The jungle enemy will try to probe a position to locate the flanks of positions and key weapons. Soldiers must not give away their positions by premature firing. Claymores and hand grenades should be used to engage these probes. When probed, riflemen near machineguns should fire, not the machinegunners. Machinegunners must use their pistols for self-defense instead of their machineguns. When the enemy attacks, he will try to isolate friendly positions and destroy them one at a time. Well-planned, mutually supporting fires will prevent this.

Counterattack

If enemy forces penetrate a position, a counterattack is the best way to expel them. Troops in the area of the penetration must stay in their positions and continue to fire to support the counterattack. If they leave their positions while the enemy is being expelled, they increase the chance that they will be hit with friendly fires.





THE BATTALION COMBAT BASE



When engaged in tactical operations in the jungle, elements of the battalion will often establish a base for command and control and fire support resources, protected by a perimeter defense. These resources are called the battalion combat base.





Prior to establishing the battalion combat base, the commander should conduct a reconnaissance to determine the defensibility of the terrain. He also plans forces required for the defense. While the defense must be capable of defeating the largest attack which the enemy is likely to conduct, it must use the minimum forces necessary. The combat support company, reinforced as necessary with an attached infantry platoon, is the largest force that is realistically available for preparing and defending the perimeter. To use a larger force would probably leave insufficient forces to fight the more important combat. Since some elements, such as the antitank platoon of the combat support company, may not be employed effectively in the jungle, they will often be available for use in the perimeter defense. The battalion commander will normally designate the combat support company or headquarters and headquarters company commander to be the battalion combat base commander and will have him take charge of the construction and execution of the perimeter defense.





The scout platoon is normally used for patrolling or screening missions, rather than being used in manning the combat base perimeter.

During construction of the perimeter defense, it is vulnerable to enemy attack. Consequently, it is imperative to complete the perimeter defense as quickly as possible and to provide maximum security during construction.

The threat of infiltration attacks must be emphasized. The enemy may not be able to conduct large scale attacks on fortified positions, but he may be capable of disrupting operations by infiltrating one- or two-man teams through the perimeter to place explosive devices on command and control facilities, artillery pieces or mortars, or ammunition storage areas. This infiltration is often preceded by a deceptive attack or probe by ground forces. Troops in the perimeter must maintain constant security, using early warning systems and continuous patrolling. Starlight scopes, OPs, unattended ground sensors, and tripflares are also used. Wire obstacles should be used to keep infiltrators out of critical facilities.

A battalion combat base may have to remain in place for a long time. Continuous firing of mortars and landing of helicopters makes concealing its location very difficult. These two factors make it necessary to harden the perimeter defense. Overhead cover and sandbagged bunkers must be provided for all fighting positions. The tactical operations center (TOC) and CP should have similar protection and may also be dug underground. Mortars and artillery pieces should be dug in or fortified with sandbags.


ORGANIZATION OF THE DEFENSE



A reserve for the defense may be constituted from attachments, such as engineers (if available), or from off-shift personnel from TOC and CP elements. This reserve will react to enemy attacks, and will reinforce the defense or counterattack. They must be rehearsed on signals and actions until they become proficient. Mortars are employed to provide close-in fire support. Artillery pieces can provide direct fire but probably will not be able to provide indirect fire support of the perimeter. Hence, the perimeter should be located within range of other artillery and mortar units for additional protection.

The battalion combat base commander assigns sectors to subordinate platoons, insuring that likely avenues of approach are dominated by Dragons, machineguns, and artillery in direct fire role, if possible. He then plans indirect fires. The commander specifies points at which adjoining platoons must coordinate. The platoon leader selects each position and designates the personnel to man it.

The platoon leader must insure that he has complete coverage throughout his sector to deal with not only a mass attack but also infiltration of small elements.

Once the positions are selected, the platoon leader insures that a priority of work is adhered to.





SECTION V. RETROGRADE



Retrograde operations are conducted in much the same manner as the defense, with the additional requirement to gain a mobility advantage over the enemy. This is done by taking measures to increase the mobility of the unit conducting the retrograde (reconnaissance and preparation of routes, use of helicopters, etc.), and by taking measures to decrease the mobility of the enemy (ambushes, artillery fires, mines, wire obstacles, etc.).


WITHDRAWL



Withdrawals may be conducted under enemy pressure or not under enemy pressure. Because of the cover and concealment provided by the jungle, a withdrawal under enemy pressure may be conducted using deception in much the same manner as a withdrawal not under enemy pressure. The ruggedness of the terrain and the strength of the attacking enemy are key factors in this type of operation. Routes, assembly areas, and new positions must be thoroughly reconnoitered. They may also be marked if such marking does not compromise security. Densely vegetated areas will require increased use of guides. Control in such areas is very difficult; therefore, leadership, planning, and rehearsal are crucial.

“I will never again tell my platoon to withdraw - especially in the jungle - without telling it where to go. I had a hell of a time getting them together.”



—Platoon Leader, New Guinea, World War II





Unattended ground sensors employed along likely enemy avenues of approach can be used to provide information on enemy movement and activities. This information can in turn be used to place fires on the enemy.


DELAY



The delay in sector is normally the most frequently used type of retrograde in the jungle. Ambushes may be used to halt the enemy’s pursuit, and can aid the main body in breaking contact along the delay route. Mechanical ambushes, wire obstacles, and minefield will also delay the enemy. In the jungle, the delay is normally conducted in several phases: defense, withdrawal under pressure, breaking contact, and movement to and occupation of new positions where the defense starts again. As in the withdrawal, units should reconnoiter and clear routes to the rear.



SECTION VI. OTHER COMBAT OPERATIONS



Patrols, raids, and ambushes are not really used more often in the jungle than in more open terrain. The jungle permits small units to move undetected during reconnaissance patrols and achieve surprise when conducting raids and ambushes. These are small-unit operations. They depend heavily on the skill and stealth of infantry platoons and squads, and are demanding operations.

One jungle myth that was popular both during World War II and the Vietnam War was that “the night belongs to the enemy.” The enemy has no better night vision or stealth than do trained U.S. soldiers. He will often use the night as a means to avoid U.S. firepower, but with the proper use of patrols, raids, and ambushes, this problem can be eliminated.

“On any given night in Vietnam, American soldiers staged hundreds of ambushes, for the ambush is one of the oldest and most effective military means of hampering the enemy’s nighttime exploits.”



—J.A. Cash, Seven Firefights in Vietnam





Successful jungle patrols, raids, and ambushes result from detailed planning, intensive training, and constant rehearsal. Troops must be alert. A unit which has moved cross-country through the jungle until late in the afternoon will not be in a condition to succeed if it has to go out on ambush that night. Commanders must realize that such operations require time to prepare, train, and rest.

Specific techniques which are effective in jungle operations are described below.


PATROLS



A patrol is a detachment sent out by a larger unit to conduct a combat or reconnaissance operation. The operation itself is also called a patrol. The mission to conduct a patrol may be given to a fire team, squad, platoon, or company. The leader of the detachment conducting a patrol is referred to as the patrol leader.

Categories of patrols

The planned action at the objective determines the patrol’s category. There are two categories of patrols:

Combat (ambush, raid, or security) Patrol. This patrol provides security and harasses, destroys, or captures enemy troops, equipment, and installations. A combat patrol also collects and reports information, whether related to its mission or not.

Reconnaissance (area or zone) Patrol. This patrol collects information or confirms or disproves the accuracy of information previously gained.





Organization for a patrol

The patrol leader decides what elements and teams are needed for his patrol, selects men or units for these elements and teams, and decides what weapons and equipment are needed. He should, however, use his unit’s normal organization (squads and platoons) and chain of command (squad and platoon leaders) as much as possible to meet these needs. For example, a combat patrol may be organized like this: the company headquarters is the patrol headquarters; the 1st platoon is the assault element; the 2nd platoon is the security element; and the 3rd platoon and weapons platoon make up the support element.

General organization

A patrol generally consists of a patrol headquarters and the elements needed for the mission.

Patrol Headquarters. The headquarters (HQ) of a company-size patrol normally consists of the same number of men as a regular company headquarters. However, regardless of a patrol’s size, its leader tailors the headquarters to meet mission needs. The patrol headquarters has the same responsibilities as any other command element.

Reconnaissance Patrol. In an area reconnaissance (recon), a patrol has a reconnaissance element and a security element. In a zone reconnaissance, a patrol has several reconnaissance elements. Each one provides its own security.

Combat Patrol. A combat patrol normally has an assault element, a security element, and a support element. At times, the support element may be omitted by combining it with the assault element.

In general, jungle terrain affords excellent concealment, provides some cover, and hinders enemy observation and movement. During rainy periods, the sound of movement is less obvious. Wet ground and wet vegetation also muffle noise. All of these factors favor the patrolling unit.

On the other hand, the difficulties of movement and control and the ease with which the enemy can infiltrate friendly units are disadvantages to units patrolling in the jungle. These factors can best be overcome by training and discipline.

Silence, in both voice and movement, is essential at all times during a jungle patrol. With practice, it is possible to move steadily, deliberately, and carefully through the jungle, parting the undergrowth instead of crashing through it or cutting through it with machetes. Troops should avoid walking on dry leaves, sticks, rotten wood, or anything that would make noise. Machetes should be used to cut trails only as a last resort. Talking should be done in a whisper, and arm-and-hand signals should be used whenever possible.

Trails should be avoided. Patrols should make every effort to hide signs of movement, especially when moving through untraveled territory or near enemy positions.





Native scouts are valuable in patrolling because they are often very familiar with the terrain. Patrol leaders must realize, however, that a scout’s function is only to show direction and provide information. He should never lead the patrol. The correct position of a scout is with the patrol leader, so that the leader can make decisions based on the scout’s advice.


RAID



Raids in the jungle environment must be keyed to reliable intelligence. The actions of the raiding unit must be decisive and rapid in order to catch an elusive jungle enemy. A raid’s success depends on good intelligence and a sound plan.

Jungles favor raid operations. The excellent concealment enables skilled raiding patrols to operate deep in enemy territory. Platoon-sized units are best suited to jungle raids. Supporting artillery fires should be planned, but due to difficulties of control, timing, and communications, jungle raids may be executed without artillery support. Surprise is a key ingredient of a successful raid.

Raids that require deep penetration into enemy-held areas are best executed by establishing a patrol base in the general area of the final objective. From there, reconnaissance patrols can be sent to scout enemy positions while the remainder of the force completes its preparations for the raid. Helicopters and watercraft are effective means of transporting a raiding force rapidly to the vicinity of its objective without depleting their physical strength in a difficult march.


AMBUSHES



The ambush is more important, more effective, and more frequently used in jungle fighting than in any other type of combat. Jungle terrain provides many opportunities for a well-concealed force to gain surprise. Surprise is essential for a successful ambush.

Destruction of enemy forces is the primary purpose of most ambushes, but other benefits result from a well-executed ambush program.

More than in any other type of terrain, jungle ambushes require high standards of discipline. Soldiers on an ambush must be prepared to remain in the same position for hours at a time, without being able to sleep, talk, or smoke. They must endure insects and resist the desire to make any quick moves to swat or brush the insects away. All these require extensive training to develop the patience and self-discipline required.





The location for an ambush should be chosen after a careful analysis of the terrain, using maps, aerial photographs, and personal reconnaissance. The site chosen must contribute to the surprise of the ambush. Many times the selection of a site for surprise alone will be more effective than attempting to ambush from a site which is in other respects tactically sound but at which the enemy is sure to be suspicious. Covered routes of approach and withdrawal, good fields of fire, and canalization of the enemy are characteristics of a good site. The site should always be reconnoitered and approached from the rear.

In no other operation is camouflage more important than in the ambush. Weapons should fire through screens of undisturbed, living foliage. Spoilage resulting from the preparation of positions must be removed from sight. There can be no unnecessary noise or movement. If reliefs are used, they should be scheduled so that only a few men move at any one time. One or two men moving are harder to detect than an entire relief moving at once.


DEFENSE AGAINST AMBUSH



Since ambushes are more frequent and effective in the jungle than in any other type of terrain, a unit moving through the jungle must take all possible measures to reduce its vulnerability to ambush. The most effective means of countering an ambush is to detect it before entering the kill zone. This, however, is not always possible.

Dismounted troops have an advantage over mounted troops in avoiding ambushes because they do not have to move on roads or trails. Commanders of dismounted units should make a map and aerial photograph reconnaissance to detect likely ambush sites and plan routes which avoid them. During movement, security to the front, rear, and flanks should be maintained at all times. Alert troops, good noise discipline, and well-rehearsed signals are other means which will reduce the chances of ambush. Accurate land navigation, continuous fire support planning, and counterambush drills are also important antiambush techniques.

Mounted troops are very vulnerable to jungle ambushes, especially where the foliage grows up to the edge of a road. Ambush of vehicular columns traditionally has been a primary tactic of jungle enemies. As a result, traffic in jungle areas must be tightly controlled and kept to a minimum. All vehicles should have armed riders. Armored vehicles should escort convoys, and traffic information should be carefully guarded. Fire planning and route selection and reconnaissance are important for mounted troops as well as for dismounted troops.





COUNTERAMBUSH MEASURES



Troops must also be trained in counter-ambush measures. The key is early detection followed by reflex-type counteraction, a high volume of return fire, and relentless pursuit. The most effective counterambush measures are well-rehearsed immediate action drills. Every soldier must know exactly what he is supposed to do.

Dismounted troops should react to an ambush immediately, firing into the ambushers without orders. Building and retaining fire superiority is the best initial defense against an ambush. If a patrol finds itself in an enemy ambush, it must get out of the kill zone immediately. It must take the following immediate actions:

Troops in the kill zone, without order or signal, immediately return fire, and quickly move out of the kill zone by the safest way. (There is no set way to do this; it must be each soldier’s decision for his situation.) Smoke grenades can help conceal the troops in the kill zone.

Troops not in the kill zone fire to support the withdrawal of the troops in the kill zone.

If a dismounted patrol is ambushed, it should attempt to break contact and reorganize in the last designated rally point.

Mounted troops who are ambushed should attempt to drive rapidly out of the kill zone. Vehicles approaching the kill zone should stop so they do not enter it. Troops should then dismount and maneuver to destroy the ambush.

In any case, the rapid call for supporting artillery and mortar fire will help the ambushed force to gain fire superiority and will assist the maneuver to destroy the ambush.





CHAPTER 6





Navigation and Tracking




SECTION I. JUNGLE NAVIGATION



Navigating in the jungle can be difficult for those troops not accustomed to it. This chapter outlines techniques which have been used successfully in jungle navigation. With training and practice, troops should be able to use these techniques to navigate in even the thickest jungle.


NAVIGATION TOOLS MAPS



Because of the isolation of many jungles, the rugged ground, and the presence of the canopy, topographic survey is difficult and is done mainly from the air. Therefore, although maps of jungle areas generally depict the larger features (hill, ridges, larger streams, etc.) fairly accurately, some smaller terrain features (gullies, small or intermittent streams, small swamps, etc.), which are actually on the ground, may not appear on the map. Also, many older maps are inaccurate. So, before going into the jungle, commanders and staff should bring their maps up to date.





COMPASS



No one should move in the jungle without a compass. It should be tied to the clothing by a string or bootlace. The three most common methods used to follow the readings of a compass are:

Sighting along the desired azimuth. The compass man notes an object to the front (usually a tree or bush) that is on line with the proper azimuth and moves to that object. This is not a good method in the jungle as trees and bushes tend to look very much alike.

Holding the compass at waist level and walking in the direction of a set azimuth. This is a good method for the jungle. The compass man sets the compass for night use with the long, luminous line placed over the luminous north arrow and the desired azimuth under the black index line. There is a natural tendency to drift either left or right using this method. Jungle navigators must learn their own tendencies and allow for this drift.

Sighting along the desired azimuth and guiding a man forward until he is on line with the azimuth. The unit then moves to the man and repeats the process. This is the most accurate method to use in the jungle during daylight hours, but it is slow. In this method, the compass man cannot mistake the aiming point and is free to release the compass on its string and use both hands during movement to the next aiming point.

The keys to navigation are maintaining the right direction and knowing the distance traveled. Skill with the compass (acquired through practice) takes care of the first requirement. Ways of knowing the distance traveled include checking natural features with the map, knowing the rate of movement, and pacing.


CHECKING FEATURES



Major recognizable features (hills, rivers, changes in the type of vegetation) should be noted as they are reached and then identified on the map. Jungle navigators must BE CAUTIOUS ABOUT TRAILS—the trail on the ground may not be the one on the map.


RATE OF MOVEMENT



Speed will vary with the physical condition of the troops, the load they carry, the danger of enemy contact, and the type of jungle growth. The normal error is to overestimate the distance traveled. The following can be used as a rough guide to the maximum distance covered in 1 hour during daylight.





PACING



In thick jungle, this is the best way of measuring distance. It is the only method which lets the soldier know how far he has traveled. With this information, he can estimate where he is at any given time-something that must be known to call for indirect fire support in a hurry. To be accurate, soldiers must practice pacing over different types of terrain. Each soldier should make a PERSONAL PACE TABLE like this one—





At least two men in each independent group should be compass men, and three or four should be keeping a pace count. The artillery fire support team (FIST) chief should keep an accurate fix on his location, as should the platoon forward observers (FO). He can be a great help to the rifle company commander in matters of navigation. When in doubt, the commander should do a resection, using artillery marking rounds.



NOTE



Jungle foliage will often require that artillery marking rounds be sensed by sound.





To locate a position by resection, the general location must be known. White phosphorus rounds (airbursts) are then called on two widely separated grids which are not on terrain features like the one the unit is occupying and which are a safe distance from the estimated location. A back azimuth to each of these rounds is taken and plotted on the map. The point where they intersect is the observer’s approximate location.


LOCATION OF AN OBJECTIVE



In open terrain, an error in navigation can be easily corrected by orienting on terrain features which are often visible from a long distance. In thick jungle, however, it is possible to be within 50 meters of a terrain feature and still not see it. Here are two methods which can aid in navigation.


OFFSET METHOD



This method is useful in reaching an objective that is not large or not on readily identifiable terrain but is on a linear feature, such as a road, stream, or ridge. The unit plans a route following an azimuth which is a few degrees to the left or right of the objective. The unit then follows the azimuth to that terrain feature. Thus, when the unit reaches the terrain feature, the members know the objective is to their right or left, and the terrain feature provides a point of reference for movement to the objective.





ATTACK METHOD



This method is used when moving to an objective not on a linear feature. An easily recognizable terrain feature is chosen as close as possible to the objective. The unit then moves to that feature. Once there, the unit follows the proper azimuth and moves the estimated distance to get to the objective.





WHAT TO DO IF LOST



Do not panic. Few soldiers have ever been permanently lost in the jungle, although many have taken longer to reach their destination than they should.

Disoriented navigators should try to answer these questions. (If there are other navigators in the group, they all should talk it over.)

What was the last known location?

Did the unit go too far and pass the objective? (They should compare estimates of time and distance traveled.)

Does the terrain look the way it should? (They should compare the surroundings with the map.)

What features in the area will help to fix the unit’s location? (They should try to find these features.)

If the unit is unable to locate itself using these techniques, the leader can call for an air or artillery orienting round. However, this may cause a loss of security, particularly if the unit is moving by stealth.

An airspot can usually be obtained from Army or Air Force aircraft. The pilot can be contacted and guided to the general location by radio. A mirror, smoke, panels, or some other signal can be shown to the pilot. He will be able to determine the unit’s location and report it to them.

This, also, is a loss of security and should only be a last resort.


NIGHT MOVEMENT



The principles for navigation at night are the same as those for day movement. The problem in night movement is one of control, not navigation. In clear weather, through sparse vegetation and under a bright moon, a unit can move almost as fast by night as by day. If the sky is overcast, vegetation is thick, or there is little or no moon, movement will be slow and hard to control. The following points can assist a unit during night movement.

Attach luminous tape to the back of each soldier’s headgear. Two strips, side by side, each about the size of a lieutenant’s bar, are recommended. The two strips aid depth perception and reduce the hypnotic effect that one strip can cause.

When there is no light at all, distance between soldiers should be reduced. When necessary to prevent breaks in contact, each soldier should hold on to the belt or the pack of the man in front of him.

The leading man should carry a long stick to probe for sudden dropoffs or obstacles.

In limited visibility conditions, listening may become more important to security than observing. A unit which hears a strange noise should halt and listen for at least 1 minute. If the noise is repeated or cannot be identified, patrols should be sent out to investigate. Smell, likewise, can be an indication of enemy presence in an area.

All available night vision devices should be used.


NAVIGATIONAL TIPS





SECTION II. TRACKING



Visual tracking is following the paths of men or animals by the signs they leave, primarily on the ground or vegetation. Scent tracking is following men or animals by the odors they leave.

Practice in tracking is required to achieve and maintain a high standard of skill. Because of the excellent natural concealment the jungle offers, all soldiers should be familiar with the general techniques of visual tracking to enable them to detect the presence of a concealed enemy, to follow the enemy, to locate and avoid mines or boobytraps, and to give early warning of ambush.

Tracking is important in counterguerrills operations where it is often difficult to locate the enemy. Guerrillas who conduct raids and ambushes will normally return to their bases as quickly as possible. Well-developed tracking skills will help units to maintain contact with the enemy.


SIGNS



Men or animals moving through jungle areas leave signs of their passage. Some examples of these signs are listed below.





DECEPTION



The enemy may use any of the following methods to deceive or discourage trackers. They may, at times, mislead an experienced tracker.





WARNING





A tracker should always be alert to the possibility that the enemy is leaving false to lead the unit into an ambush.





CHAPTER 7





Jungle Obstacles




SECTION I. GENERAL



Units operating in the jungle will have to cross many obstacles. The most difficult obstacles will be streams and cliffs. In addition, units operating in the jungle will frequently have to insert or extract soldiers and units in places where helicopters cannot land. This chapter covers the skills required to perform these tasks.

Before learning these skills, however, soldiers must be familiar with ropes and knots.


SECTION II. CHARACTERISTICS AND USE OF EQUIPMENT




ROPES AND KNOTS TYPES OF ROPE



Nylon. Nylon rope is most commonly used in climbing and rappelling. The rope is seven-sixteenths of an inch in diameter and is issued in 120-foot lengths. Its dry breaking strength averages 3,840 pounds (plus or minus 5 percent). Strength is reduced by about 20 percent when the rope is wet. It will also stretch about one-third of its length when wet. Nylon sling (utility) ropes are commonly prepared by a unit in 12-foot lengths from older ropes that are no longer used for climbing or rappelling.

Vegetable Fiber. This is readily available in jungle areas as it is made primarily from the fibers of tropical plants.

Manila rope is made from the fibers of the leaves of a banana tree. The lighter the color of the rope, the better the quality. This rope is superior to nylon rope for suspension traverses and rope bridges because it does not stretch as much as nylon, and it is not weakened when wet.





Hemp rope is made from the fibers of the hemp plant. This is the strongest of the fiber ropes. It is usually soaked in tar to preserve the rope from damage caused by dampness, but this tar tends to reduce the rope’s strength. Also, because of its greater weight, tarred hemp is not practical for use by infantry troops.



NOTE



The breaking strength of a rope is always greater than its safe working capacity. The difference is a “safety factor.” Individual ropes can vary greatly in minimum breaking strength. Even though a rope may not break under this load, the fibers are stretched beyond their elastic limit. Thereafter the strength of the rope is permanently reduced. Exposure, wear, use, and bending decrease a rope’s strength over a period of time. This should be allowed for in estimating the strength of a used rope. The strength of a rope that is slung over a hook or contains a knot is reduced by about 30 percent; sharp bends over corners will cut strength by 50 percent; sand or grit between the fibers will quickly cut the fibers, and sharply drop the overall strength of the rope.





CARE OF A ROPE



Clean a muddy rope by washing it in water, but not in salt water.

Do not pull a rope over sharp edges. Place layers of heavy cloth or grass between the rope and any sharp edge to prevent the cutting of fibers.

Do not drag a rope through sand and dirt, or step on it, or drive over it.

Keep a rope dry. If it gets wet, dry it as soon as possible to prevent rotting. (A mildewed rope will have a musty odor and inner fibers will have a dark, stained look.)

Do not leave a rope knotted or tightly stretched any longer than needed.

Never splice a climbing or rappelling rope.

Inspect a rope often, both the outside and the inside. Untwist a few strands at different points to open the rope to check the inside.

Melted nylon and dark streaks indicate burns. Nylon rope burns when it rubs against other nylon ropes. Nylon ropes should never be tied in such a way that there is rope-to-rope friction.

Dirt and sawdust-like material inside the rope indicates damage.

A rope should be checked at a number of different places—any weak point in it weakens the entire rope.

Whenever any unsafe conditions are found in a rope, it should be destroyed or cut up in short pieces. This will prevent use of the rope for hoisting. The short pieces can be used for toggle ropes and for other purposes which do not involve load bearing operations.





SEAT-HIP RAPPEL



The seat-hip rappel is a fast method. In this rappel, friction is taken up by getting down from a steep hill or cliff, and the snaplink inserted in a rappel seat is fastened. It is also used to rappel from helicopters.





SECTION III. MOVING DOWN HILLS AND CLIFFS




RAPPELLING



Rappelling is a means to move quickly down very steep hills and cliffs. Rappelling involves sliding down a rope which has been anchored around a firm object (anchor point) such as a tree, projecting rock, or piton.





HASTY RAPPEL



The hasty rappel is a fast, easy way to get down a moderately steep slope or cliff. A soldier must wear a shirt to do a hasty rappel.





CAUTION



Gloves must be worn during all rappelling to protect the hands from severe rope burns.





SECTION IV. MOVING BY HELICOPTER




RAPPELLING FROM HELICOPTERS



In the jungle, there are many places where the vegetation or the ruggedness of the terrain will not permit a helicopter to land. Therefore, it maybe necessary to rappel from a helicopter to get on the ground. Special equipment is required to rappel from helicopters. There are no safe field expedients. The following paragraphs describe the equipment and procedure used in rappelling from helicopters and furnish information on other extraction means.


EQUIPMENT



The donut ring is the primary anchoring device (anchor point) inside a helicopter. The floating safety ring is the secondary anchor point. The donut ring consists of a 12-inch solid ring of ВЅ-inch cold-rolled steel cable; seven parachute static line snap hooks; four ВЅ-inch U-bolts; and 12 inches of chain or ВЅ-inch cable.





The log coil helps the double rappelling rope fall clear of the aircraft. To prepare it, start with the running end of the rope and coil the rope evenly and tightly around the log. Use a log approximately 2 to 3 inches in diameter and 16 to 24 inches long.





A system that has proven to be almost ideal for rope deployment in helicopter rappel operations is that of the rope deployment bag. The rope deployment bag is issue as a component of the Stabo extraction system The ropes are prepared in the normal rappel configuration and stretched to full length The D-bag is placed at the loose ends of rope opposite the snaplinks. After insur that all rubber bands are present all stowing lines of the D-bag, a bight is formed in the two runnings ends of the rappel ropes and then placed in the center retainer band just above the stow pocket. The rope is then folded and stowed in the retainer bands working from side to side of the D-bag, while making sure that folds do not extend past either side of the D-bag. Six to eight folds of rope are placed in each retainer band, working towards the top of the D-bag. Once the top of the bag is reached, a bight is formed in the climbing ropes 24 inches below the first snaplink and stowed in the top center retainer band. After the D-bag is inspected, the bag is rolled, going from bottom to top, leaving the snaplinks exposed. Tape is used to secure the top flap of the bag.


PROCEDURES



The rappelling rope is connected to the donut ring and the floating safety ring, in the following order, and in the manner described.





To rappel from a helicopter:

в– Hook into the rope, as in the seat-hip rappel, upon entering the helicopter. Sit on the floor, keeping the brake hand firmly in the small of the back.



в– Place the rope in lap.



■Upon the command, “GET READY,” look toward the donut ring and pull on the rope to check the anchor point connection. Check the rappel seat and snaplink to insure that the rope is properly inserted. Conduct a final visual inspection of the hookup.



■Upon the command, “SIT IN THE DOOR,” swing the feet out to the helicopter skid, keeping the brake on.



■Upon the command, “DROP ROPE,” drop the rope with the guide hand, insuring that the rope does not fall between the cargo compartment and the skid and that the rope is not tangled or fouled.



■Upon the command, “POSITION,” using the guide hand to assist, pivot 180 degrees on the helicopter and skid bar. Face the inside of the helicopter. Spread the feet shoulder-width apart; lock the knees; and bend forward at the waist, forming an “L” body position.



■Upon the command, “Go,” flex the knees and jump backward, letting the rope run through both the brake hand and the guide hand. Descend 5 to 10 meters at a time, looking at the ground over the brake hand. Keep the feet together and legs straight, while maintaining the “L” body position.



в– Upon reaching the ground, back all the way out of the rope and move quickly away from beneath the helicopter.





OTHER MEANS OF ENTERING AND LEAVING HELICOPTERS



The troop ladder is a good method for larger groups to enter or leave an area where the helicopter cannot land. Installation of the ladder is an aviation responsibility. The crew chief will control the number of troops on the ladder. Only five or six troops will be allowed on the ladder at a time.

Use the legs for climbing and descending; the arms for stability and holding the ladder close to the body.

If possible, each soldier, and especially those carrying heavy loads, should tie a rappel seat with a snaplink attached before ascending. Then, if he becomes tired, he can “snap in,” avoiding the chance of a fall.

When going down a ladder, the first soldier on the ground steadies the ladder for the remaining troops. When climbing up a ladder, the soldier designated to hold the ladder steady is the last one up the ladder. If the helicopter starts going up before everyone is loaded, the soldier holding the ladder on the ground should release it at once.

When on the ladder, remain calm at all times. If the helicopter should start settling to the ground, stay calm, watch the ground, and stay on the ladder until reaching the ground.

Once on the ground, move from underneath the helicopter.





The jungle penetrator is a metal seat rescue assembly attached to a winch on a helicopter. The seats remain folded when the device is being lowered. The seats are unfolded when the device is on the ground. A conical nose allows it to penetrate the jungle foliage. One to three soldiers (two is a standard load) can be placed on it. Nylon straps are placed under the arms of the soldier(s) to be hoisted. The device lifts the soldier(s) into the helicopter.





WARNING





While the penetrator is being lowered. Static electricity can build up on the metal surface. The penetrator should touch the ground before anyone touches it. To allow the static electricity to ground itself.





OTHER EXTRACTION MEANS



Other means which can be used for extraction of troops where landing zones (LZ) are not available include such devices as the personnel Stabo extraction system, the Maguire rig, the Palmer rig, or the jungle operations extraction system (JOES).


STABO SYSTEM



This system provides a means for rapid pickup of soldiers by helicopter from areas where the helicopter cannot land. The system consists of the personnel harness, the bridle, the suspension rope, the safety rope, and the deployment bag.

As the pickup process is initiated, the helicopter hovers over the pickup zone at altitudes up to 150 feet. A member of the helicopter crew drops the extraction system deployment bag from the left door of the helicopter. (A maximum of three units may be connected and dropped simultaneously.) As the deployment bag descends, the suspension rope deploys until the bag reaches the ground. The soldier to be extracted then attaches the bridle snaphooks to the lift V-rings on his harness. After insuring that the leg straps are connected and tight the soldier notifies the helicopter by radio or hand signals that liftoff may begin. The helicopter then lifts the soldier from the area and, carrying him suspended beneath the helicopter, moves to an area where a safe landing can be made. The helicopter then lowers the suspended soldier to the ground, lands nearby, and allows him to board the helicopter.





PALMER RIG



This rig is constructed with the 120-foot nylon rope and two 12-foot nylon sling ropes. One end of the 120-foot rope is secured to the donut ring. The running end of the 120-foot rope is tied with an end of the rope bowline knot at the end of the rope. One of the 12-foot sling ropes is tied 3 feet above the bowline with a Prusik knot, and the loose ends are tied off with a square knot to form a loop. The rider uses the remaining sling rope to form a rappel seat. He then fastens a snaplink to the rappel seat and the bowline knot, places his arms up and through the upper loop, and is extracted. The Palmer rig is relatively safe and may be used when evacuating wounded personnel.





MAGUIRE RIG



This rig is also simple and easy to construct. It is made with an 8-foot by 2-inch piece of nylon webbing sewn together at the ends to form a loop containing a D-ring. A smaller slip loop (wrist loop) is sewn 12 inches down from the top of the larger loop. During extraction, the rider simply sits in the seat of the large loop. He then places his wrist in the slip loop and tightens the loop, insuring that he does not fall from the larger loop during extraction.


JUNGLE OPERATIONS EXTRACTION SYSTEM



This system was developed after careful evaluation of the three previously mentioned systems, while considering those items of equipment available to the individual soldier. The JOES can be quickly constructed from components readily available from the supply system. The individual soldier requires very little (10 to 15 minutes) training in what he will be required to do if he needs to be extracted, and only a maximum of 5 minutes is required for him to actually prepare for extraction.





Each individual who is to be extracted must have a 12-foot utility rope and a snaplink. If the individual does not have these items, they can be dropped to him with the JOES. The individual to be extracted makes a rappel seat out of the 12-foot utility rope and installs the snaplink as if he were going to make a rappel.

When JOES is dropped, he and his buddy move to the bag. Each individual hooks his snaplink into one loop at the end of the rope bowline, and places the loop formed by one of the 12-foot utility ropes over his shoulders and under his armpits. He and his buddy stay as far back from the helicopter as practical until it starts to lift up, and as tension is put on the rope, they move forward until they are directly underneath it and linked up with other personnel. All soldiers should link up by holding onto the adjacent person’s equipment.


SECTION V. MOVING ACROSS WATER OBSTACLES




CROSSING RIVERS AND STREAMS



There are several expedient ways to cross rivers and streams. The ways used in any situation depends on the width and depth of the water, the speed of the current, the time and equipment available, and the friendly and enemy situation.

There is always a possibility of equipment failure. For this reason, every soldier should be able to swim. In all water crossings several strong swimmers should be stationed either at the water’s edge or, if possible, in midstream to help anyone who gets into trouble.

If a soldier accidentally falls into the water, he should swim with the current to the nearer bank. Swimming against the current is dangerous because the swimmer is quickly exhausted by the force of the current.





FORDING



A good site to ford a stream has these characteristics:

в– Good concealment on both banks.



в– Few large rocks in the river bed. (Submerged large rocks are usually slippery and make it difficult to maintain footing.)



в– Shallow water or a sandbar in the middle of the stream. Troops may rest or regain their footing on these sandbars.



в– Low banks to make entry and exit easier. High banks normally mean deep water. Deep water near the far shore is especially dangerous as the soldiers may be tired and less able to get out.



A unit should cross at an angle against the current. Each soldier should keep his feet wide apart and drag his legs through the water, not lift them, so that the current will not throw him off balance. Poles can be used to probe in front of the troops to help find deep holes and maintain footing.





FLOATING AIDS



For deeper streams which have little current, soldiers can use a number of floating aids such as the following:





When launching any poncho raft or leaving the water with it, take care not to drag it on the ground as this will cause punctures or tears.





ROPE BRIDGES



For crossing streams and small rivers quickly, rope bridges offer a suitable temporary system, especially when there is a strong current. Because of the stretch factor of nylon ropes, they should not be used to cross gaps of more than 20 meters. For larger gaps, manila rope should be used.





In order to erect a rope bridge, the first thing to be done is to get one end of the rope across the stream. This task can be frustrating when there is a strong current. To get the rope across, anchor one end of a rope that is at least double the width of the stream at point A. Take the other end of the line upstream as far as it will go. Then, tie a sling rope around the waist of a strong swimmer and, using a snaplink, attach the line to him. He should swim diagonally downstream to the far bank, pulling the rope across.





One-Rope Bridge. A one-rope bridge can be constructed either above water level or at water level. The leader must decide which to construct. The bridge is constructed the same regardless of the level.





Crossing Method above Water Level. Use one of the following methods.

Commando crawl. Lie on the top of the rope with the instep of the right foot hooked on the rope. Let the left leg hang to maintain balance. Pull across with the hands and arms, at the same time pushing on the rope with the right foot. (For safety, each soldier ties a rappel seat and hooks the snaplink to the rope bridge.)





Monkey crawl. Hang suspended below the rope, holding the rope with the hands and crossing the knees over the top of the rope. Pull with the hands and push with the legs. (For safety, each soldier ties a rappel seat and hooks the snaplink to the rope bridge.) This is the safest and the best way to cross the one-rope bridge.





Crossing Method at Water Level. Hold onto the rope with both hands, face upstream, and walk into the water. Cross the bridge by sliding and pulling the hands along the rope. (For safety, each soldier ties a sling rope around his waist, leaving a working end of about 3 to 4 feet. He ties a bowline in the working end and attaches a snaplink to the loop. He then hooks the snaplink to the rope bridge.)

To recover the rope, the last soldier unties the rope, ties it around his waist and, after all slack is taken up, is pulled across.





Two-rope bridge. Construction of this bridge is similar to that of the one-rope bridge, except two ropes, a hand rope and a foot rope, are used. These ropes are spaced about 1.5 meters apart vertically at the anchor points. (For added safety, make snaplink attachments to the hand and foot ropes from a rope tied around the waist. Move across the bridge using the snaplink to allow the safety rope to slide.) To keep the ropes a uniform distance apart as men cross, spreader ropes should be tied between the two ropes every 15 feet. A sling rope is used and tied to each bridge rope with a round turn and two half-hitches.





OTHER CROSSING MEANS



Suspension traverses, bridges, and cableways can be used to move large numbers of soldiers or heavy equipment over wide rivers and ravines, or up and down cliffs in a short period of time. Because heavy or bulky material or equipment is needed to construct these expedients, their use is practical only if the needed items can be transported to the site by air or surface means (watercraft, pack animals, etc.).





CHAPTER 8





Waterborne Operations




SECTION I. GENERAL



The inland waterways and jungle coastal or delta regions are land environments dominated by water routes. There may be one or more major waterways and an extensive network of smaller waterways. Usable roads are scarce, and cross-country movement is extremely difficult. The following describes jungle waterways.


UPPER SECTOR (HEADWATERS)



The headwaters of a waterway are usually formed in a mountainous region. The headwaters consist of numerous tributaries which merge to form a river system as the water flows down to the valley. Headwaters are characterized by waterfalls, rapids, and variations in water depth, all of which restrict the use of watercraft.





MIDDLE SECTOR (CENTRAL VALLEY)



When the waterway reaches the central valley, it has formed a broad river which is usually navigable for great distances inland. This river is usually fed by numerous tributaries. In those jungles where there are definite dry and rainy seasons, many of the tributaries found during the rainy season may not exist during the dry season. The river in the valley is wide, slow, and often meanders. During periods of heavy rainfall, the course of the river may change. The jungle vegetation grows up along the riverbanks to form an almost solid wall. The banks of the river are often steep and slippery. Many of the navigable tributaries feeding the major river will often be completely overgrown with vegetation and contain obstacles such as fallen trees.





LOW SECTOR (DELTA)



When the river reaches the low coastal area, it spreads over a flat, alluvial plain and becomes a number of river tributaries (small streams or channels spreading fanlike from the main channel) disbursing a great amount of sediment into a gulf, bay, or ocean. Usually, there are many large and small tidal streams and channels, whose current may change speed or reverse with the tide in a predictable manner. Bottoms of the tributaries normally slope up to a crest or bar at the river’s mouth. In some instances, only watercraft with a draft (that part of the craft under water) of 1 to 2 meters will be able to cross the crest or bar at high tide.





SECTION II. PREPARING FOR OPERATIONS




WATERBORNE COMBAT OPERATIONS



The fundamentals and tactics applicable in conventional ground operations apply in waterborne operations. However, special organization, equipment, and techniques are required when ground forces are supported by Navy ships and craft. The waterborne force should be employed with all available modes of transportation to seek out and destroy the enemy and his installations. One portion of the force may enter the area by watercraft; another may enter by helicopters; still another may enter the area by moving overland. All units then maneuver to attack the enemy. All available fire support should be used in the operation: close air support, attack helicopters, waterborne and landbased artillery, and naval gunfire. Special considerations in the conduct of jungle waterborne operations include the following:

в– The heavy vegetation along the banks of inland waterways offers excellent concealment and enhances the effectiveness of ambushes against watercraft. Therefore, counterambush measures must be planned in conjunction with all water movements. Steep, slippery river banks coupled with dense vegetation often make committing the waterborne force in a coordinated assault landing extremely difficult.



в– Security measures during the movement phase along a jungle waterway include proper watercraft formations, constant water patrolling, and air observation, when possible. Fire support to include mortar, artillery, close air support, and available naval gunfire must be preplanned for all water movements.



в– Intelligence is critical along jungle waterways. While aerial reconnaissance yields a considerable amount of information, it will have to be supplemented by reconnaissance by boat, especially in areas where tributaries are overgrown by vegetation.




SECTION III. USING JUNGLE WATERWAYS




SMALL BOAT HANDLING



The use of inland and coastal waterways can add flexibility, surprise, and speed to tactical operations in jungle areas. Use of these waterways will also increase the load-carrying capacity of units which normally operate dismounted. Thus, every combat leader should be familiar with the tactical and technical aspects of small boat handling.

Boats may be powered by outboard motors, paddles, or oars. The mission, availability, and the river itself dictate the method of propulsion to be used.

Motors are noisy. On the other hand, they provide speed, reduce fatigue, and free personnel for security missions. The noise form motors can be heard for distances of 500 to 1,000 meters by day and up to 5,000 meters at night (sound carries better in the quieter, cooler night air). Provided the craft is not seen and the motor does not change pitch, however, it is difficult to estimate the direction of the sound and exactly how far away it is. Bearing these factors in mind, troops may be able to disguise a movement by deceptive tactics such as having other craft work the area. Stopping the motor when traveling downstream will also aid the security of movement.





Paddling is a slow and tiring process, but it is quieter than using motors. (With plastic, wooden, or metal craft, paddles may need to be wrapped with cloth to reduce noise when the paddles strike the craft.)





ORGANIZATION



Before a waterborne operation, each person in a boat is assigned a specific boat position and a corresponding number. (This is the long count method of organization.)



NOTE



The unit, normally a squad, that uses the RB-15 for transportation actually comprises the crew that operates it. All others that do not operate the boat are passengers.





First, the crewmembers are assigned their positions. Next, the passengers are assigned their positions. When using an RB-15, for example, the crewmembers are assigned positions 1 through 11, and the passengers are assigned positions 12 through 15. One person is designated as the boat commander (normally the coxswain). Two persons are designated as a navigator-observer team.

For operational purposes, the crew is organized into pairs. Passengers are not numbered in this method. (This is the short count method of organization.) When using the RB-15, for example, the crewmembers (in pairs) are assigned to operational positions 1 through 5.





PREPARATION OF PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT



Each crewmember and passenger must wear a life preserver.

The load-carrying equipment harness is worn unbuckled at the waist.



The rifle is slung outside of thelife preserver, opposite the outboard side, with the muzzle down.



Crew-served weapons, radios, ammunition, and other bulk equipment are lashed securely to the boat to prevent loss if the boat should overturn.

Radios, batteries, and unboxed ammunition are waterproofed.

Hot weapons are cooled prior to being placed in the boat to prevent damage to the boat or injury to personnel.

Pointed objects are padded to prevent puncture of the boat.

The most effective equipment-lashing system that has been developed is the RB-15 lashing system. This system is quick and easy to install, requires no special equipment, and prevents loss of equipment in the event the craft is capsized. It also allows the craft to be easily righted.





The average squad can fully rig and lash an RB15, using this system, in approximately 15 minutes.





COMMANDS



“Short Count, count off.” Crew counts off their positions by pairs, for example, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, coxswain (RB-15).

“Long count, count off.” Crew counts off their positions by individuals, for example, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, coxswain (RB-15).

“Boat stations.” Crew takes position along side of boat.

“High carry, move” (used for long distance moves overland).





“Lower the boat, move.” Crew lowers the boat gently to the ground using carrying handles.

“Give way together.” Crew paddles to the front, with Number 2 setting the stroke for the rest of the crew.

“Hold.” Entire crew keeps paddles motionless in the water, thereby stopping the boat.

“Hold left (right).” Left crewmembers hold, right crewmembers continue with previous command.

“Back paddle.” Entire crew paddles backward. This action propels the boat to the rear.

“Back paddle left (right).” Left crewmembers back paddle causing the boat to turn left, right crewmembers continue with previous command.

“Rest paddles.” Crewmembers place paddles on their laps with blades outboard. This command may be given to pairs, i.e., “Number 1’s rest paddles.”


LAUNCHING AND LANDING



When launching, the crew maintains a firm grip on the boat until they are inside the boat; similarly, when landing, they hold onto the boat until it is completely out of the water.

The crew stays as low as possible when entering and leaving the boat to avoid capsizing it.

Crewmembers can load or unload a boat either by individuals or in pairs. They load and unload a boat by individuals at steep river banks and along shoreline where the water is deep near the shore. They also load or unload from or into a larger vessel such as a landing craft, mechanized (LCM), by individuals.

The crewmembers load or unload individually according to their number in the long count method. The coxswain directs them by saying, “One in (out), two in (out),” etc.

The crewmembers load and unload a boat in pairs when at shallow water riverbanks. They load or unload in pairs according to their number in the short count method. The coxswain directs them by saying, “Ones in (out), twos in (out),” etc.





HELOCASTING



Helocasting is an excellent method for deploying troops and equipment in any terrain in which water courses exist. This technique involves a CH-47 helicopter, a 15-man rubber boat (RB-15), and a squad. The RB-15 is loaded with the squad’s rucksacks, crew-served weapons, radios, and other heavy mission-essential items. All this equipment is kept in the RB-15 by a lashing system. At the desired time, the RB-15 is pushed off the ramp and into the water. The squad follows it, exiting the CH-47 in two columns off the tailgate. Drop speed is 20–25 knots and drop altitude is 10–20 feet. The water should have little or no current and should be free of all obstacles, including seaweed and stumps, and be at least 15 feet deep.





The only preparation necessary for the CH-47 is that two lengths of rollers must be installed in the center of the tailgate. The two rearward set of seats on each side of the CH-47 must be raised to fit the RB-15 inside. Personnel wear fatigues (boots unbloused, shirts out, sleeves rolled down, top button fastened), load-carrying equipment, and an individual life preserver. The individual weapon is tied to the individual in such a manner that it can be raised overhead when the individual exits the CH-47.

The RB-15 lashing system is used in rigging and lashing the rubber boat with the respective equipment. The boat is placed on the roller system and moved into the CH-47, bow first. On signal, it is pushed out by the castmaster and coxswain or RB-15 commander. Once the RB-15 is in the water, the squad follows it. The first man to the boat makes a quick inspection for damage and accountability of equipment, frees the paddles, and starts paddling the boat toward the rest of the squad. If the boat capsizes, it can be easily righted using standard drills.

This technique can be used without the RB-15 to cast scouts along a riverbank. They would swim to a designated shore or to a designated point to conduct their mission.

RB-15 helocasting is also an effective means of resupplying a company operating along a water obstacle. Over 1,000 pounds of rations, ammunition, and supplies can be placed in each boat.

RIVER MOVEMENT





NAVIGATION



There are two acceptable methods of river navigation.

Checkpoint and General Route Method. This method is used when the landing site is marked by a well-defined terrain feature and the waterway does not have many branches and tributaries. The navigator uses a strip map, with the route drawn on it, and looks for prominent checkpoints along the way. It is best used during daylight hours and for short distances. Except for those periods when the navigator is right at a checkpoint, this method is not completely accurate. It is, however, the easiest means of river navigation.





Navigator-Observer Method. This is the most accurate means of river navigation and can be used effectively in all light conditions.

The navigator is positioned in the center of the boat and does not paddle. During hours of darkness, he uses his flashlight under a poncho to check his map.

The navigator keeps his map and compass oriented at all times.

The navigator keeps the observer informed of the configuration of the river by announcing bends, sloughs, reaches, and stream junctions as shown on his map.

The observer compares this information with the bends, sloughs, reaches, and stream junctions he actually sees. When these are confirmed the navigator notes the boat’s location on his map.

The navigator also keeps the observer informed of the general azimuths of reaches as shown on his map. The observer confirms these with actual compass readings.

The navigator announces only one configuration at a time to the observer and does not announce another until the first is confirmed and noted.

At night, a strip map drawn on clear acetate backed with luminous tape may be used instead of a map. It should be to scale or a schematic. It should show all curves and the azimuth and distance of all reaches. It should also show terrain features, streams, junctions, and sloughs.


TACTICAL MOVEMENT



The techniques of tactical river movement are very similar to those employed on land. As on land, movement techniques depend primarily on the likelihood of enemy contact and must be based on the concepts of traveling, traveling overwatch, and bounding overwatch.





Distances between elements will vary depending upon observation, range of weapons, and means of communication used. Each boat must maintain visual contact with the boat to its front.

Boats move close to the shoreline, taking advantage of the natural concealment.

When bends in the river deny observation, a unit sends a reconnaissance team ashore to reconnoiter the river beyond the bend. When the reconnaissance team determines that the area is clear, it signals the boats to move forward.

Troops in the boats are assigned specific sectors in which to observe and fire.

One person is appointed in each boat as an air guard. If an enemy aircraft is sighted, the boats immediately move close to shore for concealment. Troops sit quietly in the boats until all is clear. If the aircraft makes a firing pass, the unit beaches the boats and takes the appropriate defensive actions for an air attack.

Actions taken on enemy contact resemble those taken ashore. The elements caught in the enemy’s fire return fire, beach the boats, seek cover, and continue to fire. Other elements beach their boats and maneuver ashore to destroy the enemy. When a patrol is inserted by boat, the landing site must be secured before all elements of the patrol disembark. A suggested technique is to have the lead boat unload its personnel at the landing site while the other boats cover them from a distance. After the site is secured, the other boats are landed on signal. After the boats have landed, the crews either hide the boats or have them removed from the area. In either case, the crews remove any signs of activity on the landing site.

CAPSIZE PROCEDURE





CHAPTER 9





Defensive Formation




SECTION I. GENERAL



Jungle defensive operations are based on the same fundamentals of the defense used in other type operations. Some of the fundamentals may acquire a special significance in the jungle. The basic factors of observation and fields of fire, cover and concealment, obstacles, key terrain, and avenue of approach should always be considered carefully.

Three defensive formations will be presented here: the perimeter, the triangle, and the “Y”. Platoon-size elements will be the primary consideration, although the techniques mentioned are adaptable to larger units. It should be noted that all three defensive postures have definite advantages as well as inherent disadvantages. Units should vary their type of defensive posture in order to avoid establishing a pattern.


SECTION II. FORMATIONS




PERIMETER DEFENSE



The first of the defensive formations is the perimeter. All elements are generally configured in a circular formation, and the terrain is used to the maximum advantage.





The basic technique used to establish this defensive formation is the clock system. This involves the platoon using the direction of movement as 12 o’clock, with one squad occupying from 8 to 12, one squad occupying from 8 to 4, and the last squad occupying from 4 to 12. The headquarters element would normally be located in the center of the formation to facilitate control. It is generally suggested that automatic weapons be placed to cover the most likely avenues of approach. At least one machinegun should be kept with the headquarters, under the control of the unit leader, for deployment against a specific threat.


TRIANGLE DEFENSE



The second of the defensive formations is the triangle defense. This formation is a modification of the perimeter.





This defensive formation is best established by having the commander move forward with one element and establish a base line. Again, 12 o’clock is used as the direction of movement. The baseline could be established by the first squad, running from 8 to 12. Once this base line is established and the squad is prepared to provide support, the next squad moves forward and occupies the straight line position from 8 to 4; finally, the last squad moves forward and occupies the straight line position from 4 to 12. The headquarters element will normally locate in the center of the formation. If three machine guns are available, one will be placed at each comer in such a manner to allow flexibility in providing final protective fires down either of its two sides. If only two machine guns are available, one may be placed to cover the two sides deemed most vulnerable to attack. The second machine gun should be kept with the headquarters element under control of the unit leader. Firing positions should be prepared at all three comers.


“Y” DEFENSE



The third defensive formation is the “Y”. This formation, like the triangle, may be utilized as an offensive formation, usually in an ambush. Depending upon the situation, it can be a very effective defensive formation.





The recommended technique for emplacement of this formation is for the unit leader to take one element and the headquarters forward and establish the center of the sector. This establishes the 12 o’clock position. The remaining elements stay in security positions. Since all legs of the “Y” are mutually supporting, the commander has the option of having all soldiers on each leg face the same direction, or he may alternate fire teams. Once the decision is made regarding which method is to be used, subsequent legs of the “Y” must conform to the initial one. Once the lead squad is emplaced, the next squad moves forward to the center point and is closely directed into the 8 o’clock position. After the second element is in position, the third element moves forward to the center point and is closely directed into the 4 o’clock position. If three machine guns are available, one is positioned at each leg, with possible final protective fires across the fronts of adjacent legs. If only two are available, they are positioned at the center point to provide fire down the legs. This positioning of two is not preferred because it does not allow for dispersion; plus, the machine guns are bunched and extremely vulnerable to indirect fire.





Combat in the Urban Environment





CHAPTER 1





Urban Combat Skills



Successful combat operations in urban areas depend on the proper employment of the rifle squad. Each member must be skilled in moving, entering buildings, clearing rooms, employing hand grenades, selecting and using fighting positions, navigating in urban areas, and camouflage.





SECTION I. MOVEMENT



Movement in urban areas is the first fundamental skill the soldier must master. Movement techniques must be practiced until they become habitual. To reduce exposure to enemy fire, the soldier avoids open areas, avoids silhouetting himself, and selects his next covered position before movement.


1-1. CROSSING OPEN AREAS



Open areas, such as streets, alleys, and parks, should be avoided. They are natural kill zones for enemy crew-served weapons or snipers. They can be crossed safely if the individual or small-unit leader applies certain fundamentals including using smoke from hand grenades or smoke pots to conceal movement. When employing smoke as an obscurant, keep in mind that thermal sighting systems can see through smoke. Also, when smoke has been thrown in an open area, the enemy may choose to engage with suppressive fires into the smoke cloud.

a. Before moving to another position, the soldier makes a visual reconnaissance, selects the position offering the best cover and concealment, and determines the route he takes to get to that position.



b. The soldier develops a plan for his own movement. He runs the shortest distance between buildings and moves along the far building to the next position, reducing the time he is exposed to enemy fire.




1-2. MOVEMENT PARALLEL TO BUILDINGS



Soldiers and small units may not always be able to use the inside of buildings as routes of advance and must move on the outside of the buildings (Figure 1-1). Smoke, suppressive fires, and cover and concealment should be used to hide movement. The soldier moves parallel to the side of the building (maintaining at least 12 inches of separation between himself and the wall to avoid rabbit rounds, ricochets and rubbing or bumping the wall), stays in the shadow, presents a low silhouette, and moves rapidly to his next position (Figure 1-2). If an enemy gunner inside the building fires on a soldier, he exposes himself to fire from other squad members providing overwatch. An enemy gunner farther down the street would have difficulty detecting and engaging the soldier.





Figure 1-1: Selection of the next position.





Figure 1-2: Soldier moving outside building.





1-3. MOVEMENT PAST WINDOWS



Windows present another hazard to the soldier. The most common mistakes are exposing the head in a first-floor window and not being aware of basement windows.

a. When using the correct technique for passing a first-floor window, the soldier stays below the window level and near the side of the building (Figure 1-3). He makes sure he does not silhouette himself in the window. An enemy gunner inside the building would have to expose himself to covering fires if he tried to engage the soldier.





Figure 1-3: Soldier moving past windows.





b. The same techniques used in passing first-floor windows are used when passing basement windows. A soldier should not walk or run past a basement window, since he presents a good target to an enemy gunner inside the building. The soldier should stay close to the wall of the building and step or jump past the window without exposing his legs (Figure 1-4).





Figure 1-4: Soldier passing basement windows.





1-4. MOVEMENT AROUND CORNERS



The area around a corner must be observed before the soldier moves. The most common mistake a soldier makes at a corner is allowing his weapon to extend beyond the corner exposing his position (this mistake is known as flagging your weapon). He should show his head below the height an enemy soldier would expect to see it. The soldier lies flat on the ground and does not extend his weapon beyond the corner of the building. He wears his Kevlar helmet and only exposes his head (at ground level) enough to permit observation (Figure 1-5). Another corner clearing technique that is used when speed is required is the pie-ing method. This procedure is done by aiming the weapon beyond the corner into the direction of travel (without flagging) and side-stepping around the corner in a circular fashion with the muzzle as the pivot point (Figure 1-6).





Figure 1-5: Correct technique for looking around a corner.





Figure 1-6: Pie-ing a corner.





1-5. CROSSING A WALL



Each soldier must learn the correct method of crossing a wall (Figure 1-7). After he has reconnoitered the other side, he rolls over the wall quickly, keeping a low silhouette. Speed of his move and a low silhouette deny the enemy a good target.





Figure 1-7: Soldier crossing a wall.





1-6. USE OF DOORWAYS



Doorways should not be used as entrances or exits since they are normally covered by enemy fire. If a soldier must use a doorway as an exit, he should move quickly to his next position, staying as low as possible to avoid silhouetting himself (Figure 1-8). Preselection of positions, speed, a low silhouette, and the use of covering fires must be emphasized in exiting doorways.





Figure 1-8: Soldier exiting a doorway.





1-7. MOVEMENT BETWEEN POSITIONS



When moving from position to position, each soldier must be careful not to mask his supporting fires. When he reaches his next position, he must be prepared to cover the movement of other members of his fire team or squad. He must use his new position effectively and fire his weapon from either shoulder depending on the position.

a. The most common errors a soldier makes when firing from a position are firing over the top of his cover and silhouetting himself against the building to his rear. Both provide the enemy an easy target. The correct technique for firing from a covered position is to fire around the side of the cover, which reduces exposure to the enemy (Figure 1-9).





Figure 1-9: Soldier firing from a covered position.





b. Another common error is for a right-handed shooter to fire from the right shoulder around the left corner of a building. Firing left-handed around the left corner of a building takes advantage of the cover afforded by the building (Figure 1-10). Right-handed and left-handed soldiers should be trained to adapt cover and concealment to fit their manual orientation. Soldiers should be able to fire from the opposite shoulder.





Figure 1-10: Firing left-handed around the corner of a building.





1-8. FIRE TEAM EMPLOYMENT



Moving as a fire team from building to building or between buildings presents a large target for enemy fire (Figure 1-11). When moving from the corner of one building to another, the fire team should move across the open area in a group. Moving from the side of one building to the side of another presents a similar problem and the technique of movement employed is the same. The fire team uses the building as cover. In moving to an adjacent building (Figure 1-12) team members should keep a distance of 3 to 5 meters between themselves and, using a planned signal, make an abrupt flanking movement (on line) across the open area to the next building.





Figure 1-11: Fire team movement.





Figure 1-12: Movement to adjacent building.





SECTION II. ENTRY TECHNIQUES



When entering buildings a soldier must minimize the time he is exposed. Before moving toward the building he must select the entry point. When moving to the entry point the soldier should use smoke to conceal his advance. He must avoid using windows and doors except as a last resort. He should consider the use of demolitions, tank rounds, and other means to make new entrances. If the situation permits he should precede his entry with a grenade, enter immediately after the grenade explodes, and be covered by one of his buddies.


1-9. UPPER BUILDING LEVELS



Although entering a building from any level other than the ground floor is difficult, clearing a building from the top down is the preferred method. Assaulting or defending a building is easier from an upper story. Gravity and the building’s floor plan become assets when throwing hand grenades and moving from floor to floor.

a. An enemy who is forced to the top of a building may be cornered and fight desperately or escape over the roof. An enemy who is forced down to ground level may withdraw from the building, thus exposing himself to friendly fires from the outside.



b. Various means, such as ladders, drainpipes, vines, helicopters, or the roofs and windows of adjoining buildings, may be used to reach the top floor or roof of a building. One soldier can climb onto the shoulders of another and reach high enough to pull himself up.



c. Ladders offer the quickest method to access the upper levels of a building (Figure 1-13). Units deploying into an urban environment should be equipped with a lightweight, man-portable, collapsible ladder as referenced in the platoon urban operations kit.





Figure 1-13: Entering using portable ladder





(1) If portable ladders are not available, material to build ladders can be obtained through supply channels. Ladders can also be built with resources available throughout the urban area; for example, lumber can be taken from inside the walls of buildings (Figure 1-14).





Figure 1-14: Getting lumber from inside the walls.





(2) Although ladders do not permit access to the top of some buildings, they do offer security and safety through speed. Ladders can be used to conduct an exterior assault of an upper level if soldiers’ exposure to enemy fire can be minimized.




1-10. USE OF GRAPPLING HOOK



The use of a grappling hook and rope to ascend into a building is not recommended. Experimentation and training has determined that using the grappling hook and rope to ascend is extremely difficult for the average soldier, and makes a unit more likely to fail their mission. Grappling hooks are still a viable tool for accomplishing the following tasks:

• Clearing concertina or other tangle wire.



• Clearing obstacles or barricades that may be booby trapped.



• Descending to lower floors.




1-11. SCALING OF WALLS



When required to scale a wall during exposure to enemy fire, all available concealment must be used. Smoke and diversionary measures improve the chances of success. When using smoke for concealment, soldiers must plan for wind direction. They should use suppressive fire, shouting, and distraction devices from other positions to divert the enemy’s attention.

a. A soldier scaling an outside wall is vulnerable to enemy fire. Soldiers who are moving from building to building and climbing buildings should be covered by friendly fire. Properly positioned friendly weapons can suppress and eliminate enemy fire. The M203 grenade launcher is effective in suppressing or neutralizing the enemy from rooms inside buildings (Figure 1-15).





Figure 1-15: Employment of M203 grenade launcher for clearing enemy snipers.





b. If a soldier must scale a wall with a rope, he should avoid silhouetting himself in windows that are not cleared and avoid exposing himself to enemy fires from lower windows. He should climb with his weapon slung over the firing shoulder so he can bring it quickly to a firing position. If the ROE permits, the objective window and any lower level windows in the path of the climber should be engaged with grenades (hand or launcher) before the soldier begins his ascent.



c. The soldier enters the objective window with a low silhouette (Figure 1-16). Entry can be head first; however, the preferred method is to hook a leg over the window sill and enter sideways straddling the ledge.





Figure 1-16: Soldier entering the objective window.





1-12. RAPPELLING



Rappelling is an entry technique that soldiers can use to descend from the rooftop of a tall building into a window (Figure 1-17), or through a hole in the floor, in order to descend to the lower floor.





Figure 1-17: Rappelling.





1-13. ENTRY AT LOWER LEVELS



Buildings should be cleared from the top down. However, entering a building at the top may be impossible. Entry at the bottom or lower level is common and may be the only course of action. When entering a building at lower levels, soldiers avoid entering through windows and doors since both can be easily booby trapped and are usually covered by enemy fire. (Specific lower-level entry techniques are shown in Figure 1-18. These techniques are used when soldiers can enter the building without receiving effective enemy fire.)

a. When entering at lower levels, demolitions, artillery, tank fire, antiarmor weapons fire, or similar means can be used to create a new entrance to avoid booby traps. This procedure is preferred if the ROE permit it. Quick entry is then required to take advantage of the effects of the blast and concussion.



b. When the only entry to a building is through a window or door, supporting fire is directed at that location to destroy or drive away enemy forces. The assaulting soldiers should not leave their covered positions before the support by fire element has accomplished this procedure.



c. Before entering, soldiers may throw a cooked off hand grenade into the new entrance to reinforce the effects of the original blast. The type grenade used, fragmentation, concussion, or stun, is based on METT-TC factors and the structural integrity of the building.



(1) When making a new entrance in a building, soldiers consider the effects of the blast on the building and on adjacent buildings. If there is the possibility of a fire in adjacent building, soldiers coordinate with adjacent units and obtain permission before starting the operation.



(2) In wooden frame buildings, the blast may cause the building to collapse. In stone, brick, or cement buildings, supporting fires are aimed at the corner of the building or at weak points in the building construction.





NOTE



Armored vehicles can be positioned next to a building allowing soldiers to use the vehicle as a platform to enter a room or gain access to a roof.





Figure 1-18: Lower-level entry technique.





Figure 1-18: Lower-level entry technique. (Continued)





Figure 1-18: Lower-level entry technique. (Continued)





1-14. USE OF HAND GRENADES



Combat in urban areas often requires extensive use of hand grenades. Unless the ROE prevent it, use grenades before assaulting defended areas, moving through breaches, or entering unsecured areas. Effective grenade use in urban areas may require throwing overhand or underhand, with both the left and right hand. Normally, the fragmentation grenade should be cooked off for two seconds to prevent the enemy from throwing them back.

a. Three types of hand grenades can be used when assaulting an urban objective: stun, concussion, and fragmentation. METT-TC factors and the type of construction materials used in the objective building influence the type of grenades that can be used.



(1) The M84 stun hand grenade is a flash-bang distraction device, which produces a brilliant flash and a loud bang to momentarily surprise and distract an enemy force (Figure 1-19). The M84 is often used under precision conditions and when the ROE demand use of a nonlethal grenade. The use of stun hand grenades under high intensity conditions is usually limited to situations where fragmentation and concussion grenades pose a risk to friendly troops or the structural integrity of the building.





Figure 1-19: M84 stun hand grenade.





(2) The concussion grenade causes injury or death to persons in a room by blast overpressure and propelling debris within the room (Figure 1-20). While the concussion grenade does not discard a dangerous fragmentation from its body, the force of the explosion can create debris fallout that may penetrate thin walls.





Figure 1-20: MK3A2 (concussion grenade).





(3) The fragmentation grenade (Figure 1-21) produces substantial overpressure when used inside buildings and, coupled with the shrapnel effects, can be extremely dangerous to friendly soldiers. If the walls of a building are made of thin material, such as Sheetrock or thin plywood, soldiers should either lie flat on the floor with their helmet towards the area of detonation, or move away from any wall that might be penetrated by grenade fragments.





Figure 1-21: Fragmentation grenade.





b. Soldiers should engage upper-level openings with grenades (by hand or launcher) before entering to eliminate enemy that might be near the entrance.



(1) The M203 grenade launcher is the best method for putting a grenade in an upper-story window. The primary round of ammunition used for engaging an urban threat is the M433 high-explosive, dual-purpose cartridge (Figure 1-22). Throwing a hand grenade into an upper-story opening is a task that is difficult to do safely during combat.





Figure 1-22: 40-mm, tube-launched, high-explosive, dual-purpose (HEDP) grenade.





(2) When a hand grenade must be thrown into an upper-story opening, the thrower should stand close to the building, using it for cover. This technique should only be employed when the window opening is free of glass or screen.



(3) The thrower should allow the grenade to cook off for at least two seconds, and then step out far enough to lob the grenade into the upper-story opening (Figure 1-23). He should keep his weapon in the nonthrowing hand, to be used if needed. The weapon should never be laid outside or inside the building. At the same time, everyone should have a planned area to move to for safety if the grenade does not go through the window but falls back to the ground.



(4) Once the grenade has been thrown into the opening and detonates, assaulting troops must move swiftly to enter the building.





Figure 1-23: Hand grenade thrown through window.





c. If soldiers must enter the building by the stairs, they must first look for booby traps, then engage the stairwell door with a grenade (by hand or launcher), let it detonate, and quickly move inside. They can then use the staircase for cover.





WARNING





1. If stealth is not a factor, after throwing the grenade the soldier must immediately

announce frag out to indicate that a grenade has been thrown. He then takes cover since

the grenade may bounce back or be thrown back, or the enemy may fire at him.

2. When the M203 grenade launcher is used to deliver the grenade into a window or

doorway, ensure proper standoff for arming the round. Also, the assaulting element

should take cover around a corner or away from the target area.





d. Breachholes and mouseholes are blown or cut through a wall so soldiers can enter a building. (See Chapter 2 for more information.) These are safer entrances than doors because doors can be easily booby trapped and should be avoided, unless explosive breaching is used against the door.



(1) A grenade should be thrown through the breach before entering. Use available cover, such as the lower corner of the building (Figure 2-24), for protection from fragments.



(2) Use stun and concussion grenades when engaging through thin walls.





Figure 2-24: Soldier entering through a mousehole.





e. When a door is the only means of entering a building, soldiers must beware of booby traps and fire from enemy soldiers within the room.



(1) Locked doors can be breached (forced open) using one of the four breaching methods: mechanical, ballistic, explosive, or thermal. If none of these methods are available, soldiers can resort to kicking the door open. This method is the least preferred since it is difficult and tiring to the soldier. It rarely works the first time, and gives any enemy soldiers in the room ample warning and time to shoot through the door. Once the door is breached, a grenade should precede the soldier’s entry.



(2) When opening an unlocked door by hand, the assault team should be sure not to expose themselves to enemy fire through the door. The soldiers should stay close to one side of the doorway to minimize exposure in the open doorframe.



(3) Once the door is open, a hand grenade should be tossed in. After the grenade explodes, soldiers enter and clear the room IAW the tactics, techniques, and procedures discussed in Section III.



f. Although buildings are best cleared from the top down, this procedure is not always possible. While clearing the bottom floor of a building, soldiers may encounter stairs, which must also be cleared. Once again, grenades play an important role.



(1) To climb stairs, first inspect for booby traps, then toss a grenade to the head of the stairs (Figure 2-25). Soldiers must use voice alerts when throwing grenades.



(2) Using the staircase for cover, soldiers throw the grenade underhand to reduce the risk of it bouncing back and rolling down the stairs.



(3) Once the first grenade has detonated, another grenade should be thrown over and behind the staircase banister and into the hallway, neutralizing any exposed enemy in the hallway.



(4) When the second hand grenade has detonated, soldiers proceed to clear the stairway in accordance with prescribed TTP.





NOTE



Large quantities of hand grenades are used when clearing buildings. A continuous supply must be available.





Figure 1-25: Soldier tossing grenade up stairway.





CAUTION



Throwing fragmentation grenades up a stairway has a high probability for the grenades to roll back down and cause fratricide. Soldiers should avoid clustering at the foot of the stairway and ensure that the structural integrity of the building permits the use of either a fragmentation or concussion grenade.





1-15. INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS CONTROL WHEN MOVING



As in all combat situations, the clearing team members must move tactically and safely. Individuals who are part of a clearing team must move in a standard manner, using practiced techniques known to all.

a. When moving, team members maintain muzzle awareness by holding their weapons with the muzzle pointed in the direction of travel. Soldiers keep the butt of the rifle in the pocket of their shoulder, with the muzzle slightly down to allow unobstructed vision. Soldiers keep both eyes open and swing the muzzle as they turn their head so the rifle is always aimed where the soldier is looking. This procedure allows to soldier to see what or who is entering their line of fire.



b. Team members avoid flagging (leading) with the weapon when working around windows, doors, corners, or areas where obstacles must be negotiated. Flagging the weapon gives advance warning to anyone looking in the soldier’s direction, making it easier for an enemy to grab the weapon.



c. Team members should keep weapons on safe (selector switch on SAFE and index finger outside of trigger guard) until a hostile target is identified and engaged. After a team member clears his sector of all targets, he returns his weapon to the SAFE position.



d. If a soldier’s weapon malfunctions during room clearing, he should immediately announce “gun down” and drop to one knee and conduct immediate action to reduce the malfunction. The other members of the team should engage targets in his sector. Once the weapon is operational, he should announce “gun up” and remain in the kneeling position until directed to stand-up by the team leader.





SECTION III. CLEARING



Infantry units often use close combat to enter and clear buildings and rooms. This section describes the TTP for clearing.


1-16. HIGH INTENSITY VERSUS PRECISION CLEARING TECHNIQUES



Precision clearing techniques do not replace other techniques currently being used to clear buildings and rooms during high-intensity combat. Specifically, they do not replace the clearing technique in which a fragmentation or concussion grenade is thrown into a room before the U.S. forces enter. Precision room clearing techniques are used when the tactical situation calls for room-by-room clearing of a relatively intact building in which enemy combatants and noncombatants may be intermixed. They involve increased risk in order to clear a building methodically, rather than using overwhelming firepower to eliminate or neutralize all its inhabitants.

a. From a conceptual standpoint, standard high-intensity room clearing drills can be thought of as a deliberate attack. The task is to seize control of the room with the purpose being the neutralization of the enemy in the room. The fragmentation and or concussion grenades can be thought of as the preparatory fires used before the assault. As in a deliberate attack against any objective, the assaulting elements move into position using covered and concealed routes. The preparatory fires (fragmentation and or concussion grenades) are initiated when soldiers are as close to the objective as they can get without being injured by the fires. The assault element follows the preparatory fires onto the objective as closely as possible. A rapid, violent assault overwhelms and destroys the enemy force and seizes the objective.



b. Compared to the deliberate attack represented by high-intensity room clearing techniques, precision room clearing techniques are more conceptually like a reconnaissance in force or perhaps an infiltration attack. During a reconnaissance in force, the friendly unit seeks to determine the enemy’s locations, dispositions, strength, and intentions. Once the enemy is located, the friendly force is fully prepared to engage and destroy it, especially if surprise is achieved. The friendly force retains the options of not employing preparatory fires (fragmentation and or concussion grenades) if they are not called for (the enemy is not in the room) or if they are inappropriate (there are noncombatants present also). The attacking unit may choose to create a diversion (use a stun grenade) to momentarily distract the defender while they enter and seize the objective.



c. The determination of which techniques to employ is up to the leader on the scene and is based on his analysis of the existing METT-TC conditions. The deliberate attack (high-intensity techniques), with its devastating suppressive and preparatory fires, neutralizes everyone in the room and is less dangerous to the assaulting troops. The reconnaissance in force (precision techniques) conserves ammunition, reduces damage, and minimizes the chance of noncombatant casualties. Unfortunately, even when well-executed, it is very stressful and hazardous for friendly troops.



d. Certain precision room clearing techniques, such as methods of squad and fire team movement, the various firing stances, weapon positioning, and reflexive shooting, are useful for all combat in confined areas. Other techniques, such as entering a room without first neutralizing known enemy occupants by fire or explosives, are appropriate in only some tactical situations.



e. Generally, if a room or building is occupied by an alerted enemy force that is determined to resist, and if most or all noncombatants are clear, overwhelming firepower should be employed to avoid friendly casualties. In such a situation, supporting fires, demolitions, and fragmentation grenades should be used to neutralize a space before friendly troops enter.



f. In some combat situations the use of heavy supporting fires and demolitions would cause unacceptable collateral damage or would unnecessarily slow the unit’s movement. In other situations, often during stability and support operations, enemy combatants are so intermixed with noncombatants that U.S. forces cannot, in good conscience, use all available supporting fires. Room-by-room clearing may be necessary. At such times, precision room clearing techniques are most appropriate.




1-17. PRINCIPLES OF PRECISION ROOM CLEARING



Battles that occur at close quarters, such as within a room or hallway, must be planned and executed with care. Units must train, practice, and rehearse precision room clearing techniques until each fire team and squad operates smoothly. Each unit member must understand the principles of precision room clearing: surprise, speed, and controlled violence of action.

a. Surprise. Surprise is the key to a successful assault at close quarters. The fire team or squad clearing the room must achieve surprise, if only for seconds, by deceiving, distracting, or startling the enemy. Sometimes stun grenades may be used to achieve surprise. These are more effective against a nonalert, poorly trained enemy than against alert, well-trained soldiers.



b. Speed. Speed provides a measure of security to the clearing unit. It allows soldiers to use the first few vital seconds provided by surprise to their maximum advantage. In precision room clearing, speed is not how fast you enter the room, rather it’s how fast the threat is eliminated and the room is cleared.



c. Controlled Violence of Action. Controlled violence of action eliminates or neutralizes the enemy while giving him the least chance of inflicting friendly casualties. It is not limited to the application of firepower only, but also involves a soldier mind-set of complete domination. Each of the principles of precision room clearing has a synergistic relationship to the others. Controlled violence coupled with speed increases surprise. Hence, successful surprise allows increased speed.





1-18. FUNDAMENTALS OF PRECISION ROOM CLEARING



The ten fundamentals of precision room clearing address actions soldiers take while moving along confined corridors to the room to be cleared, while preparing to enter the room, during room entry and target engagement, and after contact. Team members—

• Move tactically and silently while securing the corridors to the room to be cleared.



• Carry only the minimum amount of equipment. (Rucksacks and loose items carried by soldiers tire them, slow their pace, and cause noise.)



• Arrive undetected at the entry to the room in the correct order of entrance, prepared to enter on a single command.



• Enter quickly and dominate the room. Move immediately to positions that allow complete control of the room and provide unobstructed fields of fire.



• Eliminate all enemy in the room by fast, accurate, and discriminating fires.



• Gain and maintain immediate control of the situation and all personnel in the room.



• Confirm whether enemy casualties are wounded or dead. Disarm, segregate, and treat the wounded. Search all enemy casualties.



• Perform a cursory search of the room. Determine if a detailed search is required.



• Evacuate all wounded and any friendly dead.



• Mark the room as cleared using a simple, clearly identifiable marking in accordance with the unit SOP.



• Maintain security and be prepared to react to more enemy contact at any moment. Do not neglect rear security.




1-19. COMPOSITION OF THE CLEARING TEAM



Precision room clearing techniques are designed to be executed by the standard four-man fire team. Because of the confined spaces typical of building-and room-clearing operations, units larger than squads quickly become unwieldy. When shortages of personnel demand it, room clearing can be conducted with two- or three-man teams, but four-man teams are preferred. Using fewer personnel greatly increases the combat strain and risks.


1-20. BREACHING



An integral part of precision room clearing is the ability to gain access quickly to the rooms to be cleared. Breaching techniques vary based on the type of construction encountered and the types of munitions available to the breaching element. Techniques range from simple mechanical breaching to complex, specialized demolitions.

a. A useful method of breaching is the shotgun ballistic breach for forced entry of standard doors. A 12-gauge shotgun loaded with buckshot or slugs can be used to breach most standard doors quickly. Number 9 shot works equally well with reduced collateral damage on the other side of the door. When done properly, the shotgun breach requires only a few seconds. The two standard techniques of shotgun breaching are the doorknob breach and the hinge breach. When attempting either technique, the gunner is announcing his presence by using the shotgun and is completely exposed to fire through the door. Therefore, exposure time must be minimized and the number 1 man must be ready to gain entry and return fire as soon as possible. While holding the stock of the shotgun in the pocket of his shoulder, the gunner places the muzzle tightly against the door, and aims down at a 45-degree angle.





NOTE



If the shotgun muzzle is not held tightly against the door, splatter may occur that could affect friendly troops. Also, buckshot and rifled slugs can overpenetrate doors and may kill or wound occupants in the room.





(1) For the doorknob breach, the aim point is a spot halfway between the doorknob and the frame, not at the doorknob itself. The gunner fires two quick shots in the same location, ensuring the second shot is aimed as carefully as the first. Weak locks may fly apart with the first shot, but the gunner should always fire twice. Some locks that appear to be blown apart have parts still connected that can delay entry. If the lock is not defeated by the second shot, the gunner repeats the procedure. Doors may not always open after firing. The gunner should be prepared to kick the door after firing to ensure opening of the entry point.



(2) The hinge breach technique is performed much the same as the doorknob breach, except the gunner aims at the hinges. He fires three shots per hinge—the first at the middle, then at the top and bottom (Figure 1-26). He fires all shots from less than an inch away from the hinge. Because the hinges are often hidden from view, the hinge breach is more difficult. Hinges are generally 8 to 10 inches from the top and bottom of the door; the center hinge is generally 36 inches from the top, centered on the door. Regardless of which technique the gunner uses, immediately after he fires, he kicks the door in or pulls it out. He then pulls the shotgun barrel sharply upward and quickly turns away from the doorway to signal that the breach point has been cleared. This rapid clearing of the doorway allows the following man in the fire team a clear shot at any enemy who may be blocking the immediate breach site.





Figure 1-26: Aim points for shotgun breach of a standard door, doorknob target on left and hinge targets on right.





NOTE



The use of small arms (5.56-mm or 7.62-mm) as a ballistic breach on doorknobs and hinges is unsafe and should only be used as a last resort.





b. Demolitions are often needed to defeat more elaborate barriers or to produce a desired effect to aid the initial entry.



c. Mechanical breaching is planned as a backup to a ballistic or explosive breach. Mechanical breaching is an assumed capability within all units. Taking the time to defeat weak barriers, such as doors or windows, by means of crowbars, saws, sledgehammers, battering rams, axes, or other breaching tools is a decision that must be made based on the conditions of METT-TC.



d. Clearing team members must approach the breach point quickly, quietly, and in standard order. This approach preserves the element of surprise and allows for quick entry and domination of the room. The order of movement to the breach point is determined by the method of breach and intended actions at the breach point. The members of the fire team are assigned numbers 1 through 4, with the team leader normally designated number 2. If one member of the clearing team is armed with the SAW rather than an M16 rifle or carbine, he should be designated number 4.



(1) Ballistic (Shotgun) Breach. The order of movement for a shotgun breach has the gunner up front, followed by the number 1 man, number 2 man (team leader), and then the number 3 man. After the door is breached, the gunner moves to the rear of the lineup and assumes the position of the number 4 man.



(2) Explosive (Demolition) Breach. The order of movement for an explosive breach without engineer support is number 1, number 2 (team leader), number 3, and then number 4. The number 1 man provides security at the doorway. The number 2 man (team leader) carries the demolition charge and places it. The number 3 man provides security overhead, and the number 4 man provides rear security. After the demolition charge is placed, the team moves to covered positions and prepares to enter in the standard 1, 2, 3, 4 order.



(3) Mechanical Breach. A suggested order of movement for a mechanical breach is the initial assault team in order, followed by the breach man or element. At the breach point, the assault team leader brings the breach team forward while the assault team provides local security. After the breach is conducted, the breach team moves aside and provides local security as the assault team enters the breach.




1-21. CONSIDERATIONS FOR ENTRY



The entire team enters the room as quickly and smoothly as possible and clears the doorway immediately. If possible, the team moves from a covered or concealed position already in their entry order. Ideally, the team arrives and passes through the entry point without having to stop.

a. The door is the focal point of anyone in the room. It is known as the fatal funnel, because it focuses attention at the precise point where the individual team members are the most vulnerable. Moving into the room quickly reduces the chance anyone being hit by enemy fire directed at the doorway.



b. On the signal to go, the clearing team moves from covered or concealed positions through the door quickly and takes up positions inside the room that allow it to completely dominate the room and eliminate the threat. Team members stop movement only after they have cleared the door and reached their designated point of domination. The first man’s position is deep into the near corner of the room. The depth of his movement is determined by the size of the room, any obstacles in the room, such as furniture, and by the number and location of enemy and noncombatants in the room.



c. To make precision room clearing techniques work, each member of the team must know his sector of fire and how his sector overlaps and links with the sectors of the other team members. Team members do not move to the point of domination and then engage their targets. They engage targets as they move to their designated point. However, engagements must not slow movement to their points of domination. Team members may shoot from as short a range as 1 to 2 inches. They engage the most immediate enemy threats first. Examples of immediate threats are enemy personnel who—



• Are armed and prepared to return fire immediately.



• Block movement to the position of domination.



• Are within arm’s reach of a clearing team member.



• Are within 3 to 5 feet of the breach point.



d. Each clearing team member has a designated sector of fire unique to him initially and expands to overlap sectors of the other team members.



(1) The number 1 and number 2 men are initially concerned with the area directly to their front, then along the wall on either side of the door or entry point. This area is in their path of movement, and it is their primary sector of fire. Their alternate sector of fire is from the wall they are moving toward, back to the opposite far corner.



(2) The number 3 and number 4 men start at the center of the wall opposite their point of entry and clear to the left if moving toward the left, or to the right if moving toward the right. They stop short of their respective team member (either the number 1 man or the number 2 man).



e. The team members move toward their points of domination, engaging all targets in their sector. Team members must exercise fire control and discriminate between hostile and noncombatant room occupants. Shooting is done without stopping, using reflexive shooting techniques. Because the soldiers are moving and shooting at the same time, they must move using careful hurry. (Figure 1-31 in paragraph 1-23, shows all four team members at their points of domination and their overlapping sectors of fire.)




1-22. TECHNIQUES FOR ENTERING BUILDINGS AND CLEARING ROOMS



Battle Drill 6 is the standard technique used by the four-man fire team when they perform the task, Enter Building/Clear Room. However, ROE may not allow for, nor the enemy situation requires, such aggressive action on the part of the assaulting unit. Based on the aforementioned conditions, commanders may determine to use the following techniques when entering and clearing buildings and rooms.

a. Situation. Operating as part of a larger force (during daylight or darkness), the squad is tasked to participate in clearing a building. The platoon leader directs the squad to enter the building or to clear a room. An entry point breach has already been identified, or will be created before initiating the entry.



b. Special Considerations. Platoon and squad leaders must consider the task and purpose they have been given and the method they are to use to achieve the desired results.



(1) To seize or gain control of a building may not always require committing troops into the structure or closing with the enemy. The following steps describe effective techniques to be used when training soldiers to the toughest possible conditions. These techniques and procedures can be trained, rehearsed, and modified to a specific situation and mission. Before initiating this action the employment of all organic, crewserved, and supporting weapon systems should be directed onto the objective area in order to suppress and neutralize the threat, providing the mission and ROE permit.



(2) When conducting urban operations, soldiers must be equipped at all times with a night vision device or light source to illuminate the immediate area.





NOTE



The following discussion assumes that only the platoon’s organic weapons are to support the infantry squad. Urban situations may require precise application of firepower. This situation is especially true of an urban environment where the enemy is mixed with noncombatants. Non-combatants may be found in the room, which can restrict the use of fires and reduce the combat power available to a squad leader. His squad may have to operate with no fire areas. Rules of engagement can prohibit the use of certain weapons until a specific hostile action takes place. All soldiers must be aware of the ROE. Leaders must include the specific use of weapons in their planning for precision operations in urban terrain.





c. Required Actions. Figures 1-27, 1-28, 1-29, and 1-30 illustrate the required actions for performing this task. (1) The squad leader designates the assault team and identifies the location of the entry point for them.



(2) The squad leader positions the follow-on assault team to provide overwatch and supporting fires for the initial assault team.



(3) Assault team members move as close to the entry point as possible, using available cover and concealment.



(a) If an explosive breach or a ballistic breach is to be performed by a supporting element, the assault team remains in a covered position until the breach is made. They may provide overwatch and fire support for the breaching element if necessary.



(b) All team members must signal one another that they are ready before the team moves to the entry point.



(c) Team members avoid the use of verbal signals, which may alert the enemy and remove the element of surprise.



(d) Assault team members must move quickly from the covered position to the entry point, minimizing the time they are exposed to enemy fire.



(4) The assault team enters through the breach. Unless a grenade is being thrown prior to entry, the team should avoid stopping outside the point of entry.



(a) The number 2 man may throw a grenade of some type (fragmentation, concussion, stun) into the room before entry.



(b) The use of grenades should be consistent with the ROE and building structure. The grenade should be cooked off before being thrown, if applicable to the type of grenade used.



(c) If stealth is not a factor, the thrower should sound off with a verbal indication that a grenade of some type is being thrown (“frag out,” “concussion out,” “stun out”). If stealth is a factor, only visual signals are given as the grenade is thrown.



CAUTION



If walls and floors are thin, fragments from fragmentation grenades and debris created by concussion grenades can injure soldiers outside the room. If the structure has been stressed by previous explosive engagements, the use of these grenades could cause it to collapse. Leaders must determine the effectiveness of these types of grenades compared to possibilities of harm to friendly troops.





(5) On the signal to go, or immediately after the grenade detonates, the assault team moves through the entry point (Figure 1-27) and quickly takes up positions inside the room that allow it to completely dominate the room and eliminate the threat (Figure 1-30). Unless restricted or impeded, team members stop movement only after they have cleared the door and reached their designated point of domination. In addition to dominating the room, all team members are responsible for identifying possible loopholes and mouseholes in the ceiling, walls and floor.





NOTE



Where enemy forces may be concentrated and the presence of noncombatants is highly unlikely, the assault team can precede their entry by throwing a fragmentation or concussion grenade (structure dependent) into the room, followed by bursts of automatic small-arms fire by the number one man as he enters.





(a) The first man (rifleman), enters the room and eliminates the immediate threat. He has the option of going left or right, normally moving along the path of least resistance to one of two corners. When using a doorway as the point of entry, the path of least resistance is determined initially based on the way the door opens; if the door opens inward he plans to move away from the hinges. If the door opens outward, he plans to move toward the hinged side. Upon entering, the size of the room, enemy situation, and furniture or other obstacles that hinder or channel movement become factors that influence the number 1 man’s direction of movement.



(b) The direction each man moves in should not be preplanned unless the exact room layout is known. Each man should go in a direction opposite the man in front of him (Figure 1-27). Every team member must know the sectors and duties of each position.



(c) As the first man goes through the entry point, he can usually see into the far corner of the room. He eliminates any immediate threat and continues to move along the wall if possible and to the first corner, where he assumes a position of domination facing into the room.





Figure 1-27: First man enters a room.





(6) The second man (team leader), entering almost simultaneously with the first, moves in the opposite direction, following the wall and staying out of the center (Figure 1-28). The second man must clear the entry point, clear the immediate threat area, clear his corner, and move to a dominating position on his side of the room.



(7) The third man (grenadier) simply goes opposite of the second man inside the room at least one meter from the entry point and moves to a position that dominates his sector (Figure 1-29).





Figure 1-28: Second man enters a room.





Figure 1-29: Third man enters a room.





(8) The fourth man (SAW gunner) moves opposite of the third man and moves to a position that dominates his sector (Figure 1-30).





Figure 1-30: Fourth man in a room.





NOTE



If the path of least resistance takes the first man to the left, then all points of domination are the mirror image of those shown in the diagrams.





Figure 1-31: Points of domination and sectors of fire.





(9) Points of domination should not be in front of doors or windows so team members are not silhouetted to the outside of the room (Figure 3-31). No movement should mask the fire of any of the other team members.



(10) On order, any member of the assault team may move deeper into the room overwatched by the other team members.



(11) Once the room is cleared, the team leader signals to the squad leader that the room has been cleared.



(12) The squad leader marks the room (IAW unit SOP). The squad leader determines whether or not his squad can continue to clear through the building.



(13) The squad reorganizes as necessary. Leaders redistribute the ammunition. (14) The squad leader reports to the platoon leader when the room is clear.



d. Reasons for Modifying the Entry Technique. Although this technique is an effective procedure for clearing a room, leaders may be required to modify the existing action to meet their current situation. Some example reasons and methods of modifying the technique are shown in Table 1-1.



Table 1-1: Reasons and methods for modifying entry techniques.





e. Three- and Two-Man Teams. When full four-man teams are not available for room clearing three- and two-man teams can be used. Figures 1-32 (below) and 1-33 show the points of domination and sectors of fire for a three-man clearing team. Figures 1-34 and 1-35 show the same thing for a two-man team. Leaders should use the entry technique blueprint when modifying their techniques.





Figure 1-32: Points of domination and sectors of fire (three-man team, center door).





Figure 1-33: Points of domination and sectors of fire (three-man team, corner door).





Figure 1-34: Points of domination and sectors of fire (two-man team, center door).





Figure 1-35: Points of domination and sectors of fire (two-man team, corner door).





CAUTION



Ricochets are a hazard. All soldiers must be aware of the type of wall construction of the room being cleared. The walls of an enclosed room present many right angles. Combined with hard surfaces such as concrete, a bullet may continue to ricochet around a room until its energy is spent. After hitting threat personnel, ball ammunition may pass through the body and ricochet. Body armor and the Kevlar helmet provide some protection from this hazard.





1-23. REFLEXIVE SHOOTING



Precision room clearing allows little or no margin for error. Too slow a shot at an enemy, too fast a shot at a noncombatant, or inaccurate shots can all be disastrous for the clearing team. Proper weapon ready technique, stance, aiming, shot placement, and trigger manipulations constitute reflexive shooting. Reflexive shooting techniques are used by all members of the fire team, to include M203 and M249 gunners.

a. Weapon Ready Positions. The two weapon ready positions are low ready and high ready (Figure 1-36).



(1) Low Ready Position. The butt of the weapon is placed firmly in the pocket of the shoulder with the barrel pointed down at a 45-degree angle. This position is the safest carry position. It should be used by the clearing team while inside the room, except when actually entering and clearing.



(2) High, Ready Position. The butt of the weapon is held under the armpit, with the barrel pointed slightly up, keeping the front sight assembly under the line of sight but within the gunner’s peripheral vision. To engage a target, the gunner pushes the weapon out as if to bayonet the target. When the weapon leaves the armpit, he slides it up into the firing shoulder. This technique is used when moving in a single file.





Figure 1-36: Ready positions for the M16A2.





b. Stance. Feet are about shoulder-width apart. Toes are pointed to the front (direction of movement). The firing side foot is slightly staggered to the rear of the non-firing side foot. Knees are slightly bent and the upper body is leaned slightly forward. Shoulders are square and pulled back, not rolled over or slouched. The head is up and both eyes are open. When engaging targets, the gunner holds the weapon with the butt in the pocket of his shoulder.



c. Aiming with Iron Sights. The four aiming techniques all have their place during combat in urban areas, but the aimed quick-kill technique is the one most often used in precision room clearing.



(1) Slow Aimed Fire. This technique is the most accurate. It consists of taking up a steady, properly aligned sight picture and squeezing off rounds. It is normally used for engagements beyond 25 meters or when the need for accuracy overrides speed.



(2) Rapid Aimed Fire. This technique features an imperfect sight picture in which windage is critical but elevation is of lesser importance. When the front sight post is in line with the target, the gunner squeezes the trigger. This technique is used against targets out to 15 meters and is fairly accurate and very fast.



(3) Aimed Quick Kill. This technique consists of using a good spot weld and placing the front sight post flush on top of the rear peep sight. It is used for very quick shots out to 12 meters. Windage is important, but elevation is not critical with relation to the target. This technique is the fastest and most accurate. With practice, soldiers can become deadly shots at close range.



(4) Instinctive Fire. This technique is the least desirable. The gunner focuses on the target and points the weapon in the target’s general direction, using muscle memory to compensate for lack of aim. This technique should be used only in emergencies.



d. M68 Close Combat Optic. The M68 close combat optic (CCO) is an excellent close combat aiming system when used properly. Remember, the M68 is not a telescope sight.



(1) Aimed Fire. This technique requires looking through the CCO with both eyes open and focusing on the target. An optical illusion places a red aiming dot in front of the firer. The dot is placed on the target then the target is engaged with fire. The aiming dot does not have to be centered in the optic. The CCO is used in the same manner at all ranges. Therefore, there is no distinction between slow aimed fire, rapid aimed fire, and aimed quick kill techniques.



(2) Instinctive Fire. This technique remains the same with the CCO.



e. Trigger Manipulation. Rapid, aimed, semiautomatic fire is the most effective method of engaging targets during precision room clearing. As each round is fired from the aimed quick-kill position, the weapon’s recoil makes the front sight post move in a small natural arc. The gunner should not fight this recoil. He should let the weapon make the arc and immediately bring the front sight post back onto the target and take another shot. This two-shot combination is known as firing a controlled pair. Soldiers must practice a controlled pair until it becomes instinctive. Clearing team members continue to fire controlled pairs until the target goes down. If there are multiple targets, team members engage with a controlled pair and then return to reengage any enemy left standing or still trying to resist.



f. Shot Placement. In precision room clearing, enemy soldiers must be incapacitated immediately. Shots that wound or are mortal but do not incapacitate the target instantaneously are better than misses but may allow the enemy to return fire. While a solid head-shot is expected to instantaneously incapacitate the enemy, a target area of 5 by 8 inches may be difficult to hit when moving rapidly in a low crouch position.



(1) Members of clearing teams should concentrate on achieving solid, well-placed shots (controlled pairs) to the upper chest, then to the head (Figure 1-37). This shot placement increases the first round hit probability and allows for a second round incapacitating shot.



(2) This engagement technique is more reliable than attempting head-shots only and is easy for soldiers to learn, having been taught previously to aim at center of mass.



g. Reflexive Shooting Techniques During Limited Visibility. Reflexive shooting techniques are also used during periods of limited visibility.



(1) Visible Illumination. When using flashlights or other visible illumination, treat all engagements as day engagements and use the applicable technique as described above. Bright light shone into the enemy’s eyes can limit his effectiveness; also, be aware that a flashlight marks your location as well.



(2) AN/PAQ-4 and AN/PEQ-2 Aiming Lights. When using IR aiming lights in conjunction with night vision goggles (NVGs), use the instinctive fire technique to point the weapon at the target while activating the aiming light. This technique should place the aiming dot within the field of view of the NVGs and on or near the target. Adjust placement of the aiming dot onto the target and fire. Note that target discrimination is more difficult when using NVGs. IR illumination provided by flashlights with IR filters, or the illuminator that is integral with the PEQ-2, can aid in target identification and discrimination. IR illumination is also required inside buildings when there is no ambient light.





Figure 1-37: Lethal to incapacitating shot placement.





(3) AN/PAS-13 Thermal Weapons Sight. The thermal weapons sight (TWS) offers some distinct advantages over IR viewers. It does not require any ambient light and does not bloom out when encountering a sudden light source. However, its weight and bulk are a disadvantage when performing reflexive firing techniques. With the sight in the ON position, the TWS has a power saving feature that turns off the viewer after a period of inactivity. The soldier reactivates the sight by placing his eye against the rubber eyecup. When reactivated, it takes a few seconds for the sight to cool itself down enough to regain an image. This delay is not acceptable for soldiers using TWS while conducting room and building clearing tasks. When performing precision clearing tasks, the TWS must remain in the EMERGENCY setting, which allows it to remain continuously active.





NOTE



The emergency setting on the TWS greatly reduces the battery life, which requires more frequent battery changes.





(4) When using the TWS during periods of limited visibility, it is best to use the PAQ-4 aiming light, with the AN/PVS-14 Monocular IWG for reflexive shooting engagements. Use the TWS when the slow aimed fire technique is appropriate. For daytime and high visibility periods, soldiers using the TWS should not be placed on point, or be among the numbers 1 through 3 men of a room clearing team. When employed in urban operations, soldiers must be aware that the TWS cannot detect targets through window glass. The TWS is effective in daytime for locating targets hidden in shadows.




3-24. TARGET DISCRIMINATION



Target discrimination is the act of quickly distinguishing between combatant and noncombatant personnel and engaging only the combatants. U.S. forces engage in precision room clearing to apply discriminating combat power and limit unnecessary casualties among noncombatants. Target discrimination is vital in precision room clearing. If there are no noncombatants then there is less of a need for selective engagements. However, even if an area is known to be free of noncombatants, other soldiers moving through the area may be mistaken as enemy and engaged unless clearing team members are disciplined and well-trained in fire control and target discrimination. Even with well-trained, disciplined soldiers, precision room clearing can result in unintentional casualties among noncombatants. Commanders must recognize this and take steps to relieve the stress it causes soldiers.


3-25. MOVEMENT WITHIN A BUILDING



When operating under precision conditions, movement techniques may be modified based on the room clearing technique being used. The terrain, the enemy situation, visibility, and the likelihood of contact dictate movement techniques.

a. Individual Movement. When moving within a building, the soldier avoids silhouetting himself in doors and windows (Figure 1-38). When moving in hallways, he never moves alone—he always moves with at least one other soldier for security. The soldier should try to stay 12 to 18 inches away from walls when moving; rubbing against walls may alert an enemy on the other side, or, if engaged by an enemy, ricochet rounds tend to travel parallel to a wall.





Figure 1-38: Movement within a building.





b. Hallway Clearing Techniques. The clearing team must always be alert. Team members provide security at the breach point and to the rear. Inside buildings they provide security laterally down corridors, and upward if near stairs or landings. The two basic techniques for moving down hallways are shown in Figure 1-39. Hallway intersections are dangerous areas and should be approached cautiously (Figures 1-40 and 1-41).



(1) Serpentine. The serpentine technique is used in narrow hallways. The number 1 man provides security to the front. His sector of fire includes any enemy soldiers who appear at the far end of the hall or from any doorways near the end. The number 2 and number 3 men cover the left and right sides of the number 1 man. Their sectors of fire include any soldiers who appear suddenly from nearby doorways on either side of the hall. The number 4 man, normally carrying the M249, provides rear protection against any enemy soldiers suddenly appearing behind the clearing team.



(2) Rolling T. The rolling-T technique is used in wide hallways. The number 1 and number 2 men move abreast, covering the opposite side of the hallway from the one they are walking on. The number 3 man covers the far end of the hallway from a position behind the number 1 and number 2 men, firing between them. Once again, the number 4 man provides rear security.





Figure 1-39: Hallway clearing techniques.





(3) Clearing “T” Intersections. Figure 1-40 depicts the fire team’s actions upon reaching a hallway “T” intersection when approaching from the base of the “T”. The fire team is using the serpentine formation for movement.



• The team configures into a 2-by-2 formation with the numbers 1 and 2 men left, and the 3 and 4 men right. (When clearing a right-hand corner, use the left-handed firing method to minimize exposure.)



• The numbers 1 and 3 men move to the edge of the corner and assume a low crouch or kneeling position. On signal, the numbers 1 and 3 men simultaneously turn left and right, respectively.



• At the same time, the numbers 2 and 4 men step forward and turn left and right, respectively maintaining their (high) position. (Sectors of fire interlock and the low/high positions prevent soldiers from firing at another.)



• Once the left and right portions of the hallway are clear, the fire team resumes the movement formation.



Figure 1-41 depicts the fire team’s actions upon reaching a hallway “T” intersection when approaching along thecross of the “T”. The fire team is using the serpentine formation for movement.

• The team configures into a modified 2-by-2 formation with the numbers 1 and 3 men abreast and toward the right side of the hall. The number 2 man moves to the left side of the hall and orients to the front, and the number 4 man shifts to the right side (his left) and maintains rear security. (When clearing a right-hand corner, use the left-handed firing method to minimize exposure.)



• The numbers 1 and 3 men move to the edge of the corner and the number 3 man assumes a low crouch or kneeling position. On signal, the number 3 man turns right around the corner keeping low, the number 1 man steps forward while turning to the right and staying high. (Sectors of fire interlock and the low/high positions prevent soldiers from firing at one another.)



• The numbers 2 and 4 men continue to move in the direction of travel. As the number 2 man passes behind the number 1 man, the number 1 man shifts laterally to his left until he reaches the far corner.



• The numbers 2 and 4 men continue to move in the direction of travel. As the number 4 man passes behind the number 3 man, the number 3 man shifts laterally to his left until he reaches the far corner. As the number 3 man begins to shift across the hall, the number 1 man turns into the direction of travel and moves to his position in the formation.



• As the numbers 3 and 4 men reach the far side of the hallway, they too assume their original positions in the serpentine formation, and the fire team continues to move.





Figure 1-40: T-shaped hallway intersection clearing positions.





Figure 1-41: Hallway junction clearing.





Figure 1-41: Hallway junction clearing. (Continued)





c. Clearing Stairwells and Staircases. Stairwells and staircases are comparable to doorways in that they create a fatal funnel; however, the danger is intensified by the three-dimensional aspect of additional landings. The ability of the squad or team to conduct the movement depends upon which direction they are traveling and the layout of the stairs. Regardless, the clearing technique follows a basic format:



• The squad leader designates an assault element to clear the stairs.



• The squad or team maintains 360-degree, three-dimensional security in the vicinity of the stairs.



• The squad leader then directs the assault team to locate, mark, bypass and or clear any obstacles or booby traps that may be blocking access to the stairs.



• The assault element moves up (or down) the stairways by using either the two-, three-, or four-man flow technique, providing overwatch up and down the stairs while moving. The three-man variation is preferred (Figure 1-42).





Figure 1-42: Three-man flow clearing technique.





1-26. VERBAL COMMANDS AND SIGNALS



When conducting precision clearing, soldiers are very close to each other as they engage targets. The high volume of noise makes communications extremely difficult. The command and control techniques used during precision combat must consist of terms and actions that soldiers are familiar with and to which they know how to respond.

a. The use of verbal commands and signals within the assault element are extremely important. The soldier must always let others in the assault element know where he is and what he is doing.



b. As an example, terms similar to the ones listed in Table 1-2 should be a part of each soldier’s vocabulary IAW unit SOP.



Table 1-2: Verbal commands and signals.





NOTE



The use of loud verbal commands may reveal to the enemy the location and immediate intent of friendly forces. Although code words may be substituted, they can be heard and used by enemy forces if friendly forces use them too loudly..





1-27. SAFETY AND FORCE PROTECTION



Precision clearing is high risk, and even training for it can be hazardous. Only well-trained, disciplined soldiers are able to execute these techniques successfully.

a. Leaders at all levels must enforce safe handling of weapons and demolitions. The concern that individual soldiers not be injured in accidents is essential to mission accomplishment. Unintentional and unsafe weapons fire or detonation of explosives or munitions can jeopardize the mission of the clearing team and subsequently the entire unit.



b. Soldiers engaged in precision clearing should wear all their protective equipment.



(1) Soft body armor, such as the standard Army-issue Kevlar vest, is effective in preventing death or serious injury from high-velocity fragments that strike the torso area. Although the Kevlar protective vest is effective, flexible, and relatively comfortable, it is not designed to stop bullets. As a rule, soft body armor stops some low-power handgun rounds but not rifle or carbine ammunition.



(2) Some versions of hard body armor stops almost any round fired at it. They tend to be heavy and stiff, but they have proven effective during precision clearing. If a commander knows his unit is going to conduct lengthy precision room clearing, he requests a special issue of threat level III or IV protective equipment. This equipment is excellent, but soldiers must train and rehearse wearing it before they enter combat. All precision clearing is tiring, and soldiers wearing threat level III or IV protection tire or overheat more quickly.



(3) The standard Army Kevlar helmet and ballistic protective eyeglasses have also been proven to significantly reduce casualties during precision room clearing.



(4) Hard plastic knee and elbow protectors are available on special request. They are useful, especially during prolonged search and clear operations. They prevent injury from rubble and broken glass when kneeling or prone.



c. Detailed knowledge of weapons and munitions effects is important to the safety of members of the clearing team, as well as to mission accomplishment. Most interior building wails do not stop rifle fire. Fragments from grenades often penetrate interior walls. Standard home furnishings or office furniture offer little protection from high-velocity rounds. Excessive amounts of demolitions used to breach a wall may knock it down instead, perhaps even bring the roof of the building down also.



CAUTION



Goggles or ballistic eye protection should always be worn to protect soldiers from debris caused by explosives, tools, weapons, grenades, and so forth.





SECTION IV. FIGHTING POSITIONS



Whether a unit is attacking, defending, or conducting retrograde operations, its success or failure depends on the ability of the individual soldier to place accurate fire on the enemy with the least exposure to return fire. Consequently, the soldier must immediately seek and use firing positions properly.


1-28. HASTY FIGHTING POSITION



A hasty fighting position is normally occupied in the attack or the early stages of the defense. It is a position from which the soldier can place fire upon the enemy while using available cover for protection from return fire. The soldier may occupy it voluntarily or he may be forced to occupy it due to enemy fire. In either case, the position lacks preparation before occupation. Some of the more common hasty fighting positions in an urban area are: corners of buildings, behind walls, windows, unprepared loopholes, and the peak of a roof.

a. Corners of Buildings. The soldier must be capable of firing his weapon both right- and left-handed to be effective around corners.



(1) A common error made in firing around corners is firing from the wrong shoulder. This exposes more of the soldier’s body to return fire than necessary. By firing from the proper shoulder, the soldier can reduce exposure to enemy fire.



(2) Another common mistake when firing around corners is firing from the standing position. The soldier exposes himself at the height the enemy would expect a target to appear, and risks exposing the entire length of his body as a target for the enemy.



b. Walls. When firing from behind walls, the soldier must fire around cover and not over it (Figure 1-43).





Figure 1-43: Soldier firing around cover.





c. Windows. In an urban area, windows provide convenient firing ports. The soldier must avoid firing from the standing position since it exposes most of his body to return fire from the enemy and could silhouette him against a light-colored interior beyond the window. This is an obvious sign of the soldier’s position, especially at night when the muzzle flash can easily be observed. In using the proper method of firing from a window (Figure 1-44), the soldier is well back into the room to prevent the muzzle flash from being seen, and he is kneeling to limit exposure and avoid silhouetting himself.





Figure 1-44: Soldier firing from window.





d. Loopholes. The soldier may fire through a hole created in the wall and avoid windows (Figure 1-45). He stays back from the loophole so the muzzle of the weapon does not protrude beyond the wall, and the muzzle flash is concealed.





Figure 1-45: Soldier firing from loophole.





e. Roof. The peak of a roof provides a vantage point for snipers that increases their field of vision and the ranges at which they can engage targets (Figure 1-46). A chimney, a smokestack, or any other object protruding from the roof of a building can reduce the size of the target exposed and should be used.





Figure 1-46: Soldier firing from peak of a roof.





f. No Position Available. When the soldier is subjected to enemy fire and none of the positions mentioned above are available, he must try to expose as little of himself as possible. The soldier can reduce his exposure to the enemy by lying prone as close to a building as possible, on the same side of the open area as the enemy. To engage the soldier, the enemy must then lean out the window and expose himself to return fire.



g. No Cover Available. When no cover is available, the soldier can reduce exposure by firing from the prone position, by firing from shadows, and by presenting no silhouette against buildings.




1-29. PREPARED FIGHTING POSITION



A prepared firing position is one built or improved to allow the soldier to engage a particular area, avenue of approach, or enemy position, while reducing his exposure to return fire. Examples of prepared positions include barricaded windows, fortified loopholes, sniper positions, antiarmor positions, and machine gun positions.

a. The natural firing port provided by windows can be improved by barricading the window, leaving a small hole for the soldier’s use. Materials torn from the interior walls of the building or any other available material may be used for barricading.



(1) When barricading windows, avoid barricading only the windows that are going to be used as firing ports. The enemy can soon determine that the barricaded windows are fighting positions.



(2) Also avoid neat, square, or rectangular holes that are easily identified by the enemy. A barricaded window should not have a neat, regular firing port. The window should keep its original shape so that the position of the soldier is hard to detect. Firing from the bottom of the window gives the soldier the advantage of the wall because the firing port is less obvious to the enemy. Sandbags are used to reinforce the wall below the window and to increase protection for the soldier. All glass must be removed from the window to prevent injury to the soldier. Lace curtains permit the soldier to see out and prevent the enemy from seeing in. Wet blankets should be placed under weapons to reduce dust. Wire mesh over the window keeps the enemy from throwing in hand grenades.



b. Although windows usually are good fighting positions, they do not always allow the soldier to engage targets in his sector.



(1) To avoid establishing a pattern of always firing from windows, an alternate position is required such as in an interior room and firing through a rubbled outer wall (Figure 1-47), or a prepared loophole (Figure 1-48). The prepared loophole involves cutting or blowing a small hole into the wall to allow the soldier to observe and engage targets in his sector.





Figure 1-47: Interior room position.





Figure 1-48: Prepared loophole.





(2) Sandbags are used to reinforce the walls below, around, and above the loophole (Figure 1-49). Two layers of sandbags are placed on the floor under the soldier to protect him from an explosion on a lower floor (if the position is on the second floor or higher). A wall of sandbags, rubble, furniture, and so on should be constructed to the rear of the position to protect the soldier from explosions in the room.





Figure 1-49: Cut-away view of a sandbag reinforced position.





(3) A table, bedstead, or other available material can provide overhead cover for the position. This cover prevents injury to the soldier from falling debris or explosions above his position.



(4) The position should be camouflaged by knocking other holes in the wall, making it difficult for the enemy to determine which hole the fire is coming from. Siding material should be removed from the building in several places to make loopholes less noticeable.



(5) Because of the angled firing position associated with loopholes, primary and supplementary positions can be prepared using the same loophole (Figure 1-50). This procedure allows the individual to shift his fire onto a sector that was not previously covered by small arms fire.





Figure 1-50: Loopholes with primary and supplementary positions.





c. A chimney or other protruding structure provides a base from which a sniper position can be prepared. Part of the roofing material is removed to allow the sniper to fire around the chimney. He should stand inside the building on the beams or on a platform with only his head and shoulders above the roof (behind the chimney). Sandbags placed on the sides of the position protect the sniper’s flanks.



d. When the roof has no protruding structure to provide protection, the sniper position should be prepared from underneath on the enemy side of the roof (Figure 1-51). The position is reinforced with sandbags, and a small piece of roofing material should be removed to allow the sniper to engage targets in his sector. The missing piece of roofing material should be the only sign a position exists. Other pieces of roofing should be removed to deceive the enemy as to the true sniper position. The sniper should be invisible from outside the building and the muzzle flash must be hidden from view.





Figure 1-51: Sniper position.





e. Some considerations for selecting and occupying individual fighting positions are:



• Make maximum use of available cover and concealment.



• Avoid firing over cover; when possible, fire around it.



• Avoid silhouetting against light-colored buildings, the skyline, and so on.



• Carefully select a new fighting position before leaving an old one.



• Avoid setting a pattern; fire from both barricaded and non-barricaded windows.



• Keep exposure time to a minimum.



• Begin improving your hasty position immediately after occupation.



• Use construction material that is readily available in an urban area.



• Remember that positions that provide cover at ground level may not provide cover on higher floors.



f. In attacking an urban area, the recoilless AT weapon and ATGM crews may be hampered in choosing firing positions due to the backblast of their weapons. They may not have enough time to knock out walls in buildings and clear backblast areas.



They should select positions that allow the backblast to escape such as corner windows where the round fired goes out one window and the backblast escapes from another. When conduction defensive operations the corner of a building can be improved with sandbags to create a firing position (Figure 1-52).





Figure 1-52: Corner firing position.





g. The rifle squad during an attack on and in defense of an urban area is often reinforced with attached antitank weapons. The rifle squad leader must be able to choose good firing positions for the antitank weapons under his control.



h. Various principles of employing antitank weapons have universal applications such as: making maximum use of available cover; trying to achieve mutual support; and allowing for the backblast when positioning recoilless weapons, TOWs, Dragons, Javelins, and AT4s.



i. Operating in an urban area presents new considerations. Soldiers must select numerous alternate positions, particularly when the structure does not provide cover from small-arms fire. They must position their weapons in the shadows and within the building.



j. AT4s and Javelins firing from the top of a building can use the chimney for cover (Figure 1-53). The rear of this position should be reinforced with sandbags but should not interfere with backblast area.





Figure 1-53: A recoilless weapon crew firing from a rooftop.





k. When selecting firing positions for recoilless weapons and ATGMs, make maximum use of rubble, corners of buildings, and destroyed vehicles to provide cover for the crew. Recoilless weapons and ATGMs can also be moved along rooftops to obtain a better angle to engage enemy armor. When buildings are elevated, positions can be prepared using a building for overhead cover (Figure 1-54). The backblast under the building must not damage or collapse the building or injure the crew.





Figure 1-54: Prepared positions using a building for overhead cover.





NOTE



When firing from a slope, ensure that the angle of the launcher relative to the ground or firing platform is not greater than 20 degrees. When firing within a building, ensure the enclosure is at least 10 feet by 15 feet, is clear of debris and loose objects, and has windows, doors, or holes in the walls for the backblast to escape.





l. The machine gun can be emplaced almost anywhere. In the attack, windows and doors offer ready-made firing ports (Figure 1-55). For this reason, the enemy normally has windows and doors under observation and fire, which should be avoided. Any opening in walls created during the fighting may be used. Small explosive charges can create loopholes for machine gun positions (Figure 1-56). Regardless of what openings are used, machine guns should be in the building and in the shadows.





Figure 1-55: Emplacement of machine gun in a doorway.





Figure 1-56: Use of a loophole with a machine gun.





m. Upon occupying a building, soldiers board up all windows and doors. By leaving small gaps between the slots, soldiers can use windows and doors as good alternate positions.



n. Loopholes should be used extensively in the defense. They should not be constructed in any logical pattern, nor should they all be at floor or tabletop level. Varying their height and location makes them hard to pinpoint and identify. Dummy loopholes, knocked off shingles, or holes cut that are not intended to be used as firing positions aid in the deception. Loopholes located behind shrubbery, under doorjambs, and under the eaves of a building are hard to detect. In the defense, as in the offense, a firing position can be constructed using the building for overhead cover.



o. Increased fields of fire can be obtained by locating the machine gun in the corner of the building (Figure 1-57), in the cellar (Figure 1-58), or sandbagged under a building (Figure 1-59). Available materials, such as desks, overstuffed chairs, couches, and other items of furniture, should be integrated into the construction of bunkers to add cover and concealment.





Figure 1-57: Corner machine gun bunker.





Figure 1-58: Machine gun position in cellar.





Figure 1-59: Sandbagged machine gun emplacement under a building.





p. Although grazing fire is desirable when employing the machine gun, it may not always be practical or possible. Where destroyed vehicles, rubble, and other obstructions restrict the fields of grazing fire, the gun can be elevated to where it can fire over obstacles. Firing from loopholes on the second or third story may be necessary. A firing platform can be built under the roof and a loophole constructed (Figure 1-60). Again, the exact location of the position must be concealed. Camouflage the position by removing patches of shingles, over the entire roof.





Figure 1-60: Firing platform built under roof.





1-30. TARGET ACQUISITION



Urban areas provide unique target acquisition challenges to units. Buildings mask movement and the effects of direct and indirect fires. The rubble from destroyed buildings, along with the buildings themselves, provides cover and concealment for attackers and defenders, making target acquisition difficult. Urban areas often favor the defender’s ability to acquire targets so this makes offensive target acquisition extremely important, since the side that fires first may win the engagement. Target acquisition must be continuous, whether a unit or soldier is halted or moving. The six steps of target acquisition, search, detection, location, identification, classification, and confirmation are no different in an urban environment than anywhere else but are usually performed at a much faster pace.

a. Search. Using all senses during the search step enhances the detection capabilities of all soldiers on the urban battlefield. The techniques of patrolling and using observation posts apply in urban as well as in wooded or more open terrain. These techniques enable units to search for and locate the enemy. Soldiers searching the urban battlefield for targets should employ target acquisition devices. These devices can include binoculars, image intensification devices, thermal sights, ground surveillance radar (GSR), remote sensors (REMs), platoon early warning systems (PEWS), and field expedient early warning devices. Several types of devices should be used since no single device can meet every need of a unit.



(1) Observation. Observation duties must be clearly given to squad members to ensure 360 degrees and three-dimensional security as they move. This security continues at the halt. Soldiers soon recognize the sights, smells, sounds and so forth, associated with their urban battlefield and can soon distinguish targets.



(2) Movement. Stealth should be used when moving in urban areas since there are often short distances between attackers and defenders. Hand and arm signals should be used until contact is made. The unit should stop periodically to look and listen. Routes should be carefully chosen so that buildings and piles of rubble can be used to mask the unit’s movement.



(3) Movement Techniques. Techniques are basically the same as in open terrain (traveling, traveling overwatch, bounding overwatch). When a unit is moving and enemy contact is likely, the unit must use a movement technique with an overwatching element. This principle applies in urban areas as it does in other kinds of terrain except that in urban terrain, the overwatching element must observe both the upper floors of buildings and street level.



(4) Observation Posts. The military aspects of urban terrain must be considered in selecting observation posts (OPs). OPs can be positioned in the upper floors of buildings, giving soldiers a better vantage point than at street level. Leaders should avoid selecting obvious positions, such as water towers or church steeples that attract the enemy’s attention (Figure 1-61).





Figure 1-61: Selection of OP location.





b. Detection. Personnel, weapons, and vehicles have distinguishing signatures. Soldiers must recognize signatures so they can acquire and identify targets. This is extremely important in the urban battlefield, where one or more senses can be degraded. For example, soldiers operating in an urban area where smoke is used as an obscurant will have their sense of sight degraded, since they may not be able to see through the smoke with the naked eye. Their sense of smell and breathing is also affected. Some considerations are:



• Soldiers must look for targets in areas where they are most likely to be employed. Squad leaders must place OPs where they are most likely to see targets.



• Odors from diesel fuel, gasoline, cooking food, burning tobacco, after-shave lotion, and so forth reveal enemy and friendly locations.



• Running engines, vehicles, and soldiers moving through rubble-covered streets can be heard for great distances. Vehicles driven in urban areas produce more noise than those moving through open terrain. Soldiers moving through rubble on a street or in the halls of a damaged building create more noise than in a wooded area.



• Sounds and smells can aid in acquiring targets at night since they transmit better in the cooler, damper night air.



• Dust and noise created by the firing of some weapons such as a tank main gun can be seen and smelled.



• Irregularly shaped objects that do not conform to the surrounding area stand out.



• Abnormal reflections or flashes from movement of optics or metal can be seen.



• Voices can often be heard at long distances, with the sound reflecting off of structures.



• Shadows can be seen day or night.



• When scanning multistory buildings, soldiers may have to scan up as well as out (three-dimensional scanning).



c. Location. In an urban environment, determining the target location can be difficult. The cover and concealment provided by buildings and rubble can provide the enemy with an advantage that is not easily overcome. After the enemy is detected or contact is made, soldiers must visualize the situation from the enemy’s viewpoint. This visualization helps the soldier determine where the likely enemy position is. At that point, the suspected enemy position should be suppressed, consistent with the ROE.



d. Identification. Being able to identify potential targets as quickly as possible after they are detected gives soldiers the advantage during urban combat. As a minimum, identification must determine if the potential target is friend, foe, or, a noncombatant. Correct identification is the key to preventing fratricide. Soldiers must know and understand the ROE. Soldiers must know what to engage and what not to engage.



e. Classification. To determine an appropriate method of dealing with a target, the soldier must determine the danger it represents. It requires quick decisions as targets are observed and occurs virtually simultaneously with identification. Situational awareness is vitally important. Multiple targets must be classified from most dangerous to least dangerous and engaged starting with the most dangerous.



f. Confirmation. This rapid verification of the initial identification and classification of the target is the final step of target acquisition. Identification, classification, and confirmation are done simultaneously.




1-31. DEFENSE AGAINST FLAME WEAPONS AND INCENDIARY MUNITIONS



Incendiary ammunition, special weapons, and the ease with which incendiary devices can be constructed from gasoline and other flammables make fire a threat during urban operations. During defensive operations, fighting fire should be a primary concern. Steps must be taken to reduce the risk of a fire that could make a chosen position indefensible.

a. Soldiers should construct positions that do not have large openings. These positions should provide as much built-in cover as possible to prevent penetration by incendiary ammunition. All unnecessary flammable materials should be removed including ammunition boxes, furniture, rugs, newspapers, curtains, and so on. Electricity and gas coming into the building must be shut off.



b. A concrete block building, with concrete floors and a tin roof, is an ideal place for a position. However, most buildings have wooden floors or subfloors, wooden rafters, and wooden inner walls, which require improvement. Inner walls should be removed and replaced with blankets to resemble walls from the outside. Sand should be spread 2 inches deep on floors and in attics to retard fire.



c. All available fire-fighting gear is pre-positioned so it can be used during actual combat. For the individual soldier such gear includes entrenching tools, helmets, sand or earth, and blankets. These items are supplemented with fire extinguishers.



d. Fire is so destructive that it can easily overwhelm personnel regardless of precautions. Soldiers should plan routes of withdrawal so a priority of evacuation from righting positions can be established. This procedure allows soldiers to exit through areas that are free from combustible material and provide cover from enemy direct fire.



e. The confined space and large amounts of combustible material in urban areas can influence the enemy to use flame weapons or incendiary munitions. Two major first-aid considerations are burns and smoke inhalation. These can easily occur in buildings and render the victim combat ineffective. Although there is little defense against flame inhalation and lack of oxygen, smoke inhalation can be reduced by wearing the individual protective mask. Medics and combat lifesavers should be aware of the withdrawal plan and should be prepared to treat and evacuate burn and smoke inhalation casualties.



f. Offensive operations also require plans for fighting fire since the success of the mission can easily be threatened by fire. Poorly planned use of incendiary munitions can make fires so extensive that they become obstacles to offensive operations. The enemy may use fire to cover his withdrawal and to create obstacles and barriers to the attacker. Intentional flame operations, in an urban area, are difficult to control and may undermine mission success.



g. When planning offensive operations, the attacker must consider the effects of all weapons and munitions. Targets are chosen during the initial planning to avoid accidentally destroying critical facilities within the urban area. When planning flame operations in an urban area, priorities must be established to determine which critical installations (hospitals, power stations, radio stations, and historical landmarks) should have primary fire-fighting support.



h. Every soldier participating in the attack must be ready to deal with fire. The normal fire-fighting equipment available includes the entrenching tool, helmet (for carrying sand or water), and blankets (for snuffing out small fires).




1-32. DEFENSE AGAINST ENHANCED FLAME WEAPONS



Combat operations in Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Bosnia saw the increased use of enhanced flame weapons in an urban environment. While these weapons have been in existence for some time, U.S. forces have not had much experience (after Vietman) in the use of and defense against them. Because future threats may use these weapons against U.S. forces, this paragraph explains what enhanced flame weapons are and how to defend against them.

a. Enhanced Flame Weapons. These types of weapons primarily rely on blast, flame and concussion to inflict damage, rather than explosively driven projectiles, fragments, or shaped charges. The Russians found these weapons to be especially effective in Chechnya because they produced casualties without fragmentation and shrapnel. As Chechens would “hug” Russian units to negate the use of Russian firepower, Russians would use directed blast weapons against enemy personnel and positions to minimize fratricide due to ricochets, shrapnel, and fragmentation.



(1) Types of Enhanced Flame Weapons. There are two types of these weapons, though their effects are the same. Fuel air explosives (FAE) are the older generation of blast weapons. FAE rely on distributing fuel in the air and igniting it. Casualties are primarily produced by fuel exploding and burning in the air. The newer generation blast weapons are referred to as volumetric or thermobaric. They throw out explosives from a warhead into a larger volume and use oxygen to ignite as a single event. This technique provides more reliable and controllable effects than FAE. Thermobaric weapons cause a tremendous blast in a confined space, such as a room or small building—the larger the volume of the weapon, the larger the blast effect. Many of these weapons are shoulder fired and are operated by a single gunner (Figure 1-62). Some shoulder fired blast weapons have tandem warheads that consist of a shaped charge followed by a Thermobaric munition (Figure 1-63). Currently, there are no thermobaric weapons in the U.S. inventory, but are under research and development as a possible replacement for the M202A2 (Flash).



(2) Effects of Enhanced Flame Weapons. These types of weapons are characterized by the production of a powerful fireball (flame temperatures of up to 1,200 degrees centigrade) together with a relatively long duration pressure wave. The fireball, and its associated dust storm, damages exposed skin and eyes over a wider radius than the blast effect. Most physical damage is caused by the heave and the push of the blast wave. This blast wave can collapse brick or block-built structures. Therefore, internal injuries to vital organs and internal bleeding are common blast effects to personnel. Such weapons are particularly effective against fortified positions such as buildings. Confined spaces enhance the blast effect and, unlike fragments, blast and flame can travel around corners and down passages such as hallways or tunnels. Since blast pressure falls off rapidly in the open, much shorter minimum safety distances are possible and assault troops can be relatively close (to within 40 meters depending on the size of the munition) when many of these weapons are employed.





Figure 1-62: Russian RPO-A SHMEL, a shoulder fired thermobaric weapon.





Figure 1-63: Russian RShG-1, tandem warhead.





b. Defensive Measures. Using materials that absorb its energy or block its path can reduce the lethality of the blast/flame wave. The best protection is to isolate personnel from the wave; however, this procedure may not be possible in many tactical situations. Balance should be struck between protecting soldiers and not hampering their ability to fight or protect themselves from other threats. The first step is to prevent the munition from entering a structure by providing a physical barrier. If that is not possible, then the next step is to minimize damage from the weapons by weakening and isolating their effect. Another consideration is to make enhanced flame weapon gunners’ priority targets for snipers or selected marksmen.



(1) Personnel. Personal injury can be minimized if soldiers wear a balaclava or similar garment to protect the face, goggles to protect the eyes from flash and flying dust and debris, and leather gloves to protect the hands.



(2) Armored Vehicles. If vehicles are buttoned up, the crew is protected against blast/flame damage; however, antennas, external components, and optics suffer varying degrees of damage. Tandem warheads pose a greater threat to armored vehicles.



c. Fighting Positions. Fixed fortifications, such as concrete bunkers or heavy-clad framed buildings, provide good protection against enhanced flame weapons detonating near the outside of the structure. Hastily prepared fighting positions or prepared fighting positions in lighter clad or framed buildings are more susceptible to blast effects. Unframed masonry buildings with concrete floors should be avoided since a falling floor is likely to cause injury to personnel. Fighting from basements or below ground positions or from prepared strong points in heavy-clad framed buildings provide additional protection. To reduce blast effects within a structure, unused openings inside buildings should be sealed to block the blast/flame wave path, while exterior openings should be left open or sealed with panels that blow off, depending on the tactical considerations, allowing the blast energy an exit route. Wet heavy curtains hung over exits, entries, and firing ports help weaken the blast energy.





SECTION V. NAVIGATION IN URBAN AREAS



Urban areas present a different set of challenges involving navigation. Deep in the city core, the normal terrain features depicted on maps may not apply—buildings become the major terrain features and units become tied to streets. Fighting in the city destroys buildings and the rubble blocks streets. Street and road signs are destroyed during the fighting if defenders do not remove them. Operations in subways and sewers present other unique challenges. Maps and photographs are available to help the unit overcome these problems. The global positioning system (GPS) can provide navigation assistance in urban areas.


1-33. MILITARY MAPS



The military city map is a topographical city map delineating streets and showing street names, important buildings, and other urban elements. The scale of a city map can vary from 1:25,000 to 1:50,000 depending on the importance and size of the city, density of detail, and intelligence information.

a. Special maps, prepared by supporting topographic engineers, can assist units in navigating in urban areas. These maps have been designed or modified to give information not covered on a standard map, which includes road and bridge networks, railroads, urban areas, and electric power fields. They can be used to supplement military city maps and topographical maps. Products that can be developed by the National Imagery Mapping Agency (NIMA) can be specifically tailored for the area of operations.



b. Once in the urban area, soldiers use street intersections as reference points much as they use hills and streams in rural terrain. City maps supplement or replace topographic maps as the basis of navigation. These maps enable units moving in the urban area to know where they are and to move to new locations even though streets have been blocked or a key building destroyed.



c. Techniques such as compass reading and pace counting can still be used, especially in a city where street signs and buildings are not visible. The presence of steel and iron in the urban environment may cause inaccurate compass readings. Sewers must be navigated much the same way. City sewer departments maintain maps providing the basic layout of the sewer system. This information includes directions the sewer lines run and distances between manhole covers. Along with basic compass and pace count techniques, such information enables a unit to move through the city sewers.



d. Helicopters can assist units in moving to objectives. An OH-58D assisting with a laser or an IR searchlight can be a useful technique.



e. Operations in an urban area adversely affect the performance of sophisticated electronic devices such as GPS and data distribution systems. These systems function the same as line-of-sight communications equipment. They cannot determine underground locations or positions within a building. These systems must be employed on the tops of buildings, in open areas, and down streets where obstacles do not affect line-of-sight readings.



f. City utility workers are assets to units fighting in urban areas. They can provide maps of sewers and electrical fields, and information about the city, which is especially important with regard to the use of the sewers. Sewers can contain pockets of highly toxic methane gas. City sewer workers know the locations of these danger areas and can advise a unit on how to avoid them.




1-34. GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEMS



Most GPS use a triangulation technique using satellites to calculate their position. Preliminary tests have shown that small urban areas, such as villages, do not affect GPS. Large urban areas with a mixture of tall and short buildings cause some degradation of most GPS. This effect may increase as the system is moved into the interior of a large building or taken into subterranean areas.


1-35. AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS



Current aerial photographs are excellent supplements to military city maps and can be substituted for a map. A topographic map, military map, or city map could be obsolete. A recent aerial photograph shows changes that have taken place since the map was made, which could include destroyed buildings and streets that have been blocked by rubble as well as enemy defensive preparations. More information can be gained by using aerial photographs and maps together than using either one alone. Whenever possible, the aerial photos or satellite imagery should be acquired during the noon hour to minimize the amount of shadowing around structures.



SECTION VI. CAMOUFLAGE



To survive and win in combat in urban areas, a unit must supplement cover and concealment with camouflage. To properly camouflage men, vehicles, and equipment, soldiers must study the surrounding area and make positions look like the local terrain.


1-36. APPLICATION



Only the material needed for camouflaging a position should be used since excess material could reveal the position. Material must be obtained from a wide area. For example, if defending a cinderblock building, do not strip the front, sides, or rear of the building to camouflage a position.


a. Buildings provide numerous concealed positions. Armored vehicles can often find isolated positions under archways or inside small industrial or commercial structures. Thick masonry, stone, or brick walls offer excellent protection from direct fire and provide concealed routes.



b. After camouflage is completed, the soldier inspects positions from the enemy’s viewpoint. He makes routine checks to see if the camouflage remains natural looking and actually conceals the position. If it does not look natural, the soldier must rearrange or replace it.



c. Positions must be progressively camouflaged, as they are prepared. Work should continue until all camouflage is complete. When the enemy has air superiority, work may be possible only at night. Shiny or light-colored objects attracting attention from the air must be hidden.



d. Shirts should be worn since exposed skin reflects light and attracts the enemy.



e. Camouflage face paint is issued in three standard, two-tone sticks. When face-paint sticks are not available, burnt cork, charcoal, or lampblack can be used to tone down exposed skin. Mud should be used as a last resort since it dries and peels off, leaving the skin exposed.




1-37. USE OF SHADOWS



Buildings in urban areas throw sharp shadows, which can be used to conceal vehicles and equipment (Figure 1-64). Soldiers should avoid areas not in shadows. Vehicles may have to be moved periodically as shadows shift during the day. Emplacements inside buildings provide better concealment.

a. Soldiers should avoid the lighted areas around windows and loopholes. They are better concealed if they fire from the shadowed interior of a room (Figure 1-65).



b. A lace curtain or piece of cheesecloth provides additional concealment to soldiers in the interior of rooms if curtains are common to the area. Interior lights are prohibited.





Figure 1-64: Use of shadows for concealment.





Figure 1-65: Concealment inside a building.





1-38. COLOR AND TEXTURE



Standard camouflage pattern painting of equipment is not as effective in urban areas as a solid, dull, dark color hidden in shadows. Since repainting vehicles before entering a urban area is not always practical, the lighter sand-colored patterns should be subdued with mud or dirt.

a. The need to break up the silhouette of helmets and individual equipment exists in urban areas as it does elsewhere. Burlap or canvas strips are a more effective camouflage than foliage (Figure 1-66). Predominant colors are normally browns, tans, and grays rather than greens, but each camouflage location should be evaluated.





Figure 1-66: Helmet camouflaged with burlap strips.





b. Weapons emplacements should use a wet blanket (Figure 1-67), canvas, or cloth to keep dust from rising when the weapon is fired.





Figure 1-67: Wet blankets used to keep dust down.





c. Command posts and logistical emplacements are easier to camouflage and better protected if located underground. Antennas can be remoted to upper stories or to higher buildings based on remote capabilities. Field telephone wire should be laid in conduits, in sewers, or through buildings.



d. Soldiers should consider the background to ensure they are not silhouetted or skylined, but blend into their surroundings. To defeat enemy urban camouflage, soldiers should be alert for common camouflage errors such as:



• Tracks or other evidence of activity.



• Shine or shadows.



• An unnatural color or texture.



• Muzzle flash, smoke, or dust.



• Unnatural sounds and smells.



• Movement.



e. Dummy positions can be used effectively to distract the enemy and make him reveal his position by firing.



f. Urban areas afford cover, resources for camouflage, and locations for concealment. The following basic rules of cover, camouflage, and concealment should be adhered to:



• Use the terrain and alter camouflage habits to suit your surroundings.



• Employ deceptive camouflage of buildings.



• Continue to improve positions. Reinforce fighting positions with sandbags or other fragment- and blast-absorbent material.



• Maintain the natural look of the area.



• Keep positions hidden by clearing away minimal debris for fields of fire.



• Choose firing ports in inconspicuous spots when available.





CHAPTER 2





Offensive Operations



“From 1942 to the present, shock units or special assault teams have been used by attackers (and often by defenders) with great success. These assault teams are characterized by integration of combined arms. Assault teams typically contain Infantry with variable combinations of armor, artillery, or engineers.”





Technical Memorandum 5–87

Modern Experience in City Combat

U.S. Army Human Engineering Laboratory

March, 1987





SECTION I. OFFENSIVE CONSIDERATIONS



Offensive operations in urban areas are based on offensive doctrine modified to conform to the urban terrain. Urban combat also imposes a number of demands that are different from other field conditions such as combined arms integration, fires, maneuver, and use of special equipment. As with all offensive operations, the commander must retain his ability to fix the enemy and maneuver against him. Offensive UO normally have a slower pace and tempo than operations in other environments. Unlike open terrain, units cannot maneuver quickly, even when mounted. Missions are more methodical. Brigades must be prepared to operate independently or within a division or joint task force (TF). The brigade and its subordinate battalion TFs must also be prepared to conduct different missions simultaneously. For example, a battalion may establish checkpoints in one section of a city and clear enemy in another section simultaneously.


2-1. REASONS FOR ATTACKING URBAN AREAS



Reasons for attacking urban areas include the following:

a. The results of the commander and staff’s estimate may preclude bypassing as an option. The mission itself may dictate an attack of an urban area.



b. Cities control key routes of commerce and provide a tactical advantage to the commander who controls them. Control of features, such as bridges, railways, and road networks, can have a significant outcome on future operations. The requirement for a logistics base, especially a port or airfield, may play a pivotal role during a campaign.



c. The political importance of some urban areas may justify the use of time and resources to liberate it. Capturing the city could deal the threat a decisive psychological blow and or lift the moral of the people within the city.



(1) The tactical situation may require the enemy force to be contained.



(2) The urban area itself may sit on dominating terrain that would hinder bypassing for combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) elements.



(3) The enemy within that urban area may be able to interdict lines of communications even though the terrain around an urban area may facilitate its bypass.




2-2. REASONS FOR NOT ATTACKING URBAN AREAS



Conversely, reasons for not attacking urban areas include the following:

a. The commander may decide to bypass if he determines no substantial threat exists in the urban area that could interdict his unit’s ability to accomplish its mission. The commander’s intent may dictate speed as essential to the mission. Since combat in an urban area is time consuming, the commander may choose to bypass the urban area to save time.



b. During the estimate process, the commander and staff may realize a sufficient force is not available to seize and clear the urban area, or enough forces are available to accomplish the mission but cannot be logistically supported. If the tactical situation allows, the commander should avoid attacks on urban areas.



c. The urban area may be declared an open city to prevent civilian casualties or to preserve cultural or historical sites. An open city, by the law of land warfare, is a city that cannot be defended or attacked. The defender must immediately evacuate the open city and cannot distribute weapons to the city’s inhabitants. The attacker assumes administrative control of the city and must treat its citizens as noncombatants in an occupied country.




2-3. TROOP REQUIREMENTS



Due to the nature of combat in urban areas, more troops are normally needed than in other combat situations. This situation is due to the number of requirements placed upon units, soldier fatigue, controlling civilians, and evacuation of casualties.

a. Because of the need to clear buildings and provide security, the number of troops required to accomplish an offensive mission is much greater. Some forces must be left behind in a building once it has been cleared to prevent enemy forces from repositioning or counterattacking friendly forces. Commanders and staffs need to be keenly aware that attacking units will effectively lose manpower from assault elements as they secure rooms and floors. They must ensure that the proper force ratios exist to conduct the missions assigned to subordinate units.



b. Commanders must also consider soldier fatigue. Fighting in urban areas is physically demanding and quickly tires a force. Commanders must plan for the relief or rotation of their forces before they reach the point of exhaustion. This situation is facilitated through proper task organization and maintenance of adequate reserves.



c. Additional forces may be needed to deal with noncombatants in the urban area. These forces must protect the noncombatants, provide first aid, and prevent them from interfering with the tactical plan.



d. Fighting in an urban area may result in a greater number of friendly casualties. The greater the restrictions on firepower, the less suppressive fire can be used, and the more the individual soldier is exposed to enemy fire. MEDEVAC/CASEVAC must be planned and subordinate units designated to conduct this task.




2-4. FIRES And MANEUVER



As in other terrain, units conduct penetrations, envelopments, turning movements, and frontal attacks. Unlike open terrain, commanders cannot maneuver their units and attachments quickly due to the close, dense environment. Clearing buildings and looking for antiarmor ambushes, snipers, and booby traps degrade the ability of subordinate units to maneuver. Due to the dense environment and its effects on weapon systems, the synchronization of combat power is one of the commander’s main challenges. Offensive operations need to be planned in detail, with subordinate elements given specific instructions and on order missions. Maintaining situational awareness assist in overcoming the inability to maneuver quickly.

a. Indirect Fires. The fire support plan may require extensive air and artillery bombardment to precede the ground attack on an urban area. Supporting fire suppresses the defender’s fire, restricts his movement, and may destroy his position. However, indirect fire in urban areas with heavily clad construction creates rubble, which can be used for cover but may restrict the movements of attacking troops. For that reason, the artillery preparation should be short and violent. Assaulting troops must follow the artillery fire closely to exploit its effect on the defenders. While the supporting fire suppresses the enemy, maneuver units move near the coordinated fire line (CFL). As the attacking force assaults the objective, fires are lifted or shifted to block enemy withdrawal or to prevent the enemy from reinforcing their position.



(1) Prior coordination is critical to determine the techniques and procedures for communication, target identification, and shifting of fires. Consideration must be given to the noncombatants, houses of worship, medical centers, schools, public services, and historical monuments. The fire support plan can include integrating tanks, Infantry weapons, artillery, and dismounted direct and indirect fires.



(2) Indirect fire is planned to isolate objectives, to prevent reinforcement and resupply, to neutralize known and suspected command and observation posts, and to suppress enemy defenders. Most indirect fires are high-angle in urban terrain.



(3) Mortars are the most responsive indirect fires to hit targets of opportunity at the close ranges typical of combat in urban areas. Forward observers move with the forward units to adjust fire on targets as requested by the supported troops.



b. Direct-Fires. Direct-fire is the most effective fire support in urban areas. Once a target can be located in a building, one or two direct-fire rounds can accomplish what entire salvos of indirect fire cannot. The best direct-fire support is provided by Bradley fighting vehicles (BFVs) but can also be provided by tanks and/or howitzers. Tanks and howitzers may create rubble and building and street damage that could restrict movement for the attacking force.



(1) Tanks may support by fire when lead units are seizing a foothold. During the attack of an urban area, tanks overwatch the Infantry’s initial assault until an entry into the area has been secured. Tanks are supported by Infantry organic weapons to suppress enemy strongpoints while they move into overwatch positions. Commanders employ tanks to take advantage of the long range of their main gun. This procedure is usually achieved with tanks employed outside the urban area, for the duration of the attack to cover high-speed mounted avenues of approach, especially during the isolation phase. Tanks may also support Infantry in the urban area as an assault and support weapon. In both cases, Infantry must protect tanks.



(2) In house-to-house and street fighting, tanks and/or BFVs move down streets protected by the Infantry, which clears the area of enemy ATGM weapons. Tanks and BFVs in turn support the Infantry by firing their main guns and machine guns to destroy enemy positions. Tanks are the most effective weapon for heavy fire against structures and may be used to clear rubble with dozer blades (Figure 2-1). The BFV can provide sustained, accurate suppressive fires with its 25-mm gun.





Figure 2-1: Tank in direct fire supported by Infantry.





(3) Large-caliber artillery rounds that are shot by direct-fire are effective for destroying targets in buildings. If available, self-propelled 155-mm howitzers can use direct-fire to destroy or neutralize bunkers, heavy fortifications, or enemy positions in reinforced concrete buildings (Figure 2-2). The self-propelled 155-mm can be used to clear or create avenues of approach. The 105-mm artillery can be used in this role but are not the preferred artillery pieces used in offensive UO. When artillery is used in the direct-fire role, it must be close to the Infantry for security against enemy ground attack. Prior coordination must be accomplished so the bulk of the field artillery unit’s shells are switched to High Explosive (HE).





Figure 2-2: Artillery in direct-fire role.





(4) Tanks, self-propelled artillery, and BFVs are vulnerable in urban areas because streets and alleys provide ready-made fire lanes for defenders. Motorized traffic is restricted, canalized, and vulnerable to ambush and close-range fire. Tanks are at a further disadvantage because their main guns cannot be depressed sufficiently to fire into basements or elevated to fire into upper floors of buildings at close range (Figure 2-3).





Figure 2-3: Tank dead space.





(5) Direct-fire systems organic to Infantry battalions—mainly ATGMs and recoilless weapons, such as the AT4, are initially employed to support the seizure of a foothold. Then, if necessary, they are brought forward to fight enemy armor within the town. Antitank weapons are not as effective as tank rounds for neutralizing targets behind walls. They neutralize a target only if that target is located directly behind the point of impact. ATGMs are at a greater disadvantage because of their 65-meter arming distance and the possibility of their guiding wires becoming caught on ground clutter. These factors limit employment in close engagements like those in urban areas.



(6) Snipers are a valuable asset during urban operations. They must be equipped with effective observation devices and placed in a key area to be effective. In situations where the ROE permit the use of destructive force, snipers can be used as part of the support element to provide accurate, long-range fires. Depending on the commander’s concept, snipers can be employed in the counter-sniper role or assigned priority targets. If a restrictive ROE is in effect, snipers may be used to prevent collateral damage. Snipers can also overwatch breaching operations and call for indirect artillery fires.



c. Maneuver. The first phase of the attack should be conducted when visibility is poor. Troops can exploit poor visibility to cross open areas, gain access to rooftops, infiltrate enemy areas, and gain a foothold. If the attack must be made when visibility is good, units should consider using smoke to conceal movement.



(1) The formation used in an attack depends on the width and depth of the zone to be cleared, the character of the area, anticipated enemy resistance, and the formation adopted by the next higher command.



(2) Lead companies may have engineers attached for immediate support. Tasks given to the engineers may include:



• Preparing and using explosives to breach walls and obstacles.



• Finding and exploding mines in place or helping remove them.



• Clearing barricades and rubble.



• Cratering roads and other countermobility measures.



(3) When the unit is involved in clearing, bypassing buildings increases the risk of attack from the rear or flank. A single building may be an objective for a rifle squad, or if the building is large, for a rifle platoon or company. When the commander’s concept is based on speed or when conducting a hasty attack, a battalion may be directed not to clear its entire zone.



(4) The reserve should be mobile and prepared for commitment. The reserve can stay close to forward units because of the available cover in urban areas. Battalion reserves normally follow one to two blocks to the rear of the lead company. A company reserve, if available, follows within the same block so it can immediately influence the attack. A unit with a reserve mission may be called upon to perform one or more of the following tasks:



• Attacking from another direction.



• Exploiting an enemy weakness or friendly success.



• Clearing bypassed enemy positions.



• Securing the rear or a flank.



• Maintaining contact with adjacent units.



• Supporting or counterattacking by fire.



(5) The battalion reconnaissance scout platoon is normally employed to reconnoiter the battalion’s flanks and rear. Its capability for reconnaissance and security is somewhat reduced in urban areas. The reconnaissance/scout platoon can also help isolate a village or small town. They must be prepared to dismount and enter buildings for reconnaissance or for setting up OPs. Infantry platoons and squads conduct reconnaissance patrols and man OPs to supplement the reconnaissance/scout platoon effort.



(6) Security in an urban area presents special problems. All troops must be alert to an enemy that may appear from the flanks, from above, or from subterranean areas.



d. Movement. Moving from building to building or between buildings present a problem to units conducting offensive operations. Historical examples, recent operations in Somalia, and the Russian experience in Grozny have shown that most casualties can be expected during movement from building to building and down streets. Therefore, during mission analysis, commanders and staffs should plan operations in such a manner that allow subordinate elements to take maximum advantage of covered and concealed routes within the urban area. Additionally, commanders and staffs must carefully analyze which buildings must be isolated, suppressed, and obscured, consistent with the ROE, as well as using armored assets as shields for maneuver elements.



(1) In movement down narrow streets, or down wider streets with narrow paths through the debris, Infantry should move ahead of the tanks clearing the buildings on each side. Personnel movement across open areas must be planned with a specific destination in mind. Street intersections should be avoided, since they are normally used as engagement areas. Suppression of enemy positions and smoke to cover Infantry movement should also be included in the fire support plan. When needed, tanks move up to places secured by the Infantry to hit suitable targets. When an area is cleared, the Infantry again moves forward to clear the next area. Tanks and Infantry should use the traveling overwatch movement technique and communicate with tank crews by using arm-and-hand signals and radio.



(2) For movement down wider streets, Infantry platoons normally have a section of attached tanks with one tank on each side of the street. Single tanks should not be employed. Other tanks of the attached tank platoon should move behind the Infantry and fire at targets in the upper stories of buildings. In wide boulevards, commanders may employ a tank platoon secured by one or more Infantry platoons. The Infantry can secure the forward movement of the lead tanks, while the trailing tanks overwatch the movement of the lead units.



(3) If an Infantry unit must travel along streets that are too narrow for mutual tank support, the tanks travel in single file for support. The tanks move and fire to cover each other’s approach while the Infantry provides ATGM fire from buildings as necessary.



(4) Tanks may drive inside buildings or behind walls for protection from enemy antitank missile fire where feasible. Buildings are cleared by the Infantry first. Ground floors are checked to ensure they support the tank and there is no basement into which the tank could fall. When moving, all bridges and overpasses are checked for mines, booby traps, and load capacity. Specific Infantry elements are assigned to protect specific tanks.




2-5. LIMITATIONS



Commanders attacking an urban area must recognize some important limitations in the use of available assets.

a. Indirect Fires. Normally, the use of indirect fires is much more restricted in urban areas than in open terrain.



Consideration must be given to the effects of the indirect fire on the urban area and noncombatants. This procedure is especially true when extremely restrictive ROE are in effect. When indirect fires are authorized, they must be fired in greater mass to achieve the desired effect. When units are performing multiple missions, indirect fire supporting one element can easily cause casualties in adjacent elements. The rubbling caused by massive indirect fires adversely affect a unit’s ability to maneuver during the attack.



b. Noncombatants. If there are noncombatants intermingled with combatants, the ability to use all available firepower may be restricted.



c. Night Vision Devices. Commanders and leaders must consider the effect that city lights, fires, and background illumination have on night vision devices. These elements may limit the effectiveness of night vision goggles (NVGs) and make thermal imagery identification difficult.



d. Communications. Communications equipment may not function to its maximum effectiveness because of the density in building construction. Intelligent use of graphic control measures, understanding the commander’s intent, and maintaining situational awareness at all levels become more important to mission accomplishment.





SECTION II. MISSION, ENEMY, TERRAIN, TROOPS, TIME, CIVIL FACTORS



The planning, preparation, and conduct of offensive operations in an urban area are the same as all other offensive operations and must be based on the mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time, and civil (METT-TC) factors. Commanders must focus on the synchronization of maneuver forces and the fire support plan to accomplish the assigned mission. Combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) play a critical role in the offense.


2-6. MISSION



The commander and staff must receive, analyze, and understand the mission before beginning planning. The conditions of the operation; either precision or high intensity; the ROE; and the desired end-state must be clearly understood and stated. Brigades and battalions may be required to conduct different missions simultaneously. Additional considerations that are specific to offensive operations are discussed below. When conducting this analysis, commanders and staff must consider the higher level commander’s intent. For example, a brigade must determine if supporting efforts are needed to shape the battlefield prior to the main effort executing its mission. A battalion must determine if a mission given to them means clearing every building within an area, block by block, or if the seizure of key terrain only requires clearing along the axis of advance.

a. In certain circumstances, subordinate units may secure rather than clear buildings. Normally, clearing means entering and searching each building to kill, capture, or force the withdrawal of the threat in the zone of action or objective area as well as leaving security to prevent reoccupation of cleared buildings. This procedure may not be feasible due to the nature of the mission and should be made clear when orders are issued. Clearing requires a systematic search of every room. Securing means a search of selected areas and preventing the occupation or reoccupation of the area by the threat and questioning of noncombatants, if present.



b. Commanders and staffs must also consider how and where the unit is postured in order to conduct follow-on missions to facilitate higher echelon missions, and influences the missions that are given to subordinate units.



c. When the battalion is involved in clearing operations, bypassing buildings increases the risk of attack from the rear or flank unless planned support isolates and suppresses those buildings.



d. A battle may transition quickly from precision to high intensity conditions. The transition can be caused by enemy actions. Commanders must be prepared to request changes in ROE for certain areas or buildings. Indications of an enemy-forced change of ROE (and a change from precision conditions to high intensity) include:



• The requirement to breach multiple obstacles.



• The use of booby traps by the enemy.



• The requirement to use repetitive explosive breaching to enter a building; and rooms.




2-7. ENEMY



The unique factor the commander must determine to complete the IPB process is the type threat he is attacking—conventional, unconventional or other, such as gangs, factional elements, or organized criminals. The type of threat determines how the unit task-organizes and how combat power is synchronized to accomplish the mission.


2-8. TERRAIN AND WEATHER



Offensive operations must be tailored to the urban environment based on a detailed analysis of each urban terrain setting, its types of urban areas, and existing structural form. Commanders and subordinate leaders must incorporate the following special planning considerations for an urban environment when conducting an offensive operation.

a. Alternates for military maps that do not provide enough detail for urban terrain analysis or reflect the underground sewer system, subways, underground water system, mass transit routes, and utility generation.



b. Natural terrain surrounding the urban area.



c. Key and decisive terrain (stadiums, parks, sports fields, school playgrounds, public buildings, and industrial facilities).



d. Confined spaces limiting observation, fields of fire and maneuver, which also prevents the concentration of fires at critical points.



e. Covered and concealed routes to and within the urban area.



f. Limited ability to employ maximum combat power due to the need to minimize damage and rubbling effects.



g. A greater demand for ammunition and rations, thus imposing unusual strains on logistics elements.



h. Problems with conducting effective reconnaissance during conventional operations. (Reconnaissance by force becomes the most effective reconnaissance means. This method involves probing a defense with successively larger units until the enemy positions are disclosed and successfully attacked. During unconventional operations, the opposite is true. Reconnaissance and security are easily accomplished by both sides and may be difficult to prevent.)




2-9. TROOPS AVAILABLE



Troop density for offensive missions in urban areas can be as much as three to five times greater than for similar missions in open terrain. Urban operations may require unique task organizations. Commanders must consider providing assets where they are needed to accomplish specific tasks. All phases of mission execution must be considered when developing task organization. Changes in task organization may be required to accomplish different tasks during mission execution. Task organizations could very well change as conditions and missions change. For example, high intensity offensive operations probably require different task organizations from precision offensive operations. Likewise, task organizations change as mission transitions from offense to stability and support and vice-versa. (See brigade, battalion, company, and platoon sections [Sections V, VI, VII, VIII] for specific task organizations and troop considerations.)


2-10. TIME AVAILABLE



Combat in urban areas has a slower tempo and an increased use of methodical, synchronized missions. Additionally, a brigade or battalion may find itself planning different operations simultaneously. For example, a task force may have the mission to conduct offensive missions in one part of the brigade’s AO and another battalion may be conducting stability missions in yet another part of the brigade’s AO. In planning UO, the commander and staff must take these factors into account. Plans must also take into account that more time is required for clearing buildings, blocks, or axes of advance due to the density of urban terrain and that troops tire more quickly because of stress and additional physical exertion caused by the environment. More time must be allowed for thorough reconnaissance and subordinate unit rehearsals. Allocating time for rehearsals is especially important when units are not habitually used to working with each other.


2-11. CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS



The commander and staff must understand the composition, activities, and attitudes of the civilian population, to include the political infrastructure, within the urban area. Various options are available to the commander to control the impact of civilians on the operation such as screening civilians, prohibiting unauthorized movement, diverting or controlling refugee movements, and evacuating. Understanding the urban society requires comprehension of:

• Living conditions.

• Cultural distinctions.



• Ethnicity.



• Factions.



• Religious beliefs.



• Political affiliation and grievances.



• Attitude toward U.S. forces (friendly, hostile, neutral).





SECTION III. COMMAND AND CONTROL



Urban operations require centralized planning and decentralized execution. Therefore the staff must develop a detailed plan that synchronizes the BOS in order to meet the commander’s intent and also provide subordinate units with the means to accomplish the mission.


2-12. COMMAND



Subordinate units require mission-type orders that are restrictive in nature. Commanders should use detailed control measures to facilitate decentralized execution. Increased difficulties in command, control, and communications from higher headquarters demand increased responsibility and initiative from subordinate leaders. Understanding of the commander’s intent two levels up by all leaders becomes even more important to mission accomplishment in an urban environment.


2-13. CONTROL



Control of the urban battlefield is difficult. In urban areas, radio communications are often less effective than field telephones and messengers. Units often fight without continuous communications, since dependable communications are uncertain. Pyrotechnic signals are hard to see because of buildings and smoke. The high noise level of battles within and around buildings degrades voice alerts. Voice communication can also signal the unit’s intention and location to the enemy. Graphic control measures common to other tactical environments are also used in urban combat. These and other control measures ensure coordination throughout the chain of command, enhance the mission, and thus prevent fratricide. Thorough rehearsals and detailed backbriefs also enhance control. It is also important that subordinate leaders clearly understand the commander’s intent (two levels up) and the desired mission end state in order to facilitate control. Commanders should consider using the executive officer (XO), the S3, and other staff members to control certain portions of the fight, when the commander’s attention needs to be focused elsewhere.


a. Radio Communications. Radio communications in urban areas pose special problems to tactical units. Communications equipment may not function properly because of the massive construction of buildings and the environment. In addition to the physical blockage of line of sight transmissions, there is also the interference from commercial power lines, absorption into structures and the presence of large quantities of metal in structures. Leaders should consider these effects when they allocate time to establish communications. Unit SOPs become much more important in urban terrain. The time needed to establish an effective communications system might be greater in urban areas. Leaders should consider the following techniques when planning for radio communications:



• Emplace radios and retransmission sites on the upper floors of buildings. Radio antennas should blend in with the building structure so as not to be easily identifiable to the enemy.



• Construct field expedient antennas to enhance capabilities.



• RTOs should utilize an earpiece to keep their hands free in order to write messages and use their weapon to defend themselves.



• Use windows and holes in walls to extend antennas for better communications.



• Open doors and windows to enhance the flow of FM signals.



b. Other Types of Communications. Wire laid at street level is easily damaged by rubble and vehicle traffic. Also, the noise of urban combat is much louder than in other areas, making sound or verbal signals difficult to hear.



• Develop and utilize other nonverbal signals. Use color-coded signaling devices per unit SOP. Marking areas as the unit moves is a key to success.



• If possible, lay wire through buildings for maximum protection.



• Use existing telephone systems. Telephones are not always secure even though many telephone cables are underground.



• Use messengers at all levels since they are the most secure means of communications.



c. Graphic Control Measures. The use of detailed graphic control measures is critical to mission accomplishment and fratricide avoidance in urban terrain. Phase lines can be used to report progress or to control the advance of attacking units. Limits of advance should be considered. Principal streets, rivers, and railroad lines are suitable phase lines or limits of advance. Examples are shown below.



(1) When attacking to seize a foothold, a battalion normally assigns each company a sector or a group of buildings as its first objective. When an objective extends to a street, only the near side of the street is included in the objective area. Key buildings or groups of buildings may be assigned as intermediate objectives. The battalion’s final objective may be a group of buildings within the built-up area, key terrain, or nodes, depending on the brigade’s mission. To simplify as objectives and reporting, all buildings along the route of attack should be identified by letters or numbers (Figure 2-4). Mixing numbers and letters may help differentiate between blocks as an attack progresses.



(2) Phase lines can be used to report progress or to control the advance of attacking units (Figure 2-5). Phase lines should be on the near side of the street or open area. In systematic clearing, a unit may have the mission to clear its zone of action up to a phase line or limit of advance. In that case, the commander chooses his own objectives when assigning missions to his subordinate units.



(3) Boundaries are usually set within blocks so that a street is included in the zone. Boundaries must be placed to ensure that both sides of a street are included in the zone of one unit.





Figure 2-4: Example of a numbering system.





Figure 2-5: Boundaries and phase lines.





(4) Checkpoints and contact points are planned at street corners, buildings, railway crossings, bridges, or any other easily identifiable urban feature.



(5) Forward units may occupy an attack position for last-minute preparation and coordination. The attack position is often behind or inside the last covered and concealed position, such as a large building, before crossing the LD. The LD should be the near side of a street, a rail line, or a row of buildings.



(6) A unit’s assigned frontage for the attack of a built-up area depends on the size of buildings and the resistance anticipated. A company normally attacks on a one- to two-block front, and a battalion on a two- to four-block front, based on city blocks averaging 175 meters in width.




2-14. FOCUS ON THE THREAT



During the mission analysis, the plan should focus on the factors of METT-TC. Make the plan enemy-oriented instead of terrain-oriented. Use terrain factors to defeat the threat—do not attack buildings for the sake of seizing buildings, attack buildings to defeat the threat. Considerations include, but are not limited to, the following:

a. Thorough evaluation of the urban area’s related terrain and threat may take much longer than other environments. This time factor also affects friendly planning efforts.



b. Determine the threat’s location, strength, and capabilities. Develop a plan that defeats his direct and indirect fire systems.



c. Focus the axis of advance on the threat’s weaknesses while maintaining adequate force protection measures. When possible employ multiple and supporting axes of advance.



d. Divide the objective area into manageable smaller areas that facilitate battalion TF maneuver.



e. Isolate the objective area and establish a foothold at the point of entry. The location chosen for the foothold must allow for expansion.



f. The brigade and battalion maneuver plans directly affect the company schemes of maneuver. Every company within the brigade must know what enemy targets will be engaged by brigade and battalion assets.




2-15. COMMANDER’S CRITICAL INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS



The commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR) directly affect his decisions and dictate the successful execution of tactical operations. The staff must develop the components of CCIR that facilitate the commander’s ability to make decisions that impact the plan during urban operations. Logical deductions are that essential elements of friendly information (EEFI) should address the enemy commander’s priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and friendly forces information requirements (FFIR) should be items that cause the commander to make decisions that impact the plan. The following are examples of PIR, EEFI, and FFIR that would be more likely to help the commander in an urban environment.

a. PIR. These are intelligence requirements that a commander has anticipated and have stated priority in task planning and decision making. Examples include:



• Where are the threat command posts?



• What are the most likely threat infiltration routes into the area of operations?



• What streets and alleys restrict movement of friendly armored and wheeled vehicles?



• Where are the likely threat strong points and engagement areas?



• What is the threat air defense capability against Army aviation assets?



b. EEFI. These are critical aspects of a friendly operation that, if known by the threat, would subsequently compromise, lead to failure, or limit success of the operation and, therefore, must be protected from detection. Examples include:



• Is the unit command net vulnerable to intercept, direction finding, and electronic attack?



• Is the unit vulnerable to HUMINT collection and sabotage by local nationals?



• Where are the supply routes/LOC most vulnerable to ambush and snipers?



• Are friendly troop concentrations and movement under threat observation?



c. FFIR. This requirement is information the commander and staff need about the friendly forces available for the operation. Examples include:



• Scouts captured or compromised.



• Main bridge locations along the ground route that have been blown.



• OPORD compromised.



• Loss of cryptographic equipment.



• Expected personnel and equipment replacements that did not arrive.




2-16. REHEARSALS



After developing a thorough, well-synchronized plan, commanders should require subordinate units to conduct combined arms rehearsals and include all phases of the operation. When conducted properly, combined arms rehearsals identify potential problems in the synchronization of the plan between maneuver, combat support, and combat service support elements. Rehearsals provide a means for units that seldom operate together to train collective skills. Carefully consider where rehearsals are conducted within the brigade AO. It is preferable to conduct rehearsals on urban terrain similar to the objective area.



SECTION IV. OFFENSIVE FRAMEWORK AND TYPES OF ATTACKS



This section discusses the framework that is used and the types of attacks that are conducted during offensive UO.


2-17. OFFENSIVE FRAMEWORK



Figure 2-6 depicts the operational framework of brigade urban offensive operations. The brigade commander’s primary responsibility is to set the conditions for tactical success for his subordinate units. Whenever possible, close combat by maneuver units is minimized and brigades attempt to move from assess to transition. At the brigade level and below, offensive operations often take the form of either a hasty or deliberate attack. Both hasty and deliberate attacks are characterized by as much planning, reconnaissance, and coordination as time and the situation permit. Battalions and below conduct those attacks executing the tasks shown in Figure 2-6. The elements of offensive operations are not phases. There is no clear line of distinction that delineates when the brigade moves from one element to another. Properly planned and executed operations involve all four elements. They may be conducted simultaneously or sequentially, depending on the factors of METT-TC. During offensive operations, the brigade commander seeks to:

• Synchronize precision fires (lethal and non-lethal effects) and information operations.

• Isolate decisive points.



• Use superior combat power to destroy high pay-off targets.



• Use close combat, when necessary, against decisive points.





Figure 2-6: Offensive urban operational framework.





2-18. HASTY ATTACK



Battalions and companies conduct hasty attacks as a result of a movement to contact, a meeting engagement, or a chance contact during a movement; after a successful defense or part of a defense; or in a situation where the unit has the opportunity to attack vulnerable enemy forces. When contact is made with the enemy, the commander immediately deploys; suppresses the enemy; attacks through a gap, flank, or weak point; and reports to his higher commander. The preparation for a hasty attack is similar to that of a deliberate attack, but time and resources are limited to what is available. The hasty attack in an urban area differs from a hasty attack in open terrain because the terrain makes command, control, communications, and massing fires to suppress the enemy difficult.

a. In urban areas, incomplete intelligence and concealment may require the maneuver unit to move through, rather than around, the friendly unit fixing the enemy in place. Control and coordination become critical to reduce congestion at the edges of the urban area.



b. On-order missions, be-prepared missions, or fragmentary orders may be given to a force conducting a hasty attack so it can react to a contingency once its objective is secured.




2-19. DELIBERATE ATTACK



A deliberate attack is a fully synchronized operation employing all available assets against the enemy. It is necessary when enemy positions are well prepared, when the urban area is large or severely congested, or when the element of surprise has been lost. Deliberate attacks are characterized by precise planning based on detailed information, thorough reconnaissance, preparation, and rehearsals. The deliberate attack of an urban area is similar to the technique employed in assaulting a strong point. Attacking the enemy’s main strength is avoided and combat power is focused on the weakest point of his defense. Battalions and below conduct deliberate attacks of an urban area in the phases shown in Figure 2-7. Detailed descriptions of these phases at the battalion, company, and platoon levels are found in Sections VI, VII, and VIII, respectively.





Figure 2-7: Phases of a deliberate urban attack.





SECTION V. BRIGADE OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS



A brigade may be assigned an objective that lies within an urban area, and may conduct the full range of offensive operations within a single large city or in an AO that contains several small villages and towns.


2-20. TASK ORGANIZATION



Proper task organization is essential for successful execution of offensive UO.

a. During UO, the brigade is often augmented with additional assets, which may include aviation, engineers, signal, smoke and or decontamination, ADA, MI, counterintelligence, MP, public affairs, PSYOP, civil affairs, translators, and LRS assets, when available. The brigade may also receive additional mechanized Infantry or armor. A sample Infantry brigade task organization is shown at Figure 2-8. Actual task organizations are METT-TC dependent. How the brigade commander task-organizes so that the BOS can be synchronized is of critical importance to tactical success.





NOTE



The task organization shown in Figure 2-8 would be essentially the same for light, airborne, and air assault Infantry brigades. Heavy brigades would differ based on the composition of their Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE).





Figure 2-8: Sample UO task organization for an Infantry brigade.





b. Urban operations may require unique task organizations. Figure 2-9 depicts a sample brigade task organization for offensive operations, showing units under brigade control, and subordinate task forces necessary to accomplish decisive and shaping operations, specifically, the main and supporting efforts and the brigade reserve. Commanders must consider providing assets where they are needed to accomplish specific tasks. All phases of mission execution must be considered when developing task organization. Changes in task organization may be required to accomplish different tasks during mission execution. Task organizations could very well change from shape through transition.





Figure 2-9: Sample brigade task organization for offensive UO.





NOTE



Figure 2-9 also depicts two field artillery platoons that have been given DS missions to provide direct fire support to the main and the supporting attacks.





2-21. ASSESS



Brigades primarily assess the urban environment using the military decision-making process (MDMP); intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) acts as a key tool in that process. IPB is combined with the following:

• Division or joint task force (JTF) reconnaissance efforts and other shaping operations.



• Reconnaissance efforts of brigade units.



• Results of previous operations that impact current operations.



a. An important step in mission analysis is to determine the essential tasks. Combat power is applied precisely at decisive points, and other portions of the urban area are isolated to the extent necessary to ensure they do not adversely influence the UO. Operations are conducted both sequentially and simultaneously, as appropriate. Specific tasks to subordinates may address the full spectrum of Army operations, and the brigade will likely be conducting support, stability, and combat operations simultaneously. The complexity of UO may require simultaneous full spectrum operations down to company level.



b. The brigade commander and staff must determine, during assessment, whether the shaping efforts of higher headquarters are sufficient for the brigade to accomplish its missions or whether additional shaping efforts are required—for example, isolation of nodes or other key terrain. Additionally, the brigade commander and staff must assess whether the shaping efforts of higher headquarters permit them to move directly to domination and or transition.




2-22. SHAPE



Brigades normally shape the area of operations through isolation. Isolation is defined as a tactical task to seal off (both physically and psychologically) an enemy from his sources of support, to deny an enemy freedom of movement, and prevent an enemy unit from having contact with other enemy forces. During isolation, the brigade commander sets the conditions for tactical success. Implied in this step are the thorough reconnaissance of the objectives and movement of subordinate units to positions of tactical advantage. The brigade commander must carefully determine the extent and the manner in which his forces can isolate the objectives. The factors of METT-TC determine how the brigade will isolate the objective psychologically and physically. Only areas essential to mission success are isolated.

a. Psychological Isolation of the Objective. Isolation begins with the efforts of the division and corps psychological and civil affairs operations to influence enemy and civilian actions. The brigade commander should consider using PSYOP teams to broadcast appropriate messages to the threat and to deliver leaflets directing the civilian population to move to a designated safe area. These actions must be coordinated with the overall PSYOP plan for the theater and must not sacrifice surprise. By themselves, PSYOP are seldom decisive. They take time to become effective and often their effects are difficult to measure until after the actual attack, but they have usually proven to be successful. Under some METT-TC conditions, they have achieved results far outweighing the effort put into them.



b. Sensors and Reconnaissance Units. One of the more common methods of isolation involves the use of a combination of sensors and reconnaissance units along avenues of approach to detect enemy forces as they attempt to enter or leave the objective area. The brigade can engage these enemy forces with indirect fires, aerial fires, or a combination of the two, consistent with the ROE. This technique may be effective in detecting and stopping large enemy units from entering or leaving, but the cover and concealment the urban area provides make it difficult to totally seal off the urban objective. To be successful, this technique requires skillful reconnaissance units and responsive fires. It may not be possible for the brigade to observe all avenues of approach, and enemy units may escape detection by infiltrating or exfiltrating. It may be difficult to distinguish between enemy and friendly personnel and noncombatants moving in and out of the urban area. Indirect fires may cause unacceptable damage to key parts of the urban area.



c. Snipers. In certain situations that require precise fire, snipers can provide an excellent method of assisting in isolating key areas. Skillful application of snipers can provide lethal fire while simultaneously minimizing collateral damage and noncombatant casualties. Snipers can also be used to observe and report enemy activity and to call for and adjust indirect fire.



d. Combination of Assets. The most effective method of isolating an urban objective is probably the use of a combination of sensors, reconnaissance elements, and maneuver forces. The brigade can move platoons and companies into positions where they can dominate avenues of approach with observation and direct fires. Smaller urban areas with clearly defined boundaries make this method easier to accomplish. Larger urban areas may prevent a maneuver force from gaining access to a position from which to stop enemy movement into the objective area.



e. Use of Fires and Smoke. In some instances, where the ROE permit, indirect and aerial fires may be the only available or appropriate method of isolation. This technique is the most destructive; it demands large amounts of ammunition, and it may only last for short periods of time. Brigade fire planners can improve the effectiveness of this technique by careful selection of high pay-off targets and use of precision munitions. Mortar and light artillery fires falling onto large buildings are not as effective in preventing enemy movement as fires falling into open areas. Targeting them against larger avenues, parks, and other open areas force the enemy to move within buildings. Artillery and aerial fires can be directed against buildings that the enemy is using for movement and observation. This method slows and impedes enemy movement, but not stop it. It can also hinder enemy supply efforts and make it difficult to reinforce units under attack. Targeting obvious choke points, such as bridges or main road junctions, can also assist in the isolation effort. Smoke can be used to isolate the objective from enemy observation, but it is difficult to predict what smoke does in an urban area.





NOTE



Multiple flat polished surfaces in an urban area may degrade laser use, thereby rendering some weapon systems useless. Close coordination must occur between maneuver and fire support planners in order to obtain the desired effects of laser-guided precision munitions. Also, obscuration rounds may cause uncontrolled fires in the city and must be carefully planned.





2-23. DOMINATE



The brigade uses all combined arms available, consistent with the ROE, to defeat or destroy the enemy at decisive points and achieve the desired end-state of the mission. The brigade seeks to dominate the enemy through well-planned isolation and skillful use of combined arms. The brigade commander seeks to minimize the amount of street to street and house to house fighting that must be performed by battalions.


2-24. TYPES OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS



The brigade conducts the same types of offensive operations as it would on open terrain. Techniques that may be more applicable during urban offensive operations are discussed in the following paragraphs. These techniques are applicable to all forms of offensive maneuver and would be determined by METT-TC factors.

a.Movement to Contact, Search and Attack Technique. Figure 2-10, depicts a brigade conducting a movement to contact in an urban area using the search and attack technique. This technique is used when knowledge of the enemy is unclear and contact is required. It is normally employed against a weak enemy force that is disorganized and incapable of massing strength against task forces (for example, urban insurgents or gangs). The brigade divides the AO into smaller areas and coordinates the movement of battalions through the brigade AO. In the example shown in Figure 2-10, the enemy is found and fixed during isolation and finished during domination. During a mission of this type, the urban environment makes it difficult for conventional Infantry forces to find, fix, and finish the enemy. For example, movement of units may become canalized due to streets and urban canyons created by tall buildings. The application of firepower may become highly restricted based on the ROE. The use of HUMINT in this type of action becomes increasingly more important and can be of great assistance during the find portion of the mission. (Table 2-1 shows the advantages and disadvantages of search and attack.)





Figure 2-10: Search and attack technique.





Table 2-1: Advantages and disadvantages of search and attack.





b.Attack on a Single Axis. If the brigade must mass combat power in order to conduct a deliberate attack against an enemy strongpoint, an attack on a single axis may be considered. This technique would be used when the axis of advance is not well defended by the enemy. Figure 2-11 depicts a brigade conducting an attack on a single axis on OBJ GOLD. In the example shown, the lead task force (TF) has the mission of conducting a supporting attack to seize OBJ 22 and facilitate passage of the second the TF through OBJ 22. The second TF conducts the main attack to seize and clear OBJ 21 with an on order mission to seize OBJ 23. A third TF follows in reserve. In the example shown below, the brigade would normally receive assistance in isolating the objective. (Table 2-2 shows the advantages and disadvantages of an attack on a single axis.)



c.Attack on Multiple Axes. If enemy defenses are more robust and the brigade commander wishes to force the enemy to fight in multiple directions, an attack on multiple axes can be considered.



(1) Figure 2-12 depicts a brigade conducting the same attack on OBJ GOLD using multiple axes. In this case, a battalion TF (air assault) conducts an air assault on OBJ C and then conducts a supporting attack to seize OBJ D. A second TF conducts a supporting attack to seize OBJ B, with a third conducting the main attack to seize and clear OBJ A. The supporting attacks isolate OBJ A. (Table 2-3 shows the advantages and disadvantages of an attack on multiple axes.) Synchronization of BOS is crucial to ensure the massing of effects at the critical points and to prevent the isolation and piecemeal destruction of smaller elements separated by the structures in the urban area.





Figure 2-11: Attack on a single axis.





Table 2-2: Advantages and disadvantages of an attack on a single axis.





Figure 2-12: Attack on multiple axes.





Table 2-3: Advantages and disadvantages of an attack on multiple axes.





(2) Figure 2-13 depicts an attack on multiple axes on different terrain. In this situation the brigade has the mission to seize OBJ ZULU (OBJs DOG, RAT, and CAT). The brigade commander has decided to attack on multiple axes with two battalion task forces conducting supporting attacks to seize OBJs DOG and RAT in order to isolate OBJ CAT. The brigade main attack seizes and clears OBJ CAT.





Figure 2-13: Attack on multiple axes, different terrain.





d. Cordon and Attack. The brigade may find itself in a position where it may physically isolate a large portion of an urban objective. The brigade commander may also determine that he can force the enemy out of his positions and out into more open areas where he can be engaged by direct and indirect fires. In this case, the cordon and attack technique may be considered. A cordon is a type of isolation. Cordon is a tactical task given to a unit to prevent withdrawal from or reinforcement of a position. Cordon implies seizing or controlling key terrain and or mounted and dismounted avenues of approach. Figure 2-14 depicts a brigade attacking to seize and clear OBJ EAGLE using the cordon and attack technique. One task force (four company teams) cordons OBJ EAGLE by occupying battle positions. (A cordon may also be accomplished using ambushes, roadblocks, checkpoints, OPs, and patrols.) The example in Figure 4-14 shows one TF seizing and clearing OBJ EAGLE and another as the brigade reserve. Skillful application of fires and other combat multipliers may also defeat the enemy when this technique is used and minimize or preclude close combat. (Table 2-4 lists the advantages and disadvantages of cordon and attack.)





Figure 2-14: Cordon and attack.





NOTE



In the example shown in Figure 2-14, the battle positions are oriented to place fires on the enemy leaving OBJ EAGLE and to prevent his withdrawal from the objective area. The factors of METTTC determine how the battle positions are oriented and what the mission end-state will be. Additional direct fire control measures, such as TRPs and engagement areas, as well as indirect fire control measures can focus fires and assist in canalizing the enemy into desired areas.





Table 2-4: Advantages and disadvantages of cordon and attack.





e. Fix and Bypass. A brigade may find itself in a position where it is conducting operations near an urban area that needs to be bypassed. In certain situations the enemy may have to be fixed prior to the brigade’s bypassing the urban area. Figure 2-15 depicts a brigade conducting a limited offensive action to fix the enemy with a small force and bypass the urban area with the bulk of the brigade’s combat power. If entering the urban area is unavoidable or force protection requirements force the brigade to attack the urban area, the fix and bypass technique may be considered. (Table 2-5 lists the advantages and disadvantages of fix and bypass.) It is preferable to completely avoid the urban area if it is eventually bypassed. During the planning process, routes are chosen so that close combat in the urban area can be avoided. Also, the brigade may be able to fix the enemy with fires and avoid having to enter the urban area.



f. Multiple Nodal Attacks. The brigade may be given the mission to attack multiple nodes either simultaneously or sequentially. This mission is characterized by rapid attacks followed by defensive operations. The enemy situation must permit the brigade to divide its forces and seize key nodes. Multiple attacks such as this require precise maneuver and supporting fires. This mission may be given to a brigade before an anticipated stability operation, or to isolate an urban area for other units that are going to conduct offensive operations inside the urban area. Figure 2-16 depicts a brigade conducting multiple nodal attacks. This technique is used to deny the enemy the use of key infrastructure. Use of this technique may also require designated rapid response elements in reserve in the event that enemy forces mass and quickly overwhelm an attacking battalion. The duration of this attack should not exceed the brigade’s self-sustainment capability. (Table 2-6 lists the advantages and disadvantages of multiple nodal attacks.)





Figure 2-15: Fix and bypass.





Table 2-5: Advantages and disadvantages of fix and bypass.





Figure 2-16: Multiple nodal attacks.





Table 2-6: Advantages and disadvantages of multiple nodal attacks.





2-25. TRANSITION



During transition, the brigade continues to use all CS and CSS assets consistent with the mission end-state and ROE to move from offensive operations to stability and or support operations in order to return the urban area back to civilian control. During this step, the roles and use of SOF, CSS, and CS units, such as civil affairs (CA), PSYOP, medical, and MPs become more important with the requirements to maintain order and stabilize the urban area. Subordinate task forces and other brigade units consolidate, reorganize, conduct area protection and logistical missions, and prepare for follow-on missions. The brigade staff prepares to transition from being a supported force to being the supporting force.



SECTION VI. BATTALION TASK FORCE OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS



The battalion plan of action was as follows: one platoon of Company “F,” with a light machine gun section, would stage the initial diversionary attack. It would be supported by two tanks and two tank destroyers, who were instructed to shoot at all or any suspected targets. Observation posts had been manned on a slag pile to support the advance with 81-mm mortar fire… The platoon action was to be the first step… to reduce the town of Aachen.



…the remainder of our zone of action…would be cleared by Companies “F” and “G,” who would execute a flanking attack, jumping off abreast of each other through the area secured by the Company “F” platoon… Preparatory fire by medium artillery was to be planned…Mortar observers would accompany each company… Tanks and tank destroyers were assigned to each company…





LTC Darrel M. Daniel

Commander, 2nd Bn, 26th In Rgt

October, 1944, Battle of Aachen



This section discusses tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) and considerations that battalion task forces can employ to conduct independent UO or to conduct operations as part of larger brigade UO. The TTP described in this section can apply to all types of battalion task forces, with modifications made for the assets available.


2-26. TASK ORGANIZATION



As with brigade UO, battalion task forces (TF) may require unique task organizations. For example, UO provide one of the few situations where Infantry and armor elements may be effectively task-organized below platoon levels. Battalion commanders must consider providing assets where they are needed to accomplish specific tasks. All phases of mission execution must be considered when developing task organization. Changes in task organization may be required to accomplish different tasks during mission execution. Figure 2-17 depicts a sample task organization for a light Infantry TF conducting an offensive UO that consists of a main effort, two supporting efforts, and a reserve.





Figure 2-17: Sample offensive task organization.





NOTE



The task organization shown may change after the assault when the TF reorganizes for follow-on missions.





2-27. DELIBERATE ATTACK



Because companies or company teams may become isolated during the attack, the TF commander should attach some support elements to ensure the success of his plan. Armored vehicles (tanks, BFVs, self-propelled artillery) attached to light units must have their own logistics packages. Tanks and BFVs can be used to clear or isolate hardened targets protected by buildings or rubble. Engineers can neutralize obstacles hindering the attack. The TF commander plans to conduct a deliberate attack by performing the following actions.

a. Reconnoiter the Objective. This method involves making a physical reconnaissance of the objective with battalion assets and those of higher headquarters, as the tactical situation permits. It also involves making a map reconnaissance of the objective and all the terrain that affects the mission, as well as the analysis of aerial imagery, photographs, or any other detailed information about the buildings or other urban terrain the battalion is responsible for. Additionally, any human intelligence (HUMINT) collected by reconnaissance and surveillance units, such as the battalion reconnaissance platoon, snipers, and so forth, should be considered during the planning process.



b. Move to the Objective. This method may involve moving through open and or urban terrain. Movement should be made as rapidly as possible without sacrificing security. Movement should be made along covered and concealed routes and can involve moving through buildings, down streets, in subsurface areas, or a combination of all three. Urban movement must take into account the three-dimensional aspect of the urban area.



c. Isolate the Objective. Isolation begins with the efforts of SOF units controlled by higher headquarters to influence enemy and civilian actions. The battalion commander should consider using PSYOP teams to broadcast appropriate messages to the threat and to deliver leaflets directing the civilian population to move to a designated safe area, if the units are available to support the battalion. These actions must be coordinated with the overall PSYOP plan for the brigade and must not sacrifice surprise. By themselves, PSYOP are seldom decisive. They take time to become effective and often their effects are difficult to measure until after the actual attack. Under some METT-TC conditions, PSYOP have achieved results far outweighing the effort put into them.



(1) In certain situations that require precise fire, snipers can provide an excellent method of isolating key areas. Skillful application of snipers can provide lethal fire while simultaneously minimizing collateral damage and noncombatant casualties.



(2) Isolating the objective also involves seizing terrain that dominates the area so that the enemy cannot supply, reinforce, or withdraw its defenders. It also includes selecting terrain that provides the ability to place suppressive fire on the objective. (This step may be taken at the same time as securing a foothold.) If isolating the objective is the first step, speed is necessary so that the defender has no time to react. Battalions may be required to isolate an objective as part of brigade operations, or may be required to do so independently (Figure 2-18). Depending on the tactical situation, companies within the battalion may isolate an objective by infiltration and stealth.



(3) Cordon is a tactical task given to a unit to prevent withdrawal from or reinforcement of a position. A cordon is a type of isolation. It implies seizing or controlling key terrain and or mounted and dismounted avenues of approach. Figure 2-18 depicts a brigade attacking to seize and clear OBJ EAGLE using the cordon and attack technique. One battalion TF (four company teams) cordons (isolates) OBJ EAGLE by occupying battle positions. (A cordon may also be accomplished through use of ambushes, roadblocks, checkpoints, OPs, and patrols.) Skillful application of fires and other combat multipliers may also defeat the enemy when this technique is used and minimize or preclude close combat. In the example shown in Figure 2-18, the battle positions are oriented to place fires on the enemy leaving OBJ EAGLE and to prevent his withdrawal from the objective area. The factors of METT-TC determine how the battle positions are oriented and what the mission end-state will be. Additional direct fire control measures, such as TRPs and engagement areas, as well as indirect fire control measures, can focus fires and assist in canalizing the enemy into desired areas.





Figure 2-18: Isolation of an urban area by an Infantry battalion using the cordon technique.





NOTE



Combat experience and recent rotations at the CTCs have shown that many casualties can be sustained when moving between buildings, down streets, and through open areas to enter a building either to gain a foothold or to clear it. One purpose of isolation at the company and battalion levels must be to dominate the area leading to the points of entry to protect assaulting troops entering the building from effective enemy fire. This technique is accomplished by using direct and indirect fires and obscurants, maintaining situational awareness, and exercising tactical patience prior to movement.





d. Secure a Foothold. Securing a foothold involves seizing an intermediate objective that provides cover from enemy fire and a location for attacking troops to enter the urban area. The size of the foothold is METT-TC dependent and is usually a company intermediate objective. In some cases a large building may be assigned as a company intermediate objective (foothold).



(1) As a company attacks to gain a foothold, it should be supported by suppressive fire and smoke. In the example shown in Figure 2-19, the center TF conducts a supporting attack to seize OBJ DOG. (In the brigade scheme of maneuver, the TF on the left conducts the main attack to seize and clear OBJ CAT, and the TF on the right conducts a supporting attack to seize OBJ RAT. The seizure of OBJs RAT and DOG isolates OBJ CAT.) In order to seize OBJ DOG the TF commander determined that two intermediate objectives were necessary.



(2) One company secures a foothold in OBJ Y. As a follow-on mission, the same company seizes OBJ Z and supports the battalion main effort by fire, or facilitates the passage of another company through OBJ Y to seize OBJ Z to support the battalion main effort by fire.





Figure 2-19: Securing a foothold, battalion attack.





e. Clear an Urban Area. Before determining to what extent the urban area must be cleared, the factors of METTTC must be considered. The ROE affect the TTP subordinate units select to move through the urban area and clear individual buildings and rooms. The commander may decide to clear only those parts necessary for the success of his mission if—



• An objective must be seized quickly.



• Enemy resistance is light or fragmented.



• The buildings in the area have large open areas between them. In this case, the commander would clear only those buildings along the approach to his objective, or only those buildings necessary for security.



An Infantry battalion may have a mission to systematically clear an area of all enemy. Through detailed analysis, the commander may anticipate that he will be opposed by strong, organized resistance or will be in areas having strongly constructed buildings close together. Companies may be assigned their own AO within the battalion sector in order to conduct systematic clearing (Figure 2-20).

f. Consolidate/Reorganize and Prepare for Future Missions. Consolidation occurs immediately after each action. Reorganization and preparation for future missions occurs after consolidation. Many of these actions occur simultaneously.



(1) Consolidation provides security and facilitates reorganization, and allows the battalion to prepare for counterattack. Rapid consolidation after an engagement is extremely important in an urban environment. The assault force in a cleared building must be quick to consolidate in order to repel enemy counterattacks and to prevent the enemy from infiltrating back into the cleared building. After securing a floor, selected members of the assault force are assigned to cover potential enemy counterattack routes to the building. Priority must be given to securing the direction of attack first.





Figure 2-20: Systematic clearance within assigned areas.





(2) Reorganization actions (many occurring simultaneously) prepare the unit to continue the mission. The battalion prepares to continue the attack, prepares for future missions, and prepares for the possible transition to stability and support operations.





NOTE



Friendly force situational awareness is significantly improved in digitally equipped units through the use of Force XXI Battalion Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) assets.





g. Transition. During transition, the battalion continues to use all CS and CSS assets consistent with the mission end-state and ROE to move from offensive operations to stability and or support operations in order to return the urban area to civilian control. During this step, the roles and use of SOF, CS, and CSS units, such as civil affairs (CA), PSYOP, medical, and MPs, become more important with the requirements to maintain order and stabilize the urban area. These assets normally support the battalion’s transition efforts under brigade control. The battalion and other brigade units consolidate, reorganize, conduct area protection and logistical missions, and prepare for follow-on missions. The battalion staff, in coordination with the brigade staff, must prepare to transition from being a supported force to being the supporting force.




2-28. MOVEMENT TO CONTACT



Figure 2-21 depicts a movement to contact in an urban area using the search and attack technique. This technique is used when knowledge of the enemy is unclear and contact is required. It is normally employed against a weak enemy force that is disorganized and incapable of massing strength against the battalion; for example, urban insurgents or gangs. The battalion divides its portion of the AO into smaller areas and coordinates the movement of companies. The battalion can either assign sectors to specific companies or control movement of companies by sequential or alternate bounds within the battalion sector. In the example shown in Figure 2-21 individual companies would find, fix, and finish the enemy (company sectors), or they would find and fix the enemy and the battalion would assign another company the task of finishing the enemy (sequential or alternate bounds). During a mission of this type, the urban environment makes finding, fixing, and finishing the enemy difficult for conventional Infantry forces. For example, movement of units may become canalized due to streets and urban canyons created by tall buildings. The application of firepower may become highly restricted based on the ROE. The use of HUMINT in this type of action becomes increasingly more important and can be of great assistance during the find portion of the mission.





Figure 2-21: Search and attack technique.





2-29. INFILTRATION



The following example describes the actions of an Infantry battalion conducting an infiltration. With some modification, it could also apply to a dismounted mechanized Infantry battalion.

a. The outskirts of an urban area may not be strongly defended. Its defenders may have only a series of anti-armor positions, security elements on the principal approach, or positions blocking the approaches to key features in the town. The strongpoints and reserves are deeper in the urban area.



b. A battalion may be able to seize a part of the urban area by infiltrating platoons and companies between those enemy positions on the outskirts. Moving by stealth on secondary streets by using the cover and concealment of back alleys and buildings, the battalion may be able to seize key street junctions or terrain features, to isolate enemy positions, and to help following units pass into the urban area. Such an infiltration should be performed when visibility is poor and no civilians are in the area. Bypassing enemy strongpoints may result in flank and rear security problems for the infiltrating battalion. Bypassed units may become a counterattack force or cut lines of communications, if not isolated. Planning should include securing all mounted and dismounted avenues of approach from the bypassed enemy strongpoints to ensure their isolation.



c. The Infantry battalion is organized into infiltration companies with appropriate attachments and a reserve consistent with METTTC. Each company should have an infiltration lane that allows stealthy infiltration by company or smaller size units. Depending on the construction of the urban area and streets, the infiltration lane may be 500 to 1,500 meters wide.



d. The infiltrating companies advance stealthily on foot using available cover and concealment. Mortar and artillery fire can be used to divert the enemy’s attention and cover the sound of infiltrating troops.



e. Armored vehicles and antiarmor weapons are positioned to cover likely avenues of approach for enemy armored vehicles. The battalion commander may position antiarmor weapons to cover the likely avenues of approach, if no BFVs or tanks are available. The reconnaissance platoon and antiarmor company screen the battalion’s more vulnerable flanks. Also, the antiarmor company can support by fire if the situation provides adequate support by fire positions.



f. As the companies move into the urban area, they secure their own flanks. Security elements may be dropped off along the route to warn of a flank attack. Engineers assist in breaching or bypassing minefields or obstacles encountered. Enemy positions are avoided but reported.



g. The infiltrating companies proceed until they reach their objective. At that time, they consolidate and reorganize and arrange for mutual support. They patrol to their front and flanks, and establish contact with each other. The company commander may establish a limit of advance to reduce chances of enemy contact or to ensure safety from friendly forces.



h. If the infiltration places the enemy in an untenable position and he must withdraw, the rest of the battalion is brought forward for the next phase of the operation. If the enemy does not withdraw, the battalion must clear the urban area before the next phase of the operation (Figure 2-22).





Figure 2-22: Infiltration.





2-30. ATTACK OF A VILLAGE



The battalion may have to conduct either a hasty or deliberate attack of a village that is partially or completely surrounded by open terrain. (Figure 2-23 depicts a TF conducting such an attack.) After the factors of METT-TC have been considered, the tactical tasks discussed in paragraph 2-27 are performed (specifically, reconnoiter the objective, move to the objective, isolate the objective, secure a foothold, clear the objective, consolidate and reorganize, and/or prepare for future missions). In the example shown in Figure 2-23, two companies and or company teams isolate the village, and a company team secures a foothold and enters and clears the village.





Figure 2-23: Attack of a village.





2-31. ROUTE SECURITY AND CLEARANCE



An Infantry battalion may have to clear buildings to secure a route through a city. How quickly the battalion can clear the buildings depends on enemy resistance and the size and number of the buildings. The battalion deploys companies/company teams IAW with METT-TC factors. Figure 2-24 shows three companies abreast clearing routes in sector. The enemy situation must permit the battalion to deploy its subordinate, units. This mission would not normally be executed against well prepared enemy defenses in depth. In outlying areas, the forward units proceed by bounds from road junction to road junction. Other platoons provide flank security by moving down parallel streets and by probing to the flanks.

a. Depending on the required speed and enemy situation, the Infantry may either move mounted or dismounted. The platoons move down the widest streets, avoiding narrow streets. Each BFV section overwatches the squad to its front, keeping watch on the opposite side of the street. Sections provide their wingman with mutual support. Combat vehicles providing overwatch should be secured by dismounted troops. The rest of the Infantry should stay mounted to maximize speed and shock effect until required to dismount due to the enemy situation or upon reaching the objective.



b. When contact with the enemy is made, tanks support. Supporting fire fixes and isolates enemy positions which dismounted troops maneuver to attack.



c. Phase lines can be used to control the rate of advance of subordinate companies or company teams and other action. At each phase line, the forward companies might reestablish contact, reorganize, and continue clearing (Figure 2-24).





Figure 2-24: Clearing along a route.





2-32. NODAL ATTACK



The battalion may be given the mission to seize key nodes as part of a brigade operation. (See Figures 2-25 and 2-26.) In certain situations, the battalion may be required to seize nodes independently. This mission is characterized by rapid attacks followed by defensive operations. The enemy situation must permit the attacking force to divide its forces and seize key nodes. Multiple attacks, as depicted in Figures 2-25 and 2-26, require precise maneuver and supporting fires. This mission may be given to a battalion before an anticipated stability and or support operation, or to isolate an urban area for other units that will be conducting offensive operations inside the urban area. Figure 2-25 depicts a brigade conducting multiple nodal attacks. Figure 2-26 depicts a battalion TF executing its assigned mission. This technique is used to deny the enemy key infrastructure. Use of this technique may also require designated rapid response elements in reserve in the event that enemy forces mass and quickly overwhelm an attacking battalion. Normally the reserve is planned at brigade level. Battalions executing a nodal attack independently needs to plan for a designated rapid response reserve element. The duration of this attack should not exceed the battalion’s self-sustainment capability.





Figure 2-25: Brigade scheme of maneuver, nodal attack.





Figure 2-26: Battalion nodal attack.





SECTION VII. COMPANY TEAM ATTACK OF AN URBAN AREA



“We finally reached the front of the company where the lead APC was stopped and learned that the fire was coming from the large hotel on the left side of the street, about 50 meters to the front of the lead platoon. I guided the MK 19 HMMWV up onto a steep sidewalk so the gunner could get an effective shot and told him to watch my M16 tracer rounds and to work the building from top to bottom. I fired several tracers into the hotel; he fired a spotting round into one of the top story windows and then fired the grenade launcher on automatic, hitting every single window in the building. The effects were devastating. Concrete fragments flew everywhere, and one or two Somalis fell out of the building.”





CPT Charles P. Ferry

Mogadishu, October 1993

Personal Account of a Rifle Company XO

Infantry Magazine, Sep–Oct 94



This section discusses tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) and considerations that company teams can employ to conduct independent UO or to conduct operations as part of larger battalion TF UO, The TTP described in this section can apply to all types of company teams, with modifications made for the assets available.


2-33. TASK ORGANIZATION



The company commander normally task-organizes his company into two elements: an assault element and a support element. The support element may be given a number of tasks that are conducted on order or simultaneously; specifically, support by fire, isolate the objective, and conduct other support functions. The tactical situation dictates whether or not separate elements need to be task-organized in order to conduct these support missions. The mission to breach is METT-TC dependent and may be given to the assault or support element; or a separate element may be formed to conduct this task. If available, engineers are usually task-organized into the element that performs the breach. The size and composition of the elements are determined by METT-TC. If the company is part of a battalion operation, the company could be given the mission to conduct one or more of the tasks mentioned above. If conducting an urban attack independently, the company team performs both assault and support tasks.

a. Assault Element. The purpose of the assault element is to kill, capture, or force the withdrawal of the enemy from an urban objective. The assault element of a company team may consist of one or more platoons usually reinforced with engineers, BFVs, and possibly tanks. Building and room clearing are conducted at the platoon and squad level. The assault element must be prepared to breach to gain entry into buildings.



b. Support Element. The purpose of the support element is to provide any support that may be required by the assault element. The support element at company level normally consists of the company’s organic assets (platoons, mortars, and antitank weapons), attachments, and units that are under the OPCON of the company commander. This assistance includes, but is not limited to, the following:



• Suppressing and obscuring enemy within the objective buildings and adjacent structures.



• Isolating the objective buildings with observation and direct or indirect fires to prevent enemy withdrawal, reinforcement, or counterattack.



• Breaching walls en route to and in the objective structure.



• Destroying or suppressing enemy positions with direct fire weapons.



• Securing cleared portions of the objective.



• Providing squads to assume assault element missions.



• Providing resupply of ammunition, explosives, and personnel.



• Evacuating casualties, EPWs, and noncombatants.



c. Reserves. Companies fighting in urban terrain may not be able to designate a reserve, based on the number of troops required to conduct offensive operations. A platoon may be detached from the company to form a battalion reserve. The company reserve, if one is designated, should be mobile and prepared for commitment. Because of the available cover in urban areas, the reserve can stay close to forward units. The reserve normally follows within the same block so that it can immediately influence the attack. The size of the reserve is METT-TC dependent, but at company level, the reserve normally consists of a squad, detached from an organic platoon, or attached elements. In addition, the reserve may be called upon to perform one or more of the following tasks based on the commander’s priority of commitment:



• Assuming the mission of the assault element.



• Clearing bypassed enemy positions.



• Moving behind the assault element to provide security in cleared buildings, allowing the assault element to continue to move.



d. Breaching Element. At the company level, breaching is normally conducted by the assault element. However, a separate breaching element may be created and a platoon may be given this mission and task organized accordingly. The purpose of breaching is to provide the assault element with access to an urban objective. Breaching can be accomplished using explosive, ballistic, thermal, or mechanical methods. Ballistic breaching includes using direct fire weapons; mechanical breaching includes the use of crowbars, axes, saws, sledgehammers, or other mechanical entry devices. Thermal breaching is accomplished through the use of a torch to cut metal items such as door hinges. Attached engineers, or a member of the assault element who has had additional training in mechanical, thermal, ballistic, and explosive breaching techniques, may conduct the breach.



e. Sample Task Organizations. Task organization of the company varies based on the factors of METT-TC and the ROE.



(1) Light Infantry Task Organization. An Infantry company conducting this mission might task-organize as follows:



Assault Two rifle platoons and one rifle platoon (-) reinforced with engineers (attached to the platoons).



Reserve A squad from one of the platoons.



Support The company AT weapons, 60-mm mortar section, and M240 machine guns. (Other support provided by the battalion task force.)



(2) Light/Heavy Task Organizations. Different METT-TC factors might produce the following light/heavy task organizations:





EXAMPLE 1



Assault Two rifle platoons, each reinforced with engineers.



Reserve One rifle platoon.



Support BFV platoon and the company AT weapons and 60-mm mortar section. (Other support provided by the battalion task force.)





EXAMPLE 2



Assault Two rifle platoons reinforced with engineers.



Reserve One rifle platoon.



Support One tank platoon. The company AT weapons and 60-mm mortar section.





EXAMPLE 3



Assault Two rifle platoons, each with engineers. One tank section OPCON to an Infantry platoon.



Reserve One rifle platoon.



Support A tank section and the company AT weapons under the tank platoon leader’s control. The company 60-mm mortar section. (All available direct and indirect fire weapons should be used to isolate objective buildings. Direct fire down streets and indirect fire in open areas between buildings to help in the objective isolation.)





NOTE



The company commander may use the company executive officer, tank platoon leader, BFV platoon leader, or first sergeant to control the support element, as the task organization and situation dictate. Based on METT-TC factors, a BFV platoon can perform any of the missions described above (assault, support, reserve). Unit integrity should be maintained at the platoon level. If the tactical situation requires the employment of sections, it should be for a limited duration and distance.





2-34. DELIBERATE ATTACK



At the company level, a deliberate attack of an urban area usually involves the sequential execution of the tactical tasks below.

a. Reconnoiter the Objective. This method involves making a physical reconnaissance of the objective with company assets and those of higher headquarters, as the tactical situation permits. It also involves a map reconnaissance of the objective and all the terrain that affects the mission, to include the analysis of aerial imagery, photographs, or any other detailed information about the building or other urban terrain, which the company is responsible for. Additionally, any human intelligence (HUMINT) collected by reconnaissance and surveillance units, such as the battalion reconnaissance platoon, snipers, and so forth, should be considered during the planning process.



b. Move to the Objective. This method may involve moving the company tactically through open and or urban terrain. Movement should be made as rapidly as possible without sacrificing security. Movement should be made along covered and concealed routes and can involve moving through buildings, down streets, subsurface areas, or a combination of all three. Urban movement must take into account the three-dimensional aspect of the urban area.



c. Isolate the Objective. Isolating the objective involves seizing terrain that dominates the area so that the enemy cannot supply, reinforce, or withdraw its defenders. It also includes selecting terrain that provides the ability to place suppressive fire on the objective. (This step may be taken at the same time as securing a foothold.) If isolating the objective is the first step, speed is necessary so that the defender has no time to react. Companies may be required to isolate an objective as part of a battalion operation or may be required to do so independently. Depending on the tactical situation, an Infantry company may isolate an objective by infiltration and stealth.



d. Secure a Foothold. Securing a foothold involves seizing an intermediate objective that provides cover from enemy fire and a location for attacking troops to enter the urban area. The size of the foothold is METT-TC dependent and is usually a company intermediate objective. In some cases a large building may be assigned as a company intermediate objective (foothold). As the company attacks to gain a foothold, it should be supported by suppressive fire and smoke.



e. Clear an Urban Area. Before determining to what extent the urban area must be cleared, the factors of METT-TC must be considered. The ROE influence the TTP platoons and squads select as they move through the urban area and clear individual buildings and rooms.



(1) The commander may decide to clear only those parts necessary for the success of his mission if—



• An objective must be seized quickly.



• Enemy resistance is light or fragmented.



• The buildings in the area have large open areas between them. In this case, the commander would clear only those buildings along the approach to his objective, or only those buildings necessary for security. (See Figure 2-27.)



(2) A company may have a mission to systematically clear an area of all enemy. Through detailed analysis, the commander may anticipate that he will be opposed by a strong, organized resistance or will be in areas having strongly constructed buildings close together. Therefore, one or two platoons may attack on a narrow front against the enemy’s weakest sector. They move slowly through the area, clearing systematically from room to room and building to building. The other platoon supports the clearing units and is prepared to assume their mission.





Figure 2-27: Clearing selected buildings within sector.





f. Consolidate/Reorganize and Prepare for Future Missions. Consolidation occurs immediately after each action. Consolidation is security and allows the company to prepare for counterattack and to facilitate reorganization. It is extremely important in an urban environment that units consolidate and reorganize rapidly after each engagement. The assault force in a cleared building must be quick to consolidate in order to repel enemy counterattacks and to prevent the enemy from infiltrating back into the cleared building. After securing a floor, selected members of the assault force are assigned to cover potential enemy counterattack routes to the building. Priority must be given to securing the direction of attack first. Those soldiers alert the assault force and place a heavy volume of fire on enemy forces approaching the building. Reorganization occurs after consolidation. Reorganization actions prepare the unit to continue the mission; many actions occur at the same time.



(1) Consolidation Actions. Platoons assume hasty defensive positions after the objective has been seized or cleared. Based upon their specified and implied tasks, assaulting platoons should be prepared to assume an overwatch mission and support an assault on another building, or another assault within the building. Commanders must ensure that platoons guard enemy mouseholes between adjacent buildings, covered routes to the building, underground routes into the basement, and approaches over adjoining roofs.



(2) Reorganization Actions. After consolidation, the following actions are taken:



• Resupply and redistribute ammunition, equipment, and other necessary items.



• Mark the building to indicate to friendly forces that the building has been cleared.



• Move support or reserve elements into the objective if tactically sound.



• Redistribute personnel and equipment on adjacent structures.



• Treat and evacuate wounded personnel.



• Treat and evacuate wounded EPW and process remainder of EPW.



• Segregate and safeguard civilians.



• Re-establish the chain of command.



• Redistribute personnel on the objective to support the next phase or mission.



(3) Prepare for Future Missions. The company commander anticipates and prepares for future missions and prepares the company chain of command for transition to defensive and or stability and support missions.





NOTE



Friendly force situational awareness is significantly improved in digitally equipped units through the use of Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and below (FBCB2) assets.





2-35. ISOLATE AN URBAN OBJECTIVE



Infantry companies isolate an urban objective to prevent reinforcement of, or a counterattack against, the objective and to kill or capture any withdrawing enemy forces. When planning the isolation, commanders must consider three-dimensional and in-depth isolation of the objective (front, flanks, rear, upper stories, rooftops, and subsurface). All available direct and indirect fire weapons, to include attack helicopters and CAS, should be employed, consistent with the ROE. Isolating the objective is a key factor in facilitating the assault and preventing casualties. The company may perform this mission as the support element for a battalion operation, or it may assign the task to its own internal support element for a company attack. In certain situations, companies may be required to isolate an objective or an area for special operations forces or for stability/support operations. When possible, the objective should be isolated using stealth and or rapid movement in order to surprise the enemy. Depending on the tactical situation, companies may use infiltration in order to isolate the objective. Likely tasks include, but are not limited to, the ones described below.



NOTE



Combat experience and recent rotations at the CTCs have shown that many casualties can be sustained when moving between buildings, down streets, and through open areas in order to gain entry into a building either to gain a foothold or to clear it. One of the purposes of isolation at the company level must be to dominate the outside area that leads to the point of entry in order to allow assaulting troops to enter the building without receiving effective fire from the enemy. This method is accomplished by the effective use of direct and indirect fires, obscurants, maintaining situational awareness, and exercising tactical patience prior to movement.





a. Isolating the Objective (Battalion Attack). A company may isolate the objective as the support element for a battalion operation. When a company is given this mission, the objective is normally a larger structure, a block, or a group of buildings. The company commander task-organizes his platoons and assigns them support by fire positions based on the factors of METT-TC. In addition to isolating the objective, the company (support element) may be given additional tasks that will be conducted on order or at the same time. Examples of these additional tasks include assuming assault element missions, securing cleared buildings, handling noncombatants and EPWs, and CASEVAC.



b. Isolating the Objective (Company Attack). When a company conducts an attack, the task organization and tasks given to the company support element is determined by the factors of METT-TC. If the company conducts an attack, the objective can be a building, a block or group of buildings, a traffic circle, or a small village (Figure 2-28). Emphasis must be placed on suppressing or neutralizing the fires on and around the objective. Figure 2-28 depicts an infantry company with tanks assaulting Buildings (BLDG) 41 and 42. In order to secure a foothold and clear BLDGs 41 and 42, the commander has assigned a platoon to support by fire and suppress the enemy squad in BLDG 11 and the medium machine gun in BLDG 21. A tank section suppresses the light machine gun in BLDG 51 and assists in the suppression of BLDG 11. Another platoon supports by fire and suppresses any enemy fire from BLDGs 31, 41, and 42. The company’s third platoon, positioned in buildings behind the support element, acts as the assault element to clear BLDGs 41 and 42. In this manner, three-dimensional isolation of the objective (BLDGs 41 and 42) is accomplished.





NOTE



All buildings within the support element’s sector of fire were numbered to facilitate command and control.





Figure 2-28: Isolating an urban objective.





c. Tasks. The company commander isolates the objective with direct and indirect fires before and during the assault element’s execution of its mission. The company will—



• Suppress known, likely, and suspected enemy targets, consistent with the ROE, with direct and indirect fire weapons. Under restrictive ROE, suppression may be limited only to actual enemy locations.



• Cover mounted avenues of approach with antiarmor weapons.



• Cover dismounted avenues of approach with automatic weapons.



• Control key terrain near or adjacent to the objective in order to prevent the enemy from reinforcing his positions, withdrawing, or counterattacking.



• Be prepared to move to other locations in order to suppress enemy fires and neutralize enemy positions as the assault element performs its tasks.



(1) Company commanders must give specific instructions to subordinate leaders concerning where to place fires in support of the assault element. For example, from TRP 1 to TRP 2, along the third and second floor windows on the east side of Building 21, shift fires to the west side of the objective from TRP 1 to TRP 4 when the green star cluster is seen, and so on. Once suppressive fires on the objective begin, they normally increase and continue until masked by the advancing assault element. Suppressive fires may or may not be used from the beginning of the assault depending on the ROE. Targets can be marked and identified with tracer rounds; M203 smoke, HE, or illumination rounds; voice and arm-and-hand signals; laser pointers; or similar devices.



(2) The precise well-placed volume of fire, as opposed to a volume of fire, suppresses the enemy. The volume of fire and types of weapons employed is ROE dependent. Once masked, fires are shifted to upper or lower windows and continued until the assault force has entered the building. At that time, fires are shifted to adjacent buildings to prevent enemy withdrawal or reinforcement. If the ROE are restrictive, the use of supporting fires is normally limited to known enemy locations that have engaged the unit.





NOTE



Care must be taken in urban areas when WP, ILLUM, or tracers are used since urban fires can be caused. Care must also be exercised, if sabot rounds are used by the armored vehicles, based on the its penetration capability. Sabot rounds can penetrate many walls and travel great distances to include passing through multiple buildings, creating unintended damage, casualties, and fratricide.





2-36. ASSAULT A BUILDING



The company conducts this mission as part of the assault element of a battalion task force or independently. (Independently is defined here as a company having to provide its own support element, as opposed to conducting an operation without flank and rear support, such as a raid or ambush.) If it is conducted as the assault element of a battalion task force, it will probably be conducted against a large building defended by a strong enemy force; for example, a reinforced platoon. Company commanders need to clearly understand the specified and implied tasks that are required to accomplish the mission, as well as the brigade/battalion commanders’ intent and the desired mission end-state. This procedure allows the company commander to task-organize and issue specific missions to his subordinate elements as to which floors and rooms to clear, seize, or bypass. As an example, Figure 2-29, depicts an Infantry TF assigned the mission of clearing the objectives in its sector (DOG and TAIL). Company B has been given the TF supporting effort of seizing and clearing OBJ TAIL. The company commander has decided to assign an intermediate objective (WING) to 1st platoon. 3d platoon is the support element with the mission of isolating WING (1st and 2d squads) and providing one squad to act as the company reserve (3d squad). 2d platoon has the mission of passing through 1st platoon, which will mark a passage lane and seize TAIL.

a. Execution. Platoons should move by bounds by floor when clearing a multistory building. This procedure permits troops to rest after a floor has been cleared. It is likely that platoons are required to leave security on floors and in cleared rooms and also facilitate the passage of another platoon in order to continue the assault. The assault element must quickly and violently execute its assault and subsequent clearing operations. Once momentum has been gained, it is maintained to prevent the enemy from organizing a more determined resistance on other floors or in other rooms. If platoons come across rooms/hallways/stairwells that are barricaded with furniture or where obstacles have been placed, they should first attempt to bypass the barricade or obstacle and maintain the momentum of the attack. If they cannot bypass the barricade or obstacle, security should be placed on it, it should be checked for booby traps, and should then be reduced. Also, sealing doors and floors may be an option in order to maintain momentum. Subordinate leaders should continue the momentum of the assault, yet not allow the operation to become disorganized.





Figure 2-29: Assault of a building.





b. Ammunition and Equipment. METT-TC factors and the ROE determine how the assault element is equipped and armed. The assault element carries only a fighting load of equipment and as much ammunition as possible, especially grenades (fragmentation, smoke, concussion, and stun consistent with the building construction and the ROE). The support element maintains control of additional ammunition and equipment not immediately needed by the assault element. An often overlooked munition in an urban battle is the light antitank weapon such as the M72 LAW and the AT4. Soldiers can use these for a variety of purposes such as suppressing a manned position or supporting the breaching or assault elements. Resupply should be pushed to the assault element by the support element. Commanders must carefully manage the soldier’s load during the assault. Normally, ammunition, water, special assault weapons/equipment, and medical supplies/litters are the only items carried in the assault. Attached or OPCON tank or BFV platoons should also configure their ammunition load to support their mission, consistent with the ROE.



c. Assault Locations. The assault may begin from the top or bottom of the building.



(1) Top Entry. Entry at the top and fighting downward is the preferred method of clearing a building. This method is only feasible, however, when access to an upper floor or rooftop can be gained by ladder; from the windows or roofs of adjoining, secured buildings; or when enemy air defense weapons can be suppressed and troops can be transported to the rooftops by helicopter.



(2) Bottom Entry. Entry at the bottom is common and may be the only option available. When entering from the bottom, breaching a wall is the preferred method because doors and windows may be booby trapped and covered by fire from inside the structure. If the assault element must enter through a door or window, entry from a rear or flank position is preferred. Under certain situations, the ROE may not permit the use of certain explosives, therefore entry through doors and windows may be the only option available. Armored vehicles can be especially useful in supporting bottom entry.



d. Breaching. Squads and platoons will have to conduct breaching. Engineers may be attached to the unit responsible for breaching. Depending on the factors of METT-TC, company commanders may need to designate specific breaching locations or delegate the task to platoon leaders. The ROE also influences whether mechanical, thermal, ballistic, or explosive breaching is used. For example, if BFVs are attached to the company and the ROE permit their use, they can breach the wall by main-gun fire for the initial-entry point.



e. Assault Tasks. Once inside the building, the priority tasks are to cover the staircases and to seize rooms that overlook approaches to the building. These actions are required to isolate enemy forces within the building and to prevent reinforcement from the outside. The assault element clears each room on the entry floor and then proceeds to clear the other floors to include the basement. If entry is not made from the top, consideration may be given to rushing/clearing and securing a stairwell and clearing from the top down, if the tactical situation permits. If stairwell use is required, minimize their use and clear them last. If there is a basement, it should be cleared as soon as possible, preferably at the same time as the ground floor. The procedures for clearing a basement are the same as for any room or floor, but important differences do exist. Basements may contain entrances to tunnels such as sewers and communications cable tunnels. These should be cleared and secured to prevent the enemy from infiltrating back into cleared areas.





Danger





A safety consideration for clearing buildings is the high probability of ricochet.





f. Suppressive Fires During the Assault. The support element provides suppressive fire while the assault element is systematically clearing the building. It also provides suppressive fire on adjacent buildings to prevent enemy reinforcements or withdrawal. Suppressive fire may consist of firing at known and suspected enemy locations; or, depending on the ROE, may only include firing at identified targets or returning fire when fired upon. The support element destroys or captures any enemy trying to exit the building. The support element must also deal with civilians displaced by the assault. Armored vehicles are useful in providing heavy, sustained, accurate fire.



g. Clearing Rooms. Company commanders must ensure that clearing platoons carry enough room marking equipment and plainly mark cleared rooms from the friendly side IAW unit SOP. Also, if the operation occurs during limited visibility, marking must be visible to friendly units. The support element must understand which markings will be employed and ensure that suppressive fires do not engage cleared rooms and floors. Maintaining situational awareness concerning the location of the assault teams and which rooms/floors have been cleared is imperative and a key command and control function for the company commander. Radios can be consolidated, if necessary, with priority going to the squads and platoons clearing rooms. When exiting cleared buildings friendly troops should notify supporting elements using the radio or other preplanned signals.




2-37. ATTACK OF A BLOCK OR GROUP OF BUILDINGS



A company team normally attacks a block or group of buildings as part of a battalion task force. To attack a block or a group of buildings, a company team may need to be reinforced with BFVs or tanks and engineers, consistent with the ROE and the enemy situation.

a. Execution. The execution of this mission is characterized by platoon attacks supported by both direct and indirect fires. Success depends on isolating the enemy positions which often become platoon objectives, suppressing enemy weapons, seizing a foothold in the block, and clearing the block’s buildings room by room.



b. Direct Fire Weapons. BFVs, tanks, machine guns, and other direct fire support weapons fire on the objective from covered positions, consistent with the ROE. These weapons should not be fired for prolonged periods from one position. The gunners should use a series of positions and displace from one to another to gain better fields of fire and to avoid being targeted by the enemy. Direct fire support tasks can be assigned as follows:



(1) Machine guns fire along streets and into windows, doors, mouseholes, and other probable enemy positions. ROE may restrict firing only to known enemy locations.



(2) BFVs, tanks, and antitank weapons fire at enemy tanks and other armored vehicles can also provide a countersniper capability due to their range and target acquisition capability.



(3) Tanks fire at targets protected by walls and provide protection against enemy tanks, as required.



(4) BFVs may be used to create breaches with the 25-mm gun and TOW.



(5) Riflemen engage targets of opportunity.



c. Obscuration and Assault. Before an assault, the company commander should employ smoke to conceal the assaulting platoons. He secures their flanks with direct fire weapons and by employment of the reserve, if necessary. Concealed by smoke and supported by direct fire weapons, an assaulting platoon attacks the first isolated building. The assault element utilizes the cover of suppressive fires to gain a foothold. The company commander must closely coordinate the assault with its supporting fire so that the fire is shifted at the last possible moment. The squads and platoons then clear each designated building. After seizing the block, the company consolidates and reorganizes to repel a counterattack or to continue the attack. Periods of limited visibility may provide the best conditions to attack, especially if NVGs provide the company a technological advantage over the threat.





NOTE



Obscuration rounds may cause uncontrolled fires in the city and must be carefully planned.kes a quick assessment of the factors of METT-TC and reacts appropriately to support the higher level commander’s intent.





a. Establish Support. If attached or OPCON, tanks, BFVs, MK19s or M2HBs mounted on HMMWVs, and TOWs assume support-by-fire positions from which they can fire on the village, prevent the enemy from withdrawing, and destroy any reinforcements (support element functions). If these assets are not available, then the comIf attached or OPCON, tanks, BFVs, MK19s or M2HBs mounted on HMMWVs, and TOWs assume support-by-fire positions from which they can fire on the village, prevent the enemy from withdrawing, and destroy any reinforcements (support element functions). If these assets are not available, then the company commander moves Infantry elements into position to accomplish the same tasks. The company’s 60-mm mortar and AT sections also provide fire support. Armored vehicles can reposition during the assault, if necessary, to gain better fields of fire and provide better support.



b. ey clear the buildings quickly, consistent with the ROE, and consolidate. The company is then ready to continue operations.





Figure 2-30: Hasty attack of a village.





2-39. MOVEMENT TO CONTACT AND RECONNAISSANCE



In a fast-moving situation, a company team may have to conduct a movement to contact through an urban area to fix enemy forces (Figure 2-31). Similarly, a company team may have to reconnoiter such a route to prepare for a battalion task force attack or other mission. This type of reconnaissance is accomplished with a company team. It is preferable to conduct this mission with tanks and or BFVs. The actual task organization will be determined by the factors of METT-TC.





Figure 2-31: Movement to contact through an urban area.





a. Tempo. These operations are characterized by alternating periods of rapid movement to quickly cover distances and much slower movement for security. The speed of movement selected depends on the terrain and enemy situation.



b. Execution. An infantry company without support from tanks or BFVs would conduct travelling overwatch or bounding overwatch along urban routes. In open areas where rapid movement is possible due to terrain, a tank section should lead, if available. In closer terrain, the infantry should lead while overwatched by the tanks. Another infantry platoon and the other tank section should move on a parallel street. Artillery fire should be planned along the route. Engineers accompany the lead platoon on the main route to help clear obstacles and mines.



c. Danger Areas. The company should cross danger areas (crossroads, bridges, and overpasses, and so forth) by a combination of actions:



• Between danger areas, the company moves with the infantry mounted, or rapidly on foot, when contact is not likely.



• When enemy contact is likely, the company moves to clear enemy positions or to secure the danger area. Tanks and other combat vehicles support infantry.



d. Axis of Advance. In peripheral areas, this advance should be on one axis with the lead unit well forward and security elements checking side streets as they are reached. In the city core, this operation is conducted as a coordinated movement on two or three axes for more flank security.



e. Enemy Positions. Enemy positions can be either destroyed by the company itself or, if the need for speed is great, bypassed, reported, and left to following units if the situation allows.



f. Coordination. The company commander must ensure that the actions of platoons and attached or OPCON elements are coordinated. Situational awareness must be maintained in a rapidly moving or changing environment. The company commander reports all information collected to the battalion task force.




2-40. SEIZURE OF KEY URBAN TERRAIN



A traffic circle, bridge or overpass that spans a canal, a building complex, or, in some cases, the population itself are examples of key urban terrain. Therefore, seizing such terrain intact and securing it for friendly use is a likely mission for a company team. The discussion below describes the TTP for seizing and controlling a bridge and seizing a traffic circle.

a. Seizure of a Bridge. For this mission (Figure 2-32), a company team should perform the following actions.





Figure 2-32: Seizure of a bridge.





(1) Clear the Near Bank. The first step in seizing a bridge is to clear the buildings on the near bank that overwatch the bridge and the terrain on the far side. The commander must find out which buildings dominate the approaches to the bridge. Buildings that permit him to employ anti-tank weapons, machine guns, and riflemen are cleared while supporting fire prevents the enemy from reinforcing his troops on the far bank and keeps enemy demolition parties away from the bridge.



(2) Suppress. Suppress enemy weapons on the far bank with direct and indirect fire. In suppressing the enemy’s positions on the far bank, priority is given to those positions from which the enemy can fire directly down the bridge. Tanks, BFVs, TOWs, and machine guns mounted on HMMWVs are effective in this role. TOWs, Dragons, Javelins, and AT4s can be used against enemy tanks covering the bridge. Use screening smoke to limit enemy observation. All suppression must be consistent with the ROE.



(3) Assault. Seize a bridgehead (buildings that overwatch and dominate the bridge) on the far bank by an assault across the bridge. The objectives of the assaulting platoons are buildings that dominate the approaches to the bridge on the far side. One or two platoons assault across the bridge using all available cover while concealed by smoke. In addition to a frontal assault across the bridge, other routes should be considered. They are supported by the rest of the company and any attached and OPCON forces. Once on the other side, they call for the shifting of supporting fire and start clearing buildings. When the first buildings are cleared, supporting fire is lifted and or shifted again and the assault continues until all the buildings in the objective area are cleared.



(4) Clear the Bridge. Secure a perimeter around the bridge so that the engineers can clear any obstacles and remove demolitions from the bridge. The company commander may expand his perimeter to prepare for counterattack. Once the bridge is cleared, tanks, BFVs, and other support vehicles are brought across to the far bank.



b. Seizure of a Traffic Circle. A company may have to seize a traffic circle either to secure it for friendly use or to deny it to the enemy (Figure 2-33). This operation consists of seizing and clearing the buildings that control the traffic circle, and bringing direct-fire weapons into position to cover it. After gathering all available intelligence on the terrain, enemy, and population, the commander takes the following steps:



• Isolates the objective.



• Seizes and or clears the buildings along the traffic circle.



• Consolidates and prepares for counterattack.





Figure 2-33: Seizure of a traffic circle.





(1) Troop Safety. Friendly troops should not venture into the traffic circle until it is secure. A traffic circle is a natural kill zone.



(2) Task Organization. The company should be organized with assault, support, and reserve elements based on the factors of METT-TC and the ROE.



(a) Assault. Seizes and or clears the terrain (buildings) that influence the objective. (For example, two rifle platoons, reinforced with engineers.)



(b) Support. Isolates the traffic circle and provides security. This element can be mounted (preferred) or dismounted; for example, an infantry platoon with a section of BFVs. Provides direct fire support for the assault element. The element could consist of tanks, BFVs, TOWs, MK 19s, or M2HBs mounted on HMMWVs, occupying a support-by-fire position.



(c) Reserve. Reinforces the assault element on order. (Normally a detached squad from one of the rifle platoons.)



(3) Flexibility. At various stages in this operation, roles may change. For example, the assault element may clear buildings until the support element can no longer support it. Then the reserve can be committed to the assault. It may also occur that one of the assault elements finds itself in a better position to isolate the traffic circle and becomes the support element. At that time, the isolating (support) element would become part of the assault element. The support element may also have to reposition to continue support.




2-41. DIRECT FIRE PLANNING AND CONTROL



One of the company commander’s primary responsibilities will be to plan and control direct fires during the attack of an urban objective. The information below applies to a company isolating an objective for either a battalion or company attack. Direct fire support can be very resource intensive. Commanders must ensure that enough ammunition is available to support their fire plans.

a. Principles of Direct Fire Planning. A thorough direct fire plan will adhere to the principles stated below.



(1) Mass fires. Massing of fires is defined by the terminal effect on the enemy, not by the number of systems firing or the number of rounds fired. Mass must not be confused with volume of fires. Massing fires is achieved by placing accurate fires on multiple targets at the same time. This method means firing at enemy targets in or outside of buildings laterally and in depth. The objective is to force the enemy to respond to multiple threats and to kill or suppress enemy soldiers or positions.



(2) Leaders control fires. Leaders must control fires to simultaneously engage different priority targets. Allowing individual crews to select their own priority target will probably result in multiple systems engaging the same target while leaving other dangerous targets free to engage and possibly maneuver against friendly units.



(3) Fire plans must be understood by the soldiers who execute them. It is imperative that every soldier understands how to execute his portion of the direct fire plan. This understanding is necessary in order to avoid fratricide. This understanding is also necessary to ensure destruction or suppression of enemy soldiers and positions. A soldier must be able to identify where they are responsible for firing and if there is an enemy to engage. Then he must understand how his fires are to be controlled and directed during the course of the fight. Ensuring terms are commonly understood assists all involved. Exchanging SOPs, chalk talks, terrain models, and rehearsals assist in understanding.



(4) Focus fires. Focusing fires means accurately directing fires to hit specific targets, points, or areas, and is the most difficult task of controlling fires. The commander focuses fires by clearly conveying instructions (either preplanned or hasty) to direct the fires of the individual platoons on specific targets or areas that support his plan for distribution. Platoons must be able to recognize the point at which to focus their fires. Failure to do so will result in different units/assets in the support element engaging the same targets, while others are not engaged. Recognizable control measures allow the support element to focus fires (see paragraph d). OPORDs and rehearsals must paint the visual picture of how the commander wants the fires focused and what the platoons will see to focus their fires.



(5) Distribute fires. Distributing fires is the process of engaging different enemy threats simultaneously to avoid overkill by multiple systems engaging the same targets and to degrade the enemy’s ability to deal with single threats one at a time. Proper distribution ensures critical targets are engaged first and the enemy is engaged three dimensionally. The following points should be emphasized:



a.Avoid target overkill. Minimize engaging targets that are already destroyed or suppressed.



b.Use each weapon system in its best role. Different weapons systems and ammunition types have specific characteristics that maximize their capability to kill or suppress specific enemy weapons systems at different ranges. For example, an AT 4 can be used to suppress an enemy sniper position, but it will probably not destroy the position itself.



c.Destroy the most dangerous targets first. Proper focus, distribution, and firing first are the keys to maximizing this principle.



d. Concentrate on enemy crew-served weapons and combat vehicles. This method deprives the enemy of his ability to use his fire support weapons against friendly troops.



e.Take the best shots and expose only those weapons systems actually needed to fire in order to maximize the probability of hitting and killing enemy targets, and to protect friendly forces as long as possible.



(6) Shift fires. Shifting fires is the process of re-focusing weapons systems to change the distribution of fires as targets are destroyed or as the situation changes, for example, the introduction of new forces on the battlefield. At the company level, this method is accomplished by shifting the fires of the support element and focusing them on new targets. This fire may be used to isolate, suppress, prevent counterattack/reinforcement, and so forth.



(7) Rehearse the fire plan. The most important part of any operation that requires soldiers to shoot their weapons is the fire plan. Every fire plan must be rehearsed; for example, what is the fire plan and how is it executed in each phase: isolation/gaining a foothold, breaching, assault of the building. A rehearsed fire plan enhances execution, prevents fratricide, identifies shortcomings, and works to synchronize the operation.



b. Questions to Answer. When the direct fire plan is complete, the commander should be able to answer the following questions:



• How does the fire plan help achieve success at the decisive point?



• What is the company mission and the desired effect of our fires?



• Is the fire plan consistent with the ROE?



• Where are combat vehicles or other dangerous weapons systems?



• Which course of action has the enemy selected?



• What are the PIR to determine the enemy’s actions?



• Where are we going to kill or suppress the enemy?



• From where will we engage him?



• Which enemy weapons do we want to engage first?



• How will we initiate fires with each weapon system?



• Which weapons will fire first? What will each engage? What are the engagement criteria?



• What is the desired effect of fires from each unit in the support element?



• How will we distribute the fires of platoons to engage the enemy three dimensionally?



• What will the support element focus their fires on? (How will the support element units know where to engage? Will they be able to see and understand the control measures?)



• How will we mass fires to deal with multiple enemy threats and achieve the desired volume of fire?



• Where will leaders be positioned to control fires; how will we focus fires on new targets?



• How will we deal with likely enemy reactions to our fires?



• Does the plan avoid overkill; use each weapon system in its best role; concentrate on combat vehicles, take the best shots, expose only those friendly weapons needed, destroy the most dangerous targets first?



• Have my fires been massed to achieve suppression, obscuration, and security needs of the breach?



• Will the fires be masked by buildings or assault element movement?



c. Fire Commands. Fire commands are verbal orders used to control direct fires. They are standard formats that rapidly and concisely articulate the firing instructions for single or multiple engagements. They can be given over the radio or landline to control fires. At company level fire commands must control the fires of multiple elements with different weapons systems. Fire commands should concentrate on ensuring that the support element is accurately focused and understands its portion of fire distribution. Platoon leaders generally give these commands after the company commander gives the order to initiate fires. A general format includes:



• Alert (call sign).



• Weapon ammunition (optional, METT-TC dependent).



• Target description.



• Location or method to focus fires.



• Control pattern technique (optional, METT-TC dependent).



• Execution (my command, your command, event).



Sample Fire Command:

“Tango 27 (PSG) This is Tango 16 (PL), over”-Alert



“7.62 mm, 40 mm, and AT 4s”-Weapons/ammunition



“Windows and Door”-Target description



“OBJ 4; White; A1, B1, C1”-Location



“Fire”-Execution.



d. Direction of Assault Technique of Direct Fire Control. In this technique, the company commander assigns building numbers in a consistent pattern in relation to the direction of assault. In the example shown in Figure 2-34, the commander numbered the buildings consecutively, in a counterclockwise manner. Further, the sides of the buildings were color coded consistently throughout the objective area (WHITE = direction of assault side; GREEN = right side; BLACK = rear side; RED = left side; BLUE = roof). An odd-shaped building is also shown. Note that a four-sided concept was retained to minimize confusion. Further designations of WHITE 1, WHITE 2, WHITE 3, and so on from left to right can be added to specify which wall will be engaged. Apertures on the buildings are also labeled consecutively using rows and columns, as shown. In the example, “OBJ 4, WHITE, window A1” is the lower left-hand window on the direction of assault side of OBJ 4. All designations are labeled in relation to the direction of assault.





Figure 2-34: Direction of assault technique of direct fire control.





SECTION VIII. PLATOON ATTACK OF AN URBAN AREA



The Infantry platoon will normally conduct offensive tasks as part of a company mission. However, there may be times that the platoon will be required to perform an independent offensive operation in support of the main effort. This section discusses how the platoon conducts the various tasks as part of a company operation or as an independent mission.


2-42. TASK ORGANIZATION (PLATOON ATTACK OF A BUILDING)



The platoon leader will normally organize his platoon into at least two elements: an assault element consisting of two rifle squads, and a support element consisting of the platoon’s crew-served weapons and one rifle squad as the support or reserve (Figure 2-35). If engineers are not available, he can designate a breaching team from within either the assault or the support element or, depending on the situation, he may task organize a separate breach element. The size and composition of these elements are determined by the mission given, the number of troops available, the type and size of the objective building, whether the adjacent terrain provides open or covered approaches, and the organization and strength of the enemy defenses. As part of a company operation, the platoon will be part of either the assault element or the support element.

• As part of the company’s assault element, the platoon would organize into three assault squads with two assault teams each, and will attach the machine guns to the company support element.



• As the part of the company’s support element, the platoon may be organized into three support squads with machine guns and antiarmor weapons attached. The attached machine guns provide the support element with added firepower for increased lethality.



a. Assault Element. The purpose of the assault element is to kill, capture, or force the withdrawal of the enemy from an urban objective and to seize key terrain. The assault element of a platoon may consist of one, two, or three squads. Squad leaders will normally organize their two fire teams into two assault teams or, in special circumstances, the squad may be kept as a single assault element.





Figure 2-35: Platoon organization.





> NOTE



Clearing techniques are designed to be executed by the standard four-man fire team. This method does not mean that all four members must enter a room to clear it. Because of the confined spaces typical of building/room clearing operations, units larger than squads quickly become awkward and unmanageable. When shortages of personnel demand it, two- and three-man teams can conduct room-clearing operations, but four-man teams are best suited. Using fewer personnel adds to the combat strain and greatly increases the risks to the team. For clearing large open buildings, such as hangars or warehouses, it may be necessary to commit two squads at the same time using a bounding overwatch movement technique to effectively cover the entire structure and provide force protection.





b. Support Element. The purpose of the support element (except for the medic) is to provide immediate suppressive fire support to enable the assault element to close with the enemy. Suppressive fires must be closely controlled to avoid excessive expenditure of ammunition and prevent fratricide. The support element is normally controlled by the platoon sergeant or a senior squad leader and normally consists of the platoon’s crew-served weapons, light and medium antitank weapons systems, forward observer team, platoon medic, and any personnel not designated as part of the assault element (Figure 2-36). The support element provides both direct and indirect fire support and other assistance to advance the assault element. This support includes, but is not limited to, the following:



• Suppressing enemy weapons systems and obscuring the enemy’s observation within the objective building and adjacent structures.



• Isolating the objective building with direct and indirect fires to prevent enemy withdrawal, reinforcement, or counterattack.



• Obscuring enemy observation of obstacles en route to the objective and at the entry point of the objective during breaching operations.



• Destroying or suppressing enemy positions with direct fire weapons.



• Engaging armored vehicles.



• Securing cleared portions of the objective.



• Providing replacements for the assault element.



• Providing the resupply of ammunition and pyrotechnics.



• Bringing up specific equipment that the assault element could not carry in the initial assault.



• Treating and evacuating casualties, prisoners, and civilians.





NOTE



The platoon sergeant must be prepared to rapidly evacuate wounded from the objective area to the company casualty collection point (CCP). The use of ground ambulances may be impeded by rubble in the streets, barricades, and demolition of roads; therefore, litter teams could be used extensively. Also, snipers can affect medical evacuation from forward positions.





Figure 2-36: Platoon support element with squad integrated.





c. Breaching Element. The purpose of the breaching element is to clear and mark lanes through obstacles during movement, providing the assault element with access to an urban objective. The platoon leader organizes the force to ensure breaching elements are designated. One technique is to assign one fire team from the assault element as the breaching element. Alternatively, the breach can be conducted using an attached engineer or any member of the assault or support element who has had additional breach training.




2-43. MOVEMENT IN URBAN TERRAIN



As the lead element for the company when conducting movement, the platoon must be prepared to react to contact.

a. Platoon members must be ready to take cover and return fire immediately. They must also be alert for any signs or indications of the enemy and report promptly.



b. The rate of movement is controlled by the lead element based on the density of the urban terrain and enemy threat. In outlying or lightly defended areas, a mechanized infantry platoon may proceed along streets mounted, but send dismounted squads forward to reconnoiter key terrain (bridges, intersections or structural choke points).



c. Enemy action against the unit may come in the way of an ambush along a street, enfilade fire down the street, sniper fire from upper stories of buildings, or artillery and mortar fire when canalized. For protection from those types of threats, the platoon should move through buildings, along walls and other forms of cover, use tanks, BFV’s, as well as indirect and direct fire weapons to overwatch and support movement.



d. The platoon moves using a lead maneuver element (one squad on narrow streets and two squads on wide streets). These squads will move forward along the streets using buildings for cover when possible. They will scout danger areas and close with the enemy. An overwatching element (the rest of the platoon and the supporting weapons) will follow securing the flanks and rear while providing support to the point element. At any time the platoon leader may choose to rotate the point squad with an overwatching squad (Figure 2-37).





Figure 2-37: Movement down a street.





2-44. ATTACKING IN URBAN TERRAIN



As the culminating effort of a planned (deliberate) attack, or a result of a movement to contact, a meeting engagement or a chance contact during movement, the platoon may be required to be part of a company attack or conduct a platoon attack on an urban area or building.

a. The attack involves isolating the building to prevent the reinforcing or withdrawal of its defenders (normally planned at company level); suppressing the enemy with BFVs, tanks, machine gun and mortar fire; entering the building at the least defended point; and clearing the building. There must be close coordination between the isolation/support elements and the assault elements.



b. As the lead element in the company movement formation when a chance contact is made with the enemy (hasty attack), the platoon takes the following actions:



(1) Forward squad (or squads) will immediately return fire, get down, seek cover and suppress the enemy.



(2) Those squads not in direct fire contact will provide supporting fire with individual and crew-served weapons (to include tanks and BFVs, if attached). Engage known, then suspected, enemy positions.



(3) Provide a situation report to the commander.



(4) The commander will either direct the platoon to establish a support by fire position in order to allow another platoon to assault or, if the threat is small and disorganized, he will direct the platoon in contact to conduct a platoon attack of the enemy position (subparagraph c, below).



c. When conducting a deliberate attack of an urban objective there are three steps that must be considered, planned and coordinated in order to achieve success.



• Isolate the objective.



• Enter the building (secure a foothold).



• Clear the building (room by room, floor by floor).



(1) Isolation of the objective requires the seizing of dominant terrain in order to cut off enemy routes for reinforcing, supplying, or facilitating the withdrawal of its defenders. The intent is to completely dominate what comes and goes within the objective area and provide early warning for the assault element (Figure 2-38).





"483" height="346">



Figure 2-38: Infantry platoon with two tanks as support element, isolating the objective.





(2) As the assault element for the company, the platoon (or platoons) is responsible for entering and clearing the objective building. This method may involve creating a breach into the building and securing a foothold as well as killing, capturing or forcing the withdrawal of all enemy personnel within the structure. Squads and teams perform room clearing. The squad leader controls the maneuver of the two fire teams as they clear along hallways, stairways, and in rooms. (See Chapter 1.) The platoon leader alternates the squads as required, and maintains momentum, and ensures resupply of ammunition and water.



d. If a platoon is conducting an assault of a building independently, it should be organized with an assault element and a support element (Figure 2-39). The assault element, usually led by the platoon leader, normally consists of two squads with two fire teams each. The support element, usually controlled by the platoon sergeant, normally consists of one rifle squad equipped with antitank weapons, two medium machine gun crews, and attached forward observers. The support element must designate individuals to provide flank and rear security. In addition to its own support element, BFVs, tanks, and other company assets can support the platoon.





NOTE



Isolation of the surrounding area in conducted by the rest of the company.





Figure 2-39: Platoon attack of a building with two platoons isolating.





2-45. PLATOON ASSAULT OF A BUILDING



The assault force, regardless of size, must quickly and violently execute the assault and subsequent clearing operations. Once momentum has been gained, it is maintained to deny the enemy time to organize a more determined resistance on other floors or in other rooms. The small unit leaders are responsible for maintaining the momentum of the assault, controlling movement, yet not allowing the operation to become disorganized. Enemy obstacles may slow or stop forward movement. Leaders must maintain the momentum by rapidly creating a breach in the obstacle, or by redirecting the flow of the assault over or around the obstacles.

a. Approaches. All routes to the breach and or entry point are planned in advance. The best route is confirmed and selected during the leaders’ reconnaissance. The route should allow the assault element to approach the breach (entry) point from the enemy’s blind side, if possible.



b. Order of March. The assault team’s order of march to the breach point is determined by the method of breach and their intended actions at the breach (entry) point. This preparation must be completed prior to or in the last covered and concealed location before reaching the breach (entry) point. Establishing an order of march is done to aid the team leader with C2 and to minimize exposure time in open areas and at the entry point. An order of march technique is to number the assault team 1, 2, 3, and 4. The number 1 man should always be responsible for frontal/door security. If the breach has been conducted prior to their arrival the assault team quickly moves through the breach (entry) point. If a breach has not been made prior to their arrival at the breach (entry) point, and depending on the type of breach to be made, the team leader conducts the breach himself or signals forward the breach man/element. One option is to designate the squad leader as the breach man. If the breach man is part of the assault team, he is normally the last of the four men to enter the building or room. This method allows him to transition from his breaching task to his combat role.



(1) Ballistic Breach (Shot Gun). A suggested order of movement for a ballistic (shot gun) breach has the gunner up front, followed by the number 1 man, number 2 man, and then the number 3 man (team leader). After the door is breached, the gunner moves to the rear of the lineup and assumes the position of the number 4 man.



(2) Explosive Breach. A suggested order of movement for an explosive breach without engineer support is; number 1, number 3 (team leader), number 2, and then number 4 man. The number 1 man provides security at the entry point. The number 3 man (team leader) carries the demolition charge and places it. Number 4 provides rear security. After the demolition charge is placed, team members re-form in the original configuration and take cover around a corner or behind other protection. Team members can line up on either or both sides if there is adequate protection from the blast.



(3) Mechanical Breach. A suggested order of movement for a mechanical breach is the initial assault team in order, followed by the breach man/element. At the breach point the team leader will bring the breach element forward while the assault team provides local security. After the breach is made, the breach element moves aside and provides local security as the assault team enters the breach.



c. Security. Because of the three-dimensional threat associated with urban terrain, the assault element must maintain 360-degree security during movement to the breach (entry) point. If the assault element is to stop in the vicinity of the breach (entry) point to wait for the breach element to complete its task, the support element must maintain suppressive fire to protect the assault element.



d. Assault Locations. Entry at the top and fighting downward is the preferred method of clearing a building. This method forces the defenders down and out of the building where the support element can engage them. This method is only feasible, however, when access to an upper floor or rooftop can be gained from the windows or roofs of adjoining, secured buildings. Rooftops are treated as danger areas when surrounded by higher buildings from which enemy forces could engage the assault element. Helicopters should land only on those buildings that have a roof structure that can support their weight. If the structure cannot support the helicopter, soldiers can dismount as the helicopter hovers a few feet above the roof. Troops then breach the roof or common walls to gain entrance into the building. (If using explosives on the rooftop, ensure cover is available to the soldiers.) They may use ropes or other means to enter the lower floors through the holes created.





NOTE



Soldiers should consider the use of devices and techniques that allow them upper level access without using interior stairways. These devices and techniques include, but are not limited to, adjacent rooftops, fire escapes, portable ladders, and various soldier-assisted lifts.





e. Support Element. The support element isolates the building with direct and indirect fires to support the assault element’s move to the breach point. The support element covers mounted avenues of approach with antiarmor weapons, covers dismounted avenues of approach with automatic weapons, and suppresses enemy fires and neutralizes enemy positions to enable the breach team and assault element to move into position. The location of adjacent units must be considered in the emplacement of supporting fires.



(1) The support element uses smoke to obscure the movement of the breach team and assault element to the building. If possible, the smoke obscuration is maintained until the assault element has entered the building.



(2) Depending upon the ROE, just before the rush of the assault element, the support element increases suppressive fires on the objective and continues until masked by the advancing assault element. Once masked, fires are shifted to upper or lower windows and continued until the assault element has entered the building. At that time, fires are shifted to adjacent buildings to prevent enemy withdrawal or reinforcement.



(3) If the ROE are very restrictive, the use of supporting fires may be restricted to known enemy locations that have engaged the unit.



(4) The support element must also deal with civilians displaced by the assault, EPWs, and casualties.




2-46. CONSOLIDATION AND REORGANIZATION



The squad and platoon will conduct consolidation and reorganization immediately after each action where soldiers are engaged and ammunition is expended. Consolidation is the action taken by the squad or platoon to ensure its security, to prepare for a counterattack by the enemy, and to prepare to continue the mission. Consolidation in an urban environment must be quick in order to repel enemy counterattacks and to prevent the enemy from infiltrating back into cleared buildings or floors. After securing a floor (bottom, middle, or top), selected members of the unit are assigned to cover potential enemy counterattack routes to the building. Priority must be given initially to securing the direction of attack. Security elements alert the unit and place a heavy volume of fire on enemy forces approaching the unit. Reorganization occurs after consolidation. These actions prepare the unit to continue the mission by ensuring key leadership positions are filled and important weapon systems are manned. Many reorganization actions occur simultaneously during the consolidation of the objective.

a. Consolidation Actions. Squads assume hasty defensive positions to gain security immediately after the objective has been seized or cleared. Squads that performed missions as assault elements should be prepared to assume an overwatch mission and to support another assault element. Units must guard all avenues of approach leading into their area. These may include:



• Enemy mouse-holes between adjacent buildings.



• Covered routes to the building.



• Underground routes into the basement.



• Approaches over adjoining roofs.



b. Reorganization Actions. After consolidation, leaders ensure the following actions are taken:



• Resupply and redistribute ammunition.



• Mark buildings to indicate to friendly forces that they have been cleared.



• Treat and evacuate wounded personnel. Once the objective area is secure, begin evacuating noncombatants then enemy wounded.



• Process EPWs.



• Segregate and safeguard noncombatants.



• Reestablish the chain of command.



c. Continuation of the Assault. If the unit is going to continue with its original mission, its “be prepared/on order” mission, or receives a new mission, it must accomplish the following:



(1) The momentum must be maintained. Keeping momentum is a critical factor in clearing operations. The enemy is not allowed to move to its next set of prepared positions or to prepare new positions.



(2) The support element pushes replacements, ammunition, and supplies forward to the assault element.



(3) Security for cleared areas must be established IAW the OPORD or TACSOP.



(4) The support element must displace forward to ensure that it is in place to provide support to the assault element, such as isolation of the new objective.





CHAPTER 3





Defensive Operations



“[Captain] Liebschev prepared his defenses with extraordinary thoroughness, choosing only to defend the northern half of the town. The southern half was turned into a nightmare of trapped and mined houses some of which were blown into the streets to form road blocks and others were blown up to clear arcs of fire. All his strong points were linked by what is best described as вЂ˜mouse holing’ from house to house. All approaches to the defended sector were either heavily mined or under concealed enfilade fire. The main approach into the town square was left attractively unobstructed… The 2nd Canadian Brigade was given the task of clearing a way through the town and was forced to fight its way from house to house on not more than a 250-yard front. Every building, when taken, had to be occupied to stop the Germans infiltrating back into it again after the leading troops had passed on. The fighting was at such close quarters that artillery support was impossible…”



Extracted from The Battle for Italy

By General W. G. F. Jackson





SECTION I. DEFENSIVE CONSIDERATIONS



Full spectrum operations require that units be prepared to defend in urban areas. Before making a decision to defend urban areas, commanders at all levels should consider the issues discussed in this chapter.


3-1. REASONS FOR DEFENDING URBAN AREAS



The worldwide increase in urban sprawl has made it virtually impossible for forces conducting operations to avoid cities and towns. For various reasons, these areas must be defended.

a. Certain urban areas contain strategic industrial, transportation, or economic complexes that must be defended. Capitals and cultural centers may be defended for strictly psychological or national morale purposes even when they do not offer a tactical advantage to the defender. Because of the sprawl of such areas, significant combat power is required for their defense. The decision to defend these complexes is made by political authorities or the theater commander.



b. The defenders’ need to shift and concentrate combat power, and to move large amounts of supplies over a wide battle area may require retention of vital transportation centers. Since most transportation centers serve large areas, the commander must defend the urban area to control such centers.



c. Most avenues of approach are straddled by small towns every few kilometers and must be controlled by defending forces. These areas can be used as battle positions or strongpoints. Blocked streets covered by mortar and or artillery fire can canalize attacking armor into mined areas or zones covered by antiarmor fire. If an attacker tries to bypass an urban area, he may encounter an array of tank-killing weapons. To clear such an area, the attacker must sacrifice speed and momentum, and expend many resources. A city or town can easily become a major obstacle.



d. A well-trained force defending an urban area can inflict major losses on a numerically superior attacker. The defender can conserve the bulk of his combat power so it is available for use in open terrain. The defenders remaining in urban areas perform an economy-of-force role.



e. Aerial photography, imagery, and sensory devices cannot detect forces deployed in cities. Well-emplaced CPs, reserves, CSS complexes, and combat forces are hard to detect.




3-2. REASONS FOR NOT DEFENDING URBAN AREAS



Reasons for not defending urban areas include the following:

a. The location of the urban area does not support the overall defensive plan. If the urban area is too far forward or back in a unit’s defensive sector, is isolated, or is not astride an enemy’s expected avenue of approach, the commander may choose not to defend it.



b. Nearby terrain allows the enemy to bypass on covered or concealed routes. Some urban areas, mainly smaller ones, are bypassed by main road and highway systems.



c. Structures within the urban area do not adequately protect the defenders. Extensive areas of lightly built or flammable structures offer little protection. Urban areas near flammable or hazardous industrial areas, such as refineries or chemical plants, should not be defended because of increased danger of fire to the defenders.



d. Dominating terrain is close to the urban area. If the urban area can be dominated by an enemy force occupying this terrain, the commander may choose to defend from there rather than the urban area. This applies mainly to small urban areas such as a village.



e. Better fields of fire exist outside the urban area. The commander may choose to base all or part of his defense on long-range fields of fire outside an urban area. This applies mainly to armor-heavy forces defending sectors with multiple, small, urban areas surrounded by open terrain, such as agricultural areas with villages.



f. The urban area has cultural, religious, or historical significance. The area may have been declared an “open city” in which case, by international law, it is demilitarized and must be neither defended nor attacked. The attacking force must assume civil administrative control and treat the civilians as noncombatants in an occupied country. The defender must immediately evacuate and cannot arm the civilian population. A city can be declared open only before it is attacked. The presence of large numbers of noncombatants, hospitals, or wounded personnel may also affect the commander’s decision not to defend an urban area.




3-3. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS



The basic fundamentals of defense do not change in an urban environment. In urban combat, the defender does possess key advantages over the attacker. The defender can shape the battlefield by maximizing the natural restrictions and obstacles found in the restrictive terrain of the urban environment. U.S. forces may not wish to inflict collateral damage on the urban terrain they are defending but the very nature of conducting an urban defense may lead to high-intensity conditions on the urban battlefield and to extensive collateral damage. Typically, U.S. forces should not expect enemy forces attacking in urban terrain to be bound by restrictive ROE and should therefore not expect to accrue any of the advantages that a defender might have if the attacker is restricted in the application of force.


SECTION II. MISSION, ENEMY, TERRAIN, TROOPS AND TIME AVAILABLE,

CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS



The defense of an urban area should be organized around key terrain features, buildings, and areas that preserve the integrity of the defense and provide the defender ease of movement. The defender must organize and plan his defense considering factors of mission, enemy, terrain, troops and time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC). Procedures and principles for planning and organizing the defense of an urban area are the same as for other defensive operations. In developing a defensive plan, the defender considers METT-TC factors with emphasis on fire support, preparation time, work priorities, and control measures. Planning for the defense of an urban area must be detailed and centralized. As in the offense, execution is decentralized as the battle develops, and the enemy forces assault the buildings and rooms. Therefore, it is imperative that all leaders understand the mission end-state and the commanders’ intent, two levels up.


3-4. MISSION



Commanders and leaders must receive, analyze, and understand the mission before they begin planning. They may receive the mission as a FRAGO or as a formal OPORD, and must analyze all specified and implied tasks. Depending on mission requirements, an infantry unit at brigade and battalion level must be prepared to defend as part of a larger force or independently; companies and below normally defend as part of a larger force. Mission analysis for defense in urban terrain will essentially be the same as for other defensive operations. Detailed IPB is essential and must include building construction; routes, including underground systems; civilian communications; and utilities. A hasty defense may be conducted in any of the defensive situations described in this chapter, immediately after offensive operations, or when a higher state of security is warranted during stability operations or support operations. The major difference between a hasty defense and a deliberate defense is in the amount of time for preparation. Similar to offensive operations, units must be prepared to transition to offensive or stability and support missions, and back.


3-5. ENEMY



Units must also analyze the type of enemy force they may encounter. If the attacker is mostly dismounted infantry, the greatest danger is allowing him to gain a foothold. If the attacker is mostly armor or mounted motorized infantry, the greatest danger is that he will mass direct fire and destroy the defender’s positions. If the threat is primarily asymmetrical, force protection measures must be enhanced.


3-6. TERRAIN AND WEATHER



Specific defensive considerations are discussed in this paragraph. Terrain in urban areas is three-dimensional; the defender must make use of the entire battle space:

• Surface (ground level, for example streets and parks).



• Supersurface (buildings, both interior and exterior).



• Subterranean (subways and sewers).



Analysis of all man-made and natural terrain features is critical when planning to defend in urban terrain. The type of urban area in which it will be operating affects the unit’s defensive plan.

a. Observation and Fields of Fire. Although concealment and cover will be plentiful, observation will be limited. Attacking forces generally advance by crossing streets and open areas between buildings where they are exposed to fires from concealed positions.



(1) Weapons and Range. Units must position weapons to obtain maximum effect and mutual supporting fire. This allows for long-range engagements out to the maximum effective ranges. FOs should be well above street level to adjust fires on the enemy at maximum range. Observed fire will be very difficult in densely constructed areas. Fires and FPFs should be preplanned and, if possible and ROE permit, preregistered on the most likely approaches to allow for their rapid shifting to threatened areas.



(2) Limited Visibility. Units can expect the attacker to use limited visibility conditions to conduct necessary operations to sustain or gain daylight momentum. The following should be considered:



• Unoccupied areas that can be observed and covered by fire during daylight may have to be occupied or patrolled at night.



• Remote sensors and early warning devices should be employed in dead space and on avenues of approach.



• The artificial illumination available in urban terrain should be considered for use during the defense.



Responding to night probes with direct fire weapons should be avoided, as this gives away the location of the positions.



b. Cover and Concealment. Battle positions should be prepared using the protective cover of walls, floors, and ceilings. Units will continue to improve positions using materials on hand. Units prepare the terrain for movement between positions and can reduce exposure by—



• Using prepared breaches through buildings.



• Moving through reconnoitered and marked subterranean systems.



• Using trenches.



• Using the concealment offered by smoke and darkness to cross open areas.



c. Obstacles. An urban area is by its very nature an obstacle and or an obstruction. The series of man-made structures inherent in urban terrain canalizes and impedes an attack.



d. Key Terrain. Key terrain is any place where seizure, retention, or control affords a marked advantage to either enemy or friendly forces. Primary examples of key terrain are ports, airfields, bridges over canals or rivers, building complexes, or parks. Urban areas are unusual in that the population of the area itself may be considered key terrain. The identification of key terrain allows the defender to select his defensive positions and assists in determining the enemy’s objectives. A special kind of key terrain is the nodes that are found in urban areas. These include governmental centers, power distribution facilities, and communication hubs. These nodes may have to be protected by the defender from asymmetrical as well as conventional threats.



(1) Villages. Villages are often on choke points in valleys, dominating the only high-speed avenue of approach through the terrain (Figure 3-1). If the buildings in such a village are well constructed and provide good protection against both direct and indirect fires, a formidable defense can be mounted by placing a company in the town, while controlling close and dominating terrain with other battalion task force elements.





Figure 3-1: Village.





(2) Strip Areas. Strip areas consist of houses, stores, and factories and are built along roads or down valleys between towns and villages (Figure 3-2). They afford the defender the same advantages as villages. If visibility is good and enough effective fields of fire are available, a unit acting as a security force need occupy only a few strong positions spread out within the strip. This will deceive the enemy, when engaged at long ranges, into thinking the strip is an extensive defensive line. Strip areas often afford covered avenues of withdrawal to the flanks once the attacking force is deployed and before the security force becomes decisively engaged.





Figure 3-2: Strip area.





(3) Towns and Small Cities. Small forces can gain an advantage in combat power when defending a small city or town (Figure 3-3) that is a choke point if it places tanks, BFVs, TOWs, Javelins, and Dragons on positions dominating critical approaches, when facing a predominantly armored enemy. To deny the enemy the ability to bypass the town or city, the defending force must control key terrain and coordinate with adjacent forces. Reserve forces should be placed where they can quickly reinforce critical areas. Obstacles and minefields assist in slowing and canalizing the attacker.





Figure 3-3: Towns and small cities.





(4) Large Cities. In large cities, units must consider that the terrain is restrictive due to large buildings that are normally close together (Figure 3-4). This situation requires a higher density of troops and smaller defensive sectors than in natural open terrain. Units occupy defensive frontages about one-third the size of those in open areas.





Figure 3-4: Large cities.





e. Avenues of Approach. The defender must not only consider the surface (streets, boulevards, parks) avenues of approach into and out of the urban area, but also supersurface (interior and exterior of buildings) and subterranean avenues of approach. The defender normally has the advantage. He knows the urban area and can move rapidly from position to position through buildings and underground passages. Control of these above- and below-ground avenues of approach becomes more critical when the defense of nodes must be oriented against terrorism and sabotage.




3-7. TIME AVAILABLE



Units must organize and establish priorities of work, depending upon the time available. Many tasks can be accomplished simultaneously, but priorities for preparation should be in accordance with the commander’s order. A sample priority of work sequence follows:

• Establish security and communications.



• Assign sectors of responsibility and final protective fires.



• Clear fields of fire.



• Select and prepare initial fighting positions.



• Establish and mark routes between positions.



• Emplace obstacles and mines.



• Improve fighting positions.




3-8. TROOPS AVAILABLE



The defensive employment of troops in urban areas is governed by all METT-TC factors and on the ROE. The defender has a terrain advantage and can resist the attacker with much smaller forces.


SECTION III. DEFENSIVE FRAMEWORK AND ORGANIZATION



This section discusses the defensive framework and organization used during the planning and execution of defensive UO.


3-9. DEFENSIVE FRAMEWORK



Similar to offensive operations, the brigade will be the primary headquarters that will be task-organized to conduct defensive urban operations. The brigade can conduct the full range of defensive operations within a single urban area or in an AO that contains several small towns and cities using the elements shown in the defensive urban operational framework in Figure 3-5. The elements are similar to those in offensive operations in that the brigade commander attempts to set the conditions for tactical success. Isolation of the brigade by the enemy is avoided through security operations; defensive missions are assigned subordinate task forces in order to achieve the commander’s intent and desired end-state; and then the brigade transitions to stability and or support operations. During urban defensive operations, the transition to stability and support operations may not be clear to the soldiers conducting the operations. Commanders must offset this tendency with clear mission type orders and updated ROE. Again, as in offensive operations, the elements are not phases. They may occur simultaneously or sequentially. Well planned and executed defensive operations will have all four elements present. During defensive operations the brigade commander seeks to:

• Avoid being isolated by the enemy.



• Defend only the decisive terrain, institutions, or infrastructure.



• Conduct counter or spoiling attacks to retain the initiative.



Battalion TFs and below conducts defensive operations by conducting counterreconnaissance missions and patrols (shaping/avoiding isolation); assigning battle positions or sectors to subordinate units (dominating); and consolidating/reorganizing and preparing for follow-on missions (transitioning).


3-10. COMMAND AND CONTROL



In all defensive situations, commanders should position themselves well forward so that they can control the action. In urban terrain, this is even more critical due to obstacles, poor visibility, difficulty in communication, and intense fighting. Other key leaders may be placed in positions to report to the commander and to make critical, time-sensitive decisions.





Figure 3-5: Defensive urban operational framework.





a. Graphic Control Measures. The use of graphic control measures to synchronize actions become even more important to mission accomplishment in an urban environment (Figure 3-6). Phase lines can be used to report the enemy’s location or to control the advance of counterattacking units. Principal streets, rivers, and railroad lines are suitable phase lines, which should be clearly and uniformly marked on the near or far side of the street or open area. Checkpoints aid in reporting locations and controlling movement. Contact points are used to designate specific points where units make physical contact. Target reference points (TRPs) can facilitate fire control. Many of these points can be designated street intersections. These and other control measures ensure coordination throughout the chain of command.





Figure 3-6: Graphic control measures.





b. Command Post Facilities. Command post (CP) facilities should be located underground, if possible, or in solidly constructed buildings. Their vulnerability requires all-round security. Since each facility may have to secure itself, it should be near the reserve for added security. When collocated with another unit, command post facilities may not need to provide their own security. Also, a simplified organization for command posts is required for ease of movement. Since rubble often hinders movement of tracked and wheeled vehicles, the CP must be prepared to backpack communications and other needed equipment for operations. Identification of alternate CP locations and routes to them must also be accomplished.



c. Communications Restrictions. Radio communications is initially the primary means of communication for controlling the defense of an urban area and for enforcing security. Structures and a high concentration of electrical power lines may degrade radio communication in urban areas. Wire is emplaced and used as the primary means of communications as time permits. However, wire can be compromised if interdicted by the enemy. Messengers can be used as another means of communication. Visual signals may also be used but are often not effective because of the screening effects of buildings and walls. Signals must be planned, widely disseminated, and understood by all assigned and attached units. Increased battle noise makes the effective use of sound signals difficult.




3-11. ORGANIZATION AND PREPARATION OF THE DEFENSE



The defensive organization described in this paragraph will likely be used against a conventional enemy force that may threaten U.S. forces with mechanized and dismounted Infantry supported by other combined arms. This defensive organization may also occur in a brigade area of operation (AO) where there are multiple threats. For example, one part of the AO may require linear features; other parts may require the use of other defensive techniques, such as a perimeter defense, against different types of threats in the same brigade AO. METT-TC factors and the ROE determine how units plan, prepare, and execute the defense. The defense is organized into three areas?the security force area, main battle area, and rear area (Figure 3-7). Units defending in urban areas may have missions in any one of these areas, depending on the nature of the operation. Infantry units are well suited to conduct defensive operations in close urban terrain where engagement ranges will be short, where there is abundant cover and concealment, and where the enemy’s assault must be repelled.





Figure 3-7: Organization of the defense.





a. Patterns of Defense. Of the two patterns of defense, area and mobile, the area defense will probably be the pattern most used since many of the reasons for defending on urban terrain are focused on retaining terrain. The mobile defense pattern is more focused on the enemy and the commander may decide to use it based on his estimate of the situation. Many defenses may include a combination of both. In large urban areas, the concept of defensive operations may be mobile and exploit depth, with the defender concentrating on moving forces from key terrain features or buildings to other similar features. The defender must seek to disrupt the enemy throughout all phases of battle.



b. General Concept of the Defense. Planning of the defense must be detailed and centralized while execution is decentralized. In an urban area, the defender must take advantage of inherent cover and concealment afforded by the urban terrain. He must also consider restrictions to the attacker’s ability to maneuver and observe. By using the terrain and fighting from well-prepared and mutually supporting positions, a defending force can inflict heavy losses on, delay, block, or fix a much larger attacking force. The defense of an urban area should be organized around key terrain features, buildings, and areas that preserve the integrity of the defense and that provide the defender ease of movement. The defender must organize and plan his defense by considering obstacles, avenues of approach, key terrain, observation and fields of fire, cover and concealment, (OCOKA) and the considerations in this paragraph. Detailed knowledge of the terrain by the defender allows him to force an attacker to expend exorbitant amounts of time, supplies, equipment, and manpower.



(1) Reconnaissance. To obtain the detailed knowledge that they need, the commanders and staffs need to conduct a reconnaissance of the defensive area. The amount of time spent and the level of detail obtained will vary greatly between a deliberate defense and a hasty defense. The defender must identify the following:



• Positions that enable him to place suppressive fires on the enemy.



• Covered and concealed routes for friendly elements to move between positions (subways and sewers).



• Structures that dominate large areas.



• Areas such as parks, boulevards, rivers, highways, and railroads where antiarmor weapons have fields of fire.



• Firing positions for mortars.



• Command locations that offer cover, concealment, and ease of command and control.



• Protected storage areas for supplies.



(2) Security Operations. The defensive battle normally begins with a combined arms force conducting security operations well forward of the main body. Operations consist of security, reconnaissance, and counterreconnaissance tasks. Counterreconnaissance missions to support these operations employ ambushes, mines, obstacles, deception, security patrols, OPs, indirect fires, camouflage, demonstrations, and other measures to destroy or deceive the enemy’s reconnaissance elements. Again, urban areas are well suited for infantry counterreconnaissance operations because of the abundance of cover and concealment that permits infantry to move by stealth.



c. Main Battle Area. The decisive battle is usually fought in the main battle area (MBA). Depending on the threat, units can deploy on the forward edges of the urban area or in battle positions in depth. In either case, the defense is made stronger by including forces that are defending on close terrain or on the flanks into the defensive scheme.



(1) Size of Battle Positions. The size and location of battle positions within the area of operations depends mainly on the type of enemy encountered and the ability to move between positions to block threatened areas. It may be desirable to place small antiarmor elements, secured by infantry, on the forward edges while the main defense is deployed in depth.



(2) Considerations. Defensive positions on the forward edge of a city or town should:



• Provide early warning of the enemy’s advance.



• Engage the enemy at long range.



• Deceive the enemy as to the true location of the defense.



(3) Sectors. Depending on the factors of METT-TC, units may also assign sectors to defend instead of battle positions. In certain instances, the units may employ both. Sectors would normally be assigned when blocks and streets provide a grid type pattern and boundaries can be clearly delineated.



(4) Frontages. Infantry units will normally occupy less terrain in urban areas. For example, an infantry company, which might occupy 1,500 to 2,000 meters in open terrain, is usually restricted to a frontage of 300 to 800 meters in urban areas. The density of buildings and rubble and street patterns will dictate the frontage of the unit (Table 3-1).



Table 3-1: Approximate frontages and depths in large urban areas.





(5) Selection of Buildings. Buildings that add most to the general plan of defense are chosen for occupation. Mutual support between these positions is vital to prevent the attacker from maneuvering and outflanking positions, making them untenable. Buildings chosen for occupation as defensive positions should:



• Offer good protection.



• Have strong floors to keep the structure from collapsing under the weight of debris.



• Have thick walls.



• Be constructed of nonflammable materials (avoid wood).



• Be strategically located (corner buildings and prominent structures).



• Be adjacent to streets, alleys, vacant lots, and park sites. These buildings usually provide better fields of fire and are more easily tied in with other buildings.



• Be covered by friendly fire and offer good escape routes.



(6) Occupation of Positions. See paragraph 3-11 and Chapter 1, Section IV.



(7) Obstacles. Obstacles are easily constructed in an urban area. An urban area itself is an obstacle since it canalizes and impedes an attack. Likely avenues of approach should be blocked by obstacles and covered by fire (Figure 3-8). Units must hinder or prevent enemy maneuver without interfering with its own maneuver elements. Therefore, the battalion usually detonates cratering charges at key street locations on order. Mines are laid on the outskirts of the urban area or the sector and along routes the unit will not use. Barriers and obstacles are normally emplaced in three belts, consistent with the ROE. All avenues of approach (three-dimensional) must be denied. Units must not overlook the use of field-expedient materials, such as cars, light poles, and so on, or the emplacement of command-detonated antipersonnel mines and antitank mines. Commanders must clearly understand the ROE and what they will be permitted to emplace. When necessary, obstacles can be emplaced without mines and covered by fire.



(a) First Belt. The first obstacle belt is at the nearest buildings across from and parallel to the main defensive position (MDP). This belt consists of wire and improvised barriers to include: building interiors, subterranean avenues of approach, and exterior areas, such as open areas, danger areas, and dead space. The barriers and obstacles are covered by long-range fires. This belt impedes enemy movement, breaks up and disorganizes attack formations, and inflicts casualties and is protective in nature.



(b) Second Belt. The second obstacle belt is placed between the first belt and the MDP buildings, but out of hand grenade range from defensive positions. It impedes movement, canalizes the enemy into the best fields of fire, breaks up attack formations, and inflicts casualties. This belt is not meant to stop enemy soldiers permanently. It should be constructed efficiently to give the most benefit?not to be an impenetrable wall. It consists mainly of wire obstacles, improvised barriers, road craters, and mine fields. It should include command-detonated Claymores. Triple-strand concertina is placed along the machine gun final protective line (FPL), as marked earlier IAW unit SOP, to slow the enemy on the FPL and to allow the machine gun to be used effectively.



(c) Third Belt. The third obstacle belt is the defensive position’s denial belt. It consists of wire obstacles placed around, through, and in the defensive buildings and close-in mine fields as well as in subterranean accesses. It impedes and complicates the enemy’s ability to gain a foothold in the defensive area. Command-detonated Claymores should be used extensively. Claymores should be placed so as not to cause friendly casualties when detonated.





Figure 3-8: Example of urban obstacles.





(8) Rubbling. If they have the authority and the ROE permit, commanders also decide if buildings should be rubbled to increase fields of fire. However, rubbling the buildings too soon or rubbling too many may disclose exact locations and destroy cover from direct fire. Because rubbling may take more resources than are available to units, careful consideration of available resources must be made prior to rubbling. Additionally, care must be taken not to rubble areas that are necessary to support operations, such as MSRs. Buildings are normally rubbled with engineer assistance; engineers will usually employ explosives and engineer equipment to accomplish this task. If available, armored vehicles can be used to rubble buildings.



(9) Fire Hazards. The defender’s detailed knowledge of the terrain permits him to avoid areas that are likely to be fire hazards. All urban areas are vulnerable to fire, especially those with many wooden buildings. The defender can deliberately set fires?



• To disrupt and disorganize the attackers.



• To canalize the attackers into more favorable engagement areas.



• To obscure the attacker’s observation.



Likewise, the enemy may cause fires to confuse, disrupt, or constrain friendly forces and efforts. Units should anticipate this possibility and ensure that fire-fighting equipment is on hand when conducting these types of operations. Battalion S4s can move sand and water to buildings. The S5 can coordinate for usage of local fire-fighting equipment. Defensive positions should not be located atop known gas lines, oil storage tanks, or other highly flammable areas.



(10) Actions on Contact. When enemy forces enter and maneuver to seize initial objectives, the defender should employ all available fires to destroy and suppress the direct-fire weapons that support the ground attack. Tanks and enemy APCs should be engaged as soon as they come within the effective range of antiarmor weapons. As the enemy attack develops, the actions of small-unit leaders assume increased importance. Squad and platoon leaders are often responsible for fighting independent battles. Thus, it is important that all leaders understand their commander’s concept of the defense. Situational awareness must be maintained and where the enemy’s efforts are likely to result in a gaining a foothold, violent counterattacks must be employed to deny him access into the MBA.



(11) Employment of a Reserve. The unit defensive plan must always consider the employment of a reserve. The reserve force should be prepared to counterattack to regain key positions, to block enemy penetrations, to protect the flanks, or to assist by fire in the disengagement and withdrawal of positions. During urban combat, a reserve force—



• Normally consists of infantry.



• Must be as mobile as possible.



• May be a company or platoon at battalion level; a squad or platoon at company level.



• May be supported by tanks or other armored vehicles.



• Should be positioned as close as possible to the place where it is anticipated being employed.



(12) Counterattacks. All elements should be prepared to counterattack. The best counterattack force is a small, infantry-heavy element supported by BFVs and or tanks, if available. They should be prepared to counterattack to regain key positions, to block enemy penetrations, to provide flank protection, and to assist by fire the disengagement and withdrawal of endangered positions. It is especially important for enemy footholds to be repelled violently. When an element is committed to counterattack to reinforce a unit, it may be attached to the unit in whose sector the counterattack is taking place. Otherwise, the counterattack becomes the main effort. This makes coordination easier, especially if the counterattack goes through the unit’s positions.



(13) Defense During Conditions of Limited Visibility. Commanders can expect the attacker to use conditions of limited visibility to conduct operations to sustain or gain daylight momentum.



(a) Commanders should employ the following measures to defend against attacks during limited visibility:



• Defensive positions and crew-served weapons should be shifted from an alternate position or a hasty security position just before dark to deceive the enemy as to the exact location of the primary position.



• Unoccupied areas between units, which can be covered by observed fire during daylight, may have to be occupied, blocked, or patrolled during limited visibility. Early warning devices and obstacles need to be installed.



• Radar, remote sensors, and night observation devices should be emplaced to cover streets and open areas. Thermal imagery devices, such as the one found on the TOW weapon system, are excellent for observation during limited visibility.



• Noise-making devices, tanglefoot tactical wire, and LP/OPs should be positioned on all avenues of approach for early warning and to detect infiltration.



• Artificial illumination should be planned, to include the use of street lamps, stadium lights, pyrotechnics, visible and IR ILLUM, and so forth.



• Indirect fire weapons, grenade launchers, and hand grenades should be used when defenses are probed to avoid disclosure of defensive positions.



• Tank and BFV platoons must know the locations of friendly positions. The use of thermal recognition signals and markers can help decrease the possibility of fratricide.



(b) Commanders should initiate FPFs through the use of a planned signal. Crew-served weapons, armored vehicle-mounted weapons if available, and individual riflemen fire within their assigned sectors. Grenades and command-detonated mines should be used to supplement other fires as the enemy approaches the positions.



(c) Defenders should move to daylight positions before BMNT. Buildings should be marked from the friendly side IAW unit SOP in order to facilitate movement. Armored vehicles can be used to cover the movement of friendly troops.



d. Rear Area. Units may be deployed in the rear area to protect CSS elements and to defend high payoff assets, lines of communications, C2 nodes, and other key locations. Units will employ the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) discussed in Sections V, VI, and VII.




3-12. PRIORITIES OF WORK



Priorities of work in during defensive operations in urban areas are the same as other defensive operations. Specific considerations for a defense on urbanized terrain are discussed in this paragraph.

a. Establish Security. Units should quickly establish all-round security by placing forces on likely avenues of approaches. The level of security (50 percent, 30 percent, and so forth) is determined by METT-TC factors. The reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance plan should be emphasized. While security is being established, civilians located within the defensive area need to be identified and evacuated.



b. Assign Areas of Responsibility. Boundaries define sectors of responsibility. They include areas where units may fire and maneuver without interference or coordination with other units. Responsibility for primary avenues of approach should never be split. In areas of semidetached construction, where observation and movement are less restricted, boundaries should be established along alleys or streets to include both sides of a street in a single sector. Where buildings present a solid front along streets, boundaries may have to extend to one side of the street. Battle positions should also be specifically assigned, as required by METT-TC. Commanders and leaders should specify which buildings comprise the battle positions or strongpoints. Positions should be clearly designated so that no doubt remains as to which elements will have responsibility for occupation or control.



c. Clear Fields of Fire. In urban areas, units may need to rubble certain buildings and structures to provide greater protection and fields of fire to the defender (see paragraph 3-11c(8), Rubbling). If the ceiling of a lower-story room can support the weight of the rubble, collapsing the top floor of a building before the battle starts may afford better protection against indirect fires. Rubbling an entire building can increase the fields of fire and create an obstacle to enemy movement. Planning must be extensive so that rubbled buildings will not interfere with planned routes of withdrawal or counterattack. Vehicles may also have to be moved to clear fields of fire.



d. Select and Prepare Initial Fighting Positions. Units should select positions in depth. Units should prepare positions as soon as troops arrive and continue preparing as long as positions are occupied. Enemy infiltration or movement sometimes occurs between and behind friendly positions. Therefore, each position must be organized for all-round defense. The defender should also:



(1) Make minimum changes to the outside appearance of buildings where positions are located.



(2) Screen or block windows and other openings to keep the enemy from seeing in and tossing in hand grenades. This must be done so that the enemy cannot tell which openings the defenders are behind.



(3) Remove combustible material to limit the danger of fire. Fires are dangerous to defenders and create smoke that could conceal attacking troops. For these reasons, defenders should remove all flammable materials and stockpile fire-fighting equipment (water, sand, and so forth). The danger of fire also influences the type of ammunition used in the defense. Tracers or incendiary rounds should not be used extensively if threat of fire exists.



(4) Turn off electricity and gas. Both propane and natural gas are explosive. Natural gas is also poisonous, displaces oxygen, and is not filtered by a protective mask. Propane gas, although not poisonous, is heavier than air. If it leaks into an enclosed area, it displaces the oxygen and causes suffocation. Gas mains and electricity should be shut off at the facility that serves the urban area.



(5) Locate positions so as not to establish a pattern. Units should avoid obvious firing locations like towers and buildings prohibited for use by the Law of Land Warfare, such as churches.



(6) Camouflage positions.



(7) Reinforce positions with all materials available such as mattresses, furniture, and so forth. The S4 will have to arrange for as much protective material as possible. Caution should be taken as mattresses and fabric furniture are flammable. Drawers and cabinets should be filled with earth or sand to provide cover. Vehicles, such as trucks or buses can be placed over positions outside buildings. Flammable fluids should be drained. Other flammables, such as seats should be removed, and the gas tank filled with water.



(8) Block stairwells and doorways with wire or other material to prevent enemy movement. Create holes between floors and rooms to allow covered and concealed movement within a building.



(9) Prepare range cards, fire plans, and sector sketches.



(10) Look at how basements may be used. If grazing fire can be achieved from basement widows, emplace machine guns in basements. When basements are not used, they should be sealed to prevent enemy entry.



(11) Cache resupply of ammunition, water, and medical supplies.



e. Establish Communications. Commanders should consider the effects of urban areas on communications when they allocate time to establish communications. Line-of-sight limitations affect both visual and radio communications. Wire laid at street level is easily damaged by rubble and vehicle traffic. The noise of urban area combat is much louder than in other areas, making sound signals difficult to hear. Therefore, the time needed to establish an effective communications system in urban terrain may be greater than in other terrain. Units should consider the following techniques when planning for communications:



• Emplace line of sight radios and retransmission sites on the upper floors of buildings.



• Use existing telephone systems. However, telephones are not secure even though many telephone cables are underground.



• Use messengers at all levels since they are the most secure means of communications.



• Lay wire through buildings for maximum protection, if the assets are available.



f. Emplace Obstacles and Mines. To save time and resources in preparing the defense, commanders must emphasize using all available materials (automobiles, railcars, rubble) to create obstacles. Civilian construction equipment and materials must be located and inventoried. This equipment can be used with engineer assets or in place of damaged equipment. Coordination must be made with proper civilian officials before use.



(1) Engineers must be able to provide advice and resources as to the employment of obstacles and mines. The principles for employing mines and obstacles do not change in the defense of an urban area; however, techniques do change. For example, burying and concealing mines in streets are hard due to concrete and asphalt. Consider placing mines in sandbags so they cannot be seen and also using fake mines placed in sandbags in order to deceive the enemy.



(2) FASCAM may be effective on the outskirts of an urban area or in parks; however, in a city core, areas may be too restrictive. Mines and obstacles must be emplaced consistent with the ROE. Any antipersonnel mines must be command-detonated. Riot control agents may be employed to control noncombatant access into defensive areas, if permission is granted by the National Command Authority (NCA).



g. Improve Fighting Positions. When time permits, all positions, to include supplementary and alternate positions, should be reinforced with sandbags and provided overhead cover. Attached engineers can help in this effort by providing advice and assisting with construction.



h. Establish and Mark Routes Between Positions. Reconnaissance by all defending elements will assist in route selection for use by defenders moving between positions. Movement is crucial in fighting in urban areas. Early selection and marking of routes adds to the defender’s advantages.




SECTION IV. BRIGADE DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS



This section discusses planning considerations and provides tactics and techniques for the planning of brigade defensive UO.


3-13. DEFENSIVE PLANNING



In planning a defense in an urban area, the brigade staff must identify the following:

• Positions and areas that must be controlled to prevent enemy infiltration.



• Sufficient covered and concealed routes for movement and repositioning of forces.



• Structures and areas that dominate the urban area.



• Areas such as parks and broad streets that provide fields of fire for tanks and antiarmor weapons.



• Position areas for artillery assets.



• C2 locations.



• Protected areas for CSS activities.



• Suitable structures that are defensible and provide protection for defenders.



• Contingency plans in the event that the brigade must conduct breakout operations.



• Plans for rapid reinforcement.



a. Units defending in urban areas must prepare their positions for all around defense. The brigade must employ aggressive security operations that include surveillance of surface and subsurface approaches. The brigade must constantly patrol and use OPs and sensors to maintain effective security. Special measures must be taken to control possible civilian personnel who support the enemy or enemy combatants who have intermixed with the local population. Consideration must also be given to the protection of non-combatants that remain in the AO, and contingency actions in the event that the situation deteriorates and requires their evacuation.



b. Defensive fire support in urban operations must take advantage of the impact of indirect fires on the enemy before he enters the protection of the urban area. Fire support officers at all levels must coordinate and rehearse contingencies that are inherent to nonlinear fire support coordination measures and clearance of fires. Mutually supporting observation plans for daylight and periods of limited visibility must account for the degradation of lasers in well-lit urban areas. The brigade fire support officer also plans and coordinates nonlethal capabilities for the brigade Civil affairs and PSYOP assets should be coordinated with the appropriate command and control warfare/information operations headquarters.




3-14. INTEGRATING THE URBAN AREA INTO THE DEFENSE



The brigade may also integrate villages, strip areas, and small towns into the overall defense, based on higher head-quarters’ constraints and applicable ROE (Figure 3-9). A defense in an urban area or one that incorporates urban areas normally follows the same sequence of actions. When defending large urban areas, the commander must consider that the terrain is more restrictive due to buildings that are normally close together. This requires a higher density of troops and smaller AOs than in open terrain. The brigade normally assigns task force AOs and may use phase lines, control measures, or other positions to position forces in depth.





Figure 3-9: Integrating urban areas into a defense.





3-15. NODAL DEFENSE



Figure 3-10 depicts a transitional situation where the brigade moves from an offensive to a defensive or stability operation. The brigade mission may contain METT-TC factors that require varying defensive techniques by the subordinate battalion TFs under the brigade’s control. Considerations in a situation such as this include:

a. Task Organization. TFs may very well have to be task-organized differently to conduct the specific missions assigned by the brigade commander. The task organization required for the defensive or stability operation will probably be different from the task organization used in an offensive operation.



b. Symmetrical/Asymmetrical Threats. The brigade will likely respond to both symmetrical and asymmetrical threats within the area of operations. The defensive techniques chosen by subordinate battalion TFs should be capable of responding to the specific threats in their respective AOs.



c. Boundary Changes. Again, based on the commander’s intent and the brigade’s defensive scheme of maneuver, boundary changes may be required in order to give battalion’s more or less maneuver space.





Figure 3-10: Nodal defense, transitional situation.





d. Roe modification. The ROE may require modification based on the type of mission to be conducted. The ROE may become more or less restrictive based on METT-TC factors. Commanders and leaders must insure that the ROE are clearly stated and widely disseminated at the beginning and conclusion of each day.



Figure 3-11 depicts a nodal defense where TFs employ varying defensive techniques in order to achieve the brigade commander’s desired end-state. The brigade commander’s intent is to safeguard the key nodes that were seized during the offensive action in order to eventually return the infrastructure of this particular urban area back to civilian control. A combination of sectors, battle positions, strong points, roadblocks, checkpoints, security patrols, and OPs could be employed throughout the brigade AO. Figure 3-11 depicts the changed TF task organizations, the extended boundaries, and directed brigade OPs.



NOTE



TF operational graphics were drawn in order to provide an example of a possible technique that may be employed within the brigade AO in order to meet the brigade commander’s intent. For example, the TF defending the transportation center has elected to use a perimeter defense for inner security and has assigned the attached mechanized infantry company team the mission to conduct outer security by means of a screen and manning the designated brigade OP.





Figure 3-11: Nodal defense, varying defensive techniques.





SECTION V. BATTALION DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS



This section discusses planning considerations and provides tactics and techniques for the planning of battalion TF defensive UO.


3-16. EMPLOYMENT OF COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT ASSETS



This paragraph will concentrate on the employment of combat and combat support assets at the battalion level. Once the battalion has decided where to defend, it should select company battle positions or sectors that block or restrict the enemy’s ability to maneuver and control key areas. The battalion needs to plan two levels down at the platoon level where the battle will be fought. The frontage for a platoon is about one to two city blocks long. Platoons can occupy about three small structures or one larger two- or three-story building (Table 3-1 and Figure 3-6), depending on METT-TC factors. Companies may be tasked to detach a platoon to act as the battalion reserve.

a. Mortar Platoon. The battalion mortar platoon may be initially positioned forward in support of the security area. After withdrawal of security forces, it is positioned to support the entire battalion. Mortars at the battalion level are employed to maximize the effect of their high-angle fires. They should be used to engage:



• Enemy overwatch positions.



• Enemy infantry before they seize a foothold.



• Targets on rooftops.



• Enemy reinforcements within range.



b. AT Weapons. The commander will give the AT platoon missions that support the defensive scheme of maneuver based on the capabilities and limitations of the system and the type of threat that the battalion will face. For example, battalion defending against conventional threats that have armored vehicles will most likely give the AT platoon missions that primarily defend against armored threats. Battalions defending against asymmetrical threats will most likely give the AT platoon missions that will enhance force protection.



c. Scout Platoon. Depending on the situation and terrain, the battalion scout platoon may provide a security force forward of the battalion to give early warning of enemy activity. Alternately, the scout platoon may be used to screen a flank or the rear.



d. Employment of Tanks and BFVs. The battalion should employ tanks and BFVs to take advantage of their long-range fires and mobility. Urban areas restrict the mobility of tanks and BFVs and make them vulnerable to enemy infantry antiarmor weapons.



(1) When tanks and BFVs are employed in the defense of an urban area, infantry should be positioned to provide security against close antitank fires and to detect targets for the armored vehicles. Tanks and BFVs should be assigned engagement areas in support of the defensive scheme of maneuver. BFVs may be placed along the forward edge of the area in order to engage enemy armored vehicles. Friendly armored vehicles can also be placed in positions to the rear of the buildings and interior courtyards where their weapon systems can provide added rear and flank security. Combat vehicles are assigned primary, alternate, and supplementary positions as well as primary and secondary sectors of fire. They should be positioned in defilade behind rubble and walls or inside buildings for movement into and out of the area. Armored vehicles can also be used for resupply, CASEVAC, and rapid repositioning during the battle. BFVs can also provide a mobile reserve. Tank or BFV elements should be placed OPCON to a light infantry battalion rather than attached. A tank or BFV element attached or OPCON will have to be divided up within the defensive area to take advantage of the fires available to this asset. BFVs and antitank weapons should supplement tank fires. Tanks and BFVs may be—



• Positioned on the edge of the urban area in mutually supporting positions.



• Positioned on key terrain on the flanks of towns and villages.



• Used to cover barricades and obstacles by fire.



• Part of the reserve.



(2) Tanks and BFVs are normally employed as platoons. However, sections may be employed with light infantry platoons or squads based on METT-TC factors and identified engagement areas. This provides tanks and BFVs with the close security of the infantry. Tanks and BFVs provide the commander with a mobile force to respond quickly to enemy threats on different avenues of approach. They can also be effectively employed in counterattacks.



e. Indirect Fire Support. Fire planning must be comprehensive due to the proximity of buildings to targets, minimum range restrictions, repositioning requirements, and the ROE. Mortar and artillery fires are planned on top of and immediately around defensive positions for close support.



(1) Artillery. Artillery may be used as direct or indirect support. In the defense, artillery fire should be used to—



• Suppress and blind enemy overwatch elements.



• Disrupt or destroy an assault.



• Provide counterbattery fire.



• Support counterattacks.



• Provide direct fire when necessary.



(2) Fire Planning. Fire planning is conducted for urban areas in much the same manner as it is for other areas, taking into concern the limitations of the restrictive terrain. Consideration should be given to TRPs, covering obstacles, FPFs.



(3) Priorities of Fire. The commander should establish priorities of fire based on enemy avenues of approach and threat systems that present the greatest danger to the defense. For example, during the attacker’s initial advance, tanks, BMPs, and overwatching elements are the greatest threat to the defense. In certain situations, enemy APCs may provide a larger threat than enemy tanks in an urban area; the APCs carry infantry, which can gain footholds in buildings. Artillery and mortar fires should suppress and destroy enemy ATGMs and overwatch positions and or elements. If enemy formations secure a foothold, priority is shifted to the destruction of enemy forces within the penetration.



(4) Control of Supporting Fires. As the enemy attack progresses in the city, fires are increased to separate infantry from supporting tanks and fighting vehicles. During this phase, friendly artillery concentrates on attacking infantry, counterfire missions, and the destruction of reinforcements that are approaching the city.



(5) Support of Counterattacks. When initiated, counterattacks are given priority of supporting fires. When artillery is firing the missions as mentioned above, it must remain mobile and be prepared to displace to preplanned positions to avoid enemy counterbattery fire.



f. Employment of Engineers. Normally, one engineer platoon or company supports a battalion or battalion task force. Engineers are employed under battalion control or attached to companies. Company commanders may be given an engineer squad to assist them in preparing the defense. The battalion commander and staff must consider engineer tasks that enhance survivability, mobility, and countermobility. The supporting engineers use C4 and other explosives to make firing ports, mouseholes, and demolition obstacles. Based upon priority of work, the battalion tells the attached or OPCON engineer element to assist each of the infantry companies preparing the village for defense and to execute their obstacle plan. The engineers’ mission is to tell the infantrymen exactly where to place the demolitions and how much is needed for the desired effect. They assist in preparation of charges. Tasks that engineers can accomplish in the defense of an urban area include:



• Constructing obstacles and rubbling.



• Clearing fields of fire.



• Laying mines.



• Preparing mobility routes between positions.



• Preparing fighting positions.



g. Air Defense Assets. Air defense assets available to the commander, such as Stinger and Avenger, are normally employed to ensure all-round air defense. These assets are normally controlled at battalion level, however they may be placed under a company commander’s control when METT-TC factors warrant that type of use. The lack of good firing positions for long-range air defense missile systems in some urban areas may limit the number of deployed weapons. In the defense, weapons systems may have to be winched or airlifted into positions. Rooftops and parking garages are good firing positions because they normally offer a better line-of-sight. Stingers and Avengers can be assigned the missions of protecting specific positions or of functioning in general support of the battalion.



h. Battalion Trains/Service Support. The battalion locates an area where the trains can be positioned near enough to provide support but far enough away to not get in the line of fire. A location is chosen near the main avenue of approach to ease resupply, recovery, and maintenance operations. Company trains are often collocated with the battalion trains. Ammunition expenditure is usually high when fighting in an urban area.

To avoid moving around the village with ammunition resupply during the battle, ammunition should be stockpiled in each occupied platoon and squad position. Platoons should also stockpile firefighting equipment, drinking water, food, and first-aid supplies at each squad position. Other factors the battalion must consider are:



• Resupply.



• Medical evacuation.



• Firefighting.



• Security.




3-17. INTEGRATING URBAN AREAS INTO THE DEFENSE



The battalion may often integrate villages, strip areas, and small towns into the overall defense, based on higher head- quarters’ constraints and applicable ROE. (See Figure 3-12.) A defense in an urban area, or one that incorporates urban areas, normally follows the same sequence of actions. Specific TTP are discussed in paragraphs 3-18 through 3-21.





Figure 3-12: Integrating urban areas into the defense.





3-18. DEFENSE OF A VILLAGE



A battalion TF assigned a defensive sector that includes a village may incorporate the village as a strongpoint in its defense. This use of an urban area is most common when the village stands astride a high-speed avenue of approach or when it lies between two difficult obstacles. To incorporate such an area into its defense, the battalion TF must control the high ground on either side of the village to prevent the enemy from firing from those areas into the village.

a. The majority of the TF tanks and BFVs should be employed where maneuver room is the greatest on the key terrain to the flanks of the village. This is also where the TF BFVs should be employed. As the security force withdraws and companies and or teams assume the fight, BFVs can assume support by fire positions.



b. Although the battalion TFs disposition should prevent large enemy forces from threatening the rear and flanks of the village, the danger of small-unit enemy infiltration means the village must be prepared for allround defense.



c. Engineers required for team mobility operations should stay with the company or company team in the village to provide continuous engineer support if the company team becomes isolated. The TF commander should centrally control engineer support for the rest of the TF. Engineer assets may be in DS of the other companies or company teams. The priority of barrier materials, demolitions, and mines should go to the company or company team in the village.



d. The TF commander should use any key terrain on the village flanks for maneuver to prevent the village’s defense from becoming isolated. The strongpoints in the town should provide a firm location where the enemy can be stopped and around which counterattacks can be launched (Figure 3-13).





Figure 3-13: Battalion TF defense of a village.





3-19. DEFENSE IN SECTOR



A battalion TF may be given the mission of defending a sector in a city (Figure 3-14). The battalion should take advantage of the outlying structures to provide early warning and delay the enemy and take advantage of the tougher interior buildings to provide fixed defense. This defense should cover an area about 4 to 12 blocks square.





Figure 3-14. Defense in sector.





a. The battalion TF deployment begins with the reconnaissance/scout platoon reconnoitering the urban area to provide an area reconnaissance and location of the enemy. At the edge of the area, where fields of fire are the greatest, the battalion TF should deploy BFVs and other antiarmor weapon systems to provide long-range antiarmor defense.



b. The forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) should include the most formidable buildings in the sector. Forward of the FEBA, the battalion TF should organize a guard force, which could be a reinforced company. The guard force should concentrate on causing the enemy to deploy without engaging the enemy in decisive combat. This can be done through maximum use of ambushes and obstacles and using covered and concealed routes through buildings for disengagement. The guard force inflicts casualties and delays the enemy, but the guard force avoids decisive engagement since buildings beyond the FEBA do not favor the defense. As the action nears the FEBA, the guard force detects the location of the enemy’s main attack. Upon reaching the FEBA, the guard force passes through the battalion lines and can be used as a reserve and reinforce other elements of the battalion, or it can counterattack.



c. Defense along the FEBA consists of a series of positions set up similar to that described in the company defense of the village (see paragraph 3-23). Key terrain features such as strong buildings, road junctions, and good firing positions should be the center of the strongpoint defense. Based on METT-TC considerations, the defense in sector may consist of either strongpoints or battle positions. Strongpoints located on or covering decisive terrain are extremely effective in the defense. Buildings should be prepared for defense as outlined in Chapter 1.



d. BFVs should be used to engage threat armored vehicles; to cover obstacles with fire; and to engage in counterattacks with tanks. They can also be used to transport casualties and supplies to and from the fight.



e. The battalion’s attached tanks should be used to engage enemy tanks, cover obstacles by fire, and engage in counterattacks. They should be employed in platoons where possible, but in congested areas may be employed in sections.



f. Artillery and mortar fire should be used to suppress and blind enemy overwatch elements, to engage enemy infantry on the approaches to the city, to provide counterbattery fire, and to support counterattacks using both indirect and direct fire.



g. Engineers should be attached to the defending force to help in laying mines and constructing obstacles, clearing fields of fire, and preparing routes to the rear. These routes should also have obstacles. Engineers should help prepare fighting positions in support of the force in strongpoints.




3-20. NODAL DEFENSE



Figure 3-15 depicts a transitional situation where the battalion moves from an offensive to a defensive or stability operation. The brigade mission may contain METT-TC factors that require varying defensive techniques by the sub-ordinate battalions under the brigade’s control. Figure 3-16 depicts a nodal defense where battalions employ different defensive techniques in order to achieve the brigade commander’s desired end-state. The brigade commander’s intent is to safeguard the key nodes that were seized during the offensive action in order to eventually return the infrastructure of this particular urban area back to civilian control. A combination of sectors, battle positions, strong points, roadblocks, checkpoints, security patrols, and OPs could be employed within the TF sector or AO. Figure 3-16 depicts the changed TF task organizations, the extended boundaries, and directed brigade OPs. Considerations in a situation such as this include:

a. Task Organization. Companies may have to be task organized differently to conduct the specific missions assigned by the battalion or TF commander. The task organization required for the defensive or stability operation will probably be different from the task organization used in an offensive operation.



b. Symmetrical/Asymmetrical Threats. The battalion or TF will likely respond to both symmetrical and asymmetrical threats within the area of operations. The defensive techniques chosen by subordinate companies should allow them to respond to the specific threats in their respective AOs, battle positions, or sectors.



c. Boundary Changes. Again, based on the commander’s intent and the battalion’s or TF’s defensive scheme of maneuver, boundary changes may be required in order to give companies more or less maneuver space.



d. ROE Modification. The ROE may require modification based on the type of mission to be conducted. The ROE may become more or less restrictive based on METT-TC factors. Commanders and leaders must ensure that the ROE are clearly stated and widely disseminated at the beginning and conclusion of each day.





Figure 3-15: Nodal defense, transitional situation.





Figure 3-16: Nodal defense, different defensive techniques.





NOTE



In Figure 3-16, the northern TF defending the transportation center/industrial complex has decided to use a perimeter defense for inner security and has assigned the attached mechanized Infantry company the mission to conduct outer security by means of a screen and manning the designated brigade OP. Other TFs within the brigade AO may be required to use different defensive techniques.





NOTE



The digital force has the potential to provide accurate threat information that can enhance situational awareness, which facilitates targeting and obstacle placement. JSTARS; GUARDRAIL; unmanned aerial vehicles, if present; and other reconnaissance assets will significantly improve the threat situational awareness and targeting capability of the unit.





3-21. DELAY



The purpose of a delay is to slow the enemy, cause enemy casualties, and stop the enemy (where possible) without becoming decisively engaged or bypassed. The delay can be oriented either on the enemy or on specified terrain such as a key building or manufacturing complex.

a. Ambushes and Battle Positions. A delay in an urban area is conducted from a succession of ambushes and battle positions (Figure 3-17). The width of the TF zone depends upon the amount of force available to control the area, the nature of the buildings and obstacles along the street and the length of time that the enemy must be delayed.



(1) Ambushes. Ambushes are planned on overwatching obstacles and are closely coordinated but they are executed at the lowest levels. The deployment of the TF is realigned at important cross streets. The ambushes can be combined with limited objective attacks on the enemy’s flanks. These are usually effective in the edge of open spaces, parks, wide streets, and so on. Tanks and BFVs should execute these along with dismounted Infantry.



(2) Battle Positions. Battle positions should be placed where heavy weapons, such as tanks, BFVs, antiarmor weapons, and machine guns, will have the best fields of fire. Such locations are normally found at major street intersections, parks, and at the edge of open residential areas. Battle positions should be carefully and deliberately prepared, reinforced by obstacles and demolished buildings, and supported by artillery and mortars. They should be positioned to inflict maximum losses on the enemy and cause him to deploy for a deliberate attack.





Figure 3-17: Battalion delay in an urban area.





b. Two Delaying Echelons. The TF is most effective when deployed in two delaying echelons, alternating between conducting ambushes and fighting from battle positions. As the enemy threatens to overrun a battle position, the company disengages and delays back toward the next battle position. As the company passes through the company to the rear, it establishes another battle position. Smoke and demolitions are used to aid in the disengagement. Security elements on the flank can be employed to prevent the enemy from outflanking the delaying force. A small reserve can be used to react to unexpected enemy action and to conduct continued attacks on the enemy’s flank.



c. Engineers. The engineer effort should first be centralized to support the preparation of battle positions and then decentralized to support the force committed to ambush.




SECTION VI. COMPANY DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS



This section discusses planning considerations and provides tactics and techniques for the planning of company team defensive UO.


3-22. HASTY DEFENSE



A very likely defensive mission for the Infantry company in urban terrain will be to conduct a hasty defense. This mission is characterized by reduced time for the preparation of the defense. All of the troop-leading procedures are the same. The priorities of work will basically be the same, but many will take place concurrently. Units will be deployed, weapons emplaced, and positions prepared in accordance with the mission analysis and amount of time the company commander has available. Companies must be prepared to conduct a hasty defensive mission as part of stability and support operations.

a. Occupation and Preparation of Positions. Preparations for the hasty defense will vary with the time available. The preparations described below will generally take between two to four hours. In a hasty defense, the primary effort is to camouflage and conceal the presence of the hasty fighting positions and provide as much protection as possible for the soldiers manning them. Positions are constructed back from the windows in the shadows of the room using appliances, furniture, and other convenient items and materials. The emphasis on fortifying positions and making major alterations to the environment is reduced. These actions will occur after security has been established.



(1) Position Crew-Served and Special Weapons. Generally, they will be employed from the inside of buildings, unless an outside position is preferable and can be protected and camouflaged. Armored vehicles can exploit longer fields of fire or a reverse slope engagement using buildings to protect the vehicle’s position.



(2) Emplace Barriers and Obstacles. Lack of time means there will be two belts established and they will not be as extensive as in a defense that permits more time. Cover all obstacles with observation and fire.



(a) First Belt. The first belt is usually between 50 to 100 meters from and parallel to the defensive trace. It will normally consist of wire obstacles, improvised barriers, road craters, and minefields. For example, burning tires and trash have proven to be effective obstacles on urban terrain. Antitank and command detonated mines are used consistent with the ROE. This belt blocks, fixes, turns, or canalizes the enemy; disrupts attack formations; and inflicts casualties.



(b) Second Belt. The second belt is the denial belt. It consists of wire obstacles placed around, through, and in the defensive buildings and close-in mine fields as well as in subsurface accesses. It impedes and complicates the enemy’s ability to gain a foothold in the defensive area. Command detonated Claymores are used extensively consistent with the ROE. Claymores are placed where they will not cause friendly casualties.



(c) Field-Expedient Obstacles. Field-expedient obstacles made from available materials, such as rubble, cars and light poles, should be employed.



(3) Prepare Positions. Squads and platoons prepare positions using whatever materials are available; for example, filling dressers or other furnishings with earth or other materials.



(4) Rehearsals. Conduct rehearsals with leaders and soldiers concerning the orientation of the defense, unit positions, location of crew served weapons, CASEVAC, resupply, execution of counterattack plans, withdrawal plan, and so on. One of the more important rehearsals to conduct is the synchronization of direct and indirect fires to accomplish the commander’s intent.



(5) Movement Enhancement. There will not be much time to improve movement within the defense. Units should plan to use subsurface and supersurface (through buildings) routes. Priority should be given to removing obstructions to alternate positions and to the counterattack route.



(6) Communications. Check communications. Communications is initially radio. Plans are made for messengers and routes improved for them. Wire is emplaced as an improvement to the defense as time and the terrain allows.





NOTE



The digital force has the potential to provide accurate threat information that can enhance situational awareness, which helps facilitate targeting and obstacle placement. JSTARS; GUARDRAIL; unmanned aerial vehicles, if present; and other reconnaissance assets will significantly improve the threat situational awareness and targeting capability of the unit.





b. Improving the Defense. As time permits, the following areas can be given consideration and prioritized in accordance with METT-TC.



• Sleep plan.



• Barrier and obstacle improvement.



• Improvement of primary and alternate positions.



• Preparation of supplementary positions.



• Additional movement enhancement efforts.



• Initiation of patrols.



• Improvement of camouflage.



• Maintenance/refueling.



• Continued rehearsals for counterattack and withdrawal.




3-23. DEFENSE OF A VILLAGE



An Infantry company may be given the mission to defend a village (Figure 3-18). Once the company commander has completed his reconnaissance of the village, he scouts the surrounding terrain and, with the information assembled, he develops his plan for the defense. One of his first decisions is whether to defend with his Infantry on the leading edge of the village or farther back within the confines of the village. Normally, defending on the leading edge will be more effective against an armor heavy force, where the defending company can take advantage of longer range observation and fields of fire. Defending in depth within the village will be more effective against a primarily Infantry heavy force, in order to deny the enemy a foothold. This decision will be based on the factors of METT-TC. This mission is usually characterized with the company defending an urban area that is surrounded by open terrain. The company may need to coordinate with adjacent units to plan for the defense or control of this terrain.





Figure 3-18: Company defense of a village.





a. Influencing Factors. Several factors influence the commander’s decision. First, he must know the type of enemy that his company defends against. If the threat is mainly Infantry, the greater danger is allowing them to gain a foothold in the village. If the threat is armor or motorized Infantry, the greatest danger is that massive direct fire destroys the company’s defensive positions. The company commander must also consider the terrain forward and to the flanks of the village from which the enemy can direct fires against his positions.



b. Platoon Battle Positions. Based on the mission analysis, platoons are normally given a small group of buildings in which to prepare their defense, permitting the platoon leader to establish mutually supporting squadsized positions. This increases the area that the platoon can control and hampers the enemy’s ability to isolate or bypass a platoon. A platoon may be responsible for the road through the village. The rest of the company is then positioned to provide all-round security and defense in depth.



c. Company Mortars and Antitank. Weapons. A position for the company mortars must be chosen that protects mortars from direct fire and allows for overhead clearance. Antitank weapons are placed where they can engage targets at maximum ranges with alternate firing points. Infantry should protect antitank weapons.



d. BFVs. Based on METT-TC considerations, BFVs may be placed along the forward edge of the urban area to engage enemy armored vehicles. Friendly armored vehicles can also be placed in positions to the rear of the buildings and interior courtyards where their weapon systems can provide added rear and flank security. Combat vehicles are assigned primary, alternate, and supplementary positions as well as primary and secondary sectors of fire. They should be positioned in defilade behind rubble and walls or inside buildings for movement into and out of the area. Armored vehicles can also be used for resupply, CASEVAC, and rapid repositioning during the battle. BFVs can also provide a mobile reserve for the company. If a mechanized Infantry platoon is attached, it is controlled through its chain of command. If a mechanized Infantry section is attached, it can be controlled through the senior squad leader.



e. Tanks. If a tank platoon is available from the battalion task force, the company commander could place the tanks along the leading edge where rapid fire would complement the antitank weapons. The tank platoon leader should select exact firing positions and recommend engagement areas. If faced by enemy Infantry, the tanks move to alternate positions with the protection of friendly Infantry. These alternate positions allow the tanks to engage to the front as well as the flanks with as little movement as possible. Positions can be selected within buildings and mouseholes can be constructed. After they are withdrawn from the leading edge of the village, the tanks could provide a mobile reserve for the company.



f. FPFs. FPFs are planned to address the biggest threat to the company—the enemy’s Infantry. When firing an FPF inside an urban area is required, mortars are more effective than artillery. This situation is true due to their higher angle of fall that gives them a greater chance of impacting on the street.



g. Barriers and Obstacles. Obstacles are easily constructed in an urban area. The company commander must stop enemy vehicles without interfering with his own movement in the village. Therefore, the company detonates cratering charges at key street locations on order. Mines are laid on the outskirts of the town and along routes the company will not use. Barriers and obstacles are normally emplaced in three belts. If attached or OPCON, the tank or BFV platoon leader can assist the commander by giving advice on where to place antivehicular obstacles.



h. Engineers. The supporting engineers use C4 and other explosives to make firing ports, mouseholes, and demolition obstacles. Based upon his priority of work, the commander tells the engineer squad leader to assist each of the Infantry platoons preparing the village for defense and to execute the company team’s obstacle plan. The engineer squad leader’s mission is to tell the Infantrymen exactly where to place the demolitions and how much is needed for the desired effect. He assists in preparation of charges. He also assists in the emplacement and recording of the minefields as well as the preparation of fighting positions.



i. Communications. To ensure adequate communications, redundant verbal and nonverbal communications are planned and checked. The company installs a wire net and develops a plan for pyrotechnic signals. Lay backup wire in case the primary lines are cut by vehicles, fires, or the enemy. The commander also plans for the use of messengers throughout the village.




3-24. DEFENSE OF A BLOCK OR GROUP OF BUILDINGS



An Infantry company operating in urban terrain may have to defend a city block or group of buildings in a core periphery or residential area. The company conducts this operation in accordance with the battalion task force’s defensive scheme of maneuver. The operation should be coordinated with the action of security forces charged with delaying to the front of the company’s position. The defense should take advantage of the protection of buildings that dominate the avenues of approaches into the MBA. This mission differs from defense of a village in that it is more likely to be conducted completely on urban terrain, without surrounding open terrain that characterizes the defense of a village. An Infantry company is particularly well suited for this type of mission, since the fighting will require the enemy to move Infantry into the urban area in order to seize and control key terrain. (See Table 3-1.)

a. Task and Purpose. A well-organized company defense in an urban area—



• Defeats the enemy’s attack on the streets and city blocks by using obstacles and fire.



• Destroys the enemy by ambush and direct fire from prepared positions within defensible buildings.



• Clears the enemy from footholds or remains in place for a counterattack.



b. Reconnaissance and Security. The execution of the mission will be more effective if the terrain is reconnoitered and obstacles and fire lanes are prepared. The LP/OPs should be supplemented by patrols, mainly during periods of limited visibility, and wire communications should be used. Platoons should be given the mission to provide one LP/OP in order to provide spot reports concerning the size, location, direction and rate of movement, and type of enemy assaulting the company sector or battle position.



c. Task Organization. METT-TC factors will determine how the company will be task organized to accomplish the mission. A possible task organization might be:



(1) Rifle Platoons. Three platoons (one platoon minus a squad) occupy the defensive sector.



(2) Reserve. Detached squad from one of the rifle platoons. The reserve should be given priority of commitment missions such as reinforcing the fires of the defense, reacting to a danger on the flank, or counterattacking to throw the enemy from a foothold. The biggest threat to the company is for the enemy to gain a foothold and use it to begin clearing buildings. Any foothold should be counterattacked and the enemy must be quickly and violently expelled.



(3) Fire Support. Company 60-mm mortar and antitank weapons.



(4) Company Control. An engineer squad, with priority to the company obstacle plan, then reverts to company reserve. Engineers should be controlled at company level. They construct obstacles, prepare access routes, and assist in preparing defensive positions. Additional attachments or OPCON units, such as BFVs and tanks may be placed under company control. For example, a BFV Infantry element can be used to defend a sector or battle position. The BFVs can stay under the control of the platoon sergeant and support by fire and or conduct other missions as determined by the company commander. A platoon or section of tanks attached or OPCON to the company should provide heavy direct-fire support, engage enemy tanks, and support counterattacks. An attached or OPCON tank platoon can initially attack by fire and then revert to a mobile reserve role. The company executive officer can be used to control a reserve with multiple elements.



d. Execution. The defensive forces should ambush on the avenues of approach, cover the obstacles by fire, and prepare a strong defense inside the buildings. Counterattack forces should be near the front of the company sector in covered and concealed positions with an on order mission to counterattack. Rehearsals should be conducted both day and night. Counterattack forces should also be given specific instructions of what their actions will be after the enemy assault has been repelled; for example, stay in sector or revert back to reserve status.




3-25. DEFENSE OF KEY URBAN TERRAIN



An Infantry company may have to defend key urban terrain. This defense may be part of defensive operations or may be an adjunct mission to stability and support operations. In many cases, the mission is characterized by an unclear enemy situation and extremely restrictive ROE. The key terrain may be a public utility, such as gas, electrical, or water plants; a communications center, such as radio and or television; transportation center; a traffic circle; and so forth. When assigned a mission of this type, a company commander may often find his company having to defend a piece of terrain that he would rather not have to occupy. Often the facilities previously described are sited for their centrality of location and convenience and not for the defensibility of the terrain.

a. Task Organization. The factors of METT-TC will determine the task organization of the company. Figure 3-19, depicts an Infantry rifle company reinforced with an additional rifle platoon to defend the objective (water purification plant). Additional assets will be given to the company commander as they are requested or assigned, based on mission requirements and availability. In the situation depicted in Figure 3-19, the organic weapons of the Infantry company are sufficient to accomplish the mission. The only additional requirement was for another rifle platoon to defend the objective.



b. Tasks. In the situation shown in Figure 3-19, the company commander has determined that in order to properly defend the objective, he needs to deploy platoons on the defensible terrain available. Therefore, he is defending urban terrain (left), high ground (top), and low vegetated terrain (right, bottom). Additionally, it may be necessary to perform some of the tasks listed below:



• Provide inner and outer security patrols.



• Conduct counterreconnaissance.



• Establish LP/OPs.



• Establish checkpoints and roadblocks.



• Conduct civilian control and evacuation.



• Conduct coordination with local authorities.



• Prevent collateral damage.



• Supervise specific functions associated with operation of the facility, such as water purification tests, site inspections, and so forth.





Figure 3-19: Perimeter defense of key terrain.





c. Execution. The company commander will normally deploy platoons in a perimeter around the objective in order to dominate key terrain and cover the mounted and dismounted avenues of approach into the objective. Machine guns and antitank weapons will be emplaced to cover the dismounted and mounted avenues of approach into the objective, respectively. Wire obstacles will normally be used to restrict and deny entry into the objective area. Obstacles should be covered by fire and rigged with detection devices and trip flares. Antitank and command-detonated mines will be used consistent with the ROE. The company prepares to defend against a direct attack, such as a raid, or sabotage against key facilities within the objective, for example, water filtration system, pump station, and so forth. The commander makes an assessment as to the overall importance of the key facilities within the objective and prioritizes security requirements. The 60-mm mortar section is positioned to provide 360-degree fire support. The AT section is positioned to engage vehicular targets. If the threat does not require the employment of mortars or AT weapons, these sections are given other tasks.





NOTE



IBCT company assets will be positioned using the same considerations.





d. Other Considerations. Depending on the mission requirements and threat, the company commander may have to consider the need for the following:



• Artillery and attack helicopter support.



• ADA assets to defend against air attack.



• Engineer assets to construct obstacles.



• Interpreters to assist in the functioning of the facility and operation of the equipment.



• MP, civil affairs, and or PSYOP assets for civilian control and liaison/coordination with local police and or authorities.



• BFVs or tanks to act as a mobile reserve or reaction force, or integrated into the company plan.



e. Force Protection. The company may be required to conduct a perimeter defense as part of force protection, such as defending a friendly base camp on urban terrain. The same techniques of establishing a perimeter defense would be used. The company maintains the appropriate level of security (100, 50, 30 percent, and so forth), consistent with the commander’s plan and the enemy situation. Additional tasks may include:



• Setting up roadblocks and checkpoints.



• Searching individuals and vehicles prior to entry into the camp.



• Maintaining a presence as a show of force to the population outside the base camp.



• Conducting inner and outer security patrols.



• Clearing potential threats from any urban terrain that overwatches the base camp.



• Conducting ambushes to interdict any enemy forces moving towards the base camp.



• Restricting access to locations within the base camp. Conducting surveillance of these locations from within or from adjacent structures or positions.



• Conducting reaction force duties inside and outside the perimeter of the camp.



f. Defense of a Traffic Circle. An Infantry company may be assigned the mission of defending a key traffic circle in an urban area, or similar terrain, to prevent the enemy from seizing it or to facilitate movement of the battalion task force or other units (Figure 3-20).





Figure 3-20: Defense of a traffic circle.





(1) The company commander with this mission should analyze enemy avenues of approach into the objective and buildings that dominate those avenues. He should plan direct and indirect fires, consistent with the ROE, on to the traffic circle itself and on the approaches to it. He should also plan for all-round defense of the buildings that dominate the traffic circle to prevent encirclement. The company should prepare as many covered and concealed routes between these buildings as time permits. This makes it easier to mass or shift fires and to execute counterattacks.



(2) Obstacles can also deny the enemy the use of the traffic circle. Obstacle planning, in this case, must take into account whether friendly forces will need to use the traffic circle.



(3) Antitank weapons can fire across the traffic circle if fields of fire are long enough. Tanks should engage enemy armored vehicles and provide heavy direct-fire support for counterattacks. BFVs should engage enemy armored vehicles and provide direct fire to protect obstacles.




3-26. DEFENSE OF AN URBAN STRONGPOINT



A company may be directed to construct a strongpoint as part of a battalion defense (Figure 3-21). In order to do so, it must be augmented with engineer support, more weapons, and CSS resources. A strong point is defended until the unit is formally ordered out of it by the commander directing the defense. Urban areas are easily converted to strongpoints. Stone, brick, or steel buildings provide cover and concealment. Buildings, sewers, and some streets provide covered and concealed routes and can be rubbled to provide obstacles. Also, telephone systems can provide communications.





Figure 3-21: Urban strongpoint.





a. The specific positioning of unit in the strongpoint depends on the commander’s mission analysis and estimate of the situation. The same considerations for a perimeter defense apply in addition to the following:



(1) Reinforce each individual fighting position (to include alternate and supplementary positions) to withstand small-arms fire, mortar fire, and artillery fragmentation. Stockpile food, water ammunition, pioneer tools, and medical supplies in each fighting position.



(2) Support each individual fighting position with several others. Plan or construct covered and concealed routes between positions and along routes of supply and communication. Use these to support counterattack and maneuver within the strongpoint.



(3) Divide the strongpoint into several independent, but mutually supporting, positions or sectors. If one of the positions or sectors must be evacuated or is overrun, limit the enemy penetration with obstacles and fires and support a counterattack.



(4) Construct obstacles and minefields to disrupt and canalize enemy formations, to reinforce fires, and to protect the strongpoint from the assault. Place the obstacles and mines out as far as friendly units can observe them, within the strongpoint, and at points in between where they will be useful.



(5) Prepare range cards for each position and confirm them by fires. Plan indirect fires in detail and register them. Indirect fires should also be planned for firing directly on the strongpoint using proximity fuses.



(6) Plan and test several means of communication within the strongpoint and to higher headquarters. These are radio, wire, messenger, pyrotechnics, and other signals.



(7) Improve or repair the strongpoint until the unit is relieved or withdrawn. More positions can be built, routes to other positions marked, existing positions improved or repaired, and barriers built or fixed.



b. A strong point may be part of any defensive plan. It may be built to protect vital units or installations, as an anchor around which more mobile units maneuver, or as part of a trap designed to destroy enemy forces that attack it.




3-27. DELAY



The intent of a delay is to slow the enemy, cause casualties, and stop him, where possible, without becoming decisively engaged. This procedure is done by defending, disengaging, moving, and defending again. A company delay is normally conducted as part of the battalion task force’s plan. The delay destroys enemy reconnaissance elements forward of the outskirts of the urban area, prevents the penetration of the urban area, and gains and maintains contact with the enemy to determine the strength and location of the main attack by trading space for time. Infantry companies are well suited for this operation, because they can take advantage of the cover and concealment provided by urban terrain and inflict casualties on the enemy at close range. Delays are planned by assigning platoon battle positions, platoon sectors, or both. Figure 3-22 depicts a company delay in urban terrain with the company commander assigning platoon battle positions. Routes are planned to each subsequent battle position or within the sector. Routes also are planned to take advantage of the inherent cover and concealment afforded by urban terrain, such as going through and hugging buildings, using shadows, subsurface areas, and so forth.





Figure 3-22: Company delay in an urban area.





a. The company’s sector should be prepared with obstacles to increase the effect of the delay. Engineers prepare obstacles on main routes but avoid some covered and concealed routes that are known by the friendly troops for reinforcement, displacement, and resupply. These routes are destroyed and obstacles are executed when no longer needed.



b. Antiarmor weapon systems, tanks, and BFVs should be positioned on the outskirts of the urban area to destroy the enemy at maximum range. They should be located in defilade positions or in prepared shelters. They fire at visible targets and then fall back or proceed to alternate positions. Platoons should be assigned sectors from 100 to 300 meters (one to two blocks) wide. If available, they should be reinforced with sensors or GSRs, which can be emplaced on the outskirts or on higher ground to attain the maximum range in the assigned AO. Platoons delay by detecting the enemy early and inflicting casualties on him using patrols, OPs, and ambushes and by taking advantage of all obstacles. Each action is followed by a disengagement and withdrawal. Withdrawals occur on covered and concealed routes through buildings or underground. By day, the defense is dispersed; at night, it is more concentrated. Close coordination and maintaining situational awareness are critical aspects of this operation.




SECTION VII. PLATOON DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS



In urban areas, buildings provide cover and concealment, limit fields of observation and fire, and restrict the movement of troops and armored vehicles. This section covers the key planning considerations, weapons selection, preparations, and the construction of a platoon defensive position on urbanized terrain.


3-28. PLANNING THE DEFENSE



Planning the defense begins when the leader receives a mission or determines a requirement to defend such as during consolidation and reorganization after an assault. The leader must use terrain wisely and designate a point of main effort. He chooses defensive positions that force the enemy to make costly attacks or conduct time-consuming maneuvers to avoid them. A position that the enemy can readily avoid has no defensive value unless the enemy can be induced to attack it. The defense, no less than the offense, should achieve surprise. As platoon leaders conduct their troop-leading procedures, they also have to consider civilians, ROE, limited collateral damage, and coordination with adjacent units to eliminate the probability of fratricide. Maneuver, methods, and courses of action in establishing defensive positions in and around urbanized terrain are METT-TC intensive.

a. Focus. The squad’s and platoon’s focus for defending in an urban area is the retention of terrain. As with most defensive scenarios, the squad and platoon will defend as part of the company. The platoon will either be given a sector to defend or a battle position to occupy and the platoon leader must construct his defense within the constraints given to him. See Sections II and III for other planning considerations.



b. Strongpoint. One of the most common defensive tasks a platoon will be given during urban operations is to conduct a strongpoint defense of a building, part of a building, or a group of small buildings (see paragraph 3-26 and Figure 3-21). The platoon’s defense is normally integrated into the company’s mission. The platoon leader organizes the strongpoint defense by positioning personnel and their weapons systems to maximize their capabilities. Supporting fires are incorporated into the overall defensive plan to provide depth to the engagement area.



(1) The platoon leader organizes the defense into a series of individual, team, and squad fighting positions located to cover avenues of approach and obstacles, and to provide mutual support in order to repel the enemy advance. Snipers should be positioned to support the commander’s intent and to allow for the opportunity to engage C2 and key targets.



(2) Depending on the length of the mission, the platoon should stockpile munitions (especially grenades), food and water, medical supplies, and firefighting equipment.




3-29. PRIORITIES OF WORK AND DEFENSIVE CONSIDERATIONS



A critical platoon- and squad-level defensive task during defensive urban operations is the preparation of fighting positions. General defensive considerations in urban terrain are similar to any other defensive operations. Fighting positions in urban areas are usually constructed inside buildings and are selected based on an analysis of the area in which the building is located, the individual characteristics of the building, and the characteristics of the weapons system.

a. Priorities of Work. The priorities of work are the same as those listed in paragraph 3-12. Specific considerations at platoon level are discussed below.



(1) Select key weapons and crew-served weapon positions to cover likely mounted and dismounted avenues of approach. To cover armored avenues of approach, position antiarmor weapons inside buildings with adequate space and ventilation for backblast (on upper floors, if possible, for long-range shots). Position machine guns/M249s to cover dismounted avenues of approach. Place them near ground level to increase grazing fires. If ground rubble obstructs grazing fires, place machine guns/M249s in the upper stories of the building. Ensure weapons are mutually supporting and are tied in with adjacent units.



(2) Ensure the position is free of noncombatants. Remove them from the area of operations before occupying the position.



(3) Clear fields of fire. Prepare loopholes, aiming stakes, sector stakes, and TRP markings. Construct positions with overhead cover and camouflage (inside and outside).



(4) Identify and secure subsurface avenues of approach (sewers, basements, stairwells, and rooftops). (5) Stockpile ammunition, food, fire-fighting equipment, and drinking water.



(6) Construct barriers and emplace obstacles to deny the enemy any access to streets, underground passages, and buildings, and to slow his movement. Integrate barriers and or obstacles with key weapons. Cover all barriers and obstacles by fire (both direct and indirect) and or observation. (See Chapter 8 for more information concerning obstacles.)



(7) Improve and mark movement routes between positions as well as to alternate and supplementary positions. Improve routes by digging trenches, if possible; using sewers and tunnels; creating entry holes; and positioning ropes and ladders for ascending and descending.



b. Considerations. The following must be considered when establishing a defensive position:



(1) Security. The first priority is establishing all-around security. Each position should have at least one soldier providing security during all preparations.



(2) Protection. Select buildings that provide protection from direct and indirect fires. Reinforced concrete buildings with three or more floors provide suitable protection while buildings constructed of wood, paneling, or other light material must be reinforced to provide sufficient protection. One- and two-story buildings without a strongly constructed cellar are vulnerable to indirect fires and require construction of overhead protection for each fighting position. If possible, use materials gathered from the immediate area to build the overhead cover.



(3) Dispersion. A platoon position should not be established in a single building when it is possible to occupy two or more buildings that permit mutually supporting fires. A position without mutual support in one building is vulnerable to bypass, isolation, and subsequent destruction from any direction.



(4) Concealment. Do not select buildings that are obvious defensive positions (easily targeted by the enemy). If the requirements for security and fields of fire dictate the occupation of exposed buildings, the platoon will be required to add reinforcement materials to the building to provide suitable protection to the troops inside.



(5) Fields of Fire. To prevent isolation, individual and crew-served weapons positions should be mutually supporting and have fields of fire in all directions. When clearing fields of fire, try to maintain the natural appearance of the surrounding area if possible. Removing objects that interfere with the gunner’s field of vision may be necessary.



(6) Covered Routes. Defensive positions should have at least one covered and concealed route that allows resupply, medical evacuation, reinforcement, or withdrawal from the building without being detected, or at least provides protection from direct fire weapons. The route can be established using underground systems, communications trenches, or walls and buildings that allow covered movement.



(7) Observation. Positions in buildings should permit observation of enemy avenues of approach and adjacent defensive sectors. Upper stories offer the best observation but also attract enemy fire.



(8) Fire Hazard. If possible, avoid selecting positions in buildings that are obvious fire hazards. If these flammable structures must be occupied, reduce the danger of fire by wetting down the immediate area, laying an inch of sand on the floors, and providing fire extinguishers and fire fighting equipment. Ensure that each defender is familiar with the withdrawal routes and that they have the opportunity to rehearse their withdrawal using these planned routes in the event of fire.



(9) Tag Lines. Tag lines are a flexible handhold used to guide individuals along a route. Tag lines aid in navigation and movement when operating in confined spaces such as buildings, tunnel systems and caverns where visibility is limited and sense of direction can be lost. When preparing defensive positions inside buildings, tag lines can be run from each fighting position back to the command post, or along an egress route. These lines can be made of rope, string, cable, wire and so forth. The most effective item to be used as a tag line is WD-1A communications wire. Along with serving as a tag line it can be used as a primary means of communication between individual fighting positions and leader’s positions.



(10) Time. Time is the one element in METT-TC that the platoon and its leaders have no control over. The most important factor to consider when planning the use of time is to provide subordinate leaders with two-thirds of all available time. The unit TACSOP provides the leaders with their priorities when time does not allow for detailed planning. The platoon will complete defensive preparation IAW the TACSOP and the commander’s operational priorities.



c. Preparation. Preparation of the platoon’s individual fighting positions will normally be conducted inside the buildings the platoon has been assigned to defend. As with all defensive positions, the leader’s first task is to establish security. This will normally be in the form of an observation post located within the protection of the platoon’s direct fire weapons. The OP should be manned with at least two personnel. Leaders then assign individual or two-man positions to adequately cover his sector. The squad leader will position himself to best control his squad. The platoon leader will designate the level of security to be maintained. The remaining personnel will continue to work preparing the defense. The leaders will continue to make improvements to the defense as time permits. (The preparation of fighting positions is discussed in detail in Chapter 1.)



d. Other Typical Tasks. Additional defensive preparation tasks may be required in basements, on ground floors, and on upper floors.



(1) Basements and Ground Floors. Basements require preparation similar to that of the ground floor. Any underground system not used by the defender that could provide enemy access to the position must be blocked.



(a) Doors. Unused doors should be locked or nailed shut, as well as blocked and reinforced with furniture, sandbags, or other field expedients.



(b) Hallways. If not required for the defender’s movement, hallways should be blocked with furniture and tactical wire (Figure 3-23).





Figure 3-23: Blocking stairs and doorways.





(c) Stairs. Unused stairs should be blocked with furniture and tactical wire, or removed. If possible, all stairs should be blocked (Figure 3-23), and ladders should be used to move from floor to floor and then removed.



(d) Windows. Remove all glass. Block unused windows with boards or sandbags to prevent observation and access.



(e) Floors. Make fighting positions in the floors. If there is no basement, fighting positions can give additional protection from heavy direct fire weapons.



(f) Ceilings. Erect support for ceilings that otherwise would not withstand the weight of fortified positions or rubble from upper floors (Figure 3-24).





Figure 3-24: Reinforcing ceilings.





(g) Unoccupied Rooms. Block rooms not required for defense with tactical wire.



(2) Upper Floors. Upper floors require the same preparation as ground floors. Windows need not be blocked, but should be covered with wire mesh, canvas, ponchos, or other heavy material, to prevent grenades from being thrown in from the outside. The covering should be loose at the bottom to permit the defender to drop grenades.



(3) Interior Routes. Routes are required that permit defending fire teams and squads to move within the building (Figure 3-25) to engage enemy forces from any direction. Plan and construct escape routes to permit rapid evacuation of a room or a building. Mouseholes should be made through interior walls to permit movement between rooms. Such holes should be marked to enable defenders to easily locate them during day and night conditions. Brief all personnel as to where the various routes are located. Conduct rehearsals so that everyone becomes familiar with the routes.





Figure 3-25: Movement routes within building.





(4) Fire Prevention. Buildings that have wooden floors and rafter ceilings require extensive fire prevention measures. Cover the attic and other wooden floors with about one to two inches of sand or dirt, and position buckets of water for immediate use. Place fire-fighting materials (dirt, sand, fire extinguishers, and blankets) on each floor for immediate use. Fill water basins and bathtubs as a reserve for fire fighting. Turn off all electricity and gas. If available, use any existing fire extinguishers found in buildings.



(5) Communications. Conceal radio antennas by placing them among civilian television antennas, along the sides of chimneys and steeples, or out of windows that would direct FM communications away from enemy early-warning sources and ground observation. Lay wire through adjacent buildings or underground systems or bury them in shallow trenches. Lay wire communications within the building through walls and floors.



(6) Rubbling. See paragraph 3-11c(8) Rubbling.



(7) Rooftops. Platoons must position obstacles on the roofs of flat-topped buildings to prevent helicopters from landing and to deny troops from gaining access to the building from the roof. Cover rooftops that are accessible from adjacent structures with tactical wire or other expedients and guard them. Block entrances to buildings from rooftops if compatible with the overall defensive plan. Remove or block the structure on the outside of a building that could aid the attacker in scaling the building to gain access to upper floors or to the rooftop.



(8) Obstacles. Position obstacles adjacent to buildings to stop or delay vehicles and infantry. To save time and resources in preparing the defense, platoon leaders must allow the use of all available materials, such as automobiles, railcars, and rubble, to create obstacles. Vehicles can be tied together by running poles through their windows. Leaders must supervise the construction of obstacles to ensure they are tied to buildings and rubble areas to increase effectiveness, and to canalize the enemy into engagement areas selected by the leader. Direct support engineers can provide advice and resources as to the employment of obstacles and mines.



(9) Fields of Fire. The field of fire is the area a weapon or group of weapons may cover effectively with fire from a given position. After the defensive positions are selected and the individuals have occupied their assigned positions, they will determine what clearance is necessary to maximize their field of fire. Leaders and individuals must view fields of fire from the fighting position and from the view of the enemy. Only selective clearing will be done to improve the field of fire. If necessary, the position will be relocated to attain the desired field of fire. Within the field of fire leaders will designate for each weapons system a primary and an alternate sector of fire. Each weapons system has unique requirements for its field of fire, and the platoon and squad leaders must ensure these requirements are met. Each position is checked to ensure that the fields of fire provide the maximum opportunity for target engagement and to determine any dead space within the sector of fire.



e. Antitank Weapons Positions. Employ antitank weapons in areas that maximize their capabilities in the urban area. The lack of a protective transport could require the weapon to be fired from inside a building, from behind the cover of a building, or from behind the cover of protective terrain. Leaders should make every effort to employ antitank weapons in pairs so that the same target can be engaged from different positions. Another consideration is security for the crew and system. This is necessary to allow the gunner to concentrate on locating and engaging enemy armor.



f. Sniper Positions. Snipers give the platoon a force multiplier by providing an overwatch capability and by engaging enemy C2 targets. Snipers normally operate in two-man teams, which provides the shooter with security and another set of eyes for observation and to locate and identify targets. Leaders should allow the snipers to select their own positions for supporting the defense. An effective sniper organization can trouble the enemy far more than its cost in the number of friendly soldiers employed. Snipers deploy in positions where they are not easily detected, and where they can provide the most benefit.




3-30. CONDUCT OF THE DEFENSE



The conduct of the defense in an urban area is similar to the conduct of the defense in any other environments.

a. Occupy Positions. After planning and preparing for the defense, the platoon moves to the defensive positions using prescribed movement techniques. To establish the defense the platoon will stop short of the actual site and conduct a reconnaissance to ensure the area is free of enemy or noncombatants, and to identify individual and crew served weapons positions. The platoon then establishes security and begins to occupy positions. Once the platoon has occupied, the priorities of work will be performed as established by the platoon leader.



b. Locate the Enemy. The platoon establishes and maintains OPs and conducts security patrols as directed by the commander. OPs, patrols, and individual soldiers look and listen using night vision devises, binoculars, and early warning systems to detect the enemy’s approach.



c. Action on Contact. Once the enemy is detected, the platoon leader—



• Alerts the platoon sergeant, squad leaders and forward observer.



• Reports the situation to the company commander.



• If possible, calls in OP’s.



• Initiates indirect fire mission when enemy is at maximum range.



• Initiates long-range direct fires on command.



d. Fight the Defense. Determining that the platoon can destroy the enemy from their current positions, the platoon leader—



• Continues with indirect and direct fire engagements.



• Controls fires using standard commands, pyrotechnics, and other prearranged signals.



• Initiates FPF as the enemy closes on the protective wire.



The platoon continues to defend until the enemy is repelled or ordered to disengage.


3-31. CONSOLIDATION AND REORGANIZATION



Once the enemy has been repelled, the order to consolidate and reorganize will be given by the platoon leader.

a. The platoon will—



• Reestablish security.



• Reman key weapons.



• Provide first aid and prepare to evacuate casualties.



• Repair damaged obstacles and replace mines and early warning devices.



• Redistribute ammunition and supplies.



• Relocate key weapons, and adjust positions for mutual support.



• Reestablish communications.



• Prepare for a renewed enemy attack.



b. Squad leaders provide ammunition, casualties, and equipment (ACE) report to the platoon leader.



c. The platoon leader—



• Reestablishes the platoon chain of command.



• Provides a platoon ACE report to the commander.



d. The platoon sergeant coordinates for resupply and supervises casualty evacuation.



e. The platoon quickly reestablishes OP’s, resumes patrolling and continues to improve the defense.




3-32. COUNTERATTACK



A platoon may be given the mission to counterattack in order to retake a defensive position or key point, to destroy or eject an enemy foothold, or to stop an enemy attack by hitting his flank and forcing him to stop his movement and establish a hasty defense.

a. A platoon counterattack is planned at company level to meet each probable enemy penetration. They must be well coordinated and aggressively executed. Counterattacks should be directed at the enemy’s flank and supported with direct and indirect fires.



b. If tank support is available, it should be used to spearhead the counterattack. Tanks have the mobility, firepower, and survivability to quickly execute the counterattack mission. Tanks are ideally suited for destroying enemy armor, heavy weapons, and fortifications with their main gun and engaging enemy infantry with their coaxial machine gun. This capability will assist the infantry in executing their part of the mission.



c. The counterattack mission is planned and coordinated as part of the defensive operation.



(1) Considerations for counterattack planning may include, but are not limited to, the following:



• Location of friendly units.



• Location of noncombatants.



• Critical location in the defense that, if threatened, could collapse.



• Size and type of force required to defeat and eject the enemy.



• Where in the defense do we want the enemy to think he is successful?



• Who determines and initiates the execution of the counterattack?



(2) Control measures needed for the conduct of the counterattack include:



• Assembly area or blocking position.



• Start point, route, and release point, if necessary.



• Attack position.



• Line of departure or line of contact.



• Zone of action, direction of attack, and or axis of advance.



• Objective.



• Limit of advance.




3-33. DEFENSE AGAINST ARMOR



Urban terrain is well suited to an infantry’s defense against mechanized infantry and armored forces. Mechanized infantry and armored forces will attempt to avoid the dense, canalizing urban areas but may be forced to pass through them. Well-trained infantry can inflict heavy casualties on such forces.

a. Urban areas have certain traits that favor antiarmor operations.



• Rubble in the streets can be used to block enemy vehicles, conceal mines, and cover and conceal defending infantry.



• The buildings restrict and canalize armor maneuver, fields of fire, and communications, reducing the enemy’s ability to reinforce.



• Buildings provide cover and concealment for defending infantry.



• Rooftops, alleys, and upper floors provide good firing positions.



• Sewers, drains, and subways provide underground routes for infantry forces.



b. When preparing for antiarmor operations in urban areas leaders should:



(1) Choose a good engagement area. Enemy tanks should be engaged where most restricted in their ability for mutual support. The best way for infantrymen to engage tanks is one at a time, so they can destroy one tank without being open to the fires of another. Typical locations include narrow streets, turns in the road, “T” intersections, bridges, tunnels, split-level roads, and rubbled areas. Less obvious locations can include using demolitions or mines to create obstacles.



(2) Select good weapons positions. The best weapons positions are places where the tank is weakest and the infantry is most protected. A tank’s ability to see and fire is limited, to the rear and flanks, if the tanks are buttoned up. Figure 3-26, shows the weapons and visual dead space of a buttoned-up tank against targets located at ground level and overhead. The TRPs should be clearly visible through the gunner’s sights and resistant to battle damage (for example, large buildings or bridge abatements, but not trees or cars). The leader of the antiarmor operation should specify what type of engagement should be used such as frontal, crossfire, or depth. Frontal fire is the least preferred since it exposes the gunner to the greatest probability of detection and is where armor is the thickest.



(a) The best places to fire on tanks from the dismounted infantry perspectives are at the flanks and rear at ground level or at the top of tanks if the force is in an elevated position in a building. A suitable antiarmor defense might be set up as shown in Figure 3-27.



(b) The best place to engage a tank from a flank is over the second road wheel at close range. This can be done using a corner so the tank cannot traverse the turret to counterattack.



(c) For a safe engagement from an elevated position, infantrymen should engage the tank from a range three times the elevation of the weapons.





Figure 3-26: Tanks cannot fire at close-range, street-level, and overhead targets.





Figure 3-27: A platoon’s antiarmor defense.





(d) To engage at a longer range is to risk counterfire since the weapon’s position will not be in the tank’s overhead dead space. Overhead fire at the rear or flank of the tank is even more effective. Alternate and supplementary positions should be selected to enforce all-round security and to increase flexibility.



(3) Coordinate target engagement. The first task of the tank-killing force is to force the tanks to button up using all available direct and indirect fire because tanks are most vulnerable when buttoned up. The next task is to coordinate the fires of the antitank weapons so if there is more than one target in the engagement area, all targets are engaged at the same time.



c. Often armored vehicles are accompanied by infantry in built-up areas so antiarmor weapons must be supported by an effective all-round antipersonnel defense (Figure 3-28).



d. At a planned signal (for example, the detonation of a mine) all targets are engaged at the same time. If targets cannot be engaged simultaneously, they are engaged in the order of the most dangerous first. Although tanks present the greatest threat, threat armored personnel carriers (APCs) are also dangerous because their infantry can dismount and destroy friendly antiarmor positions. If the friendly force is not secured by several infantrymen, priority of engagement might be given to threat APCs.





Figure 3-28: Coordinated antiarmor ambush.





3-34. CONDUCT OF ARMORED AMBUSH



A rifle company can use an attached tank platoon to conduct an armored ambush in a built-up area (Figure 3-29). To do so, the tank platoon should be reinforced with a BFV and one or two squads from the rifle company. The ambush can be effective against enemy armor if it is conducted in an area cleared and reconnoitered by friendly forces.





Figure 3-29: Armored ambush.





a. The ambushing tank platoon must know the area. The operation involves maneuver on a road network that is free of obstacles. Obstacles outside the ambush area can be used to canalize and delay the enemy.



b. The ambushing tanks should be located in a hide position about 1,000 meters from the expected enemy avenue of approach. A security post, located at a choke point, observes and reports the approach, speed, security posture, and activity of the enemy. This role is assigned to scouts, if available, or Infantrymen who use the BFV to move from OP to OP; or a series of dismounted OPs are established. When the enemy is reported at a trigger point or TRP, the tank platoon leader knows how much he must move his tanks to execute the ambush.



c. Tanks move quickly from their hide positions to firing positions, taking advantage of all available concealment. They try for flank shots on the approaching enemy at an average range of 300 to 400 meters. These ranges do not expose tanks to the enemy infantry. Once the enemy is engaged, tanks break contact and move to a rally point with close security provided by an infantry squad and moves to a new ambush site.